8月3日（木）Wenwei PENG 氏 （香港科技大学）のセミナーを開催いたします。
日時：8月3日（木）11:00 - 12:30
報告者：Wenwei PENG (香港科技大学)
場所：2号館11階経済学部会議室B & ZOOM (HyFlex)
The Law and Economics of Lawyers: Evidence from the Revolving Door in China's Judicial System
By compiling the first comprehensive dataset covering the universes of judges, lawyers, law firms, litigants, and lawsuits in China from 2014 to 2022, we identify over 15,000 judges who left their positions and joined private law firms as lawyers, which accounts for 7.5% of all judges (2.6% of all lawyers) nationwide. We show that these revolving-door lawyers enjoy significant advantages in securing favorable court decisions for their clients. Specifically, all else being equal, criminal defendants represented by judge-turned lawyers on average receive 5% shorter imprisonment sentences and are 9% (15%) less likely to be sentenced to life imprisonment (death penalty). In commercial lawsuits, holding constant case features, litigants represented by revolving door lawyers on average have 10% higher win rates. Exploiting intra-lawyer variation in performances at home v.s. away courts, We show that the edge for revolving door lawyers comes from both “know who” and “know how.” We further document that, the revolving door lawyers, by joining larger law firms that serve richer/larger customers, create systematic inequalities in criminal and civil trials in China.