Let me inform you of the following research seminar.

Date: November 14  (Fri.)  , 2025 
Time: 5:20PM-6:50PM
Venue: 11th Floor, Bldg.No.2 Meeting Room B
Speaker: Satoshi Nakada  (Tokyo University of Science)
Organizer: Kohei Kamaga
Language: English

Title:
The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions (joint with Kensei Nakamura)
Abstract:
This paper studies the axiomatic bargaining problem and proposes a new class of bargaining solutions, called coarse Nash solutions. These solutions assign to each problem a set of outcomes coarser than that chosen by the classical Nash solution (Nash,1950). Our main result shows that these solutions can be characterized by new rationality axioms for choice correspondences, which are modifications of Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (or more precisely, Arrow's (1959) choice axiom), when combined with standard axioms.

Co-hosted by Sophia Institute for Human Security and JSPS KAKENHI Grant No. 24H00143 "Institutional Design for Social Common Capitals."