日時：11月16日（火）12:40-13:25
報告者：市川 顕三 氏（上智大学大学院経済学研究科）
場所：Online Seminar in Zoom
幹事：釜賀浩平
言語：日本語
タイトル：A characterization of reference set welfarism
要旨：Accepting reference-set welfarism is one possible approach to evaluating resource allocations from both efficiency and equity perspectives on the basis of agents’ preferences. Referenceset welfarism postulates that the evaluation of resource allocations is done by using a single evaluation relation defined for agents’ reference-set utilities, which are specific numerical representations of their preferences derived from a given list of reference sets of resource bundles. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of reference-set welfarism. We introduce the axiom of reference-set independence, which requires that the social ranking of any two allocations depend solely on agents’ reference-set utilities of these allocations. We first show that the conjunction of Pareto indifference and reference-set independence is equivalent to the neutrality axiom that we call reference-set neutrality. Then, our main result establishes that reference-set welfarism is axiomatized by Pareto indifference and reference-set independence.

*オンラインセミナーへ参加をご希望の方は、幹事にメールなどでご相談ください。