2018年4月23日
5月18日（金）Geir B. Asheim氏 (University of Oslo), Jonathan Goyette氏（Université de Sherbrooke）を招いてセミナーを開催致します。
日時 : 5月18日（金）16:30－19:45
会場：2号館11階経済学部会議室Ｂ
報告者：Geir B. Asheim氏(University of Oslo)
時間 : 16:30－18:00
タイトル：Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics (coauthor: Stéphane Zuber)
要旨：When evaluating well-being distributions in an anonymous (and replication invariant) manner, one faces a dilemma between (i)assigning dictatorship to a single worst-off person, thus succumbing to a tyranny of non-aggregation and (ii)assigning dictatorship to (unboundedly) many better-off persons, thus succumbing to a tyranny of aggregation. We show how this corresponds to a population-ethical dilemma in the variable population setting between, on the one hand, a reversed repugnant conclusion (prefferring a very small population with high well-being) and, on the other hand, a repugnant conclusion (preferring a sufficiently large population with lives barely worth living to a population with good lives) or very sadistic conclusion (not preferring a large population with lives worth living to a population with terrible lives). The dilemma can be resolved by relaxing replication invariance and thus allowing that evaluation in the fixed population setting might change with population size even though the relative distributions of well-being remain unchanged. Rank-dependent criteria are evaluation criteria that resolve this dilemma but fails replication invariance. We provide conditions under which rank-dependent criteria are the only way out of the dilemma. Furthermore, we discuss the following consequence of relaxing replication invariance: It becomes essential to take into account the existence and utility of non-affected people when evaluating population policies with limited scope.
報告者：Jonathan Goyette氏（Université de Sherbrooke）
時間 : 18:15－19:45（予定）
タイトル :Civil armed conflicts: the impact of the interaction between climate change and agricultural potential
要旨:The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of rising world temperatures on the incidence of civil armed conflicts, focusing on a specific mechanism: the interaction between variations in annual temperatures and variations in agricultural potential. We assemble a dataset from various sources for 181 countries from 1946 till 2014. Agricultural potential is based on the Food and Agricultural Organization’s definition of a country land suitability for growing crops. Annual temperature data come from the Climate Unit of the University of East Anglia. Data on civil armed conflicts is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project. Using a fixed-effect panel approach, we find that a low agricultural potential exacerbates the effect of temperature on the incidence of armed conflicts. More precisely, we find that an increase of 1\% in annual temperature in a country with low agricultural potential could see the incidence of conflicts on its territory increase by 3\%. The results are tested against numerous robustness checks.