Comparative Foreign Policy: An Evaluation of Simulated Bargaining among Canada, Japan and the United States*

(比較対外政策 — カナダ，日本，アメリカ間バーゲニングのシュミレーション評価)

Patrick James** and Anoop Prihar***

シミュレーション実験は，現実の状況を示す指標として使用しうる。本稿で行う実際のバーゲニングとシミュレーションによるバーゲニングの再現の研究には二つの目的がある。一つは，1986年秋の事例において，対外政策シミュレーションに，実際の政策決定者による慎重な行動，及びそれに伴う限界が反映される度合いを評価することである。今一つの目的は，実際の相互作用とシミュレーションによる相互作用のいずれ（あるいは双方）が既存の交渉行動理論によって説明されるかを検討することである。

シミュレーション評価に関しては，カナダ，アメリカ合衆国，日本の三国による，経済，酸性雨，南ア問題等の対外政策問題に関する行動が検証される。シミュレーション評価と諸仮説の検証という全体的な目的を達成するがため，1，シミュレーションの解説とその妥当性の評価，2，シミュレーション行動の文脈での既存のバーゲニング，交渉に関する議論の概観，3，諸仮説の展開，4，各問題領域での実際の世界の現状の詳説，5，シミュレーション相互作用に関しての発見の紹介，6，一般的な意味での実験結果の分析，の六段階にわたって行われる。

Compared to other models, a distinctive element of simulations is their ability to represent changes that may occur in a

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** Professor of Political Science, Florida Stata University, Tallahassee

*** Graduate student of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal

> complex system even though these changes cannot be accurately forecast by humans who know only the initial properties of the sysytem .[1]

Simulation exercises, as Hermann suggested, can serve as potentially accurate indicators of conditions in reality, while also raising questions about how actual bargaining may proceed. As Verba noted in a classic exposition on political leadership, the small group experimental model can serve as a "useful complement to verbal or mathematical models".[2] For such reasons, simulation has become a major area of research activity, useful in studying conflict, decision making, intergroup relations, intercultural communication and other interactions.[3] The present investigation of real and simulated bargainning has two basic objectives. One is to assess the extent to which a foreign policy simulation, occurring in the fall of 1986, reflected the deliberations conducted and boundaries faced by those who make decisions in the real world. The other purpose of this study is to determine whether the real or simulated interactions — possibly both — can be explained by existing ideas about negotiating behavior.

With regard to evaluating the simulation, the actions of the three participants — Canada, the United States and Japan — are examined in relation to the foreign policy issues of economics, acid rain and South Africa. Given the state of negotiations in reality, it is postulated that the simulated bargaining should result in varying degrees of conflict in each of the three areas among all three participants. More specific propositions about the negotiating process are introduced at a later point.

To achieve the overall goals of assessing replication and testing propositions, the investigation unfolds in six stages : (1) description of the simulation and an assessment of its validity ; (2) some reflections on bargaining and negotiation in the context of simulated behavior ; (3) development of hypotheses ; (4) description of the real world conditions in each issue area ; (5) presentation of findings with respect to the simulated interactions ; and (6) discussion of the results in more general terms.

The Simulation and Its Validity

Lasting seven weeks, the inter-university simulation exercise took place under the auspices of Project ICONS, a cross-national effort directed toward enhanced usage of simulation techniques in a classroom setting. Referred to as the Western Industrial Dialogue (WID), trilateral simulated bargainning among the US, Japan and Canada provided graduate students in political science with a better understanding of the practical aspects of foreign policy. Wilkenfeld and Brecht describe the WID as

> "situated in the contemporary world projected foward by about six months to allow an orginal simulated world to develop. A scenatio, which launches the exercise, outlines the state of the world, insprired by present-day facts, but including new data."[4]

While exposing students to the every complexities of bargaining and diplomacy, the simulation followed extensive preparation based on more academic material. The six weeks immediately preceding the simulation were spent reviewing theoretical approaches to foreign policy in general, and to Canadian, American and Japanese foreign policies in particular. The three participants — McGill University from Canada, California State University at Stanislaus from the United States, and Waseda University from Japan, communicated through networked personal computers. Each school represented its respective country.

Faculty at the University of Maryland at College Park monitored the system. Consistent with that role, the Maryland team of supervisory personnel (referred to as "Polcon") set the initial agenda from which the discussions proceeded. They also routed and recorded all messages.

In designing and implementing the simulation, Polcon made every effort to include topical issues and constraints faced by leaders in the real world, such as the need for translating foreign languages. As a result, Polcon monitored all messages to ensure that the positions advocated by the respective teams did not stray into unrealistic areas. For example, at no point during the simulation would it have been

permissible for Canada to threaten to hold the US Ambassador hostage over the latter's policy of constructive engagement regarding South Africa.

In logistical terms, Canada transmitted messages to Maryland (for approval and translation) in French, one of its two official languages. At that point, translators produced versions in Japanese and/or English and rerouted the messages to the intended final destination, either Waseda, Stanislaus or both.[5] This procedure increased the presumed validity of the simulation by introducing a variable that normally has to be accounted for in international negotiation. As Wilkenfeld and Brecht have observed, "within the framework of this simulation, a foreign language is no longer an abstract system devoid of meaning or consequence ; rather, it becomes a purposeful, authentic, and communicative activity."[6] Canada exchanged a total of 74 messages in the WID with the other two teams and Polcon. The communications system allowed two teams to exchange messages without the third team having knowledge of such activity, although Polcon automatically had access to all communications.

Throughout the simulation, the teams met twice a week for approximately two hours per session.[7] These meetings, chaired by a randomly selected class member, consisted of discussing information researched by team members, assessing recently received messages and formulating outgoing correspondence. The instructor in each class played a minimal role, attending the sessions but contributing only when it became necessary to answer procedural questions. For the final session, referred to as the "conference", each team assembled in the computer lab at its respective university.[8] In contrast to the regular meetings, this "live" session required virtually immediate decision-making. Messages had to be received, evaluated and replied to within a 5 to 10 minute period. The final session lasted for approximately one hour.

In terms of preparation, each member of a given team selected an area of policy for more intensive study, based on personal interests. Subsequently, each student became a resident expert on a given issue and assumed responsibility for advising the rest of the team with regard to that specific area. These roles approximated ministries within a cabinet setting. Messages reflected the expertise of those most directly concerned

with the subject matter, although transmissions generally emerged as the result of a consensus regarding content and wording. Failing that, in a few instances the message was revised to be amenable to the majority of team members. In other words, the final composition of each outgoing message corresponded to a team decision.

Seven general issue areas can be identified within the simulation. Appearing in Table 1, each has been numbered for notational purposes. While each among Issues 2–7 contains a main component, Issue 1 — economics — is an amalgam of finance, trade and investment. Due to the interrelated nature of these items, they are placed under the general heading of economics. This aggregation reflects the actual process of decision-making observed within the simulation.

As noted, the foreign policy issues of economics, South Africa and acid rain have been selected for detailed examination. Collectively speaking, these issues are appropriate for further study, encompassing varying degrees of interest and intensity of preference among the participants. For example, South Africa is of particular interest to the US. Not only is it a source of strategic minerals, but due to geographic location, South Africa exists as a key element in maintaining a sphere of influence.[9] Japan's position in the world today is, by and large, a function of its economic power. However, fiscal relations with the US have floundered over Japan's allegedly protectionist policies and an associated trade surplus. Of course, trade, capital markets and investment are of interest to all three participants. Acid rain is different in that regard. Although this issue also concerns economics, it primarily reflects a growing concern over the environment and the overall quality of life. The issue is of fundamental importance to Canada, a state whose international power does not rival that of the US or Japan. Consequently, the strategies employed in dealing with these issues should indicate the priority attached to them.

As previously asserted, the goal of a simulation is to replicate conditions that resemble the international situation in meaningful ways, specifically, the observed interactions among Japan, the US and Canada with regard to the issues at hand. Since the simulation did not take place in a completely controlled environment, intervening events (i. e., "history") may have affected its results. The simulation occurred over

TABLE 1 ISSUES IN THE SIMULATION

Issue Number	Issue	Content
1	Economics	Topics discussed include pegging the US dollar, protectionism, global integration of capital markets, foreigh investment regulations and US-Japan trade relations.
2	Strategic Defense Initiative	Major points of deliberation include SDI's possible violation of the ABM Treaty, cost sharing and technology licensing for commercial applications.
3	Fishing	This issue revolved about the US refusal to recognize the United Nations' Law of the Sea Agreement, as well as driftnet fishing and the resulting resource depletion off the Canadian Coast.
4	South Africa	Attention focused on developing a coherent policy towards South Africa while taking into account public opinion, strategic minerals and global security. The legitimacy of the ANC also was discussed.
5	Oil	This issue raised the questions of the impact of fluctuating prices on the global economy, pegging the world price of oil and reducing OPEC-based dependence.
6	Environment	Efforts focused on establishing a bilateral agreement to reduce the toxicity of the Great Lakes, as well as acid rain emissions.
7	Sovereignty	Deliberations centered on Canada's attempts to assert sovereignty over its northern waters and islands. There also was an attempt to establish a joint board to enforce environmental standards and monitor traffic in these waters.

a period of six to seven weeks; with some of the most important agreements occurring toward the end of that period, it is possible that the traditionally hectic end of semester activity had some impact on the proceedings. It is also is known that, generally speaking, most of the agreements in any simulation exercise will tend to be generated near the point of termination. A second potentially distorting factor is that of selection bias. Selection means that results may have been a product of differences in team composition, because the latter were neither matched nor randomly selected. While all three teams consisted of students in political science, with participation in the simulation being a course requirement, neither matching nor random assignment of team members was feasible. Factors such as age, ethnicity, work-related experience and academic background could not be controlled.[10]

On balance, however, it is unlikely that the validity of the simulation exercise is compromised seriously by either history or selection. With regard to intervening influences, the simulation did not overlap with any major events in world history. As for selection, impressions from each of the instructors suggested that the participants exhibited a range of characteristics that would be normal for those at similar life stages in the respective countries.

Some Reflections on Bargaining and Negotiation

In order to place the negotiations among the simulation participants in a context that is useful analytically, it may be helpful to borrow some ideas from the influential framework established by Sawyer and Guetzkow.[11] Although their approach is by no means new, there is no denying its comprehensive treatment of the bargaining process. What follows is less a formal application of their model than an attempt to benefit from using some of its concepts, which retain practical value.

Sawyer and Guetzkow defined negotiation as "a process through which two or more parties — be they individuals, groups or larger social units — interact in developing potential agreements to provide guidance and regulation of their future behavior." In presenting a socio-psychological framework, Sawyer and Guetzkow asserted that the

ultimate goal of any negotiating party is to obtain the most favored outcome to which the other parties will agree. The ability to achieve such a result is a function of the manner in which the goals of the negotiating parties are interrelated, because reciprocal benefits may accrue via a meshing of the various needs and capabilities of the participants. Goal attainment also is a function of the specificity with which objectives are defined: "if you are unclear in the definition of your goals, you are not likely to be clear in their expression." Generality and long-term perspectives serve only to dilute the negotiating process, while specific goals are more conducive to settlement. Overarching principles, such as a general ideology, also generate greater conflict, because participants are no longer disputing only interests, but also values.

Negotiating, according to Sawyer and Guetzkow, includes (1) preliminary bargaining over procedure and agenda; (2) formulation of alternatives and preferences by each party; (3) communication intended to alter the other's perception of the situation; and (4) activity intended to widen or narrow the range of available outcomes and alternatives. To begin, the decision to enter into negotiations is based upon the belief that a more favorable outcome may be obtained from such interactions, as opposed to abiding by the status quo. For example, when participants are amenable to a mutually advantageous solution, the situation is more likely to be resolved than one in which a participant cannot be convinced that negotiations will improve its position.

Ultimately, the goal of any negotiator is to alter the opponent's preferences in a favorable direction. In establishing this point, Sawyer and Guetzkow refer to the roles played by communication and persuasion. Since "connotative differences and culturally specific meanings may hinder translations" in international relations, negotiations should become easier as communications increase.

Persuasion also is an integral component of negotiating. Here the task is to convince the opponents that they have different interests than previously perceived. This, in turn, will cause the adversaries to reconsider the respective outcomes. Re-evaluation may be triggered by one of three factors: (1) Intrinsic Interests — the opponents are per-

suaded to perform an act for their own self-interests, i. e., "lower tariffs will permit your people to buy imported goods more cheaply"; (2) Second Party Effects — the opponents are convinced that, if a specific task is not completed, you may be forced to perform an act detrimental to their interests, i.e., "If you do not lower your tariffs, we may raise ours"; and (3) Third Party Effects — a third party or parties approve of your request with regard to the opponent's actions, i. e., "Other countries will approve if you lower your tariffs."

Despite these examples of techniques of persuasion, it is rare that the most favored position of one party will ever match that of its opponents. Hence, there will not be a "best" point, but a set, among which "one party gains only at the expense of the other." Thus bargaining often becomes a matter of "trying to establish what is the least the others will take, and convincing them that that is the most one will give."

Consequently, a great deal of importance is attached to knowing the opponent's baseline position. Upon discovery of that position, the task becomes to convince the opponent to implement an agreement more favorable to you. As with persuasion, effective communication is central to achieving this goal. Four techniques may be utilized: (1) Alter the conditions upon which the opponent's minimal bargaining position is based; for example, increasing military power during negotiations for peace; (2) Emphasize the maximum advantages and minimum disadvantages of your position; advocates of Canada-US free trade, for instance, attempted to convince their nationalist opponents that the Agreement would not lead to an erosion of sovereignty; (3) Communicate to the opponent the actual or fictitious estimates of its minimal position; for example, convey to the opposing group (or individual) that you know it still generates a profit if it sells to you at the disputed price; or (4) Communicate to the opponent "an intrinsic development in the negotiations and relay to him that negotiation mores require that he follow this development"; for instance, explain to the opponent that because you have been making all the concessions up to this point, it is now time for reciprocity. If the adversary refuses, it will result in aggravated relations and place the negotiations in jeopardy.[12]

It also may be beneficial to modify the opponent's conception of your minimal barganing position. This can be achieved by altering the

conditions upon which the latter is based or by asserting that it would be impossible to come to terms at anything below the false level perceived by the opponent. The goal is to stand firm at a favorable position along what economists refer to as the 'contract curve', that is, the set of efficient points.

Outcomes will correspond to different utilities ascribed by the players. Moreover, because there is no metric by which all results can be measured, the value attached to different outcomes must be assessed individually by the various participants; "utility is taken, both operationally and conceptually, to correspond directly to preference; outcomes of a higher utility are those that are more highly preferred, and vice versa."[13] This becomes even more complex with multiple issues and potential linkages among them.[14] Negotiators seek an agreement that permits them to avoid a zero-sum (or pure conflict) situation, increases collective utility and, ultimately, approximates to a Pareto-optimal position. (Pareto optimality means that it is not possible to make one person better off without worsening the position of at least one other.)[15] Within this scenario, negotiations will be limited to those outcomes whose utility at least equals that of the status quo resulting from no agreement. Exit from negotiations, of course, is a salient option for players in interstate bargaining games.

While Pareto-optimality represents a logical — if not always normatively appealing — solution to negotiated conflict, there is no guarantee that such an outcome will be achieved. For example, even commonality of goals will be overlooked if "sufficiently strong negative feelings" exist between the negotiating parties. The likelihood of a zero-sum game being perceived increases under such conditions, as each participant is preoccupied with obtaining results "better" than the opponent. An increase in zero-sumness is also likely when the absolute level of utility derived from negotiations is small. This implies that winning — "getting more than the other by trying to force him to compromise while holding out oneself — might be valued more when there is little or no absolute reward."[16]

From a spectrum of approaches toward bargaining and negotiating the Sawyer and Guetzkow framework has been chosen because it is applicable to the simulation. Specifically, Sawyer and Guetzkow eschew

the highly formal approach to bargaining, preferring instead a dynamic mode of analysis which grants due consideration to the roles of communication, persuasion and the individual negotiator's capabilities. In a highly realistic manner, their framework is designed to explain the actions of states in the context of international bargaining. Unlike some other approaches, it is not expressed in terms of mathematical formulae. Rather, Sawyer and Guetzkow focus on aspects such as interests, persuasion, threat and delay which, often are significant in international negotiations.

Statement of Hypotheses

Two sets of hypotheses have been derived for testing. One set focuses on interrelated aspects of the above-noted framework as applied to both the simulation and reality. The other set pertains only to events within the simulation. It would be beyond the scope of this investigation to test this latter group of hypotheses in each setting, especially given a focus beyond the three designated issue areas.

There are three propositions (A1-A3) which deal with both the simulation and reality.

A1 : Canada-US negotiations over acid rain will result in a high degree of conflict, while Japan will occupy a neutral position.

Due to the high benefits and costs that Canada and the US associate (respectively) with controlling acid rain, it is reasonable to assume that both countries will engage in conflictual negotiations over this issue. While Canada wants to curtail acid rain emissions, the US, due to the cost involved, would prefer to ignore the problem. Consequently, the probability of reciprocal benefits accruing is low. The US, in attempting to elude a dialogue focusing on a potentially expensive issue, is expected to behave obstinately, thereby generating tension with Canada. Since acid rain is a Canada-US concern, Japan is anticipated to try to abstain from negotiations regarding this issue.

South Africa and apartheid is expected to generate conflict among all

A2 : Canada and the US will engage in conflictual negotiations regarding South Africa, with Japan occupying a less conflictual middle position.

The US has been a persistent advocate of the policy of constructive engagement. This position is a function of dependence upon South Africa's strategic minerals and the latter's salient location in the context of global security. In contrast, Canada, due to its leading position within the Commonwealth, has been a strong advocate of sanctions. Japan is expected to take a milder approach ; although not wanting to jeopardize their leading position among Asian states, South Africa has been the largest African trading partner for the Japanese. These pre-existing, background factors are expected to result in conflictual negotiations.

Economic issues provide the focus for a third hypothesis :

A3 : The US and Japan will engage in conflictual negotiations over economic policy, with Canada tending to work with the US, perhaps even forming an alliance with the latter, in an attempt to bring about changes in Japanese economic policy.

Japan's protectionist policies and its growing trade surplus vis-à-vis the US have become major concerns. Despite US requests to change its import policies, or revalue its currency, Tokyo's position has been steadfast. While both nations have intense preferences attached to this issue, bargaining is not expected to be as conflictual as in the above-noted issue areas. If negotiations should go awry, the potential losses would be substantial. The cross-cultural nature of negotiations, of course, will not make a consensus easier.

Although Sawyer and Guetzkow do not mention alliance building, given the historically close relationship between Canada and the US — and the fact that US-Japan economic relations often set the precedent for Canada-Japan economic relations — it is reasonable to infer that Canada would be willing to influence US-Japan economic relations. Moreover, Canada's presence on the US's behalf might allow the latter to claim Third Party Effects in persuading Japan to alter its economic policy.

Two other hypotheses concern the full range of issues within the

simulation. The first focuses on the expected distribution of communications :

B1 : Canada will have a relatively even distribution of communications across the issues ; Japan and the US will not.

Given the different level of capabilities, it is anticipated that the more powerful states will attempt to control the agenda. The US and Japan are expected to communicate high minimum dispositions across the issue areas, concentrating on those in which gains are perceived to be feasible. By contrast, Canada is anticipated to put forward initiatives in some areas but also to respond on others, thus producing more balanced message traffic.

A second hypothesis focuses on the priorities attached to the respective issues :

B2 : The three states will reveal different orders of importance as measured by the the amount of communication devoted to each issue area.

Since conflict among the states is expected, that should be reflected in "talking past" the opposition, avoiding unpleasant initiatives, and so on. By contrast, relatively similar orderings would reflect potentially cooperative interactions, all other things being equal. Given the nature of Hypothesis B1, it is expected that Canada will exhibit the least range in its ordering of the issues.

Bargaining in Reality

Each of the three issue areas — acid rain, South Africa and economic policy — will be covered in turn.

One of the most enduring issues in Canada-US relations is acid rain. "Acid rain or acid deposition, as it is more formally known, is a chemical soup of air pollutants, primarily sulphuric acid and nitric oxides, which is carried by the prevailing winds hundreds, even thousands of miles from industrial and population centers before falling to the ground as dry dust or acidified rain or snow."[17] The net result of such fallout is the loss of millions of acres of forests, in addition to

entire lakes — especially in the Muskoka region of Ontario — being completely killed. It is a scientifically supported fact that the vast majority of acid rain in North America originates from coal burning plants in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky and West Virginia.[18]

Acid rain has become a high-profile issue over the last decade. Negotiations date back to the Carter administration. In 1979, Canada and the US signed the Joint Statement on Transboundary Air Quality, which outlined

> "The substantial basis of obligation, commitment, and co-operative practice in existing environmental relations between Canada and the United States, the affirmation of a common determination to reduce or prevent transboundary air pollution, and the intention to develop a cooperative bi-lateral agreement on air quality."[19]

Nevertheless, the goodwill generated by the Statement was short-lived. In February 1980, the Carter Administration passed legislation initiating a $10 billion program to decrease oil imports by converting 107 power plants to coal. Not only did such legislation directly contradict the 1979 Statement, but it also resulted in the production of an additional 400,000 tons of sulphur dioxide.[20] Moreover, the legislation was implemented despite a warning from the US Academy of Sciences :

> "The circumstantial evidence linking power plant emissions to the production of acid rain is overwhelming. In fact the picture is disturbing enough to merit prompt tightening of restrictions on atmospheric emissions from fossil fuels and other large sources, such as metal smelters and cement manufacturers. Strong measures are necessary if we are to prevent strong degradation of the natural ecosystems, which together support life on this planet." [21]

Canada's ability to elicit US action on acid rain did not improve with Ronald Reagan's rise to office. Campaigning on a platform that included a strong critique of environmental policy, Reagan, from 1981 to 1983, not only cut the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) budget by 26 percent, but also reduced its headquarters' staff by 249 positions. He also virtually eliminated the Council on Environmental

Quality (CEQ), which had been designed to initiate and review environmental policy.

Reagan believed that regulation would not prove to be the best way to preserve the environment. He argued that "greater reliance should be placed on free market forces to correct environmental abuses." [22] Meanwhile, the pleas of Canadian officials for bilateral action against acid rain went unheard. Romeo Leblanc, then Minister of the Environment, called acid rain an "environmental time bomb." John Roberts, his successor, was far more outspoken. Addressing the Air Pollution Control Association's annual convention in the US, he declared the following:

> "Stated very bluntly, I see no reason why Canada's ecosystem — let me be blunter yet, Canada's people, tourist camp operators, fishing guides, commercial fishermen, loggers and other forest product workers, building owners and tenants, and possibly our asthmatics or others with respiratory illness, should have to pay the price of keeping the electricity rates of those coal producing middle western states well below those now being paid along the United States' eastern seaboard."[23]

Despite such actions, US indifference towards acid rain prevailed.

Canada's first official acid rain proposal, a 1982 joint program designed to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions up to 50 percent by 1990, was rejected. Face-saving measures were implemented at the 1985 Shamrock Summit, with special envoys being appointed to once again study the problem. This time, however, minor action was taken, as Reagan pledged to spend $2.5 billion over 5 years to investigate cleaner ways of burning coal.[24] However, such a concession remained a far cry from the actual reduction in emissions that the Mulroney government desired.

South Africa and apartheid have been of concern to the United States, Canada and Japan for some time. The evolution of US public opinion in a direction solidly opposed to apartheid coincided with President Carter's term in office. Under Carter, Washington's South Africa policy consisted of three actions: (1) a tightening of the arms embargo implemented previously by the US via the United Nations (UN) Security Council; (2) close scrutiny of South Africa's possession and

use of nuclear weapons, and the consequences of this with regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty ; and (3) the effective closing of US military facilities in South Africa.[25]

With the ascendancy of Reagan, American policy toward South Africa changed significantly ; closer links were established between the two nations. This new policy of constructive engagement has been defined as an approach to apartheid which "purports to stress quiet diplomacy rather than confrontation" in an attempt to bring about change by working within the system.[26] To a large extent, this shift in policy reflected American dependence on South African strategic minerals. In January 1980, the US Subcommittee on Mining declared, "America is now dependent on foreign sources, in excess of 50 percent, for 24 of the 32 minerals essential to national survival."[27]

In detailing constructive engagement, the Administration stated that, while finding apartheid objectionable, its primary concern was the evolution of South African society in a direction that would allow the US to pursue full relations with Pretoria. Therefore, Washington encouraged change while minimizing the risk of damage to its interests. This could be achieved only by providing support for Pretoria and maintaining communications with South Africa as a whole.[28] The policy was not endorsed by all US allies, however, because Canada and Japan adopted somewhat contradictory positions.

Undoubtedly, among the three states being discussed, the strongest response to apartheid came from Canada. This reaction can be traced to Canada's historical commitment to human rights and leadership position within the Commonwealth. Despite its outspoken criticism of Pretoria, until the late 1970s Canada also endorsed constructive engagement. Although it had very limited economic interaction with South Africa (1 percent of total imports and exports), Canada maintained a "hands-off" policy, while also abstaining from UN votes designed to pressure Pretoria into enacting reforms. However, the absence of change, a respected position in the eyes of black states in the Commonwealth, and the insignificant opportunity cost involved in implementing sanctions, led Canada to reevaluate its policy : "By 1985 Canada had concluded that it could no longer tolerate a course which meant continued repression within South Africa, and lawless raids on coun-

tries which are friends and partners in the Commonwealth."[29]

Up to that point, an arms embargo and a voluntary ban on the sale of military equipment had been all that had existed in the way of sanctions. Nevertheless, as part of its 1985 policy against apartheid, Canada implemented

> "an embargo on the sale of computers, abrogation of double taxation agreements, a prohibition on the sale of krugerrands, a ban on loans to the South African Government, a ban on the sale of crude oil and refined products, an embargo on air transportation between the two countries, and the assignment of an officer charged with responsibility for labour affairs at Canada's embassy in South Africa to maintain direct contact with African opposition leaders who are agents of reform."[30]

Ottawa also eliminated the Programme for Export Market Development, designed to promote the sale of Canadian goods to South Africa, and created a fund to assist the families of South African political prisoners. Other measures included a special administrator to monitor corporate behavior and a $5 million educational aid program for black South Africans.[31] Furthermore, following the 1986 Commonwealth Conference, it was announced that Canada also would ban the import of South African agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron, and steel, as well as new investment and the reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa.

Although South Africa is Japan's largest African trading partner, the latter, in response to the lack of change in Pretoria's racial policies, moved to implement economic sanctions. Japan's South African policy first gained substance in the late 1970s, when Tokyo provided tempered support for all African liberation movements, including those waging the battle against apartheid. Other steps taken at that time included the refusal to open an embassy in Pretoria and a ban on direct Japanese investment in South Africa.

Towards the mid-1980s, Japan still was reluctant to impose unilateral sanctions against Pretoria, due to its dependence on South African minerals. As a result, it continued to extend official trade credits to South Africa through the Export-Import Bank, and permitted Japanese firms to cultivate extensive licensing and technical assistance arrange-

ments with South African manufacturers. In addition, Japan, along with the US and the UK, abstained from voting on the UN Anti-Apartheid Act of 1980.[32]

The end of 1986 marked a hardening of Japan's policy towards South Africa. In a speech at the UN, Foreign Minister Kuranori outlined Japan's new position: "Japan has availed itself of every opportunity to strongly urge the Government of South Africa to have the courage to take decisive political actions to promptly abolish apartheid, free Nelson Mandela, legalize the African National Congress (ANC) and other political organizations, and enter into discussions with Black leaders." He also claimed that, because there had been little or no change in Pretoria's policy, Japan had no choice but to impose sanctions. Thus he announced new measures, including "a prohibition on the import of iron and steel, restrictions on tourist travel between Japan and South Africa, the continuation of the suspension of air links with South Africa, and a prohibition on the use of international flights of South African Airways by governmental officials."[33]

Among the issues examined in the simulation, perhaps none is as complex or volatile as economics. In 1985, the US trade deficit with Japan already exceeded $50 billion. A significant portion of this deficit was attributed to Japan's "reluctance or even inability, to expand substantially its imports of manufactured products."[34] While 60 percent of American exports to Japan are industrial supplies such as coal, logs and cotton, 65 percent of Japanese exports to the US are either automobiles or other capital goods. This situation has triggered considerable concern in Congress, and has led to the Japanese being viewed as free-riders: while expecting the US to import Japanese manufactured products, they do not reciprocate. As noted in Congressional Studies, "We are a developing nation, supplying a more advanced nation. We are Japan's plantation; haulers of wood and growers of crops, in exchange for high technology, value added products.... This relationship is unacceptable".[35]

The US government has four main points of contention with regard to Japanese trade relations. These are (1) Japan's reluctance to import foreign (i.e., US) manufactured products; (2) the unfair support Japanese exports receive from government, especially those in the high

technology sector; (3) Tokyo's tendency to balance periods of slow economic growth by cutting imports while expanding exports; and (4) due to the periodically misaligned exchange rates of the yen and/or dollar, Japanese price competitiveness has been perceived to be promoted, while the US has been undermined. More recently, the range of items under dispute has expanded; US officials now claim that Japanese non-tariff barriers (NTB) are effectively denying US agricultural products a share of the Japanese market.[36]

Increasingly frustrated over its inability to persuade Japan to abide by the rules of the "trading game," the US government has concluded that it has no option but to "defend American exports against foreign protectionism. The notion is as simple as it is biblical: the United States must exact an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; or in other, more modern words, there must be a level playing field on which to engage." US economic policy has become forthright: to gain the same access to the Japanese market as Japan has to that of the US. To facilitate this goal, Bill S-2094, which "makes it an offence to deny the US commercial opportunities substantially equivalent to those offered by the US," has been enacted into law.[37] In addition, domestic content requirements and voluntary export restraints (VERs) have been imposed upon Japanese automobiles.

Japanese economic relations with Canada have followed a similar path. In 1980, trade between the two nations totalled $7.1 billion. Japanese exports to Canada are far higher than those in the opposite direction, with the absolute magnitudes being much greater compared to a decade ago. This imbalance is all the more serious when it is noted that Canadian trade with Japan is greater than its combined trade with Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.[38]

Attempts to provide access for Canadian manufactured goods to Japanese markets can be traced back to the early initiatives of Trudeau's foreign policy. Given that Japan is Canada's second largest trading partner, while Canada is Japan's ninth largest, the policy adopted a cautious tone and criticized Japan for its "restrictive import policies, extraordinarily aggressive marketing policies and her undervalued currency." In a 1972 speech at the Japanese Press Club, the Secretary

of State for External Affairs, Jean-Luc Pepin, stated: "Only 3 percent of Canadian exports to Japan are end products, and if I may speak frankly, as we do among friends, this is an unsatisfactory situation."[39] Despite the Trudeau Government's sustained efforts, the situation did not change. Japan steadfastly maintained that the structure of its economy, i. e., few natural resources and a heavy reliance upon manufactured exports, precluded an ability to import finished goods. Nevertheless, Japan did import substantial quantities of manufactured products from the US, UK and West Germany.

In commenting upon this relationship, analysts have stated that, while Tokyo has acknowledged Canada's initiatives in this area, there has been no discernible change in Japanese policy.[40] This in turn has led Japanese officials to state that "Canada by itself is not powerful enough to exert much influence over Japan. Instead, it has often relied on the leverage created by its close relationship with the United States to induce Japan to impose export restraints or to increase direct investment."[41]

Canada-US economic relations, however, have not been free from controversy: imposition of the Nixon 10 percent import surcharge encouraged Canada to lessen its dependence upon the United States via the Third Option. Canada also has expressed concern about protectionist policies being implemented at the state level in the US. At last count, approximately 17 states had enacted legislation detrimental to foreign produced goods.[42]

For its part, the US has accused Canada of being protectionist, arguing that the latter's unemployment insurance benefits program, and its regional development grants, provide unfair advantages for Canadian producers. Moreover, the US is still venting concern that Canadian economic nationalism, previously characterized by the National Energy Program (NEP) and the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), be kept in check.

Simulated Bargaining

At this point it is useful to reflect upon Hypotheses A1–A3, which

concern the three highlighted issue areas, in the context of the simulation. Tables 2A and 2B display the relevant data concerning messages and lines of transmission.

First, in relation to South Africa, it was postulated that, due to Canada's involvement in the Commonwealth and the American policy of constructive engagement, the simulation would result in Canada and the US experiencing a significant amount of corlflict, with Japan located somewhere in between. Upon examination of the total number of messages and lines exchanged — as well as content — this hypothesis seems to be validated.[43]

In the context of Sawyer and Guetzkow's model of negotiating, where goal attainment is a function of communication, persuasion and specificity, it would seem that Canada adopted a strong anti-apartheid

TABLE 2A TOTAL MESSAGES, PER ISSUE, PER SOURCE COUNTRY

ISSUE	CANADA	UNITED STATES	JAPAN
1	11	5	17
2	6	6	6
3	1	0	0
4	5	2	4
5	6	6	4
6	6	3	0
7	3	0	0
All	38	22	31

TABLE 2B TOTAL LINES, PER ISSUE, PER SOURCE COUNTRY

ISSUE	CANADA	UNITED STATES	JAPAN
1	74.5	247.0	275.5
2	51.5	56.5	72.5
3	8.0	0.0	0.0
4	61.5	60.0	54.5
5	47.0	124.5	34.0
6	61.0	24.0	0.0
7	34.0	0.0	0.0
All	337.5	512.0	436.5

position. Although the Canadian team initially called upon the US to take the lead in fighting apartheid, the latter's policy of constructive engagement meant that no satisfactory response would be forthcoming. Hence the Canadian team conveyed "disappointment at the reluctance of the United States to exercise leadership in coordinating an effective Western response to the South African question."[44]

By contrast, the US sent the least number of messages about South Africa. However, in terms of lines transmitted per issue, they were in second position, slightly behind the Canadian team. Despite calls for sanctions, the US team maintained its position, asserting that "strict sanctions would seriously undermine the Administration's attempts at peaceful reform. We do not want to impose sanctions for reasons previously mentioned, and by the same token, do not want you (Canada and Japan) to impose sanctions."[45] Given the fact that the US, along with Britain, has been a leading advocate of the constructive engagement philosophy, a reaction of that nature is to be expected. The low message but high line volume seems to characterize the American approach to negotiating. It is logical, given its post-World War II dominance, to expect the US to "walk softly with a big stick," i. e., the US states its position once and expects others to act accordingly. Moreover, due to the high line content, there is no difficulty meeting the requirement of goal specification as dictated by Sawyer and Guetzkow.

The Japanese, in addressing the South African problem, were faced with a sensitive issue. On the one hand, they had to contend with global public opinion regarding apartheid, a situation not made easier by a leading position in Asia. On the other, South Africa represented their largest African trading partner. To a large extent, the actions of the Japanese team reflected that quandary. Although willing to implement minimal sanctions, they argued that further action would "adversely affect the South African blacks and other countries in the area."[46] While Japan's message volume was higher than that of the United States, the total number of lines transmitted with regard to this issue was the lowest of all three nations. Moreover, of the four issues that the Japanese chose to address, only Issue 5 received less attention. Based on their ability to control Asian reaction, the Japanese could justify continued — but limited — economic relations with South Africa.

At the outset of this paper it was hypothesized that US-Canada negotiations over acid rain would lead to a conflictual dialogue. This expectation reflects the cost involved in rectifying the problem, especially from an American perspective, and the fact that regulation of the environment contradicted Reagan's free market policies.

An examination of the results obtained in the simulation lends support to such a line of reasoning. In terms of messages dispatched, Canada sent 6, while the US responded with 3. This trend also was maintained in the total number of lines per issue relayed, as Canada sent 61, while the US uncharacteristically sent only 24. It would seem that the American team had chosen to deal with this issue by not dealing with it; at one point, the Canadian team remarked that "Canada is concerned with the US hesitation to respond in detail."[47] To the extent that goal attainment is a function of specificity and communication, the US team appears to have assigned an extremely low concession level, perhaps even preferring the status quo, in the acid rain dispute. Moreover, the chances of resolving the dispute could not have been enhanced by the level of frustration that must have been experienced by the Canadian team.

The US appears to have reduced the situation regarding the environment to a zero-sum game. In attempting to understand this seemingly lopsided situation, two points should be considered. First, in contrast to the South African issue, which was one of global scrutiny and attention, the acid rain dispute is a bilateral issue concerning only Canada and the US. Consequently, there is little global pressure to resolve the dispute quickly. Second, due to the US' economic and military strength, historically it has experienced little trouble in convincing Canada to adjust to its policies. The US had confidence in its negotiating strategy and, accordingly, adopted a high request/expectation and low concession position. Along those lines, Canadian trade officials have observed that "one cannot discuss the settlement of disputes without bearing in mind the disparity in the relative bargaining weights of Canada and the US."[48]

Although the US appears to advocate a zero-sum approach to the acid rain dispute, this is not a viewpoint endorsed by all analysts. For example, addressing the issue of social costs, Coase asserted that "in the

absence of transaction costs, resource allocation is neutral with respect to liability rules."[49] If resolved along 'Coasian' principles, the dispute would result in Canada paying the US an amount equal to the damage caused by acid rain, in an effort to induce the latter to halt its production of sulphuric acid and nitric oxide.

Nonetheless, the applicability of the Coase Theorem to the acid rain dispute is questionable for two main reasons. First, as demonstrated by Aivazian and Callen, when applied to situations with three or more participants, the theorem can lead to suboptimal solutions.[50] While it might be argued that the dispute involves only Canada and the US, there can be no denying Japan's potential ability to influence the outcome in an effort to gain concessions elsewhere in the simulation exercise. More fundamental, however, is the problem of assigning a dollar value to the damage caused by acid rain. This is not only a question of calculating the number of lakes and acres of forests destroyed and the financial and emotional distress incurred by those individuals affected by the loss of such resources. It also involves assessing the impact on the future quality of life. Not only are Canada and the US unlikely to come to an agreement over such a value, but Coase's assumption of zero transaction costs does little to aid the applicability of his theorem to this situation.

By far the most complex issue was that of economics. In formulating A3, it was held that different levels of conflict would be encountered, depending upon the countries involved. While all three nations devoted the majority of their attention to Issue 1, it must be remembered that there are three sub-issues encapsulated within the heading of economics. Japan led the way in terms of communications with the most messages-17, and the most lines per issue - 275.5. The US maintained its "big stick" approach to negotiating, as it had the least number of messages-5, but the second most lines per issue - 247. Canada dispatched the least number of lines per issue - 74.5. Based upon these figures, it would seem that, in relative terms, the US and Japan devoted a great deal of attention to economic issues. Each dispatched messages in an effort to specify its own position, while also attempting to alter the preference orderings of opponents. For example, the US described Japanese economic policy as "one-sided, short-sighted and self-serving,"

while the Japanese replied that it was imperative for the US to improve its balance of payments situation by "reducing its fiscal debt and adjusting the environment for acceptance of foreign capital ."[51]

Within this area, perhaps the most interesting aspect is the behavior of the Canadian team. As previously stated, due to a lack of power, it was postulated that Canada would ally with the US in an effort to bring about changes in Japan's economic policies. Intuitively, this seems to be a logical position ; it would explain not only Canada's low line per issue transmissions, but the Third Party effects generated by such a manoeuver would make it difficult for the Japanese to continue ignoring such requests. Toward that end, Canada communicated the following offer to the US team : "Should the US be willing to increase investment in our manufacturing sector, and to invest in new industry, Canada will entertain the notion of pressuring Japan in conjunction with the United States to open up to increased exports from both countries."[52]

While Canada did send a number of messages regarding economics to the US only, it also dispatched a number to Japan. Therefore, it is not possible to state conclusively that Canada and the US attempted to form an alliance. Moreover, judging by the US response to acid rain, the wisdom of entering into such an alliance on Canada's behalf must be questioned, as the division of spoils generated by such a relationship is not likely to reflect Canada's contribution. Hence, it would seem that Canada's low lines per issue transmission is simply a reflection of its tendency to direct an equal amount of traffic to each area, perhaps in the hope of gaining an advantage in a relatively unattended domain.

To assess Hypotheses B1-2, two sets of calculations were performed. The first set of statistics is based on the total number of messages transmitted, per issue, per country. The second set of calculations employs the total number of lines, per issue, per country, dispatched. The rationale behind separate calculations is embedded within the bargaining literature, which posits that goal attainment is a function of the specificity with which they are delineated. Greater detail would indicate greater message length, as well as a more concerned approach towards the negotiations. The second set of calculations is sensitive to such considerations.

Tables 2A and 2B reveal that Canada addressed the issues the most evenly. By contrast, the US had 2 areas where no messages were sent, while Japan had three. The respective chi-square statistics reveal an interesting pattern. Starting with the Canadian data, X^2(chi-square) = 10.7, df = 6, $p > 0.05$, indicating that the issues received an approximately equal amount of attention. For the US, the relevant figures are $X^2 = 13.2$, df = 6, $p < 0.05$, indicating a moderate amount of difference among the seven issues. The Japanese messages reveal a somewhat different pattern, with $X^2 = 50.0$, df = 6, $p < 0.001$. This is not surprising; over 50 percent of the Japanese messages concentrated on Issue 1, while 3, 6 and 7 show no messages whatsoever.

As previously mentioned, the second set of chi-square calculations is mechanically identical to the first, except that the data employed is no longer the total number of messages (per issue, per country), but rather the total number of lines (per issue, per country). It is interesting to note that the US generated the most lines overall -512.0, while Japan was second with 436.5 and Canada was third at 337.5. This is in stark contrast to the total number of messages dispatched, where Canada was first, Japan second and the US third.

statistics ($p < 0.001$). The respective X^2 values from Table 2B are 59.4 (Canada), 635.1 (US) and 930.5 (Japan). Hence, it would seem that all three countries have a hierarchical ordering of the issues. In addition, and as expected, Canada showed much less differentiation across the seven areas. Taken together, the results based on both the number of messages and lines of transmission lend support to Hypothesis B1.

Bilateral comparison will provide an assessment of Hypothesis B2, which asserts that the priorities of each state across the issue areas will be different from those of its peers. Beginning with the number of messages, comparison of Canada and the US yields $X^2 = 4.6$, df = 6, which is insignificant at even the 0.05 level. This pattern held for the other two pairings : Canada and Japan recorded a value of 11.2, while the US and Japan generated a value of 9.4.

The more precise information provided by the number of lines, however, reveals important differences. The Canada-US dyad generates

a statistic of 156.7, df = 6, $p < 0.001$. Although both countries appear to have made Issue 1 their priority, the similarities end here. While Canada devoted approximately equal attention to Issues 2, 4, 5 and 6, the US seemed especially interested in Issue 5. The Canada-Japan comparison produced a chi-square of 215.4, df = 6, $p < 0.001$. As noted before, both countries spent the most time on Issue 1, but Canada's relatively even distribution across other areas stands in contrast to Japan's neglect of Issues 3, 6 and 7. The US-Japan contingency table resulted in a X^2 value of 43.9, df = 6, $p < 0.001$. Thus the results based on lines of transmission, collectively speaking, support Hypothesis B2.

Conclusion

Several points should be noted. Propositions A1-A3 received support from both reality and the simulation. This pattern suggests that the bargaining model borrowed from Sawyer and Guetzkow retains relevance in the contemporary era of interstate bargaining.

Experiences varied across the issue areas of the environment, South Africa and economics from one state to the next. Based on the analysis performed and the issues examined, it would appear that the Canadian team gained the least from the negotiations. Not only was Canada to a large extent absent from the economic debate, but it also appears to have been unsuccessful in extracting concessions from the US regarding acid rain. In fact, it could be posited that Canada failed to advance the discussions beyond the status quo.

Canada's inability to impose its will upon Washington is not surprising : Consider Holmes' description of the situation in reality :

> Canadian policies in recent years have been determined more by what has happened in Washington or Houston, Brussels or Tegucigalpa, than by what has been decided or sought in Ottawa. I suggest, although without total conviction, that Canadian policies would not have been very different if there had been another Liberal leader or a longer Conservative government during these years. The range of Canadian

> foreign policies is considerably more restricted by basic geo-political economic and cultural factors than critics and opposition spokesmen assume, and the room for radical change is circumscribed.[53]

Perhaps the most interesting component of the simulation concerned the relationship between the United States and Japan. It often has been stated that, due to its reliance upon American defense forces, Japan's foreign policy must mimic that of the United States. In fact, Prime Minister Nakasone, in a speech addressing the 108th Session of the National Diet, asserted that "the relationship with the United States is the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy, and the further development of this bilateral relationship is an important foundation for world peace and stability."[54] But based upon the results obtained in the simulation, it would seem that Japan is not so much dependent upon US foreign policy as it is selectively intertwined with it. For example, on the issue of South Africa and apartheid, it was evident that Japanese team occupied a midway position between Canada and the US. Advocating a position as strong as Ottawa's would result in substantial economic losses, while endorsing a position as conservative as that of Washington would endanger its image and leadership position within Asia.

At the same time, Japanese refused to cede to American charges of protectionism and free-riding. The reason for that is Tokyo's reluctance (in reality and the simulation) to endorse any act which might threaten its power base. As Michael Donnelley proposes, "the Japanese are deeply convinced that their country remains vulnerable and are consequently unimpressed by the realities of economic miracles and concerned that their future prosperity is still beset by external forces beyond control."[55] Not surprisingly, neither Canada nor the US could convince Tokyo to significantly alter its economic policy in the simulation. Hence, to the extent that the simulation was a valid exercise, the relationship between Japanese and US foreign policy ought to be recast in a more realistic light.

Finally, Propositions B1 and B2, generally speaking, received support from the data gathered from the simulation. The simulation's success in that regard lends further support to the assertions from Hermann and Verba noted at the outset of this study: small group

interactions in a controlled setting can help to confirm and even advance understanding of political decision making and behavior. The educational value of the process makes it all the more worthwhile.

NOTES

1 Charles F. Hermann, *Crises in Foreign Policy : A Simulation Exercise* (New York, NY : The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., 1967), 37.

2 Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior : A Study of Leadership* (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1961), 101.

3 David Crookall, "Cultural and Social Aspects of Simulation : An Introduction," in Crookall, et al., eds., *Simulation-Gaming in Education and Training* (Oxford and New York : Pergamon Press, 1988), 3.

4 Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Richard D. Brecht, *ICONS User Manual* (College Park, Maryland : University of Maryland, 1989).

5 Financial restrictions and limited translation facilities prevented the Japanese team from dispatching massages in Japanese. Instead, the Japanese transmitted in English.

6 Wilkenfeld and Brecht, *ICONS User Manual.*

7 It is beyond the scope of this study to describe the process of making decisions for each team. The account that follows is based on the experience at McGill ; details for the other schools are similar.

8 Due to technical difficulties, the conference ultimately included only the US and Canada.

9 For a detailed discussion of this argument, see Bruce E. Arlinghus, ed., *African Security Issues, Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity* (Boulder : Westview Press, 1984).

10 These distorting factors are described in detail by Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, *Quasi-Experimentation* (Chicago : Rand-McNally College Publishing, 1979).

11 Jack Sawyer, and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in Kelman, ed., *International Behavior,* 466-520, 13.

12 Sawyer and Guetzkow, "Bargaining," 481.

13 Sawyer and Guetzkow, "Bargaining," 476-477.

14 Howard Raiffa, *The Art and Science of Negotiation* (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1982), 11-19.

15 James Booth, Patrick James and Hudson Meawell, *Toward a New Science of Politics : Essays on Rational Choice* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993, forthcoming).

16 Sawyer and Guetzkow, "Bargaining," 477, 478.

17 Stephen Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge* (Toronto : The Institute for Economic Policy, 1981), 183.

18 "The fifty largest coal-fired power plants are mostly clustered in the Midwest and the Ohio and Tennessee Valleys, and are currently the focus of Congressional efforts to reduce acid rain. SO_2 is emitted from many of the plants without any pollution controls." See Roy Gould *Going Sour : Science and the Politics of Acid Rain* (Boston : Birkhauser, 1985), 7.

19 *Ibid*., 187.

20 The US has linked the Canadian desire to eliminate acid rain to its energy policy. As "The Secret Alliance," a 1984 study sponsored by the American Utility Industry states, "For several years Canadian officials have staged an aggressive and highly visible lobbying effort to impose stringent emission controls in the United States and to limit the alleged damage of the phenomena of acid rain. During this same period, Canadian officials have conducted an equally aggressive, though not as visible, marketing effort designed to increase Canadian electricity exports to the United States. Although these same officials have denied any connection between the two programs, drastic acid rain controls on US power plants would rebound to Canada's competitive advantage" (*Saturday Night*, April 1988, 51).

21 See Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge,* 192.

22 Lynton K. Caldwell, US *Interests and the Global Environment* (Muscantine : The Stanley Foundation 1985), 18.

23 Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge*, 188, 190, 192.

24 *Saturday Night*, 52.

25 Carter based his reasonung on four points : 1) because blacks were most dependent on export led growth, sanctions would most hurt them ; 2) Pretoria's ability to declare an economic state of emergency, and the neutralizing effect this would have upon sanctions, would result in a highly unpredictable situation ; moreover, it would be next to impossible to stop gold exports ; 3) due to Western dependence upon South African minerals and the related employment such dependence generated, sanctions would constrain Western economies without any guarantee that similar effects would be experienced in Pretoria ; and 4) Black African states also would incur a large amount of damage. See Richard F. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States : The Erosion of an Influence Relationship* (New York : Praeger, 1982), 62-63, 82-84.

26 Pauline Baker, "Facing Up to Apartheid," *Foreign Policy*, 64 (1986), 32.

27 Furthermore, according to the Subcommittee, the "presence of South African mining operations at the cutting edge of racial progress in that country" and the extraordinary concentration of "much of the world's resources of many vital mineral products that are important to the survival of the Industrial West" suggested that "the US Government should exhibit encouragement and interest in South Africa's undertakings and in their efforts — and that threats of international sanctions against South Africa should be opposed." See Bissell, *South Africa and the United States*, 96.

28 Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa : Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (1981),

324.

29 Richard J. Payne, "Canada, South Africa and the Commonwealth," *International Perspectives*, (1987), 9.

30 Payne, "Canada," 11.

31 Clarence G. Redekop, "The Mulroney Government and South Africa : Constructive Disengagement," *Behind the Headlines* 44(1986), 5-6.

32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Blue Book 1987 : Japan's Diplomatic Activities* (Tokyo : Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987), 324.

33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Blue Book 1987*, 271-272.

34 Fred C. Bergsten, "What to do about the U. S. -Japan Economic Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, 60 (1982), 1059.

35 Wendy Dobson, *Canada-Japanese Economic Relations in a Triangular Perspective* (Toronto : C. D. Howe Institute 1987), 42.

36 See Bergsten, "What to do About the U. S. -Japan Economic Conflict," 1059.

37 See Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge,* 139, 140.

38 Jean McCloskey, "New Realities in the Pacific : The Political Perspective," *Behind the Headlines* 46 (1988-9), 4.

39 Frank Langdon, *The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations* (Vancouver : University of British Columbia Press, 1983), 74.

40 Langdon, *The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations*, 73 ; Langdon noted that "[w]hen Canadian Federal officials pressed for entry of Canadian manufactured or high technology goods to Japan, they met a comparatively cordial reception from Japanese government leaders, but they failed to see the economic advantages."

41 Dobson, *Canada-Japanese Economic Relations,* 42.

42 Richard G. Lipsey, "Canada and the United States : The Economic Dimension," in the American Assembly, Columbia University and Council on Foreign Relations, eds., *Canada and the United States : Enduring Friendship, and Persistent Stress* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall 1985), 87.

43 Two indicators will be used to assess the volume of communications : number of message and lines, respectively. Although frequency and length of transmission can reflect extraneous factors to at least some degree, each of the measurements possesses a high level of "face" validity. For an introductory discussion of the latter and other criteria for valid measurement, consult Earl R. Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA : Wadsworth, 1989), 124-125.

44 WID Message 042.

45 WID Message 031.

46 WID Message 008.

47 WID Message 061.

48 Willian Diebold, "Canadian Foreign Policy : Comments on the Green Papers," *Behind*

the Headlines XLII/XLIII(1985), 15.

49 R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3 (1960), 1-44.

50 Varouj A. Aivazian and Jeffery L. Callen, "The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core," *Journal of Law and Economics* 24 (1981), 175.

51 WID Message 002 and 035.

52 WID Message 010.

53 John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," *International Journal* 39 (1984), 372.

54 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Blue Book,* 235.

55 Michael Donnelly, "Growing in Canadian-Japanese Trade," *International Journal* 36 (1981), 879.