

# Japan-U. S. Frictions Seen from Localities : Adjustment of Local Interests As Key to Opening Japanese Markets\*

(地方から見た日米経済摩擦)

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**SUMMARY IN JAPANESE:** 日米間の摩擦については中央の視点からのみ捉えられてきた。しかし 1980 年代の日本からの対米直接投資の伸長に見られるように両国関係に於ける地方の重要性は高まっている。また日本に対する市場開放要求が伝統的な社会システムの変革にまで触れる段階に来ていることも、地方から日米関係を見る必要性を高めている。本稿では、1985 年から 89 年にかけて日本の地方紙が、農産物の市場開放 (12 品目, オレンジ, 牛肉, コメ) についてのどのような論調を展開してきたか, 社説を用いて検証している。そこから明らかになった一つのことは、日本の地方は、中央に比べ国際的要求に対して決して鈍感であるわけではなく、地方紙は積極的に地方の人々の意識を変える役割を担っているということであった。

## Importance of Local Opinions on the United States

About three years ago, in an NHK special program, I saw an engineer and his family involved in a drama of visiting the United States all of a sudden as an automobile manufacturer in Hiroshima decided to build a plant in America. I was filled with deep emotion while watching the scenes in which the husband went to his family temple to obtain the ancestral memorial tablet, probably because he anticipated

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a long-time stay in the United States, and the other scenes in which his wife, who had never thought of leaving Japan, was having a hard time adjusting herself and her children to the language and the American society itself.

Scenes like these may not be uncommon nowadays, for Japanese corporations' foreign direct investment, particularly in the United States, has increased rapidly against the high yen rate after the Plaza Accord of September 1985. According to the reports to the Ministry of Finance, the direct investment in the United States, that marked 1,284 cases in 1986, was doubled to 2,543 cases in 1988. The JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) surveys show that nearly 10 percent of the total corporate advancements overseas are by the companies capitalized at ¥100 million or less. As a result, a situation hardly imaginable in former times is now a reality; that is, those Japanese who have never visited Tokyo are to reside in foreign countries on a long-range basis. On the other hand, as of 1988, 39 of the 50 American states have opened their Tokyo offices to invite Japanese corporations. These are indications that economic activities across national borders are bound to be accompanied by the movement of goods and people and thereby to deepen mutual penetration between the nations involved.

But the above-mentioned is not the only facet where we can observe mutual penetration. The Japan-U.S. economic frictions, to which there is no end, are resulted from the intensified penetration. Whereas the sudden increases in the exports of Japanese products to the United States have evoked Congressional opposition backed by the American corporations and labor unions, the American demands for open Japanese markets have met resistance in various districts in Japan, centering on the agricultural producers. The frictions recently cover wider fields, ranging from commodities to services and social systems as well, which are rooted in culture and society. Herein is observable the situation where foreign policy cannot but be transformed into domestic policies.

The reason why I have thus far stated these things is that I should like to point out the importance of domestic circumstances, or the growing relative importance of the localities, in Japan-U.S. relations. Of

course, I do not mean to say that the localities have come to play positive roles in solving the economic frictions. The parties responsible for the solution are invariably the Government and the ruling LDP (Liberal-Democratic Party). But they, too, would have to act, keeping the domestic moves in sight.

### Why the Local Press ?

From the point of view mentioned above, I will observe here, in this paper, the Japanese local opinions on the United States. My method is not to investigate the opinions of those local business employees and their families who are going to the United States, as I described at the outset, but rather to extract the local views of the United States, indirectly, from the local reactions to the economic frictions which are centered on the American demands that the Japanese markets be opened to American agricultural products. Concretely, I will analyze the contents of the editorials of ten local newspapers covering the period from September 1985 through October 1989. I will, in this analysis, take two approaches to comparison. First, are there differences among the ten newspapers in their opinions on the United States? Are they different from the opinions of the central press? If they are, what are the differences? Second, are there any changes observed in the local press's opinions on the United States during the four years from September 1985 to the present?

This is not the first study of the kind concerning Japanese opinions on the United States. Excellent contributions have been made by Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard University and by some other scholars, but in many cases, the objects of their studies are the historical events including the Pacific War. Outstanding among a few studies focusing on the localities is "The 1924 Anti-Japanese Immigration Legislation and the Boycott of American Commodities" by Professor Kimitada Miwa of Sophia University (in Chihiro Hosoya, ed., *A History of International Economic Conflict in the Pacific-Asian Sphere*, published by the University of Tokyo Press, 1983), which study deals with Kobe as the scene of observation.

While not directly dealing with the Japanese opinions on the United States, sober investigations (“Strengthening of the Bases for Japan-U. S. Partnership, and the Role for the Localities to Play”) on the levels of the states and the prefectures of the two countries have been continued by the Japan Center for International Exchange (Representative: Tadashi Yamamoto) since three years ago. However, studies from the angle of the localities and the present Japan-U. S. relations can be said to have just started. Before proceeding to the main subject, I should explain why I have used the editorials of the local press from which to extract local opinions on the United States.

Several means whereby to explore the local consciousness vis-à-vis the United States will be conceivable. As is often conducted, on-the-spot interviewing will be one method. That will be extremely interesting, for various people’s opinions can be gathered.

This method may be good in observing some specified individuals’ opinions about the United States, but the whole locality’s views cannot be shown. Another method will be to take an opinion poll in some specific local areas, but that will cost time and money. Moreover, both of these methods will be inadequate in that one cannot go back to the past to observe the changes in the local views of the United States up to the present.

I have, therefore, decided to use newspaper editorials which have been kept as records. Through this method, comparisons not only between the past and the present but among those local newspapers will become possible to some extent.

The ten local newspapers I have chosen for this research are: *the Hokkaido Shimbun*, *the Akita Sakigake Shimpō*, *the Kahoku Shimpō* (Miyagi), *the Niigata Nippo*, *the Shinano Mainichi* (Nagano), *the Sanyo Shimbun* (Okayama), *the Ehime Shimbun*, *the Saga Shimbun*, *the Minami Nihon Shimbun*, and *the Okinawa Times*. For the purpose of comparison, I have also used two central newspapers, *the Asahi*, and *the Yomiuri*. The criteria for the selection of the papers are: (1) geographical consideration, and (2) the districts exposed to the American offensives over the agricultural products. (After having finished the research, I have a reflection that I could have added some more districts along the Sea of Japan and in

the Kansai region.) Some readers might think the editorial opinions on the United States are detached from the actual local views or are closer to the central papers' attitudes, that is, being sensitive to the American demands. They may well think so, for there is a great difference between the masses and the mass media in the amount of information they can obtain. On the other hand, an editorial writer of a local newspaper said in response to my telephone-interview, "It is natural that the local interests should be reflected in the editorials, and this is the only justification for the local paper's existence." He may well say so. In short, following the political scientist Gabriel A. Almond, we may define the newspaper editorials as "the policy and opinion elites" whose role is to bridge between the "general public" and "the legal or official policy leadership." The editorials of the local press thus play their part as intermediaries at times having the Government policies penetrate the people, while at other times speaking for the people and pressuring the Government.

The question is whether the local newspapers do carry independent editorials of their own. If their arguments are similar to the editorial comments of the three central papers, papers, my points mentioned above will be off the mark and my reading of some 700 editorials, taken from the microfilms through the cooperation of the editorial staff, will be meaningless. In parallel with the content analysis of the editorials, therefore, I have telephone-interviewed the editorial writers of those local papers and asked what kind of materials they use for their editorial writing. Three local newspaper companies have answered that they base their editorials on the data they have gathered on their own, while consulting the materials furnished by the Kyodo Press for editorial purposes. The remaining seven companies have answered that they have never purchased any of those editorial materials of the Kyodo Press but write their editorials on the basis of the original materials they have prepared for themselves. Judging from these results, we may safely anticipate the editorials of the local press to be considerably rich in individual character and their opinions on the United States rich in variety.

The next question is to what extent the local newspapers are subscribed for. If, in the Japanese press world, the three major papers—

*the Asahi*, *the Yomiuri*, and *the Mainichi*—plus *the Nikkei* are sweeping the land and the local press has hardly any influence, my research will be almost meaningless. A view like this has, however, been found completely erroneous. To be sure, the total circulation of the three major papers plus *the Nikkei* and *the Sankei* exceeds 25 million, but the local press, too, has a total circulation of 17 million. More important than this is the share of the local press in each prefecture. According to *The Local Press on the Scene* (Kakiuchi Publishing, 1987) by Yoshiaki Mori, most local papers have a share of 55-65 percent in each prefecture, except for such cases as in Fukushima Prefecture where there are two influential local papers. This has been confirmed through my telephone-interviews. The local press has, indeed, a great penetration and influence in the localities. Another point of importance is that in the local areas where the three major papers are subscribed for, the local papers, too, are read in many cases. These facts can tell that if one thinks one can understand the Japanese trends through reading the three major papers, that will be a fairly one-sided view.

As I mentioned above, the objects of my analysis are the ten local newspapers including *the Hokkaido Shimbun*, and *the Asahi* and *the Yomiuri* for comparison. The period for the analysis is from September 1985 to the present. It would be desirable if I could cover the period following the two Nixon shocks of 1971 that marked the biggest turning-point in the postwar Japan-U.S. relations (the U.S.-China rapprochement over the head of the Japanese Government, and the U.S. announcement of a new currency and trade policy which put an end to the one dollar for 360 yen system). That was impossible for reasons of time and personnel. Even by limiting the period to the said four years and the number of the papers to ten (and two central papers), the number of the relevant editorials exceeded 700. Thus, I finally decided to focus on the period from September 1985, which marks a relatively recent turning-point in Japan-U.S. relations. This period has witnessed various happenings that symbolize the turbulent relationships between the two countries.

## **Turbulent Japan-U.S. Relations**

As is well known, the Reagan Administration changed its high dollar-rate policy, through the Plaza Accord of September 1985, and set about improving the trade imbalances by means of macro-adjustments. About the same time, the Administration changed its trade policy, too, though this was not given prominent coverage, compared to the Plaza Accord. The fact is, this was the beginning of the growing tensions we see in the Japan-U.S. trade relations today. The story is as follows :

Up until September 1985, the Reagan Administration had remained extremely prudent about invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which has a "mandatory" power to remove foreign impediments, even when the business circles appealed against such impediments in the ways of the American products' entry into the foreign markets due to unfair trade practices on the part of their trade partners. The Congressional criticism of long standing against this posture of the Reagan Administration, coupled with the large-scale trade deficit, finally made it obligatory to change the trade policy as well as to implement the macro-adjustments. In and after September 1985, the Administration "autonomously" instructed investigations on the basis of Section 301, pointing out the existence of unfair trade practices as to Japanese tobacco and leather, the Republic of Korea's insurance, the Taiwanese beer, and Brazilian computers. Even without appeals from the business circles, the Administration would invoke Section 301 at its own discretion. The trade partners that were named on the charge of unfair trade practices criticized those "unilateral" measures taken by the United States.

However, the negotiations based on Section 301, which presupposes retaliative tariffs and other sanctions, can easily draw concessions on the part of the trade partners. The Japanese tariff on tobacco was lowered. As to the leather goods, Japan did not reject the American demands but promised to lower the tariffs on some other products, instead. The trade partners would not always accede to the

American demands. In such cases, punitive measures are taken against them.

In April 1987, dissatisfied with the semiconductor negotiations that had been carried on for the alleged reason of the Japanese unfair trade practice, the Reagan Administration resolutely resorted to a retaliation based on Section 301. The result was an imposition of a 100 percent tariff on three items including motor-operated tools.

These "compulsory" measures to open the trade partners' markets by means of sanctions, as mentioned above, were inherited by the Omnibus Trade Act which was signed by the President and took effect in the summer of 1988, with the contents further intensified. As is well known, the right of decision as to whether or not to invoke Section 301 was virtually transferred from the President to the Trade Representative (USTR), who is in charge of trade affairs; moreover, Super 301 was stipulated whereby to list up the nations with unfair trade practices, designate priority objects, and carry out negotiations to remove trade barriers by setting a time-limit.

On the basis of this stipulation, in the spring of 1989, the Japanese super-computers, satellites, and lumber were designated as the object items under Super 301. At the same time, problems involving the distribution systems and bidrigging, which were regarded as likely objects under Super 301 but for which negotiations presupposing sanctions were considered inappropriate for the time being for various reasons, were put to the Structural Impediments Initiative on a one-year schedule from September 1989. It is thus with boundless enthusiasm that the United States is pressing Japan to open its markets.

### **Vehement Demands for Open Agricultural Markets**

Meanwhile, partly in connection with Section 301, the United States raised vehement demands urging Japan to open its markets for agricultural products. Since this is the central subject for my content analysis in the second half of this paper, I will explain it in some detail. The targets of the U.S. demands for open Japanese markets are: first, the 12 items under the residual import quota restrictions,



including tomato juice and pineapples; second, beef and oranges; and third, rice.

America, as a big agricultural country, is a major supplier of wheat and barley for Japan and has shown strong interest in exporting the above-mentioned items to Japan. Japan, however, did not liberalize the 12 items for domestic reasons, although it was criticized as a violation of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Toward the end of 1987, the Screening Panel of GATT, which was set up at the U.S. request, severely ruled against Japan that ten items, except for peanuts and minor beans, were "guilty." Partly because of the strong opposition among the producers in Japan, the Japanese Government in an unprecedented manner filed an appeal with GATT, asking for a postponement of its reply as to acceptance or declining of the Panel decision. The result was, Japan agreed to liberalize the items other than powdered milk and condensed milk, out of the ten items that were ruled "guilty," and thereby had the 12 items problem brought to a tentative settlement. Included among the 12 items were some local special products such as the dairy products of Hokkaido and the pineapples of Okinawa; and vigorous opposition movements were developed in the areas where serious impacts of liberalization were anticipated.

In June 1988, the Japanese Government acceded to the longtime demands by the United States and Australia for Japanese liberalization of beef and oranges and promised full liberalization from 1991 or three years later. The negotiations were started prior to March 1988 when the old agreement that fixed import quotas was to expire. A severe exchange of views was repeated between Japan and the United States, the former trying to tide over the immediate difficulties by expanding the import quotas, whereas the latter demanding liberalization to the last. The negotiations failed to reach a settlement even when the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry visited the United States, although a ministerial visit usually takes place with an eye to concluding an agreement. I will omit the details of the complicated process of the negotiations, but what remained to the end was the question concerning the post-liberalization protective measures for the beef producers. Japan, while agreeing to liberalization, insisted on impos-

ing an import surcharge as it was adopted by the EC. On the other hand, the United States was opposed to any protective measures other than tariffs, saying that depending upon the amount of a surcharge, liberalization would become meaningless. The U.S. assertion was that an import surcharge, the propriety of which was called in question at the Uruguay Round-multilateral trade negotiations of GATT, could not be accepted.

In Japan, some opinions said that Japan should take up the American challenge of appealing to GATT; but on the basis of the general judgement by the Government and the LDP, it was finally decided to meet liberalization by a tariff cut to 70 percent in 1991, to 60 percent in 1992, and to 50 percent in 1993.

The "impacts" that hit the agricultural producers were not limited to the 12 items, beef and oranges. The United States now demanded opening of the rice market, which had been regarded as a "sanctuary," and similar voices came to be heard even in Japan. In September 1986, the American Rice Makers Association (RMA) asked for government investigations under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, saying that the complete closure of the Japanese rice market was a violation of GATT and an unfair trade practice. (As to the bilateral and multilateral issues on rice, see my article "Rice Friction Is Not Over" in *Sekai*, August 1989.) That was a skillful tactic by RMA, timed with the off-year congressional elections and intended to have the Congressmen from the rice-producing states to put pressure for an invocation of Section 301. The USTR, however, turned it down on the grounds that the rice problem would be dealt with, at the Uruguay Round negotiations, together with the market barriers to other agricultural products. At that point, Japan maintained the posture that it would decline to have both bilateral and multilateral talks on the opening of the rice market. It stood on the justification that rice is a national trade item recognized by GATT.

Subsequently, in the spring of 1987, Japan decided to agree to a rice conference of the Uruguay Round negotiations. However, the New Round itself was absorbed in the discussions of the general principles. Also partly because of some shades of tightness in the export markets for rice, the American pressure calmed down for some while.

It was in the fall of 1988 that the offensives were resumed. The RMA again appealed for Section 301, in an attempt to open the Japanese rice market, on the occasion of the presidential election. They thought that both Republican Presidential Candidate Bush and Democratic Vice-Presidential Candidate Bentsen, who are from a rice-producing state, would support the RMA demand, with minds to the election. But the RMA plan failed once again. Toward the end of October when the voting date was drawing near, USTR Yuetter said he would wait for the talks at the Uruguay Round negotiations, and thereby turned down the RMA appeal. He said, however, that he would consider invoking Section 301, depending upon the Japanese posture at the Uruguay Round negotiations. On the other hand, the GATT Panel screening on the 12 items made it clear that a complete ban on imports would not be recognized even in the cases of national trade items. Thinking of these, one could not but admit the fact that the demand for the opening of the rice market remained intact as a big problem. Thereafter, the United States passed rice as irrelevant to Super 301 in spring 1989, but in its agricultural proposal to the Uruguay Round negotiations in the fall, it invariably demanded an open rice market.

The above-mentioned is not the whole story about the issues arising between Japan and the United States from September 1985 to the present. There were other cases such as the Toshiba Machinery's violation of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Control to Communist Areas) in 1987 and the problems of opening markets for construction work and for lawyers. Frictions were not limited to liberalizing the Japanese markets. Exports to the United States were a standing issue, and whether or not to continue voluntary restrictions on the exports of machine tools, textile, and automobiles was repeatedly discussed even in the newspaper editorials. In the meantime, there occurred a case in which Prime Minister Nakasone incurred strong opposition in the United States because of his racist statement.

Unlike those frictions in the economic aspects, the security relationship between Japan and the United States had gone favorably until 1989 when the FSX (the next support fighters) became politicized as a compound friction in which technology, trade, and national defense

were the three elements entangled with one another. Aside from the question of right or wrong, the favorable relationship was a result of the positive response by the Nakasone Cabinet, which made a start in 1982, to the American demands for expansion of defense expenditures. The Cabinet endeavored so that Japan could perform a positive role as a member of the West.

### **Growing Anti-Japanese and Anti-U.S. Sentiments**

Besides these issues in the economic and security aspects, the Japan-U.S. relations in and after September 1985 have been characterized by some remarkable arguments arising in both Japan and the United States, criticizing each other's country in forms qualitatively different from the arguments in the past. In America, *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1985) carried "The Japan Problem" by Karel G. van Wolferen, a Dutch journalist residing in Japan. This triggered some revisionist tough arguments against Japan to gather strength and win considerable support above all in Washington, centering on Congress, such as *Trading Places* by former U.S. Commerce Department official Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., and *Containing Japan* by American journalist James Fallows. Their views, in a nutshell, are as follows: Japan is seemingly moving by the rule of a capitalist economic system similar to that in any other Western country, but the truth is that the Japanese system is different and is supported by the close personal networks between officials and people; accordingly, dealing with the economic big power Japan should require rules different from those for the other Western countries.

For a time after the publicity of Wolfren's "The Japan Problem," there arose in Japan, too, an increasing amount of argument of the type that "Japan is not in the wrong; America is to blame." The arguments became vigorous, accompanied by the growing anti-U.S. sentiments over the U.S. sanctions against semiconductors and the Toshiba Machinery's COCOM violation incident of 1987. According to the joint Japan-U.S. opinion polls taken by *the Yomiuri* and the Gallup in 1987, the respondents who fated the Japan-U.S. relations

“good” marked 32 percent or a 9 percent decrease from the results of the preceding year’s polls, while those who answered the relations were “bad” marked 26 percent or a 9 percent increase. These figures showed the worst records for the past decade. The 1988 joint polls, however, presented a complete change marked by an increase of those who rated the Japan-U.S. relations good. Whether this tendency will continue in the 1989 polls or not remains to be seen. The firm American posture toward Japan on the FSX problem (on which Japan first insisted on home production but later acceded to the American demand and decided on joint production, which was nevertheless opposed by a segment of people within the American Congress and Government) gave rise to the Japanese argument that Japan should resolutely deal with the United States. *A Japan That Can Say No*, by Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishiware, is a good example.

Just then, *Business Week* (August 7, 1989) reported in its Feature on Japan that 68 percent of the Americans considered Japan the greater economic threat to the future of the United States than the Soviet military threat. Sony’s purchase of Columbia Pictures Entertainment and Mitsubishi Real Estate’s purchase of the Rockefeller Building irritated those national sentiments of America; and in return, the growing anti-Japanese sentiments inflamed anti-U.S. sentiments among the Japanese who object, “What’s wrong with our action which goes by economic rationalism?”

As far as these facts are enumerated, the Japan-U.S. relations after September 1985 up to the present seem to keep on deteriorating. What were the local newspaper editorials’ reactions to this situation, then? Let us first look at their attitudes toward the opening of markets for agricultural products, which is a problem most closely related to the local areas.

### **How to Read and Understand Editorials**

In order to visualize the results of the research, I have used coordinates. The object items are: the 12 items, oranges, and rice. From the Charts are illustrated the following points:

First, the editorials dealing with the agricultural products liberalization problem are numerous, except for *the Sanyo Shimbun*. They are with definite assertions. There are, on the other hand, a number of other editorials which are of a commentary type; theme I have excluded from the coordinates for lack of deciding factors for judgment. From these results, we can point out that the local papers are strongly concerned about this problem. It is interesting to note the difference in posture between *the Yomiuri* and *the Asahi* and particularly to compare it with the analyzed contents of their editorials, which I will cover later. Concerning the liberalization of agricultural products, *the Yomiuri* carried fewer editorials than *the Asahi*. This, of course, does not mean that *the Yomiuri* was less interested in the Japan-U.S. relations on the whole or in the demands that the markets be opened for agricultural products. In fact, not a few *Yomiuri* editorials discussed the future course for the Japan-U.S. relations as a whole.

Secondly, as to what can be read from the coordinates, the vertical axis shows the editorial assertions that are either positive or negative toward market liberalization, whereas the horizontal axis shows whether the editorial assertions hold that the American demands are unreasonable both in contents and in the ways they are presented or they rather say that even in the American demands there are some points we should listen to and that Japan, too, should be held responsible.

To which position each editorial should belong depends upon how deeply I read it; naturally, it is not free from bias. On the other hand, there is no denying the fact that if one repeatedly reads more than 150 editorials of similar contents, one can grasp some shades of difference among them. Thus, the following four combinations have been extracted:

1. The American demands are unreasonable, both in contents and in the ways they are presented, and are unacceptable; but judging from the international position Japan is in, we need to promote market-opening. (This group is categorized as "Criticizing the U.S. but open.")
2. The American demands are unreasonable both in contents and in the ways they are presented, and are unacceptable. Moreover, in

view of Japan's special necessities, we need not positively promote market-opening. ("Criticizing the U.S. and positively closed")

3. The American demands have some points we should listen to, and there are various aspects in Japan that should require corrections. For the time being, however, partly because of the Japanese special necessities, we cannot but take a prudent attitude toward market-opening. ("Conditionally closed")

4. The American demands have some points we should listen to, and there are various aspects in Japan that should require corrections. Moreover, judging from the international position Japan is in, we should positively promote market-opening. ("International")

Needless to say, the toughest Japanese posture appears in the 2nd quadrant, that is, "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed." The most sensitively responding to the international demands is the "international" group, in the 4th quadrant."

Four more points need be explained as regards the coordinates. First, the symbol "rice 88a" or "88b" stands for the first or the second editorial concerning rice 1988. Second, the figures (1), (2), placed before "rice" or other items show the order of the editorials in the time series. Third, the word "general" ranking with "rice," the 12 items, etc., shows the views on the opening of the Japanese markets for agricultural products, as it was referred to in the "Agricultural White Paper" and in the agricultural debates at the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) ministerial conferences and GATT Council meetings. Fourth and the last, I have divided the 4th quadrant into two sections; one for the "international" group or the groups close to "criticizing the U.S. but open" in posture, and the other section for the groups other than these.

With the above-mentioned points as the basis, I will cover from now on the item-by-item analysis of the editorial contents. (The titles of the editorials concerned will be announced separately.)

### **The 12-Item Problem**

The newspapers carrying the most negative editorials on the opening

of markets for the 12 items were, strangely enough, those at the northern and the southern tips of Japan— *the Hokkaido Shimibun* and *the Okinawa Times*. Already at the stage where the GATT decision became clear toward the end of November 1987 and where the Government's acceptance of liberalization was put on the agenda, the *Hokkaido Shimibun* severely criticized it, saying that liberalization, when implemented, will deal a considerable blow to Hokkaido where dairy products, minor beans and starch play important roles in agriculture. Although minor beans and starch were exempted from the GATT decision on "guilty" items, the editorial of December 4, 1987 showed strong resistance as follows: "This is a serious case for the Japanese agriculture, particularly for the Hokkaido agriculture." "If, in response to this decision, the imports of all these agricultural products are completely liberalized, the barely growing dairy-farming of our country will be struck a disastrous blow." The editorial continued: "This is an unreasonable demand absolutely unacceptable for our country; for if we accept it, we will lose the grounds for rejecting import liberalization of rice which is another national trade item" (87b). Furthermore, after the government policy for acceptance was decided, the editorial of January 8, 1988 pointed out, "As we have observed the series of negotiations on agricultural products, the conspicuous thing is the United States' unilateral posture of exacting liberalization from Japan one-sidedly, while restricting U.S. imports by means of the Waiver article (Note by the author: exemption from the obligation of liberalization)." Though admitting the liberalization this time, the editorial said, Japan "should more strongly assert its rights as an importer," on the question of liberalization including rice, "under the global surplus-food situation" (88b).

Concerning the 12 items, Okinawa as well as Hokkaido showed very clear reactions because of the import liberalization of pineapples. As indicated in the Chart, Okinawa's position is "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed," that is, rejecting the American demands resolutely. The fact that the Government decided to liberalize pineapples which are major primary products together with sugarcanes, unlike the cases in Hokkaido, seems to be the cause of the severer editorial comments. On August 11, 1987 when the import liberalization of



pineapples was gradually becoming a reality, *the Okinawa Times* editorial stated as follows: "Having been deprived of their fertile lands, involved in the construction of the military bases, the farmers moved to the Yaeyama Island where some of them grew pineapples. It was the U.S. Government that encouraged the farmers to move and helped them grow pineapples by introducing the seedlings. Now that the appeal to GATT has been presented, what will become of the Okinawan pineapple industry? Together with the farmers and other people involved, we need to keep a careful watch on its developments" (87a). On November 24, with the Panel decision close at hand, the editorial posed a question, saying: "No matter how unavoidable internationalization might be, the way they forced liberalization on everything at a stroke, in utter disregard of the local necessities, is too outrageous." "Is it not that reforms should progress gradually, with each nation's domestic circumstances taken into consideration?" (87c).

This posture of *the Okinawa Times* was carried through to the last. The editorial of March 25, 1988 read: "Opinions have been raised to the effect that even if the GATT 'decision' should rule us 'guilty,' we should firmly reject it. They say that a GATT decision is not a trial, that the matter is ultimately left to talks between the nations concerned, and that we can decide on our final attitude even after the GATT decision has been announced. For example, the United States did not accept to the last the import liberalization of dairy products despite the appeal presented by the Netherlands in 1951." The editorial criticized the American style of diplomacy, saying, "The Government should not be submissive to the American demands which leave no room for discussion" (88b).

What about the tendencies of the other local papers? There were various cases among them. *The Ehime Shimbun* and *the Minami Nihon Shimbun* used to be "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed" in about 1986, but they changed to the "international" attitude toward the end of 1987 when the GATT decision was made. *The Shinano Mainichi* and *the Saga Shimbun* did not pronounce clear-cut assertions on the 12 items at the beginning, but carried editorial comments of the "international" tone at the stage where liberalization became unavoid-

able. *The Niigata Nippo* which is firmly opposed to the import liberalization of rice, as mentioned later, was "international" from the outset. The Niigata Nippo editorial of July 25, 1986 sought a government decision while showing an objective judgment as follows: "At any rate, the Japanese Government should see the American demands aimed more at fair trade relations than at the amount of money and should plan to open the doors boldly, sorting out which of the 12 items could be liberalized and for which imports could be expanded. For those producers who will be hit by the policy, relief measures such as compensation for the losses should be considered" (86). This is probably because the 12 items were not so important as rice for Niigata Prefecture.

As to the central papers, *the Yomiuri* was "international" from the beginning. *The Asahi*, whose editorials at first varied, became consistently "international" in and after 1987. As has been observed thus far, the editorials of the newspapers concerning the 12 items were colored by varieties of opinions.

### **Liberalization of Beef and Oranges**

The breeding of beef cattle now spreads almost all the country over. The production of tangerines, which compete with oranges, is extensively promoted south of the Kanto district. The Government has been encouraging both beef cattle and tangerines to take the place of rice which became overproduced. The United States already had Japan materialize the import liberalization of lemons and grapefruits, leaving oranges as the only item, among all citrus fruits, that is yet to be liberalized. Through repeated negotiations for expanding the quota, the maximum amount of imports of oranges was decided to be 148,000 tons for Fiscal 1988. This figure was considered to show little difference from the amount of imports anticipated after full liberalization. In other words, the tangerine producers in recent years have been competing with oranges virtually in a situation similar to an assumed liberalization of oranges. Admitting these, however, the producers will suffer a serious psychological blow, once the liberalization is fully

materialized. How did the editorials comment on this point?

Compared with oranges, a sudden increase in the imports of beef through liberalization was anticipated to have an extremely serious impact upon the Japanese farmers with a smaller scale of production and a longer period of breeding. How did the local newspapers react to this point?

It was not until 1988 that the local newspapers began to discuss beef and oranges in their editorials. That was the time when the 12-item problem was brought to a tentative conclusion and when Japan and the United States started talks prior to the expiration of the Agreement in March. *The Ehime Shimbun* in the tangerine-producing prefecture discussed the cases seven times or at the highest frequency among all the papers, followed by six times in *the Okinawa Times* and five times in *the Minami Nihon Shimbun* in the beef-producing prefecture. Most of the other papers at least once discussed the cases in their editorials. Above all, *the Hokkaido Shimbun* and *the Kahoku Shimpo* took them up three times. The central papers, too, showed themselves interested, as *the Asahi* carried three editorials and *the Yomiuri* two in this connection.

It came as a surprise to me that none of the papers, except for *the Okinawa Times* and *the Hokkaido Shimbun*, carried editorials which sounded "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed," though this was expected to some extent. *The Ehime Shimbun*, *the Saga Shimbun*, and *the Minami Nihon Shimbun* were all "international." In short, the general trend of the newspapers was for the approving of liberalization.

*The Ehime Shimbun*, in its first editorial (in and after September 1985) concerning the liberalization of oranges and beef, stated as follows, supporting liberalization, on February 18, 1988: "We could hardly cope with the situation by means of import expansion alone. The Japanese agriculture in this age of interdependence has been oriented toward making considerable sacrifices willy-nilly. This is, as it were, the current of the times" (88a). *The Minami Nihon Shimbun*, on March 24, similarly sought a positive posture toward liberalization: "Concerning the liberalization of beef and oranges, rejection symptoms are deeply rooted within the LDP as well as among the

producers. Although we admit the situation where the producers within the country should be protected, Japan which has grown to be an economic big power while enjoying the maximum benefits from free trade, cannot indefinitely continue to oppose liberalization" (88a).

These calm responses on the part of the two prefectures directly involved in the production of beef cattle and tangerines, were beyond my expectations. Both these prefectures are producing commodities which can favorably compete with imported beef and oranges. This may be a factor that led to those editorials. Another conceivable reason is that the newspapers thought the Japanese beef cattle could qualitatively compete with imported beef for some time to come, in view of the results of the repeatedly held negotiations for increasing the import quotas.

On the other hand, in Hokkaido where beef-cattle breeding has been positively promoted through the enlargement of the scale of production, liberalization is considered to exert a more serious influence than in the other areas, and this was well manifested in the editorials. On April 3, 1988 when the negotiations were at a standstill, failing to reach a conclusion before the expiration of the Agreement, *the Hokkaido Shimbun* wrote: "What was conspicuous throughout the negotiations was the U.S. posture of not budging an inch. The Japanese side's assertion that it would cope with the situation by expanding the import quotas for the time being was turned down" (88a).

I earlier stated that *the Ehime Shimbun* and *the Minami Nihon Shimbun* were positively for liberalization, from the "international" standpoint. Look at their Charts again. *The Ehime Shimbun* shows that 88c and 88d are located as "criticizing the U.S. but open." *The Minami Nihon Shimbun* shows three editorials—88b, 88c, and 88d—as "international" or closer to "criticizing the U.S. but open." *The Shinano Mainichi* has one editorial which is "criticizing the U.S. but open." These editorials supported the "open" posture on the whole, but it seems that they were not necessarily in favor of it wholeheartedly. This was also the case with *the Asahi*. What was the reason for which each paper changed its posture from "international" to "criticizing the U.S. but open"?

The answer is, as already hinted at, in the criticism against the "high-handed" diplomatic posture of the United States which would not recognize a surcharge in return for an early liberalization. *The Ehime Shimbun* of April 11, 1988 was indignant and said: "The U.S. demands made bare the big-power egoism. They showed no consideration for the difficulties facing the Japanese agricultural producers. In the recent Japan-U.S. negotiations, the United States not only criticized Japan as continuing to protect those who are weak in competitive power, while earning pluses from trade balances, but also demanded that Japan take compensatory measures if its liberalization is delayed" (88d). On April 3, *the Minami Nihon Shimbun* stated that the recent Japan-U.S. negotiations had several aspects, one of which was "the U.S. side's haughty attitude which would reject any dialogue" (88b). Even *the Shinano Mainichi Shimbun*, which was generally more positive toward opening the markets for agricultural products, criticized the United States which would not recognize a surcharge, in its editorial of April 27, 1988 (88c).

*The Asahi* made some severe demands of the United States as regards the American attitude in the negotiations. The editorial of March 24, 1988 sharply criticized the United States as follows: "The United States has formally announced its policy of appealing immediately to GATT in case Japan will not accede to liberalization, in regard to the Agreement on the imports of beef and oranges which will expire at the end of March. That stiff posture has, indeed, baffled our country at the start as we are groping for some means whereby to reach a compromise somehow or other through political negotiations." (Note: the underline is by this author.)

As mentioned above, the editorials of the newspapers, including those which at first were positively for the opening of the markets, disclosed their feelings of displeasure, though with some shades of difference, against the United States which was sticky about its demands for complete liberalization and would not compromise an inch. In these editorial attitudes is to be perceived a sense of frustration wondering "why the United States cannot negotiate more like a gentleman, when Japan proposes to comply basically with the liberalization."

### Problem of Market-Opening for Rice

The opening of markets for rice is a rapidly growing question within Japan, as it was triggered by the RMA appeals for an invocation of Section 301 in 1986 and 1988, as earlier mentioned. With the full-scale development of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the debates have become more vigorous than ever. The newspapers carry many editorials in this connection. Ten editorials of *the Hokkaido Shimbun* dealt with the topic of the import liberalization of rice, followed by eight in *the Minami Nihon Shimbun*, seven in *the Ehime Shimbun*, and four or five in each of the other newspapers.

*The Akita Sakigake Shimpō*, whose editorial comments were "international" on the 12 items, beef and oranges, suddenly shifted to a negative posture toward the import liberalization of rice, as can be expected of a paper in a leading rice-producing prefecture. On November 9, 1986, the paper said in its editorial that Japan being the biggest importer of the American agricultural products, there is something very selfish in the American arguments. After pointing out that the United States itself has applied a surcharge on its imports of rice, the valiant editorial asserted as follows: "There is no persuasion in the American arguments, unless the United States itself corrects its protectionist policy and the closed nature of its agricultural markets. Japan must not yield to the American steamroller" (88b).

*The Niigata Nippo* in a similar rice-producing prefecture expressed its displeasure with the RMA appeals that requested negotiations presupposing retaliation. On October 25, 1986, the paper criticized the United States, saying: "Assuming that Japan has suddenly stopped the imports of rice which it has purchased in large quantities from the United States and that consequently the American farmers are in distress, then the U. S. posture of pressing Japan to import American rice, with the backing of some retaliatory measures, may be understandable. But Japan has never given a blow to the American farmers in such a form as that" (86b).

*The Saga Shimbun* carried six editorials referring to rice, but a

unified view is hardly to be seen partly because they are signed editorials, unlike the editorials in the other papers. On the rice problem, the views are divided among the editorial writers — one being “international,” four “conditionally closed,” and one “criticizing the U.S. and positively closed.” Here I will introduce the argument which is “positively closed.” The editorial of November 1, 1988 said: “However, so far as the rice problem is concerned, we should counter the United States ‘by pushing on to the front.’ We have experienced many cases, not limited to beef and oranges, in which our pulling caused the other party to push that much onto us. On the basis of a national consensus, therefore, we should be ready to make ‘sacrifices’ such as those we experienced in the face of the American demand for the liberalization of leather goods (at that time, Japan in compensation lowered tariffs on more than 100 other products)” (88b).

At first, the average arguments among the newspapers were that rice is the principal crop and has been recognized by GATT as a Japanese national trade item and that the national security will be affected if the rate of self-supply of rice is lowered as a result of liberalization. Accordingly, the arguments said, the Government should not liberalize rice for the time being but should lower the rice prices within the country, through rationalizing production and distribution, and thereby be prepared for future competition (“conditionally closed”). Some papers brought up social and cultural reasons, as *the Ehime Shimbun* did on October 27, 1986: “Former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Hada, in his talks with Mr. Yuetter, said that the paddy-rice cultivation in Japan is a source of Japanese culture which has been continuing for more than a millennium. If the import liberalization of rice is to be realized, Japan’s agricultural policy will be shaken root and stem, giving rise to serious social unrest and political confusion” (86a). But the editorials of this type were unexpectedly few.

It would be an exaggeration to say that all the papers were negative toward the liberalization of rice. *The Shinano Mainichi Shimbun* carried three editorials related to rice. The paper was quicker than the other papers to urge negotiations in the arena of multilateral consultation and emphasized the point that if Japan with black-ink balances in

trade excludes rice when market-opening is the general trend of the world, it cannot escape criticism. This assertion can be categorized as "international." About the time when criticism against the United States arose among agricultural circles over the second RMA appeal, the the Shinano Mainichi editorial of October 6, 1988 demanded a positive response of the Government, saying, "The posture that our country 'will not import a single grain of rice' is hard to maintain against the tide of internationalization" (88b). This editorial position is similar to that of *the Yomiuri*, a central paper, and is more sensitive than *the Asahi* to the international position.

Thus, the newspapers varied in their editorial comments on the rice problem. Compared with the arguments on the 12 items, beef and oranges, however, those on rice have shown a characteristic; that is, the arguments are being polarized. The editorial attitudes toward the 12 items, beef and oranges gradually changed from "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed" to "international." On the problem of rice, *the Shinano Mainichi*, followed by *the Ehime* and *the Minami Nihon*, recently takes the position that it will be difficult to continue a complete ban on imports in the future. On the other hand, *the Hokkaido*, *the Kahoku*, *the Akita Sakigake*, *the Niigata Nippo*, *the Sanyo*, and *the Okinawa* are still maintaining the arguments for a complete self-supply of rice. The polarization of opinions shows that it will take some more time before a national consensus can be reached on the handling of the problem. Throughout the period covered in this research, the problems lying between Japan and the United States were not limited to the opening of markets for agricultural products alone. I will briefly refer to this point in the final section and conclude this paper by answering the questions I raised at the outset.

### **Worried about the Growing Arguments That Japan Is Different**

The Japan-U.S. relations in and after September 1985 showed a clear difference from before, on the point that qualitative changes appeared in the economic frictions. This was partly resulted from the U.S. policy for urging market-opening on the premise of sanc-



tions. As against the sanctions applied to semiconductors in April 1987, the newspapers simultaneously denounced the U.S. action as a "unilateral measure." In the process of deliberations on the Omnibus Trade Act of August 1988, the papers repeatedly pressed for retraction of the Gephardt Clause that obligated a compulsory reduction in the black-ink balances. After the New Trade Act was passed, the papers sought prudence in its application.

Despite these demands, Super 301 was invoked against Japan in May 1989. Criticism was raised by *the Akita Sakigake Shimpo* on May 28, which said: "Market-opening or, otherwise, implementation of retaliatory measures is an utter outrage. It is natural that the Japanese Government should be maintaining the posture that it cannot agree to the negotiations backed with 'sanctions'." *The Sanyo Shim-bun* showed a somewhat different stance. Though saying that the U.S. firm posture of invoking sanctions was extremely regrettable, the paper on May 27 stated: "The crack, if widened, may cause international isolation of our country; hence, careful handling of the matter is to be desired. On the other hand, the Government should fully realize its responsibility in the development of the matter that has come to this pass and should deal with it from an international viewpoint." On the whole, the papers that "regretted the U.S. action but urged the Government to cope with the matter calmly" were predominant over the others that "expressed regret and demanded positive Japanese action."

In parallel with Super 301, the United States demanded structural renovations, including the distribution system, on the basis of the understanding that the Japanese social structure itself poses impediments to imports. The newspaper reactions to this question were a mixture of welcome and perplexity. On September 3, 1989, *the Hokkaido Shimbun* unfolded an optimistic view, as follows: "Under the present situation, Japan's favorable trade balances over the United States can hardly be reduced easily. Repeatedly finding fault with the U.S. side alone will not lead the matter to progress but rather to worsen. In order to prevent the Japan-U.S. relations from deteriorating and to construct an affluent Japanese society, we hope that a searching inquiry will be made into the structural problems." On the other hand, *the Minami Nihon Shimbun* on September 7 expressed a

pessimistic view: "The economic structure of a country has deep connections with the country's history, society, and culture. Therefore, structural adjustments will not be readily implemented." A larger number of editorials were for the optimistic views. Judging from the editorial trends on the problems of agricultural products, however, the optimistic views are unlikely to be kept intact as the negotiations progress to cover individual problems.

I have thus far shown the local newspapers' opinions about United States as they were revealed on the problem of market-opening for agricultural products. I can tentatively sum them up as follows:

First, the local papers' views of the United States were not monolithic at all, but each had its individual character. Their reactions were never one-sided, even aside from the topic of market-opening for agricultural products on which the local interests could be easily made clear. Such was perceived from their reactions to the sanctions imposed on semiconductors and to the Omnibus Trade Act which were not the objects of research this time. Far from the general understanding, there was no lack of individuality in the Japanese newspapers.

Secondly, the reactions to the American demands for the opening of markets can be divided into three types. Type 1 refers to the group of the papers that remained "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed," regardless of the progress of the negotiations. Type 2 shows the case in which the group of the papers that were "international" in the beginning did change to "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed" or to "conditionally closed," when the American demands became concrete as the negotiations progressed. Type 3 is about the group of the papers that started out with the "positively closed" posture, criticizing the American demands as unreasonable, but that changed, as time passed, to the positive posture of agreeing to the opening of markets. Among the editorials dealing with oranges and beef, the largest number is categorized as Type 3. On the 12 items, a larger number were for Type 3, but some others were for Type 1. On rice, the editorials are as yet overwhelmingly for Type 1.

Thirdly, the editorial opinions of the local papers are generally sensitive to the international demands made of Japan. This is endorsed by the fact that there were many cases in which the papers changed their

postures from "criticizing the U.S. and positively closed" to "international," saying that in view of its international position, Japan should positively accede to the American demands, and not that Japan would be compelled to open its markets because of the American demands. As stated before, the American offensives toward Japan in and after September 1985 were appalling and had great impacts upon the localities. Nevertheless, their anti-American sentiments were not so emotional. The United States should fully take note of this fact.

There is, however, no guarantee that they will remain the same in the future. The rise of the revisionist arguments that Japan is different is remarkable in the United States in 1989. They were neither strong nor influential at the time when the 12 items, beef and oranges became issues. When the rice problem is discussed seriously from now on, however, those arguments will throw delicate shadows on it. This conjecture will be supported by the following cases.

Among the editorial opinions about the United States, the most characteristic point was that the papers seriously called to account the manners in which the U.S. demands were presented though, of course, the contents of the demands were important. *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, whose posture is "international" on the question of market-opening for agricultural products, carried editorials which were focused on the style and the manners of the American diplomacy. Even if Japan is prepared to accept the contents of the American demands, there will remain frustration as in the case of beef, if the demands are presented in "coercive" manners again. Of course, it is conceivable that Japan will cease to regard the "high-handed" diplomacy of the United States as "coercive" and will be able to create a domestic policy-consensus. In that case, internal renovations will progress and the relationship between the two countries will go more smoothly. But this institutionalization of foreign pressure in Japan will not be so easy. What then will be the situation where there will be no need of a "high-handed" diplomacy on the part of the United States? Needless to say, that will be where Japan will open its markets by its own hands. But this is not likely to take place immediately, when we think of the present political situation. Thus, my first scenario will keep its high possibility. If so, the relative weight of the style and the manners

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of the American diplomacy influencing the Japanese views of the United States will increase, particularly because the structural problems related to the social and cultural systems and the sensitive problem like rice are the topics for serious debates. This is why I am worried about the rise of the arguments which demand that different rules be applied to Japan because it is different.

The Japan-U.S. relations are basically good. However, the day may come when they will become questionable in the process of the international political structure undergoing drastic changes, as a result of the rapid development of the U.S.-Soviet relations. We should calmly cope with it. Probably I am not alone in the hope that the "extreme arguments" rising in the United States and Japan will not trigger that to happen.

**The Hokkaido Shimbun**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>(9) 12 items (88a)<br/>                 (14) Beef, oranges (88c)</p>  | <p>OPEN</p> <p>(10) 12 items (88b)<br/>                 (11) 12 items (88c)</p>  |
| <p><b>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</b></p> <p>(3) Rice (86a)<br/>                 (4) Rice (86b)<br/>                 (5) Rice (86c)<br/>                 (6) Rice (87)<br/>                 (19) Rice (88e)</p> | <p><b>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</b></p> <p>(1) 12 items (86)<br/>                 (2) Marine products (86)<br/>                 (7) 12 items (87a)<br/>                 (8) 12 items (87b)<br/>                 (12) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>                 (13) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>                 (15) Rice (88a)<br/>                 (16) Rice (88b)<br/>                 (17) Rice (88c)<br/>                 (18) Rice (88d)<br/>                 (20) Rice (89)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

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**The Akita Sakigake Shimpo**

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>(2) 12 items (86)</p> <p>(6) 12 items (88)<br/>(7) Beef, oranges (88)<br/>(9) General (89)</p> | <p>OPEN</p>   |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p> <p>(2) Rice (86a)<br/>(4) Rice (88a)</p>                        | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>(3) Rice (86b)<br/>(5) Rice (88b)<br/>(8) Rice (88)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

**The Kahoku Shimpo**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>(4) 12 items (88a)<br/>(5) 12 items (88b)<br/>(6) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>(7) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>(8) Beef, oranges (88c)</p> | <p>OPEN</p>  |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p> <p>(3) General</p>   | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>(1) Rice (87a)<br/>(2) Rice (87b)<br/>(9) Rice (88a)<br/>(10) Rice (88b)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

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**The Shinano Mainichi Shimpō**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>(4) Beef, oranges (88c)</p> <p>(1) 12 items (88)<br/>                 (2) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>                 (3) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>                 (5) Rice (88a)<br/>                 (6) Rice (88b)<br/>                 (7) Rice (88c)<br/>                 (8) General (89)<br/>                 (9) Rice (89)</p> | <p>OPEN</p>                                |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p>  | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |




**The Niigata Nippo**

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>(2) 12 items (86)<br/>(3) General (86b)<br/>(10) 12 items (87a)<br/>(11) 12 items (87b)<br/>(12) 12 items (88)</p>   | <p>OPEN</p>   |
| <p><b>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</b></p> <p>(4) Rice (88a)<br/>(5) General (86c)<br/>(7) Rice (87a)<br/>(13) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>(14) Beef, oranges (88b)</p> | <p><b>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</b></p> <p>(1) General (86a)<br/>(6) Rice (86b)<br/>(8) Rice (87b)<br/>(9) General (87)<br/>(15) Rice (88)<br/>(16) Rice (89)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

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**The Sanyo Shimibun**

|   |   |
|---|---|
|  | <b>OPEN</b>   |
|   | (3) 12 items (88b)  |
| <b>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</b><br><br>(4) Rice (89)                            | <b>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</b><br><br>(1) 12 items (87)<br>(2) 12 items (88a) |
|   | <b>CLOSED</b>   |

**The Ehime Shimbun**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>(5) 12 items (87c)<br/>         (8) 12 items (88e)<br/>         (9) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>         (12) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>         (15) Beef, oranges (88e)<br/>         (16) Beef, oranges (88f)<br/>         (17) Beef, oranges (88g)<br/>         (21) Rice (89b)</p> | <p>OPEN</p> <p>(13) Beef, oranges (88c)<br/>         (14) Beef, oranges (88d)</p>  |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p> <p>(1) 12 items (86)<br/>         (3) Rice (86b)<br/>         (7) 12 items (87d)<br/>         (10) Rice (88a)<br/>         (11) Rice (88b)<br/>         (18) Rice (88c)<br/>         (19) Rice (88d)<br/>         (20) Rice (89a)</p>             | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>(2) Rice (86a)<br/>         (4) 12 items (87a)<br/>         (5) 12 items (87b)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

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**The Saga Simbun**

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>(13) Rice (88c)</p> <p>(1) General (86)<br/>         (4) Rice (86c)<br/>         (6) 12 items (87)<br/>         (7) 12 items (88)<br/>         (8) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>         (9) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>         (10) Beef, oranges (88c)<br/>         (14) General (89)</p> | <p>OPEN</p>   |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p> <p>(2) Rice (86a)<br/>         (3) Rice (86b)<br/>         (5) Rice (87)<br/>         (11) Rice (88a)</p>   | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>(12) Rice (88b)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

**The Minami Nihon Simbun**

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>(12) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>                 (13) Beef, oranges (88c)<br/>                 (14) Beef, oranges (88d)</p> <p>(1) General (86)<br/>                 (6) 12 items (87a)<br/>                 (8) 12 items (87c)<br/>                 (9) 12 items (88a)<br/>                 (10) 12 items (88b)<br/>                 (11) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>                 (15) Beef, oranges (88e)<br/>                 (16) 12 items (88)<br/>                 (21) Rice (89b)</p> | <p>OPEN</p> <p>(7) 12 items (87b)</p>   |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p> <p>(3) Rice (86a)<br/>                 (4) Rice (86b)<br/>                 (5) Rice (87)<br/>                 (19) Rice (88c)<br/>                 (20) Rice (89a)<br/>                 (22) Rice (89c)</p>   | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>(2) 12 items (86)<br/>                 (17) Rice (88a)<br/>                 (18) Rice (88b)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

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**The Okinawa Times**

|  |  |
|--|--|
|  | OPEN   |
| <p><b>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</b></p> <p>(11) Beef, oranges (88c)<br/>(12) Beef, oranges (88d)<br/>(13) Beef, oranges (88e)<br/>(14) Beef, oranges (88f)<br/>(16) Rice (89)</p> | <p><b>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</b></p> <p>(1) 12 items (86)<br/>(2) 12 items (87a)<br/>(3) 12 items (87b)<br/>(4) 12 items (87c)<br/>(5) 12 items (87d)<br/>(6) 12 items (88a)<br/>(7) 12 items (88b)<br/>(8) 12 items (88c)<br/>(9) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>(10) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>(15) Rice (88)</p> <p><b>CLOSED</b></p> |

**The Asahi Simbun**

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>(1) 12 items (86a)<br/>(7) 12 items (87)<br/>(8) 12 items (88)<br/>(9) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>(12) Beef, oranges (88d)<br/>(15) Rice (89a)<br/>(16) rice (89b)</p> | <p>OPEN</p> <p>(10) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>(11) Beef, oranges (88c)</p>                |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p> <p>(4) Rice (86b)<br/>(5) General (87)<br/>(6) Pice (87)<br/>(13) Rice (88a)<br/>(14) Rice (88b)</p>                                 | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>(2) 12 items (86b)<br/>(3) Rice (86a)</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |

Japan-U. S. Frictions Seen from Localities

**The Yomiuri Shimbun**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>(1) 12 items (86)<br/>(3) 12 items (87a)<br/>(4) 12 items (87b)<br/>(5) 12 items (88)<br/>(6) Beef, oranges (88a)<br/>(7) Beef, oranges (88b)<br/>(8) Rice (88)<br/>(9) Rice (89)</p> | <p>OPEN</p>                                |
| <p>JAPAN, TOO, IS RESPONSIBLE</p> <p>(2) Rice (86)</p>   | <p>U. S. IS UNREASONABLE</p> <p>CLOSED</p> |