Besieged and Beleaguered: The United States and Western Export Control Policy, 1954 -1956
（悩める大国アメリカ：1950年代の禁輸政策の一側面）

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SUMMARY IN JAPANESE: 本稿は1950年代におけるアメリカの対共産圏貿易統制政策の変容過程の分析を通じて、冷戦期アメリカの対同盟国政策の一側面をうつし出すことを目的としている。

朝鮮休戦、インドシナ講和後の国際関係の変化を背景に西欧諸国および日本は、アメリカの主導のもとにうちたてられた戦後対共産圏禁輸制度の改訂を要求する。アイゼンハワー政権は、中国共産主義政権の脅威認識の差異、国際貿易統制の目的自体の解釈の違いなどに基づく西側同盟内部の利害調整に対して現実主義的な基本的態度で臨む。しかし、肥大した連邦政府官僚機構による速やかな政策立案·調整の失敗、ココムの多角主義を守ることを目的とした2国間交渉方式の挫折、米英協力態勢の終結等を原因として、1957年、いわゆる「チャイナディファレンシャル」の事実上の撤廃とともに国際貿易統制システムは大きな変換期を迎えるに至る。

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In an exercise of its peculiar brand of internationalism, the United States created various multilateral organizations under its aegis in the early post-World War II years and earnestly employed them as handmaidens of its anti-Communist, anti-revolutionary global policy. These vehicles of post-war U.S. foreign policy varied widely in their organizing principles, unifying objectives and membership, ranging from formal political organizations to military alliances to economic groupings relying solely on voluntary cooperation among their members. The Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group (CG) is one of the most notable examples of voluntary cooperative institutions. It was a mechanism through which the United States sought to enhance the Western capitalist world's strategic advantage vis-à-vis the Communist bloc in the post-war world of accelerating global economic integration and interdependence. Commonly known as COCOM, this international organization provided the United States and its allies in the Western capitalist world with a forum in which to formulate a common export control program designed to help fight the cold and hot wars with their Communist opponents. Its organizational structure was roughly two-tiered: the CG was the overarching decision-making forum where the basic governing principles of Western economic warfare were discussed and agreed upon. Underneath that top layer were two administrative arms: COCOM, which was charged with the actual implementation of export control policy for the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites and the China Committee (CHINCOM), the parallel unit for running the export control program aimed at Communists states in Asia.

Despite its preponderance in the international economy in the early post-war period, however, the United States never commanded an unbridled control over this economic arm of the anti-Communist alliance system. From its very inception as a multinational organization in January 1950, the history of COCOM was rife with bitter disputes among its members. Existing studies of Western multilateral export control policy have amply demonstrated that the United States was under constant pressure from its allies to adjust the scope and severity of trade controls across the ideological dividing line to the changing realities of international relations. As the death of Joseph Stalin and the Korean armistice ushered in a new phase of global confrontation in 1953, the allies began to argue that the new international circumstances justified and necessitated a major redefinition of the Western industrialized world's relationship with the Communist camp and a recalibration of its common export control

program was one of the required policy adjustments.[1]

Leading historians of the early years of COCOM have demonstrated that Anglo-American diplomacy was the most important driving force within that international organization. For example, negotiations between Washington and London catalyzed a major revision of the COCOM export control lists in August 1954. But historians are far from unanimous as to who should claim credit for the policy change. They disagree over the relative weight to be accorded the British and American initiatives and over the appraisal of President Dwight Eisenhower's personal role in the policy-making process in Washington and in trans-Atlantic diplomacy.[2] These interpretive differences and the trenchancy of the debate that arose from them, however, should not obscure this fact: these historians share important common ground in having refined our understanding of post-war Western economic warfare, and in enabling us to transcend the fallacy of American omnipotence in Western alliance politics. Invoking highly complex interactive processes which coalesced into a significant shift in the West's multilateral trade control policy in mid 1954, these studies demonstrated that the United States was neither the sole locus of power nor a singularly self-aggrandizing party within the anti-Communist economic entente.

Indeed, what is most remarkable about the evolution of U.S. export control policy between 1953 and 1954 is the extent to which key American officials, most notably the President himself, stood ready to accommodate Britain and other Western alllies' economic needs and embrace its political initiatives. In numerous remarks at National Security Council meetings during his first two years in office, Eisenhower expressed sympathy for the economic plight of America's allies and indicated his solicitude about losing their allegiance to the multilateral export control system if the United States failed to be the ultimate guarantor of their economic interests. Scarcely ever was the subject of East-West trade control discussed in top-level policy deliberations without the President lecturing his cabinet members about the need for striking a proper balance between the imperatives of economic containment and the solidarity of the Western world. His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, showed no less appreciation of the fact that the effectiveness and legitimacy of the multilateral trade control program, not based on a formal treaty and enforced only through member nations' internal administrative measures, depended critically on the allies' voluntary cooperation. He understood that if the United States failed to embrace the allies' interests, the country was bound to become isolated in the

system of its own making.[3]

Despite their avowed commitment to multilateral voluntary cooperation, the CG was in serious danger of disintegration by the end of the administration's first term. In August 1956, a top-level U.S. internal document indicated that principal allies were rapidly losing interest in adhering to the CG's multilateral cooperative framework, and that the entire system of anti-Communist trade control was rapidly coming undone.[4] The threat of the system's breakdown did not stem from a lack of American commitment to multilateralism in the CG. Rather, the multilateral system began to crumble, and opportunities for mending it in a timely fashion were missed between 1954 and 1956 because of misguided American efforts to protect the very principle of multilateralism. In a supreme irony of misdirected good intentions and political miscalculations, the Eisenhower administration almost destroyed the CG's voluntary multilateral cooperative framework in order to save it. This article is an effort to place the erosion of the Western export control program's multilateral basis at mid-decade, and the United States' response to that centrifugal process within the context of its failed alliance diplomacy.

As the world entered an era of chronic tension in late 1954, the Western allies' demand for renegotiating the multilateral trade control arrangements became notably more strident. In the face of the allies' growing restiveness, the Eisenhower administration continued to view CG members' voluntary cooperation as the cornerstone of the Western export control effort and remained willing to pay a significant price for securing their continued allegiance to the system. Its commitment to multilateralism was decidedly inspired by pragmatism. It inherited the anti-Communist trade control system set up by the Truman administration, but it never considered this bequest to be a sacred cow. Nor did officials in the Eisenhower administration have unrealistic expectations about American ability to enforce an air-tight multilateral embargo against the wills of its fellow CG members. Aside from Eisenhower's frequent professions both in public and private, Dulles perhaps best exemplified such non-dogmatism and realism from the early days of the administration. In May 1953, he stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States should be "tolerant of a certain amount of East-West trade" in Europe. Given the high level of pre-war economic interdependence between Eastern and Western Europe, it was neither possible nor advisable, said the Secretary, to try to block the flow of trade across the ideological dividing line beyond the point of a net

political and strategic advantage to Western Europe.[5]

The administration's fundamental pragmatism about the integrative forces of the international economy was not limited to Western Europe's commercial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Japan's trade with the PRC was viewed with similar realism. As Dulles unequivocally stated in his response to nagging inquiries by Senator Joseph McCarthy, the administration never intended to try to prevent the Western capitalist world's trade with the People's Republic of China if there were, as interpreted by the United States, economic transactions to be concluded to the West's net security advantage. He explained to the red-baiting senator that the United States, lacking absolute control over the workings of the international marketplace, had no choice but to acquiesce in some level of commercial intercourse between its allies and the PRC because it "befits little to try to stop one avenue of trade if new ones are opened up," and it might be "better to tolerate a small amount of trade which is controlled as to the kind and to quantity." The relentless inquisition by McCarthyites in Congress and the fact of the PRC's involvement in the Korean War did not stop the administration from publicly declaring as early as 1953 that it was not going to coerce its allies into forgoing all trade with this Asian Communist state, for the only workable mechanism for multilateral trade restriction was voluntary cooperation by its participants.[6]

This public affirmation of pragmatism resonated with the Eisenhower administration's first internal policy statement on economic defense policy. Superseding the Truman administration's export control policy, NSC 152/2 stipulated that in this "long period of tension short of war," the United States was to interfere in trade between its allies and the Soviet bloc only where "a clear advantage to the free world would accrue from such interference." As implicit assumptions of this new policy guideline, the administration accepted the limit of its control over its allies' trade with the Soviet bloc in peacetime, and sought to harness this irresistible force into a pacifier for trade-hungry allies and a weapon for countering non-military threats posed by the rival camp. NSC 152/2, however, turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophesy. By making the administration more accepting of East-West trade, the new policy irrevocably altered the dynamics of trans-Atlantic diplomacy over this question. Increasingly forceful British and French calls for a relaxation of inter-European trade restrictions gained a more receptive hearing in Washington between 1953 and 1954, and the ultimate result of this recursive process was a major downward revision of

the COCOM international lists which went into effect on August 16, 1954.[7]

The 1954 COCOM list revision gave the United States a temporary respite in the continuous multilateral tug-of-war over trade with the Communist bloc, but the breathing spell proved quite short-lived. It merely marked the beginning of the allies' renewed bid for greater leeway in managing their commercial relations with their ideological enemies, and after the summer of 1954 their main agenda shifted to the relaxation of multilateral trade controls against the PRC. Since December 1950, CG members enforced varying levels of restrictions on their commercial transactions with the PRC, topped by the complete trade embargo and ban on financial transactions enforced by the United States. These anti-Chinese trade sanctions were generally far more sweeping and stringent than the trade controls applied against the European Soviet bloc. The discussion of China trade controls was conspicuously excluded from the August 1954 review of multilaterally-agreed trade control lists. As a result of this deliberate omission, the gap between the trade control levels enforced against the European and Asian components of the Communist bloc economy widened after the summer of 1954. A discrepancy of 265 embargo items, technically called the China differential, then began to haunt the Western economic alliance as a new and growing source of friction, and the Eisenhower administration would spend the next 3 years haggling with other CG members over this issue in and outside of CHINCOM.[8]

For several reasons, the Eisenhower administration had long anticipated that this problem would arise after the COCOM list revision. First, as most allies considered the more stringent trade sanctions against the PRC a temporary measure during the military exigency on the Korean peninsula, the administration expected them to seek the elimination of the differential once as armistice was achieved. This prediction was confirmed when the British government proposed the adoption of a single list for the entire Communist bloc as early as September 1953, barely two months after the armistice; the Japanese, claiming a special relationship to this neighboring market, began pressing for a downward adjustment of the China trade controls soon after the British gambit. In the multilateral CG negotiations leading up to the 1954 COCOM list revision, the United States persuaded its allies to accept the continued discriminatory treatment of the PRC on the grounds that the military situation in Indochina remained critical. The administration pursued this dilatory policy in the CG in order to garner the support of the U.S. military and other hard-liners within for

liberalization of intra-European trade. But the political settlement of the Indochinese conflict in July 1954 undermined that rationale. The British and the Japanese lost no time in making more formal requests for a multilateral review of the China embargo list in September 1954. Meanwhile, American officials were fully aware that the COCOM list reduction would in effect open a new avenue of trade, whereby the PRC could purchase strategic goods on the differential list from Western Europe through the European Soviet bloc. The Americans realized that such indirect trade, if it got out of hand, would make it extremely difficult for them to convince the other CG members that the China differential was effectively serving its purpose: denial of strategic goods needed by the Chinese Communists for building their war-making potential.[9]

The problem of transshipment became acute soon after the COCOM list revision. In the fall of 1954, the State Department was alarmed by the systematic frustration of the China trade controls by the Beijing regime, with subtle collaboration by America's Western European allies. It accused traders in Western Europe, particularly the British, of shipping materials on the China embargo list to the European Soviet bloc with full knowledge that the goods' ultimate recipient would be the Chinese. The Americans urged Western European governments to enforce more effective licensing controls and end-use checks, but the situation continued to deteriorate through the remainder of the year. By January 1955, a key intelligence report painted a dire picture of this form of back-channel China trade getting out of control. The increased volume of trade between Western and Eastern Europe in recently decontrolled items, and the diversion of significant portions of it to the PRC, was making the China differential an increasingly ineffective method of economic warfare against Beijing, said the report. Through the hole made in the international embargo network by the COCOM list reduction, the Chinese Communists were procuring substantial amounts of embargoed strategic and capital goods essential to their economic and military development program, even though the cumbersome indirect purchases through the European Soviet bloc added to their costs and severely strained the nation's transportation facilities.[10]

While the administration maintained the official position that the differential controls needed to be retained on strategic and psychological grounds, in its internal policy debates it readily admitted the absurdity of the China differential. By the fall of 1954 officials recognized that the United States should seek a uniform level of controls against the whole of the Communist bloc, to restore

the efficacy of the multilateral export control program itself. Faced with repeated indications by the leading CG members that they wished to discuss the problem multilaterally at a CG meeting, many administration officials, including Eisenhower and Dulles, believed that the United States should preempt the debate before the allies had a chance to force it on the Americans on terms inimical to U.S. interests.[11]

But despite early awareness of the problem, the Eisenhower administration failed to take the initiative in activating multilateral discussions on China trade controls and allowed its allies to dictate the terms of alliance politics. On August 4, 1955, to the great consternation of American officials, the French government revealed its intention to request a CG meeting to discuss the elimination of the China differential. Washington's immediate response to this unexpected French initiative was to request to Paris that it defer its call for CG discussions until after the Foreign Minister's Meeting in Geneva scheduled for October. Arguing that the French government acted in contradiction to the established practice of US-UK-French trilateral preconsultation before major CG policy initiatives, Dulles narrowly managed to contain the French move. Through subsequent diplomatic maneuvering, the State Department further succeeded in obtaining the French and British agreement to delay the calling of a CG meeting on the China trade controls until December.[12]

One reason for the administration's failure to stay at the cutting edge of the multilateral debate was its internal division. The sheer complexity of the problem also tended to exacerbate such cacophony within the decision-making apparatus. In late 1954, the administration mandated the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, a newly established inter-agency policy advisory board, to study the problem of China trade controls in the context of accelerating transshipment resulting from the COCOM list revision. Due to its very nature as an assemblage of representatives from various agencies involved in foreign economic policy, the CFEP was a perfect breeding ground for paralyzing bureaucratic in-fighting. By assigning the study of such an incendiary issue to this inherently division-prone advisory committee, the administration effectively precluded a timely preemptive move. As expected, the CFEP divided sharply and irreconcilably over what exactly was wrong with the current multilateral trade control system. It issued a report in April 1955, but it failed to offer any specific vision of a new anti-PRC export control program; instead it simply proposed a comprehensive inter-agency review to hammer out a policy which

could "command government-wide adherence." At the same time, in the course of this intense bureaucratic tug-of-war, visible signs of the PRC's unmitigated aggressiveness, for example, the bombardment of the off-shore islands in the Taiwan Strait which began in September 1954, provided a margin of advantage to the hard-liners in the CFEP's policy debate. As a result, the CFEP affirmed the existing U.S. export control policy and recommended that no substantial change be made in the multilateral China trade controls for the time being.[13]

The administration also failed to act promptly on the crisis looming on the horizon because the summer and fall of 1955 was hardly an ideal time to embark upon a time-consuming, comprehensive policy review concerning the CHINCOM controls. A series of major diplomatic events, spearheaded by the Geneva Big-Four Summit in July, crowded the administration's calender. In this open diplomatic season, it was all too tempting for American leaders to set aside long-term policy-making, and instead use East-West trade as a bargaining chip in the immediate encounters with their friends and leading enemy. In negotiations with the Soviet Union at the Geneva Summit, Americans prominently linked a relaxation of East-West trade controls to specific Soviet military and security concessions. With the President's concurrence, the question of China trade controls was altogether excluded from the summit agenda.[14]

Prior to the Geneva Summit, the United States secured grudging British and French acceptance of a unified Western position on East-West trade. The three leading CG members agreed that concessions regarding the West's security trade control system should not be made for the sake of commercial benefits alone and that such concessions should be synchronized with common disarmament and security concerns of the Western alliance. American officials obviously assumed that this trilateral agreement on East-West trade would keep the British and the French in line through the summer, and that the administration could delay a comprehensive review of China trade control policy until later in the year. Based on this optimistic projection, the CFEP reaffirmed its position in July 1955: the status quo in multilateral trade controls should be maintained at least through the Geneva Foreign Minister's Meeting scheduled for October.[15]

The administration had another reason for not wanting to take action on China trade controls in the summer and fall of 1955: US-PRC Ambassadorial talks aimed at settling outstanding bilateral issues began in Geneva on August 1. In Dulles' words, it was "unthinkable" for the United States to overhaul its China

trade policy while negotiations between U. Alexis Johnson and Wang Ping-nam were under way, because the embargo was one of the very few leverages that Americans could bring to bear on the Chinese at the negotiating table. The timing of the French proposal for a CG meeting, made less than a week after the opening of the Johnson-Wang talks, therefore could not have been worse from the U.S. point of view. While the top echelon of the U.S. government genuinely believed that an adjustment in Western embargo policy should await the outcomes of these major diplomatic events, this wait-and-see policy precluded early U.S. action, that is, before the China trade problem became too explosive.[16]

Divergent assessments within the Western alliance about international relations in Asia in the mid-decade also made the Eisenhower administration reluctant to address the question of China trade controls at the multilateral CG forum. By 1955, Western Europeans, most notably Great Britain, had come to believe that the political and military situation in Asia was settled by the cease-fire in Korea and the conclusion of the Indochina war, and no longer warranted penalizing the PRC more than the rest of the Communist bloc. In Washington, except for Eisenhower, most top officials still considered the PRC a major military threat, and Beijing's refusal at the Johnson-Wang talks to publicly renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait frustrated many American policy-makers. Such a declaration, carrying as it would a host of diplomatic implications inimical to Beijing's vital interests, such as tacit acknowledgement of the rival Taiwanese regime's lawful existence, was simply not forthcoming in 1955.[17]

Disagreement over the nature of the threat posed by the PRC naturally produced different prescriptions among CG members regarding trade with the Communist bloc. In the fall of 1955, the United States was willing to liberalize trade only with the European Communist states. In the words of the Secretary of State, the administration regarded the "post-Geneva" period as a probationary period, during which it was willing to see how Moscow would respond to greater commercial interaction with the West. The British and the French, on the other hand, believed that it was no longer necessary nor logical to make a distinction between the Chinese and Soviet-East European parts of the bloc economy. Given the bloc's increasing economic integration, as evidenced by Beijing's acquisition of significant quantities of embargoed materials from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the China differential had already lost its strategic value, they contended; and this reminder of the hot war earlier in the

decade had become an unnecessary impediment to inter-bloc trade and a gratuitous source of intra-alliance bickering. Furthermore, the British considered themselves no longer obligated by the UN resolution to maintain the differential control against the PRC, since the Chinese Communists were not actively engaged in aggression on the Korean peninsula any more.[18]

While resisting pressures from London and Paris for a fresh look at the China control list through the summer and fall of 1955, American officials were keenly aware that they had to accommodate their allies' interests to some extent if they wished to preserve the multilateral voluntary cooperative framework of the CG. As Dulles privately admitted in early October, these were honest differences among friends, and his country had no choice but to give in to some allied demands to maintain allegiance to the common export control program. But to the extent that the administration allowed itself to be constrained by the familiar trump card of economic containment at the negotiating tables in Geneva, it ceased to be the master of its own diplomacy. But its fear of relinquishing this bargaining chip revealed its insecurity. As illustrated by Dulles' expression of trepidation at an internal policy debate, American officials were all too aware of the limits of their country's ability to persuade the allies to reinstate trade restrictions in the event that the policy of reconciliation failed to bring about corresponding behavioral change in their Communist opponents. By agreeing to remove some of the remaining restrictions, the United States might be unleashing political forces and momentum that could well become overwhelming and uncontrollable.[19]

Regardless of what the United States was prepared to do, however, the political momentum was steadily building up by late 1955. The chasm between the United States and leading CG members widened and the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Geneva did nothing to iron out the differences between the United States and its two European allies. Dulles stressed to British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan in Geneva that it was imperative for London to stand by the United States on the China trade question for the duration of the Johnson-Wang talks. Citing the mounting pressures from the British business community to adopt uniform controls against the PRC and the European bloc countries, however, Macmillan told Dulles that the British government had largely lost interest in tinkering with the existing China control list but had to insist on the wholesale abandonment of the differential as a matter of principle. As if the challenge from the leading Europeans was not troublesome enough, the United

States faced an increasingly assertive Japan on the Asian front. Throughout the summer and fall of 1955, Tokyo repeatedly told the State Department that if a thaw in East-West relations should result in a further relaxation of the COCOM controls, Japan would simply have to insist on a corresponding reduction in the CHINCOM controls. The Japanese were determined not to let their main concern—trade restrictions against the PRC—be passed over by the CG again.[20]

The United States was held hostage to what turned out to be fruitless bilateral talks with the PRC, and the Big-Four consultations in Geneva produced little beyond nebulous expectations for peace. In consequence, Britain's patience ran out. The British therefore forced the issue on Washington, but in a way substantively different from the French call for a CG meeting in August. On December 3, Macmillan served notice to the State Department that due to parliamentary and business pressures, the British government had no choice but unilaterally to eliminate the China differential by a "gradual and unobtrusive process" starting January 15, 1956, if no action along that line was taken multilaterally by the CG by then. It was the first time that a key member of the CG suggested the possibility of breaking away from its multilateral cooperative framework. Dismayed as they were about this sudden ultimatum, U.S. officials still saw a silver lining in Macmillan's notice. The British Foreign Secretary assured Washington that his government would continue to work through the China Committee by keeping it apprised of London's impending actions. Dulles knew the Americans' immediate task was to prevent the British from weakening the CG's multilateralism by adopting a unilateral national policy not underscored by multilateral agreement. This would represent a dangerous precedent to be set by one of the organization's key members. He urged Macmillan to withhold any action until both sides had a chance to discuss the China trade problem directly during an impending visit to the United States by Prime Minister Anthony Eden. In response to this entreaty, the British Foreign Secretary agreed to postpone any "effective action" until after the Eisenhower-Eden summit in late January 1956.[21]

Prompted by Macmillan's notice of an impending unilateral and graduated elimination of the China differential, Dulles told Eisenhower that the administration could afford no further delay in considering a downward adjustment of the CHINCOM controls. Mandated by NSC 5429/5 to initiate a policy reappraisal if the China differential became too divisive an issue within the Western alliance, the Secretary conceded to the President on December 8 that the U.S.

effort through 1955 to persuade other CG member nations to maintain the more stringent embargo program against the PRC had failed and had resulted in a hazardous level of ill-will in America's relations with its important allies. As far as Dulles could see, his country basically had only two choices in dealing with the situation. Either the U.S. could forsake the CG's multilateral framework and seek acceptable bilateral side-deals with the allies by applying economic and political pressures, or Washington could continue to seek voluntary adherence to multilaterally-agreed controls through friendly persuasion. In his opinion, there was "no effective alternative to a voluntary multilateral control system," as bilateral pressure backed by U.S. economic and diplomatic superiority might force some allies into a half-hearted compliance, but such a strong-arm tactic was bound to alienate them. Moreover, if U.S. coercive pressures were flouted, not only would it inflict a serious blow to U.S. leadership in the CG, but the legitimacy of the multilateral trade control system based on voluntary cooperation would appreciably diminish. To Dulles, the appropriate choice for the administration was quite clear.[22]

The Secretary spelled out his crisis control proposal before the National Security Council in early December. In order to "salvage whatever could be salvaged of the free world's control system," the United States would have to acquiesce to the allies' demand for relaxing the China trade controls: the remaining restrictions "had better be changed by the agreement of the free world nations as a whole rather than as a result of unilateral action by individual free world governments." Other members of the cabinet, such as Treasury Secretary George Humphrey and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, agreed that it was time to unify the COCOM and CHINCOM lists as demanded by the British and other CG members, if for no other reason than that the PRC could get materials it needed via transshipment, albeit at higher costs. Anticipating the shock effects of a wholesale elimination of the China differential, however, the President expressed his preference for liberalizing Western trade with the PRC "on an individual basis, agreeing to decontrol specific items rather than proceeding to decontrol the entire China Committee list." Open-minded as he was to the allies' trade with the PRC, he feared a domestic backlash to a precipitous change in the existing trade sanctions against the Chinese Communist regime.[23]

In its effort to save the multilateral consultative organization, the administration faced a number of roadblocks beyond anti-PRC domestic and Congressional opinion. Opposition to any relaxation of the China trade controls, espe-

cially unmatched by Chinese concessions in security matters, remained strong within the administration. In addition to the military's continued belief in the security value of the differential, many officials feared that an abatement of these extra trade sanctions against the PRC might increase Japan's dependence on industrial materials and foodstuffs from mainland Chinese sources and place the nation under Beijing's political sway. The diversity of opinions within the administration was so entrenched as to continue to paralyze its policy formulation. But at the end of 1955, the American government did not have the luxury of time. It needed to present some interim offer to Eden on the occasion of his forthcoming visit. It fell on the CFEP to resume its study of the China trade controls and to put together a position paper in short order for the President's use during the Anglo-American summit in Washington in late January.[24]

Himself a part of the highly-institutionalized federal bureaucracy charged with making America's foreign economic policy, Eisenhower perhaps had little choice but to keep referring this divisive issue back to the CFEP, which had already proven itself a caldron of antagonistic bureaucratic interests. And yet, it was not the best of moves. The CFEP again advised the administration to proceed in a direction he and Dulles consider mistaken. He was advised to seek British consent to tighten rather than relax multilateral export controls. Only in the event that some form of concessions should become absolutely necessary to prevent the immediate collapse of the multilateral export control program should the United States acquiesce in a reduction in the existing controls, and then only a minimal deletion. The possible deletion of 19 items from the current CHINCOM list was conceivable but only with a tie-in to the re-embargo of copper wire and improved controls over merchant vessels. Overall, the package would have been a slap in the face for the visiting British Prime Minister.[25]

At this critical point in Anglo-American diplomacy, the two men situated at the top of the U.S. foreign policy-making structure were immobilized by the chimera of their overgrown bureaucracy. But neither Eisenhower nor Dulles was prepared to repudiate publicly the recommendations of the experts on the CFEP, and the President resorted to circumvention. He chose not to present the package to Eden as a basis for bilateral discussions, and in general during the summit meeting he maintained a tone more conciliatory than the CFEP position paper. Nevertheless, the existence of a powerful counterforce within his own government effectively deterred Eisenhower and Dulles from converting

the crisis created by the British ultimatum into an opportunity.[26]

While Eisenhower and Dulles stood ready to accommodate London's demands to the extent they felt strategically warranted and politically feasible, some American officials were clearly frustrated by their inability, despite London's obvious dependence on Washington's good graces in many areas, to keep the British in line on this matter of crucial importance to Western security. Indeed, the view that the United States should be able to ride roughshod over this recalcitrant ally was an underlying rationale for the coercive policy advocated in some circles of the American government. The problem, however, did not lend itself to such a simple solution.[27]

As Eisenhower himself observed to Eden during the summit meeting, the problem of trade with the PRC was extremely complicated; many facets demanded consideration. One of the sources of its complexity was the asymmetrical development of the Communist bloc economy. Compared to the European Soviet bloc, the mainland Chinese economy lagged in its degree of industrialization and technological advancement. This developmental gap created a point of profound disagreement among CG members. One reason the United States and Great Britain began to diverge so widely on the question of China trade controls was that they had very different ideas about what the West should seek to achieve through the economic quarantine of the PRC. As the problem of transshipment to the PRC became more serious in the course of 1955, even Eisenhower and Dulles continued to believe that some level of differential controls should remain in place for psychological as well as for strategic reasons. In that sense, their positions still remained within the broad parameters laid out in NSC 152/3 and NSC 5429/5, the documents which constituted the administration's basic policy regarding China trade controls. Under these policy directives, the administration was mandated to retard both China's military build-up and the growth of its industrial base which supported its war machine as opposed to the more limited goal of hampering the war-making potential of the European Soviet bloc.[28]

The British did not espouse such an expansive objective. They focused on the undeniable facts that embargoed goods were being filtered to the PRC via the European Soviet bloc, and that British business and industrial circles were clamoring for this extra margin of trade with the vast Asian continental market. As Eden told Eisenhower, what the British government needed was some visible proof, to be shown to Parliament and to domestic interest groups, that their

voices were being heard and that some progress was being made in the multilateral forum. The residual strategic value of the differential, on which the United States insisted, was not uppermost in the minds of the British leaders. The incongruity of interests was not something that the United States could expect to make disappear by use of coercive measures or as a result of a brief direct encounter between the top leaders.[29]

What emerged from the top-level U.S.-U.K. talks was an ambiguous bilateral agreement that the China trade controls would be reviewed "now and periodically as to their scope, in the light of changing conditions, so that they may best serve the interests of the Free World." The wording of the agreement represented a compromise which satisfied neither side, a perfect recipe for contending interpretations that would cause the Anglo-American alliance to fester through much of 1956. Behind the closed doors of the summit talks, however, the President offered to refer the list of commodities on the China differential which the British wished to decontrol to an item-by-item technical review by the CFEP's working group. Without negating the overall strategic value of the multilateral security control program or creating the deleterious psychological and political effects of the differential's sudden disappearance, Eisenhower hoped this piecemeal approach would deflect the immediate pressure from the British and keep them from acting independently of the CG's multilateral decontrol procedures.[30]

Only after a long and arduous process of attempting to reconcile irreconcilable bureaucratic interests and perspectives was the CFEP's technical group able to complete its evaluation of the British list in late March. Their report, representing the lowest common denominator among the agencies participating in the evaluation, suggested that as an area of concession and only to the extent it would become politically necessary, the U.S. government might negotiate the decontrol of 81 items of least economic and strategic importance to the PRC. As for negotiation tactics, the CFEP recommended that the administration make bilateral approaches to major CG members starting with Japan, to be followed closely by the British. The general tone of the package was still uncompromising, and its only novelty was the recommendation that the United States should no longer tie the question of China trade controls to the Johnson-Wang Talks. But by far the most serious long-term implication of the CFEP's new recommendation lay in its advocacy of bilateralism as the negotiating strategy for protecting the CG's multilateral framework from the allies' assaults.

This approach was innately self-defeating, and it also implied a departure from the administration's public commitment to multilateralism in export control. Furthermore, it contradicted Dulles' own espousal of the principle of multilateral consultation and problem-solving clearly expressed to Eisenhower in December.[31]

While the CFEP review was still under way in the early months of 1956, the British government waited anxiously for the administration to translate its avowed commitment to a multilateral solution into action. In their repeated inquiries about the progress in the CFEP's review of their wish list, the British pressed the Eisenhower administration to commit itself to a specific date for a CG meeting to discuss a definitive multilateral settlement of the China differential problem. By refusing to discuss a specific timetable for prospective multilateral discussions before the CFEP completed its study, the administration made itself susceptible to the charge of paying only lip service to multilateralism. At CHINCOM, the British delegation spearheaded the growing phalanx of CG members supporting the unification of the CHINCOM and COCOM lists. With varying degrees of stridency, Western Europeans and the Japanese argued that the China differential had originated as a means of coping with the military exigency of the Korean War, and was never intended as a permanent feature of the Western trade control program designed to retard China's industrial and technological advance. Only Greece and Turkey were expected to support the U.S. position and favor the maintenance of a significant differential. By the time the CFEP finally issued its new report in late March, the United States was in virtual isolation in the CG.[32]

Just as the administration faced a groundswell of opposition overseas, and even as the British were giving the multilateral framework another chance to work, the administration found itself immobilized by domestic politics unleashed by the Eden-Eisenhower talks. The Anglo-American summit aroused strong Congressional interest in the problems of East-West trade control. One prominent example of the heightened congressional interest was the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, chaired by John McClellan of Arkansas, which began hearings in mid February on the Battle Act and on the impact of the 1954 COCOM list revision. A number of prominent executive officials including Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks and former Foreign Operations Administration Director Harold Stassen, were subjected to relentless and protracted inquisition by members of the McClellan Committee, including

McCarthy. This interrogation of high-ranking executive branch officials forcefully reminded the administration just how sensitive the issue of trade with the PRC remained in U.S. domestic politics. For officials like CFEP Chairman Joseph Dodge, himself a hard-liner on the question of China trade, the McClellan hearings provided yet another reason why the executive should proceed with extreme caution regarding this tinderbox issue. A premature move might put the foreign aid bill for fiscal 1957 in jeopardy, Dodge warned the State Department.[33]

His fear was well-founded. The majority report of the McClellan Committee was a manifesto of crude anti-internationalism packaged as patriotic anti-Communism. It attacked U.S. allies for shipping highly strategic materials as copper wire to the Soviet bloc while receiving U.S. aid, but the committee ultimately placed the blame on the executive for capitulating to Western European demands for relaxing the COCOM controls, and of failing to employ coercive means at its disposal, including the punitive provisions of the Battle Act against U.S. aid recipients in noncompliance with U.S. export control policy. Furthermore, the committee charged the administration with a cover-up, and threatened to stall congressional deliberations on the Mutual Security Program until the executive published all the relevant information. The key executive witnesses in the hearings attempted in vain to persuade the irate Senatorial interrogators that the administration could only release the international control lists and information on the multilateral negotiations in closed sessions because of its pledge of secrecy to other CG members. The breach of that trust would be a cardinal sin in alliance relations and a mortal blow to the voluntary cooperative principle at the heart of the multilateral trade control program.[34]

In the politically charged atmosphere of the election year, top administration officials realized they could not move forward on the China trade question without paying a significant political price at home. In mid April, Dulles admitted to British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins that the U.S. had been less than expeditious about the review of the British wish list submitted in January, but the entire question was "charged with dynamite" as far as Congress was concerned, and the problem went far beyond election-year partisan politics; even from the ranks of its own party, the administration faced a vicious attack. Republican Congressional leaders such as Senator William Knowland of California, the powerful leader of the China Lobby, had also threatened to block the passage of the Mutual Security Bill, should the administration dare give in to

British pressure. Both Eisenhower and Dulles knew that London's patience was running paper-thin six months after the Eden-Eisenhower talks. Dulles appealed to the new British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to understand the administration's predicament in "dealing with this matter at the same time on two fronts." But with the U.S. not even prepared to participate in a CG meeting and discuss the matter multilaterally, the British were visibly losing interest in honoring the existing multilateral conflict resolution formula.[35]

Under these conflicting foreign and domestic pressures, members of the NSC finally deliberated on the CFEP recommendation on April 26. At this point, it was no longer just the increasingly vocal British and French demands that were weighing on the administration. As Eisenhower himself noted with a surreal metaphor, Japan needed some immediate relief in terms of trading with the PRC, otherwise this important Far Eastern ally would have to "pass a tin cup around in San Francisco." Desperately needing a way to obviate the key CG members' abandonment of multilateralism and yet to avoid Congressional reprisals against U.S. concessions at a CG meeting, the administration succumbed to the temptation of bilateralism. As recommended by the CFEP, the top echelon of the administration decided to authorize the Secretary of State to engage in bilateral approaches to allies outside the CG's multilateral forum for the sake of revamping their support for the U.S. position on China trade controls. Eisenhower gave in to the allure of bilateralism, but he did resist another equally powerful related temptation: the President flatly rejected the notion of using raw coercive force against the British to make them tow the U.S. line. When a suggestion was made by his NSC members about withholding nuclear technological information or bank credits from the British, Eisenhower summarily dismissed the idea, reminding them of the generosity with which the British shared military intelligence with the U.S. during World War II. The priority for him was to retain the integrity of the multilateral export control system, which was only possible through member nations' voluntary adherence to common export control criteria. Neither he nor Dulles was about to do anything to jeopardize it by attempting to bludgeon into submission what they considered the most important CG member.[36]

At this crucial NSC meeting, the Eisenhower administration made several decisions which set the parameters of its China trade diplomacy for the remainder of the year. First, the U.S. policy-makers decided as a matter of high priority to seek agreement from the allies to re-embargo copper wire, which began

to be shipped at alarming rates to the Soviet bloc following the 1954 COCOM list revision. Second, they agreed that formal multilateral negotiations at a CG meeting must be avoided at all costs because of Congressional sensitivity about trade with the Communists; they would substitute much low-key bilateral approaches for the multilateral conference. Finally, the administration adopted the CFEP's recommendation to offer as a bargaining chip in bilaterals that the U.S. would not interpose objection in CHINCOM to shipments of 81 specified embargoed goods and natural rubber and, in the case of Japan, wooden fishing vessels. This offer would entail U.S. acquiescence in more extended use by CG members of CHINCOM's exceptions shipments procedures. By opting for the bilateral route and offering to wink at more liberal use of these procedures, the U.S. in effect relinquished its moral authority as the guardian of all the CG's existing procedures, all in the name of saving the multilateral consultative structure.[37]

In the administration's omni-directional bilateral overtures which began in early May, the problem of re-embargoing copper wire provided a major bone of contention with key European CG members. This issue had been brewing for some time. In the wake of the 1954 COCOM list revision, the increase in exports to the Soviet bloc of decontrolled or downgraded items was relatively unspectacular, except for copper wire. The U.S. agreed to downgrade this item, essential to Soviet development of atomic and guided missile capabilities, from the embargo to the watch list based on British assurance that subsequent shipments would not be substantial. Between August 1954 and April 1956, however, Western European nations issued export licenses worth approximately 125,000 tons of copper wire, alarming American officials, especially the military. The problem was brought to the attention of the McClellan Committee by frustrated witnesses from the military.[38]

Barely six months had passed since downgrading when the administrarion felt compelled to try rounding up allies' support for the re-embargo of this strategic item. The CFEP listed copper wire as a major concern in its position paper for the Eden-Eisenhower talks, and the interagency group strongly urged the President to seek British consent to restore copper wire to the COCOM list. Eisenhower did not press the issue, however, except to comment to the British Prime Minister that copper wire exports were becoming totally out of control.[39] While the President agreed that copper wire figured among the highly strategic items the West should keep out of Soviet hands, he felt that the importance of

the Anglo-American alliance outweighed the immediate military danger posed by the increasing copper wire exports. When hard-liners in his cabinet, such as Humphrey, proposed strong-arm tactics to force the British to swallow the re-embargo, Eisenhower and Dulles declared that they would not try to accomplish this admittedly important military-security objective at the cost of rupturing the Anglo-American alliance.[40]

The problem of rubber exports to the PRC posed an equally complicated problem for the American officials and tested their will to accommodate British interests. London long advocated the removal of natural rubber from the CHINCOM list, because the commodity was the single most important cash crop for Malaya and Singapore and the PRC offered a huge potential market for this strategic material. The allure of the China market was overwhelming to other rubber producers in Asia. In the fall of 1952, the Ceylonese government agreed to ship 50,000 tons of natural rubber annually to Communist China in a five-year rubber-for-rice barter agreement. On the natural rubber question, America's two principal strategic objectives in Asia, containment of the PRC and the bolstering of anti-Communist states, clashed. In 1955, after careful strategic consideration, the Eisenhower administration decided not to invoke the Battle Act against Ceylon and kept U.S. aid flowing to Ceylon despite the nation's continued rubber trade with the Communist foe in defiance of the UN embargo resolution. Washington's toleration of Ceylonese rubber shipments placed the British government in a bind in its commonwealth diplomacy.[41]

At stake for the British, as Lloyd told Dulles in January, was Malaya's continued allegiance to the Commonwealth and pounds sterling area. Eden also reminded Eisenhower that trade with the PRC was a life-and-death matter for small agricultural states in Asia, including Britain's important colonial territories. That is why Ceylon, despite its staunch anti-Communism, chose to run the multiple risk of defying the UN embargo, losing U.S. aid and alienating other anti-Communist states in the region. The British government could not continue to allow Malaya to be penalized for its self-restraint and cooperation with the multilateral trade control policy.[42]

The stakes involved in copper wire and rubber were high for both sides, and the juxtaposition of these pressing needs naturally led American officials to the idea of linkage: in exchange for U.S. acquiescence in British colonial rubber shipments to the PRC, the British might agree to restore at least quantitative limitations to exports of copper wire to the Soviet bloc. Dulles first tested this

idea with Makins in mid April, indicating to the British Ambassador that the Americans were willing to "close our eyes" to Malaya's rubber trade with Beijing in exchange for the re-embargo of copper wire. But as soon as the NSC mandated this tactic of linkage, it became all too apparent to the Americans that this exchange was difficult to sell to the British. Because of the added pressure from domestic commercial interests in the wake of a visit by Soviet leaders Nicolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, Eden had very narrow leeway on this matter. The high-profile Soviet appeal to the British public for expansion of East-West trade made it politically too risky for the British government to put anything back on the embargo list at this particular juncture.[43]

Consequently, the British dragged their feet on copper wire, but they were all too happy to take Washington up on its offer on Malayan rubber. On this point, everything the State Department had feared come true. It had grave misgivings about the snowball effects of the rubber-for-copper deal on other embargoed goods, but Dulles was willing to give this formula a chance and over-ruled his subordinates. He formerly proposed the deal to the British during a meeting of the NATO Council in Paris in early May 1956. Lloyd then indicated that the best the British could do on copper wire was quantitative control. Moreover, London would only consider this in exchange for formal decontrol of some other items, to counterbalance the public relations impact copper wire's upgrading.[44]

The rubber-for-copper deal collapsed rather abruptly when the British government announced before the Parliament on May 14, that it would make liberal use of the CHINCOM exceptions procedures "to permit reasonable exports in appropriate cases to China of goods which are not on the Soviet lists," but nevertheless refused to compromise on copper wire. In addition to citing the weight of British public opinion, London argued that the re-embargo would accomplish little because the Soviet bloc could meet its needs with indigenous sources; supplies from the West would constitute a minor supplement to the bloc's own production. The Americans were also reminded of the well-known British position that it did not regard the hampering of the general industrial development of the Communist bloc as an objective of the multilateral trade control program. By late May, Britain gave a green light to Malaya to sell natural rubber to the PRC.[45]

Malaya's action was quickly replicated by Singapore and Indonesia, and there was little the U.S. could do to stop the stampede. To make matters worse for

on-going U.S. bilateral negotiations with its partners in the CG, those allies with no stake in rubber exports were infuriated by what they perceived as another U.K.-U.S. side deal. Arguing that they also were entitled to special concessions, many CG members added their own priority items to the list of goods to be liberally excepted from the China embargo list. The failed rubber-for-copper deal thus opened a Pandora's box, and the hands that opened it belonged to the two top officials who were determined not to let the Anglo-American partnership break down over trade issues: Eisenhower and Dulles. Moreover, at the fateful NSC meeting of April 26, it was Eisenhower and Dulles who strongly advocated the idea of "winking at" the exceptions procedures the British and some other CG members were already overusing to the point of abuse. They hoped that this *de facto* change in the level of the China trade controls, in lieu of a formal alteration of the CHINCOM list, would solve all their problems in one fell swoop: the administration might be spared domestic criticism for relenting on Beijing; copper wire would be re-embargoed; and the British would be given a reprieve in its intra-commonwealth problem. Humphrey's warning about the possible spill-over effect of this course of action was simply over-ruled by the two leaders.[46]

The decision to tolerate liberal use of the CHINCOM exceptions procedures set off a chain reaction that the U.S. could not control. Some CG members which had been relatively cooperative about exercising self-restraint now began to avail themselves of this built-in loophole more aggressively. Faced with the growing flood of CHINCOM exceptions by the British, Germany now felt compelled to jump on the bandwagon. The Japanese also decided to follow the British lead; they were particularly driven by the fear that Western Europeans might preempt the neighboring mainland Chinese market. By early June, the value of embargoed goods to the PRC under the exception procedures amounted to more than 7 million dollars, and the State Department estimated that at this rate exceptions shipments to the PRC for 1956 would amount to at least 21 million dollars with the net effect of making a complete travesty of the entire system of China trade control.[47]

The most serious cost of the failed U.S. attempt to buy Britain's cooperation in the spring of 1956 was the general erosion of the legitimacy of the multilateral security trade control procedures and a decline in America's moral leadership at the core of that legitimacy. By late 1955, many CG members were already annoyed by America's preaching about the sanctity of the multilateral

cooperative framework despite its frequent practice of dealing bilaterally with Britain. During the bilateral negotiations that Dulles initiated with Lloyd in early May in 1956, the allies' suspicion and irritation reached a new high. The French, in particular, resented Washington's failure to include them despite its earlier promise of trilateral preconsultation. Their chagrin was particularly severe because the administration had forced them to withdraw their call for a CG meeting in August 1955 by stressing the established practice of tripartite collaborative leadership in the CG.[48]

Other key CG members also intensely objected to the premium the American government placed on Anglo-American unity. The Japanese resented the discussion over their heads by the Americans and Europeans of a problem involving what they considered to be their rightful economic frontier. The intensive bilateral exchange between Washington and London following the Eden-Eisenhower talks did nothing to assuage their perennial fear of being excluded from the debate over China trade controls. Neither did other Western Europeans, especially the Germans, appreciate the pattern of being presented with bilateral *faits accomplis* at the multilateral forum. Moreover, the German delegation at CHINCOM said they were not about to tolerate a replay of what happened after the 1954 COCOM list review; the Germans believed that Anglo-American bilateral discussions preceding the multilateral list review gave Britain undue advantages, by allowing it to press in advance for goods already ordered to British traders by the Soviet bloc.[49]

Following the Eden-Eisenhower talks, the U.S. delegation to CHINCOM emphasized to Washington that it was imperative not to hand down any ready-made Anglo-American plan to other CG members again, for a majority of CG members had grown extremely weary of what they perceived to be America's repeated sponsorship of trade control adjustments tailor-made to suit Britain's special interests. The British rubber decision confirmed their worst suspicions; and with this and Eden's rejection of the U.S. copper-wire proposal in mid May, the Eisenhower administration lost far more than it bargained for. By consistently valuing the Anglo-American special relationship over subsidiary partnerships in spite of the rhetoric of multilateralism, by resorting closed bilateralism to save open multilateralism, and by indirectly inviting CG members to take advantage of the loophole of the multilateral export control procedures, the Americans more than any others undercut the legitimacy of the multilateral cooperative framework so dear to them. By the summer of 1956, the price of

this self-contradictory policy was a rapidly unravelling and progressively dysfunctional multilateral export control system.[50]

Meanwhile, the bilateral negotiations which the United States initiated with CG members in May 1956 ended in abysmal failure by July. The allies' use of the CHINCOM exceptions was rampant and uncontrolled, and they were demanding the wholesale abolition of the China differential as a matter of principle. The Eisenhower administration needed a new interim policy as a basis for reaching a *modus vivendi* with CG members, without having to participate in a multilateral discussion before the fall elections. This task was again given to the CFEP, but under the direction of its new chairman, Clarence Randall, an ardent free-trader. Randall would forcefully redirect U.S. export control policy from the summer of 1956 through the spring of 1957 and shepherd the administration through the demise of the China differential as through a train of unilateral actions by CG members.[51]

The United States' struggles over international export control in the mid-1950s reveal an important aspect of its self-defined role in the alliance of Western industrial nations at the apex of its power during the Cold War. Besieged by allies with proliferating and expanding demands, the principal policy-makers in the Eisenhower administration defined their country's role as the leading coordinator of diverse and shifting interests within the Western capitalist world. They sought decidedly through the power of persuasion to establish the U.S. as the main architect of multilateral anti-Communist trade control policy and exercised considerable self-restraint in adjuring raw coercive power in alliance management, an abuse which their country's position of unmatched superiority within the alliance system would have permitted. The American aspiration to the role of honest broker was sincere, but the nation was neither disinterested, capable of remaining above the multilateral fray nor in monopoly of moral authority to ensure voluntary allied compliance with agreed settlements. Furthermore, under the crushing weight of the overdeveloped policy-making apparatus at home and the sprawling alliance system abroad, the two most powerful U.S. officials missed a number of opportunities and made erroneous judgements. This manifestation of quite human fallibility accelerated the weakening of the multilateral system they wanted so much to protect. The U.S. was also outpaced by its allies in accepting the rapidly changing realities of international relations, due partly to its relative immunity from the impact of those changes. But most important of all, the world in the mid-1950s was becoming

too complex a place for one coordinator, powerful and determined as it might be, to address and settle all its problems.

Notes

1 For the history of COCOM, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967* (Stockholm, 1968) ; Philip Funigiello, *American-Soviet Trade in the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 1988); Michael Mastanduno, *Economic Containment* (Ithaca, 1992); Yoko Kato, *Amerika No Sekai Senryaku To Kokomu* (Tokyo, 1992).

2 For example, Qing Simei, "The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against China, 1954-1958," in Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds.), *The Great Powers in East Asia* (New York, 1990), 121-142; Tor Egil Førland, "'Selling Firearms to the Indians': Eisenhower's Export Control Policy, 1953-1954," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Spring 1991), 221-244; Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., "'Gradual and Moderate Relaxation': Eisenhower and the Revision of American Export Control Policy, 1953-1955," *Diplomatic History* 17 (Spring 1993), 223-249. See also the Førland-Spaulding debate in the December 1993 and March 1994 issues of the *SHAFR Newsletter.*

3 Memorandum of Discussion at the 137th NSC Meeting, March 18, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman Files, NSC Series (hereafter AWF/NSC), Box 4, Dwight Eisenhower Library (DEL), Abilene, Kansas; Memoranda of the 191st NSC Meeting, April 1, 1954, the 193rd NSC meeting, April 13, 1954, and the 198th NSC Meeting, May 20, 1954, AWF/NSC, Box 5.

4 Memorandum from Dulles to Randall, August 7, 1956, Records of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Policy Papers Series (hereafter CFEP/PPS), Box 1.

5 Testimony of Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 7, 1953, State Department Decimal File (SDDF), 493.009/5-1853, Record Group 59 (RG 59), National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.

6 McCarthy-Dulles correspondence attached to Circular Telegram, May 18, 1953, SDDF, 493.009/5-1853; Statements by Leddy and Hansen submitted to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, May 4, 1953, SDDF, 493.009/5-1853.

7 NSC 152/2, July 31, 1953, S/S-NSC Files, Department of State Lot Files (SDLF), 63D351, RG 59, NA; Memorandum of Discussion at the 207th NSC Meeting, July 22, 1954, AWF/NSC, Box 5.

8 NSC 152/3, June 18, 1954, S/S-NSC Files, SDLF, 68D351; Progress Report on NSC 152/3, August 30, 1954, ibid; Memorandum from Kalijarvi to Murphy, July 18, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/7-1856.

9 Memorandum from Lewis to McConaughy, March 22, 1954, SDDF, 493.009/3-2254; Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles, April 5, 1954, SDDF, 493.009/4-554; Memorandum from Bowie to Lay, May 25, 1954, White House Office (WHO), Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 11, DEL; Memorandum of the 205th NSC Meeting, July 1, 1954, AWF/NSC, Box 6.

10 Department of State Instruction from Dulles, November 3, 1954, SDDF, 493.009/11-354; National Intelligence Estimate, January 11, 1955, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* (*FRUS*), 10:205-206.

11 Memorandum from Goodkind to Waugh, September 16, 1954, SDDF, 493.009/9-1654; Telegram from Dulles to the Embassy in London, November 9, 1954, SDDF, 493.009/11-954; Telegram from Dulles to Embassy in Tokyo, January 7, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/1-755; Memorandum from Waugh to Hoover, February 21, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/2-2155; Memorandum from Kalijarvi to Murphy, July 18, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/7-1856.

12 Memorandum from Delany to Hollister, August 8, 1955, Records of the International Cooperation Administration, Director's File, FRC 61A32, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; Memorandum from McConaughy to Robertson, SDDF, 493.009/8-855; Memorandum of Conversation, August 11, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/9-1155; Telegram from the Department of State to Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Council, October 1, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/9-2855.

13 Memorandum from Cullen to Dodge, March 24, 1955, Records of the Council of Foreign Economic Policy, Policy Papers Series (hereafter CFEP/PPS), Box 2, DEL; Memorandum from Waugh to Hoover, January 21, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/1-2155; Memorandum from the Steering Committee to Dodge, May 25, 1955, CFEP/PPS, Box 2.

14 Memorandum from Doherty to Armstrong, June 24, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/6-2255; Memorandum of the 254th NSC Meeting, July 7, 1955, AWF/NSC, Box 7.

15 Circular Telegram, August 12, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/8-1255; Minutes of the 25th CFEP Meeting, July 26, 1955, CFEP/PPS, Box 2.

16 Memorandum from Delany to Hollister, August 8, 1955, ICA Records, FRC 61A32; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Paris, August 10, 1955, 460.509/8-855; Memorandum of Conversation, August 11, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/8-1155.

17 Telegram from Merchant to Dulles, September 30, 1955, SDDF, 593.009/9-3055; Telegram from Dulles to Johnson, October 12, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 3:124-126; Telegram from Johnson to McConaughy, October 21, 1955, ibid., 137. For Eisenhower's view of China's threat, see Memorandum of the 271st NSC Meeting, December 22, 1955, AWF/NSC, Box 7.

18 Memorandum of Conversation, August 11, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/8-1155; Telegram from Perkins to Dulles, October 6, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/10-655.

19 Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Yeh, October 4, 1955, SDDF, 611.93/10-455; Telephone Call from Dulles to Robertson, October 7, 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 3, DEL; Memorandum of Conversation at the Department of State, August 11, 1955, SDDF, 460.509/8-1155.

20 Telegram from Dulles to the Embassy in Paris, October 12, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/10-1255; Telegram from Hoover to Geneva, October 26, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/10-2655; Telegram from the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers' Meetings to the Department of State, November 16, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:267; Telegram from Aldrich to Dulles, December 7, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-755.

21 Telegram from Aldrich to Dulles, December 3, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-355; Telegram from Perkins to Dulles, December 6, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-655; Telegram from Dulles to Aldrich, December 10, 1955, SDDF, 493.419/42-1055.

22 Memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, December 8, 1955, WHO, Central Files, Confidential File (hereafter CF/CF), Box 85, DEL.

23 Memorandum of the 269th NSC Meeting, December 8, 1955, AWF/NSC, Box 7.

24 ibid.; Memorandum from Radford to Wilson, December 12, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:280; Telegram from Dulles to the Embassy in Paris, December 13, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-1355; Memorandum of the 271st NSC Meeting, December 22, 1955, AWF/NSC, Box 7; Minutes of the 36th CFEP Meeting, January 12, 1956, WHO, CF/CF, Box 86; Memorandum from Dodge to Hoover, January 13, 1956, SDDF, 460.509/1-1356.

25 Minutes of the 36th CFEP Meeting, January 12, 1956, WHO, CF/CF, Box 86; Memorandum from Dodge to Anderson, January 13, 1956, CFEP/PPS, Box 2.

26 Memorandum of the 275th NSC Meeting, January 26, 1956, AWF/NSC, Box 7; Briefing Paper for the CFEP, April 3, 1956, CFEP/PPS, Box 1.

27 Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Eden, January 31, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-156; Memorandum from Cullen to Randall, October 11, 1956, CFEP/PPS, Box 1; Memorandum from Kalijarvi to Murphy, July 18, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/7-1856; Memorandum from Gray to Hoover, December 12, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-1255; Memorandum from Radford to Wilson, December 12, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:283; Memorandum of the 271st NSC Meeting, January 26, 1956, AWF/NSC, Box 7.

28 NSC 152/3, S/S-NSC Files, SDLF, 63D351; NSC 5429/5, *FRUS, 1952-54*, 12:1062.

29 Diary Entry, February 8, 1956, AWF, DDE Diaries Series; Memorandum of Conversation, January 24, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:299; Memorandum of Conversation, January 31, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-156.

30 *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956* (Washington D.C., 1958): 217; Telegram from Dulles to the Embassy in London, SDDF, December 30, 1955, 493.009/12-3055; Eisenhower Diary Entry, February 8, 1956, ibid.; Memorandum from Hoover to Dodge, February 10, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-1056.

31 Briefing Paper for the CFEP, April 3, 1956, CFEP/PPS, Box 1; Memorandum from Cullen to Randall, October 11, 1956, CFEP/PPS, Box 1; Memorandum from Cullen to Lay, April 6, 1956, CFEP/PPS, Box 2.

32 Memorandum of Conversation, February 28, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-2856; Memorandum of Conversation, March 7, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/3-756; Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles, March 30, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/3-3056.

33 Circular Telegram, March 9, 1956, SDDF, 460.509/3-956; *East-West Trade: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations* (Washington, D.C., 1956), passim; Memorandum from Dodge to Prochnow, February 27, 1956, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, SDLF, 60D171; Memorandum from Dodge to Prochnow, February 29, 1956, CFEP, Dodge Series, Correspondence Subseries, Box 1; Memorandum from Hoover to Dulles, March 1, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/3-156.

34 *East-West Trade*, 417-515.

35 Memorandum of Conversation, April 13, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/4-1356; Memorandum for the Record, April 19, 1956, SDDF, 450.60/9-1956; Letter from Dulles to Lloyd, April 19, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:343.

36 Memorandum of the 282nd NSC Meeting, April 26, 1956, AWF/NSC, Box 7.

37 ibid.; Memorandum from Kalijarvi to Dulles, June 6, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/6-656.

38 Memorandum of Conversation, Makins and Dulles, April 13, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/4-1356; *East-West Trade*, passim.

39 Telegram from Allison to Dulles, December 10, 1954, SDDF, 493.949/12-1954; Minutes of the 36th CFEP Meeting, January 12, 1956, WHO, CF/CF, Box 86; Memorandum of Conversation, January 31, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-156.

40 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 18, 1956, AWF, Diaries Series; Memorandum of the 282nd NSC Meeting, April 26, 1956, AWF/NSC, Box 7.

41 *Problem of Economic Defense: 2nd Battle Act Report* (Washington, D.C., 1953), 26-28; *The Strategic Trade Control System, 1948-1956: 9th Battle Act Report* (Washington, D.C., 1956), 39-40.

42 Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Lloyd, January 31, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:304; Letter from Eden to Eisenhower, n.d., ibid., 349; Memorandum of Conversation, January 31, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-156.

43 Memorandum of Conversation, Makins and Dulles, April 13, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/4-1356; Telephone Conversation with Hollister, JFDP, Telephone Calls Series, Box 4, DEL; Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Makins, May 15, 1956, SDDF, 460.119/5-156.

44 Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Paris, May 4, 1956, SDDF, 460.590/5-456; Circular Telegram to the Embassies in Southeast Asia, May 9, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/5-956.

45 Letter from Dulles to Eisenhower, May 14, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:363-364; *Survey of East-West Trade*, 39; Letter from Makins to Dulles, June 6, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 10:365-366; Circular Telegram to Embassies in Southeast Asia, May 22, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/5-2256; Memorandum from Kalijarvi to Dulles, May 23, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/5-2356.

46 Circular Telegram to Embassies in Southeast Asia, May 29, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/5-2956; Mein to Dulles, June 5, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/6-456; Telegram from Durbrow to Dulles, June 5 1956, SDDF, 493.009/6-556; Telegram from Martin to Dulles, June 5, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/6-556; Memorandum of Conversation, June 11, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/6-1156; Memorandum of the 282nd NSC, Meeting, op. cit.

47 Memorandum of Conversation, Kalijarvi and De Rege, June 11, 1956; Memorandum from Kalijarvi to Hoover, June 11, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/6-1156; Telegram Martin to Dulles, May 18, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/5-1856; Telegram from Allison to Dulles, June 8, 1956, SDDF, 493.949/6-856; Despatch from the Embassy Tokyo to the Department of State, June 5, 1956, SDDF, 493.9441/6-556; Memorandum from McConaughy to Robertson, June 8, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/6-856.

48 Telegram from Dillon to Dulles, May 2, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/5-256; Memorandum from Goodkind to Prochnow, December 23, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-2355; Telegram from Perkins to Dulles, SDDF, 493.009/2-1056.

49 Memorandum from McClurkin to Robertson, December 8, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-855; Memorandum from McClurkin to Robertson, December 14, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-1455; Memorandum of Conversation, Iguchi and Robertson, February 3, 1956, OCA, SDLF, 60D171; Memorandum of Conversation, Shima and Parson, April 25, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/4-2556.

50 Telegram from Perkins to Dulles, December 19, 1955, SDDF, 493.009/12-1955; Telegram from Perkins to Dulles, February 8, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-856; Telegram from Perkins to Dulles, February 14, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/2-1456.

51 Memorandum from Prochnow to Dulles, August 3, 1956, SDDF, 493.009/8-356; Memorandum from Dulles to Randall, August 7, 1956, CHEP/PPS, Box 1.