

The Triumph of the Politics of Economic Self-Interest? Operation Matchbox and Canada's Importation of German Scientists and Technicians, 1945-1950 (自国経済を擁護する政治の勝利か? マッチ箱作戦と カナダによるドイツ人科学者の受け入れ, 1945-50年)

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SUMMARY IN JAPANESE: ナチス・ドイツ敗退と同時に各国はドイツ人の科学者や技術者の獲得に乗り出した。1945年から1950年にかけて、カナダもこの獲得合戦に参加し、69人の専門家をカナダのために働かせるべくドイツから招いた。カナダ政府がこの政策をとった最大の理由は、ドイツ人の科学者や技術者が極度の専門家不足に悩まされていたカナダ経済に発展と多様性をもたらすと信じていたからであった。ソ連にドイツの技術を渡さないことが、科学者や技術者を大西洋の向こうから連れて来ることの言い訳になったのは、後に冷戦が激化してからであった。

この計画を最も強力に支持したのは、外務、貿易・商業の両省、国家研究委員会、そして大戦当時の「スーパーミニスター(superminister)」C.D.ハウであった。マッチ箱作戦の実施に異議を唱えた政府高官はいなかったが、移民局とカナダ王立騎馬警察は安全保障上の問題を恐れて慎重な対処を求めた。また、労働省もマッチ箱作戦をはじめとする移民問題を自らの管轄下に置こうとし、事態を紛糾させる原因となった。

結局、マッチ箱作戦は目ざましい成果を上げることはなかった。官僚機構内部の縄張り争いが激しく、省庁間での協力が不十分であったため、カナダ政府は目標としていたドイツ人の獲得に全力を注ぐことが出来なかった。さらに、カナダはドイツに占領地を持たなかったため、科学者の獲得においてもイギリスとアメリカの協力に依存せざるをえなかった。そして多くの場合、イギリスとアメリカは自国のために最も有能な人材を確保したのであった。

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On 30 December 1986 the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, established in 1985 by the federal government, released its findings. Nearly hidden among the more controversial aspects of the lengthy document were four pages devoted to Canada's role in Operation Matchbox, a scheme initiated by the Western powers after 1945 to exploit the skills of German scientists and technicians. Having discovered the program's existence very late in his mandate, Justice Jules Deschenes determined he did not have enough information to rule whether 55 of the 71 Germans sponsored by Canada were implicated in war crimes. The Justice therefore advised that "the Government of Canada should carry out the additional inquiries indicated in each individual opinion and then make a decision accordingly."¹ Canadian reaction to these revelations was sporadic and muted. The press, concerned more about whether Josef Mengele had entered or tried to enter Canada, paid little attention to the importation of German scientists. Possibly the only critical response came from David Matas, a prominent Jewish activist. Noting that German nationals were barred from entering Canada until 1950, Matas labelled as "shocking" Canada's "direct and willing" participation in a plan to keep skilled Germans "from falling into Soviet hands immediately after the war."²

This paper will study Canada's role in the international effort to recruit German scientists and technicians, an activity that involved Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Australia, and Argentina. Canadian motivation for taking part stemmed from a genuine belief the Germans would be an important economic and scientific asset to a burgeoning and diversifying Canadian economy. Only later as the Cold War intensified was the denial to the Soviets of German expertise used as justification for bringing the individuals in question across the Atlantic. Strongest support for participation was found in the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce, the National Research Council (NRC), and from C.D. Howe, Canada's wartime "superminister" and the acting Minister of Mines and Resources in 1947 when the most important decisions were taken. Although no senior official counseled against taking in some Germans, both the Immigration Branch and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) advised caution, fearing potential damage to national security. The Department of Labour too caused some difficulties when it attempted to bring the Canadian portion of Matchbox, and other immigration matters, under its aegis.

The first inkling that German personnel might be recruited by Canada came

in May 1945 when Roy Geddes of the Canadian Military Mission (CMM) in Berlin suggested some German scientists might be brought to Canada for use in industry. This suggestion was not followed up as NRC President C.J. Mackenzie recommended against the plan.³ Two months later in a letter to Canada's High Commissioner to Britain, Vincent Massey, NRC employee A.G. Shenstone noted Britain and the United States were importing German scientists. The stated rationale for these actions was that the scientists were necessary to continue the war against Japan, but Shenstone was "convinced that this is an excuse for unilateral action." Certain Canada should be involved, the London-based NRC staffer noted a decision to participate could be made only "at the very highest level." Massey forwarded the letter to his superiors at External Affairs, counseling that Canada's participation in the British Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (BIOS), the body which would be handling the acquisition of German experts, made formal Canadian diplomatic representation unnecessary. Shenstone, the High Commissioner reported, was "now inclined to agree and is willing to withdraw, at least for the time being, his suggestion that this question also should be taken up through diplomatic channels."⁴

If the Canadian government preferred inaction, this posture was not duplicated by the British and Americans. Starting in late 1944, British and American military teams had begun seizing German facilities and personnel, particularly those connected to the German atomic bomb project.⁵ In July 1945 the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Operation Overcast, a scheme to use temporarily 350 German scientists in the war against Japan and to carry out postwar defense research. This number was increased to 1,000 in the spring of 1946 and received a new name, Operation Paperclip, the project receiving President Harry Truman's assent in September 1946.⁶ The British were even more enthusiastic in their efforts to acquire German expertise, perhaps because their nation's economic situation was so desperate at war's end. In December 1945 the Minister of Trade Stafford Cripps appointed Sir Charles Darwin, head of the National Physics Laboratory, to oversee the recruitment of Germans. Stalled at first by hostile public reaction, the program gained impetus in early 1946 with news that German specialists residing in Britain's occupation zone were being hired by the Soviets and French. Believing their nation "was suffering an acute shortage of scientists and technicians in all fields," the British military services agreed in September 1946 it might be

necessary to take in Nazis to deny them to the Soviet Union. Therefore in January 1947 the British cabinet was asked by Cripps to authorize the transfer of 500 Germans to the United Kingdom.⁷

The issue of bringing German specialists to Canada was put to the fore in September 1946 by C.J. Mackenzie. Previously opposed because he feared that the “possible political difficulties arising from the employment of such persons would probably outweigh the scientific advantages which might accrue from their work in Canada,” Mackenzie told Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USSEA) N.A. Robertson he had reversed his stand because Canada risked losing the skills of individuals able to make important contributions “to specialized forms of scientific research for which suitably qualified Canadian scientists are not available.” Mackenzie indicated he was prepared to bring the matter before C.D. Howe, the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply.⁸ Mackenzie was as good as his word, contacting Howe on 26 September. Remarking Britain had approached External Affairs several times about employing German scientists, the NRC chief was now willing to support the importation of experts for specific work for which no qualified Canadians were available. Mackenzie declared only those scientists who were known personally by Canadians should be admitted and he suggested at first only one individual should be accepted. Noting Robertson had warned that no further action could be taken until there was a cabinet decision, Mackenzie asked Howe to present the notion to his ministerial colleagues.⁹

Howe, well-known for getting things done, certainly was interested. Outlining Mackenzie’s request to the cabinet on 2 October, Howe promised the persons involved “would be thoroughly investigated before acceptance”. After some discussion the ministers “agreed that the proposals of the President of the National Research Council be approved.”¹⁰ Mackenzie too was no longer inclined to waste time. Nine days later he asked Lester Pearson, the new USSEA (Robertson had become High Commissioner to Britain), for permission to recruit Dr. Kurt Starke, a radio chemistry specialist for a position at Hamilton’s McMaster University. Eager to help, Pearson asked Robertson at Canada House to investigate carefully those individuals selected “from the political and security point of view,” and to aid the Immigration Branch in expediting the transfer of Dr. Starke and seven German technicians asked for by two Canadian firms, Beaver’s Dental Burrs Industry and Canadian Car and Foundry. The recruitment of the seven additional men, Pearson advised, was

made possible because both External Affairs and Trade and Commerce believed the cabinet's decision could cover more than just the transfer of one person.¹¹

Trade and Commerce proved an enthusiastic advocate of expanding the program. In a 6 November letter to A.L. Jolliffe, Director of the Immigration Branch, G.D. Mallory, Director of Trade and Commerce's Industrial Development Division, stated a limited number of German technicians were required in order to establish new Canadian industries. He declared also Dr. O.M. Solandt, Director General of Defense Research at the Department of National Defense (DND), had told him British civilian and military officials "were anxious to help Canada to bring technicians and scientists to this country." In contact with Geddes in Berlin, Mallory had made arrangements with eight Canadian firms to take 15 German technicians. If Canadian companies did a little more scouting in Germany, Mallory was certain this could swell to 25 or 50 technicians, and if scientists were included, "the list might reach 75 or even 100."¹²

Mallory's letter was apparently the first Jolliffe had heard of the scheme. In a memorandum to J.A. Glen, the Minister of Mines and Resources (the ministry to which the Immigration Branch reported), Jolliffe remarked his office had no record of the cabinet meeting (Glen had not attended the meeting and was informed of its proceedings on 9 November). However, Cabinet Secretary A.D.P. Heeney had told the Immigration Branch head what had transpired, and Jolliffe thought the matter required immediate attention. Pointing out Mallory's estimate of 100 scientists far exceeded what the cabinet had authorized, Jolliffe informed Glen the individuals in question were all German citizens and enemy aliens whose admission into Canada was "prohibited under present regulations, both on the grounds of citizenship and occupation." A ministerial permit would be necessary for those seeking to enter Canada for a specific period. If permanent admission was the preferred option, then "the authority of the Governor in Council would be required to waive the present regulations." Jolliffe favoured the first alternative because of its flexibility - the individual could return home or apply later for permanent status. He advised Glen to take up the matter with cabinet, adding "that the matter is of some urgency due to the fact that other countries are active in obtaining the service of these men."¹³

Glen, not a strong minister, used Jolliffe to reassert his influence. In a letter

to Heeney dated 9 November, Jolliffe indicated Glen would like to be present when cabinet considered the matter again. Unfortunately, the minister was leaving Ottawa that night and hoped any such discussion could wait on his return. Glen did want to emphasize two points: any German accepted should be taken only if there were no qualified Canadians available; and "that there should be the most careful security screening before the individual cases are finally approved."¹⁴ The cabinet, however, did not await Glen's return, probably because of the perceived need for quick action, possibly because Glen had little clout.¹⁵ On 12 November Prime Minister W.L.M. King read Jolliffe's memorandum to the assembled ministers, emphasizing in particular the need to acquire German technicians to help establish new industries in Canada and for educational purposes. The cabinet agreed that its 2 October decision should "be extended to permit the temporary admission to Canada of German scientists and technicians required for industrial and educational purposes; admission in each case to be recommended by the President of the National Research Council and the Director General of Defense Research."¹⁶

If Ottawa thought the way had been cleared for an expeditious initiation of an importation program, Robertson cast cold water on those hopes. Obtaining the services of Starke or any other German expert was impossible until Canada had reached an agreement with the Dominions Office concerning such issues as contracts, pay, and security arrangements. Furthermore, all applications had to be examined to determine the qualifications of the Germans and to ensure none had been active Nazis. Two bodies were involved in this procedure: the Darwin Panel if the person was to work in industry; and the British Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee (DCOS) if the individual was to be employed in military research. Those recruited by Britain were offered initially six-month contracts with an understanding the term could be extended if the individual's work was satisfactory. The British Board of Trade, Robertson declared, was anxious to ensure that Canada not compete with Britain or the Commonwealth by offering higher wages. Once the policy details had been worked out, the Board of Trade estimated it would take four to six weeks to process a Canadian request. Robertson asked for permission to contact the Dominions Office at once but he needed to know if Ottawa would accept the British screening process and the type of contracts and remuneration that might be offered.¹⁷

The first steps toward coordinating Canadian and British policy began when Canada House's D.V. LePan met with officials from the Dominions Office, the

Board of Trade, the Control Commission for Germany, the Deputy Chiefs, and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research on 20 November. They agreed Canada should provide as many details about the specific people it wanted as well as particulars about the type of work they would be given. In the event Britain and Canada sought the same person, the dispute would be settled by LePan and F.J. Broomfield of the Board of Trade. Once such problems were settled, the Canadian list would be submitted for approval to the United States. The Board of Trade promised to track down individuals in Germany for Canada but the Canadian Military Mission in Berlin would have to arrange any contract signings and exit permits. Security checks would be conducted in Germany by the British and the Control Office maintained the right to "veto the proposal to recruit any German on the list required for civil purposes if they consider him to be essential to the German economy."¹⁸

Referring to British recruiting methods as "a masterpiece of bureaucratic ingenuity and complexity," Robertson warned on 27 November that the American role could not be overlooked. Britain had agreed in 1945 to avoid a ruinous competition for talent by submitting its list of recruits to Washington. Despite the delays involved in this process, Robertson believed there was no choice but to follow along. Furthermore, by accepting British help Canada likely would not be in a position to offer contracts very much different from those of Britain. However, Robertson thought the British practice of arranging contracts allowed for more effective control of recruits, ensured security, kept complaints from unions and professional bodies to a minimum, and gave the government title to any discoveries made by the scientists. Robertson therefore recommended adopting the British system and indicated he would begin the acquisition of Starke and seven other technicians. Most importantly, Robertson made the first reference by a Canadian official to the Cold War political context in which the acquisition of German scientists was operating. Until the present, he claimed, Allied efforts to employ Germans had been "positive: to make use of the knowledge and expertise of some German scientists and technicians which is not otherwise available." However, in the aftermath of the deportation of German scientists to the Soviet Union, Robertson reported British and American military commands were recommending an expansion of the scheme to deny the Soviets the chance to recruit Germans living in their occupation zones. Britain's cabinet had not yet decided to take more scientists, but if it did, Robertson thought up to 2,000

people might be involved. If so, it was “conceivable that the Canadian government may be asked to find employment for some of these scientists.”¹⁹

Certainly Robertson’s cables gave Ottawa much to consider, and Mallory and Jolliffe were determined to act upon the High Commissioner’s concerns. They agreed Trade and Commerce should clear with the cabinet the question of contracts between the Canadian government and the Germans. In the interim, existing cases would be settled by consulting Solandt and Mackenzie. Solandt and Mackenzie could offer little help though. Solandt declined to sponsor Starke, stating he was not interested in the project. Asked to judge the qualifications of some German technicians, Mackenzie, although very much in favour of importing German expertise, replied he was not qualified to pass judgment on their skills. However, if the Darwin Panel approved their qualifications, Mackenzie would “be very glad to accept that decision.”²⁰ The RCMP were not much more helpful. When queried by Jolliffe whether the RCMP could accept the British screening procedure, and if not, what information it would require, Commissioner S.T. Wood advised he could not answer until his organization had studied the matter further.²¹

The task of coordinating the activities of concerned government departments and agencies was given to the newly-formed Committee on German Scientists (CGS). Chaired by Jolliffe, and staffed by Mallory, Solandt, Major W.H. Barton from DND, P. Eagleson of the NRC, and External Affairs representative J. Warren, the Committee on 2 December confirmed Trade and Commerce should approach the cabinet about contracts and reaffirmed the need for an early reply from the RCMP about security matters. Trade and Commerce would also handle requests from industry for German workers after submitting the particulars to the Immigration Branch for clearance.²² Meeting again on 10 December, the Committee, while believing there was no alternative to entering into contracts with each scientist, expressed the view “that the type of contract and the scale of remuneration would have to be adjusted to Canadian conditions.” Accordingly, Canada could not accept Britain’s system until the cabinet had approved British security arrangements, the need for contracts between German scientists and Canadian agencies, the type of contract, and scale of remuneration. Responsibility for approaching the cabinet was given again to Trade and Commerce.²³

There was a difference of opinion, though, concerning the security checks done in Europe. In mid-December Hume Wrong, Canada’s Ambassador to the

United States, advised that the American military was not paying strict attention to immigration regulations when visas were handed out to Germans because the Americans feared cumbersome and lengthy procedures would increase the risk German scientists might end up in Soviet hands. Citing State Department sources, Wrong said American checks consisted “merely in ascertaining that a given German scientist is not listed as a notoriously offensive Nazi.”²⁴ The RCMP did not agree. Asked in November 1946 to give its opinion on British procedures, the RCMP judged the work of the Darwin Panel and the DCOS to be “quite suitable for our requirements.”²⁵ If Wrong’s warning was circulated among the relevant officials in Ottawa, his conclusions seem to have engendered little concern, for:

Once the RCMP had expressed its satisfaction with the screening provided by the British, security screening of the German scientists was no longer of concern to government officials at Immigration Branch or External, and least of all to Trade and Commerce officials, who were keen to overcome any delays in bringing the German scientists and technicians to Canada.²⁶

Also eager to overcome Canada’s lack of speed was Britain. LePan reported in mid-January the Board of Trade had confirmed its agents would trace German scientists for Canada, would arrange exit permits once contracts had been signed, and transport the individuals involved to the United Kingdom where they would be handed over to Canada.²⁷ Two telegrams from the Dominions Office arrived in Ottawa on 1 February, emphasizing the value Britain would derive from the use of German experts in military research and industry, and noting with concern “increasing attempts on part of Russian authorities to obtain German scientists from Western zones for building up of Russian war potential.” Vigorous steps were being taken to increase employment opportunities for German scientists in Germany and the empire, but the British feared hundreds of individuals would remain jobless and thus Canada was asked if it was “prepared to employ some or increase the number already employed.” In order to help the process along, the Dominions Office would compile a list of possible recruits and send it to Ottawa.²⁸

Concern about the perceived lack of Canadian action was not confined to British officials. Jolliffe contacted Mallory in late January asking if there had

been any progress concerning contracts. Overseas, both Robertson and General Maurice Pope, head of the CMM, asked for guidance. Robertson reported some of the technicians requested the previous autumn had been processed and two persons had made it through the security clearance procedure. But the High Commissioner still did not know whether the men had to sign contracts with the Canadian government or what level of remuneration they would get. Pope had a similar complaint, remarking he had "not received any instructions to guide us in the handling of applications from Germans." Spurred on by these inquiries and the Dominion Office telegrams, Pearson suggested that it was "now advisable to proceed in this matter and obtain Council approval for the contracts, security screening and travel arrangements."²⁹

Bureaucratic considerations continued to plague the speedy development of a formal policy. While he favoured importing scientists, Solandt thought that, except in very special circumstances, they should be employed only in industry and universities. Security considerations, he believed, would present considerable problems if such persons were placed in defense research positions. Mackenzie offered a similar viewpoint. As the NRC was small and unlikely to grow much in the immediate future, Mackenzie, while willing to take a few German scientists with very specific qualifications, could not take many without damaging the prospects for employment of first-rate Canadian experts. He therefore suggested the program might be better served if the federal government set up a special establishment to handle the situation on a national rather than an institutional basis, allocating individuals to universities, industry, and government departments as needed.³⁰

The British implication that Canada might be asked to take many more Germans than had been envisioned originally sparked a reaction too. Remarking that London's proposal went beyond what the cabinet had considered, Jolliffe thought a stipulated quota unwise and doubted "the advisability of admitting any large number of these German scientists and technicians." Oliver Master, Trade and Commerce's Acting Deputy Minister, suggested a goal of 50 scientists, most to be placed in industry and educational institutions by Trade and Commerce in cooperation with the NRC and the Department of National Defense. However, before this could be done policy guidelines would have to be set by the cabinet and Master declared "that we should only contract to take scientists whom we need and can definitely place

in selected positions in Canada.”³¹

Much of the blame for the delay can be attributed to problems involved in drawing up a suitable contract form. Because the Allied Control Council in Germany insisted all agreements between Germans and agencies for employment outside of Germany had to be voluntary, Canada faced the awkward situation of signing covenants with enemy aliens, “a procedure fraught with legal and political difficulties. . .”³² Trade and Commerce had by early February submitted a draft document to the Department of Justice for perusal, and it was expected the final version would be ready before February ended.³³ This proved optimistic. Immigration Branch did not receive a copy of the proposed contract until 13 March,³⁴ and the document was not formally examined by the CGS until 22 April. In the interim a number of cables came from London listing the names of Germans expressing a wish to emigrate to Canada as well as those who had already received their security clearances.³⁵ There were, however, several matters that had to be addressed before contracts could be discussed. At a special meeting held on 15 April, the CGS agreed to inform cabinet and authorized the Immigration Branch to organize documentation and medical and security checks for applicants with the cooperation of the RCMP and the CMM. For those whose entry into Canada was approved, their transfer would be made possible by a Minister’s Permit which would allow them to stay in Canada for a year. Mallory, convinced the number of Germans would not exceed 20, would oversee the applications.³⁶

The Committee had much on its plate when it reassembled on 22 April. It approved four documents: a contract form; an agreement between the Crown and potential employers; a guide for Canadian representatives negotiating covenants in Germany; and a submission from the Committee to the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research.³⁷ There was some uncertainty as to whether the Privy Council Committee had the power to approve the contracts. If it did not, then the cabinet would have to be approached. Once affirmation was achieved, Canadian industry, provincial governments, the federal Department of Labour, and universities would be informed there existed “machinery for obtaining German scientists for whose services real need existed in Canada, and whose application would meet the approval of the President of the National Research Council and the Director General of Defense Research.” In response to Dominions Office pleas, the Committee recommended “that while every effort would be made to employ

those of the scientists listed by the United Kingdom authorities for whose services there was an actual need in Canada, and for whom a request had been received by the Government, no action would be taken to obtain employment for those scientists for whom no such need existed.”³⁸ Cold War considerations may have been important, but obviously not enough to displace concerns about the cost to native-born Canadians of importing too many foreign experts.

When the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research, chaired by Howe, convened on 19 May, it had to consider a CGS memorandum which outlined the major features of the contracts and recommended giving approval to the tentative administrative arrangements.³⁹ After some discussion, the Privy Council Committee gave its consent to the proposed arrangements for the German scientists, and agreed the cabinet should pass an Order in Council formally approving them. The body proposed too that consideration be given to the notion that German scientists whose work had proven satisfactory be allowed to bring dependent family members to Canada.⁴⁰

Two days later Howe and Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) Louis St. Laurent presented the case for importing German experts to the entire cabinet, St. Laurent arguing that consideration be given to non-German European scientists too. The ministers agreed, pledging to pass an Order in Council and to inform Britain of Canadian arrangements. Trade and Commerce was authorized “in consultation with the other departments and agencies concerned, [to] prepare and submit proposals for the families of individuals admitted under these arrangements subject to satisfactory safeguards.”⁴¹ The cabinet passed PC2047 on 29 May 1947, giving legal backing to the Canadian component of Operation Matchbox. No mention was made of exact numbers but the cabinet ruled “that while every effort will be made to employ in Canada those of the listed German scientists and technicians for whose services there is an actual need and for whom a request has been received by the Canadian Government, no action will be taken to absorb in Canada German scientists for whom no such requirement exists.”⁴²

But there was a problem. Immigration Branch Commissioner C.E.S. Smith thought cabinet had approved St. Laurent’s proposal to employ scientists and technicians from enemy countries other than Germany. However, he had been informed by the Privy Council that the attempt to widen the scope of the program to include non-German enemy aliens would require an amendment to

an existing Order in Council, PC695. Concerned this might be impossible as it would "mean enlarging the admissible classes to include a considerable number of other occupations," Smith charged if there was a change in the law "it would be only a matter of time before it would re-act to the detriment of Canadians who would welcome an opportunity for such positions."⁴³

The matter was taken up in some detail by the CGS on 3 June. Smith said procedures existed already for bringing nationals from all enemy countries except Germany and Japan, and he did not anticipate there would be any need to import any Japanese. As the cabinet's intentions remained unclear, Smith and Stannard intended to contact the Privy Council Committee on Industrial and Scientific Research for clarification.⁴⁴ Stannard did approach Heeney, informing him the CGS believed the recruitment of non-German scientists was not related to Operation Matchbox and that the new Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, Hugh Keenleyside, concurred and would be contacting cabinet.⁴⁵ Heeney wrote Keenleyside that the cabinet had intended only that Canadian industry would have access to "not only the services of German scientists and technicians under the special proposals submitted but also to make at least not less advantageous arrangements for bringing in technical people from other non-enemy countries who would be useful in Canada."⁴⁶

This idea that Canada should avail itself of the opportunity brought about by the war to acquire skilled personnel to continue Canada's economic development certainly was an important consideration in Ottawa's choice to take German scientists. However, despite pressure from industry and some government departments for a less restrictive immigration policy,⁴⁷ the Immigration Branch remained cautious. When the Privy Council Committee got together on 3 July, it accepted Jolliffe's and Keenleyside's recommendations that non-German scientists should be dealt with under ordinary immigration procedures, although each application would be referred to Trade and Commerce before any action was taken. Should an application be reviewed favourably, cabinet would examine each case separately.⁴⁸

Other issues were decided quickly. On 3 June the CGS approved the texts of letters to universities, provincial governments and the Department of Labour outlining the procedures to be followed in the recruitment and employment of German nationals, ruling too that if an employee's work record was satisfactory for a period of at least six weeks, "his wife and unmarried children under 18 may be admitted to Canada, providing immigration inspection and

transportation can be arranged,” a decision approved by the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research.⁴⁹ The last technical hurdle was overcome when the Privy Council issued PC2417 on 19 June, authorizing the Minister of Trade and Commerce, or any person chosen by him to act on his behalf, “to execute agreements between His Majesty and German scientists, and between His Majesty and the eventual employer in Canada of these scientists, in accordance with the plan approved by Order in Council P.C. 2047 of May 29, 1947.”⁵⁰

The government intended to keep its part in Matchbox removed from the public eye. External Affairs had prepared in November 1946 a press release announcing that a few German scientists might be brought to Canada on a temporary basis for industrial and educational purposes,⁵¹ but it is uncertain whether the message was issued. What is clear is that Germans recruited under the program were forbidden by the terms of their contract from making any public statement about their activities without Trade and Commerce permission.⁵² This desire for secrecy may have stemmed from a concern to avoid alerting the Soviets. However, it is more likely the Canadian government, warned in December 1946 by Wright that press reports in the United States had prompted a major political controversy about German scientists residing south of the 49th Parallel,⁵³ wanted to avoid a similar situation. These preparations threatened to unravel when Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Howard Green asked on 16 June 1947 about press reports that German scientists and technicians were being brought to Canada. Aware the question was forthcoming, Minister of Trade and Commerce James Mackinnon outlined briefly the procedure by which selected German experts were being recruited for universities and industry. Asserting Canada would take no more scientists than it could use, the Minister stated “at the present time it does not look as if there will be more than 12 or 15 such people seeking entry into Canada.”⁵⁴ A week later a second MP, Thomas Reid, submitted 18 questions, most of them dealing with concerns about selection procedures and contact terms. The answers were tabled on 26 June,⁵⁵ this episode marking both the beginning and the end of parliamentary scrutiny of Matchbox.

With this potential flashpoint successfully defused, the government set about making Matchbox work. Howe, believing the admission of Germans was too slow (he blamed delays in RCMP investigations) received cabinet approval to have the Minister of Justice expedite matters.⁵⁶ If Justice managed

to effect a change (and there is a lack of records to support a judgment), Howe soon realized not all the dallying was Canada's fault. Jules Leger, the Acting High Commissioner in London, aware Trade and Commerce was unhappy about the way the Board of Trade and the Joint Staff Mission in Washington were handling applications, cautioned against taking any radical steps to alter the agreed procedure as the situation was improving gradually and because he feared such interference "would serve no useful purpose and might even embarrass us." If Trade and Commerce tried to bypass the existing arrangements by submitting names directly to the Joint Staff Mission, such an action "would definitely create trouble for all of us."⁵⁷

But the system of scientist allocation was undergoing a significant alteration, and Canada discovered it had no input in the changes. As early as August 1948 the British and Americans had begun to streamline the process by having a committee in Germany rather than Washington deal with the applications of German experts. Canada was not informed of this move until October, the Board of Trade stating further delays were likely because although the Americans felt the agreement was satisfactory, they felt it could not be put "into operation without the approval of their Chiefs of Staff and, so far, this has not been received." Until this was accomplished, the United States would stop handling applications in Washington. This logjam would not be cleared, the Board of Trade thought, until January 1949 in the aftermath of the American presidential election.⁵⁸

This pessimistic prediction was wrong. On 18 November the Board of Trade was pleased to announce the United States had finally approved the new scheme, although when the Bipartite Allocation Committee would begin operations in Germany remained unknown.⁵⁹ For Canadian agents, the new rules involved giving a potential recruit details of the job offer which would be forwarded with a curriculum vitae and, if that person was employed already, a release from the German employer. Then the Allied Movement Control Administration would issue an exit visa and transfer the file to the Bipartite Committee. Once the application was approved there, the Canadian authorities would sign a contract with the German and arrange transportation to Canada.⁶⁰

There were immediate complaints about the new arrangements. External Affairs and Trade and Commerce were concerned more delays would inevitably result, hampering not only new requests but those already in progress. B.R. Hayden of Trade and Commerce thought it might be necessary

to circumvent the established procedure and deal directly with the authorities in the British zone without waiting for action by the Bipartite Committee. By doing so in one or two cases, Hayden hoped this "might annoy the United States officials sufficiently to get more rapid action on other cases under the official scheme." Concerned about the possible repercussions of such a step, External Affairs advised Hayden to examine in detail the Bipartite Committee's procedures and get back with some comments.⁶¹

Aware of Canadian discomfort, Broomfield admitted there was much paperwork involved and that "a good deal of chasing up of the individuals [German scientists] will be necessary," but thought the British Control Commission might help by transmitting Canadian offers to a prospective applicant and by gathering relevant documents in Germany for a fee. As displeased German employers had gained the apparent right not to release their workers, Trade and Commerce felt the Board's offer would only confuse an already complicated situation. The weakness of the proposal, Hayden charged, was "in the lack of definite information on security," information his department required if it was to gain the necessary travel permits from the Immigration Branch.⁶²

One of the worries was dealt with quickly. On 27 January Robertson cabled that the British had assured him all Germans "cleared by the Bipartite Allocation Committee have been screened by security authorities."⁶³ Furthermore, upon closer examination of the new procedures with Trade and Commerce's representative in London, Frederic Hudd of Canada House recommended Broomfield's offer be accepted as the aid "should result in a more expeditious clearance and removal of German scientists and technicians to Canada."⁶⁴ Trade and Commerce had another opinion. Believing applications might be more quickly processed by dealing directly with B.J. Bachand, Canada's Commercial Representative in Germany, the department declined to make use of the Control Commission pending Bachand's answer. Having been intimately involved already in acquiring German nationals for work in Canada, Bachand had no objection. However, he pointed out that the Control Commission, with offices in both the British and American occupation zones, had proven very helpful in dealing with American bureaucratic red tape. Moreover, Britain's delegate on the Bipartite Commission was a former member of the Control Commission. With this in mind, both Canada House and Commissioner Smith favoured retaining Control Commission services.

Mallory accepted on 21 May 1949.⁶⁵

Not all of the difficulties were procedural. Canada found itself often in competition with Britain and the United States for the same individual scientist or technician, a battle the smaller nation could not win for, without its own occupation zone, Canada was forced to rely on its allies' good offices. The first problem in this regard occurred when Canada attempted to recruit Wenzel Sistik in late 1947. The Americans rejected Canada's application for Sistik, but because Trade and Commerce valued his abilities enough to claim "no effort should be spared to obtain the necessary clearance for this man," External Affairs asked the Board of Trade and Wrong to seek a reversal of this decision. While sympathetic, Broomfield offered no support because Britain and the United States held that their military governments in Germany had the right to ban the removal of any German from the occupied zones if that person was deemed essential to the economy. In Sistik's case, the ban was apparently temporary and the United States had been informed of Canada's interest in him.⁶⁶

Wrong could offer little more help beyond revealing that the transfer of Sistik and two Germans desired by Britain had been blocked by the War Department on the grounds the men were required in their present work by the American army. More importantly, the Canadians discovered the agreement governing the clearances of German scientists was not interpreted in the same way by Britain and the United States. London believed the covenant allowed for any nation in the Commonwealth to take part; the Americans argued that if Britain cleared a German scientist, he/she could work only in Britain. British officials in Washington pledged to keep working on behalf of Canada and as the Canadian embassy judged little could be gained by approaching the State Department, "the only alternative would seem to be for Canada to be more actively identified with the existing arrangements, in which case we would be in a stronger position to make a direct approach to the Department of State."⁶⁷ Agreeing Canada was in a relatively weak position in securing disputed clearances, Mallory doubted much could be done to strengthen Canada's position. Moreover, he feared establishing an independent Canadian system would only increase the amount of work and slow down the clearance procedure without providing "sufficient improvement to justify the attempt." He was inclined to let the matter rest "and to make a protest in exceptional cases when the circumstances warrant."⁶⁸ The matter was allowed to rest, but a

small victory was gained when Sistek arrived in Canada in October 1948 to take up a position at the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company.⁶⁹

Less easily settled was a dispute between Immigration Branch teams in Germany and Mr. Jackson, Bachand's predecessor in Germany. In late 1947 Jackson had complained to Pope that the Immigration office in Hamburg had refused to grant a visa to a German scientist, forcing Jackson to drive the man to Berlin. Arguing there was a risk involved in transporting the man through the Russian zone, Pope thought External Affairs should be apprised of the situation and suggested the Immigration Office be reminded of the provisions of PC2047. Two days later, stating he had been told by Immigration officers they were not empowered to examine German scientists "or to grant them visas unless they have received definite instructions to do so from the Department of Mines and Resources," Pope recommended both Trade and Commerce and Mines and Resources take action to ensure the expeditious transfer of German specialists to Canada "and particularly that when Mr. Jackson is instructed by his Department to seek out and dispatch such a person to Canada, concurrent instructions be communicated by the Immigration Branch to their representative in the field to process the individual in question in the normal manner."⁷⁰

Pope's requests were not taken to heart by the Immigration Branch. Some seven months after Jackson's difficulties, Bachand complained that Immigration officers received him "like a potential trickster" who was trying to smuggle people into Canada without authorization. Bachand admitted the task of retaining a polite attitude when dealing with Immigration Branch officials "is, I can assure you, sometimes most exasperating." Bringing the matter to the attention of Commissioner Smith, Hayden had assured Bachand that "as far as Ottawa is concerned we are continuing to receive one hundred per cent co-operation from Immigration." Importantly, Hayden declared to Smith that he was "bringing this matter to your attention rather than have anything official go on file."⁷¹ If it was Hayden's intention to resolve the problem by not ruffling any bureaucratic feathers and thus maintaining good interdepartmental cooperation, his low-key approach paid off. Smith replied that after consulting with the Immigration teams' former leader, the difficulties stemmed from the fact the teams received notification of a particular scientist's approval two to three weeks after Bachand and the Military Mission did. This problem would be avoided in future by sending cables immediately to the

Immigration officials in Germany.⁷²

A far greater threat to intra-governmental harmony was posed by the Department of Labour's attempt to achieve some form of control over Matchbox. This was not a random incident but part of a wider effort by Labour to have its voice heard on immigration matters, a voice that often conflicted with the viewpoint of the Immigration Branch. The latter had adopted after 1945 an expansionist approach, favouring a much larger but still heavily controlled intake of immigrants. Labour, on the other hand, believed immigration should be organized to fill existing gaps in the Canadian work force and geared to the business cycle; if unemployment rose, the intake should be lowered. Attempts to coordinate activities, including the establishment of an Immigration-Labour Committee in 1947 were not entirely successful. Labour and the Immigration Branch continued to fight jurisdictional battles over their respective German operations, a struggle that did not cease when "the Immigration Mission in Germany was given full responsibility in that area."⁷³

It is important to note that during Matchbox's early days, Labour was not consulted on the project; neither did it have representatives on the CGS nor the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research. Labour Minister Humphrey Mitchell was present at the cabinet meetings discussing the issue in 1946 and 1947, but if he had any concerns, they found no public expression. Perhaps the only reference prior to 1949 of Labour interest came in June 1948 when Mallory mentioned that a Mr. Dymond of Labour's Technical Information Service had said his organization would take care of the placement of the displaced people (DPs) "and leave the placing of German technicians to me [Mallory]."⁷⁴ This lack of interest ended in January 1949. Informed that 15 German scientists and technicians had been brought to Canada and that Trade and Commerce was looking at an additional 21 individuals, Labour's Deputy Minister A. MacNamara contacted his counterpart at Trade and Commerce, M.W. Mackenzie, about taking over the recruitment of scientific and technical personnel.⁷⁵ MacNamara may have been motivated by criticism of his department's importation of unskilled labour or by the need to centralize overseas recruitment under Labour's aegis. It is possible too he was trying to reverse the 1947 decision which had made the Immigration teams supreme in Germany. Mackenzie responded favourably. Trade and Commerce, he said, had acquired the task of processing the Germans through its wartime

involvement with the Joint Committee on Enemy Science and Technology. As a next step, Mackenzie suggested two Labour representatives meet with Mallory and Hayden. As the project involved only 34 persons, the Labour officials agreed Trade and Commerce should complete it. Trade and Commerce did agree to hand over to Labour responsibility for handling the bringing to Canada of DPs or other immigrants with technical skills.⁷⁶

If MacNamara and Mackenzie thought the matter had been amicably settled, they were proven wrong. Hugh Keenleyside, the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, was most displeased upon receiving word of the meeting. Noting both he and Jolliffe would have attended had they been invited, Keenleyside told MacNamara that given the Immigration Branch's responsibility for administering the Immigration Act, "the subject of your discussions with the officials of the Department of Trade and Commerce is obviously a matter upon which decisions cannot be taken without our concurrence". The decision concerning the German scientists was reasonable, but Keenleyside could not accept the deal struck on the issue of foreign technical personnel. He therefore intended to ask M. W. Mackenzie to transmit all inquiries received at Trade and Commerce concerning such personnel to the Immigration Branch which in turn would consult with Labour where necessary.⁷⁷

Although Keenleyside and MacNamara continued to argue about the entry of skilled individuals (with Mackenzie acting as conciliator),⁷⁸ their dispute centered on issues that had nothing to do with Matchbox which was winding down in 1949. The program's demise was sped along not only by the creation in 1949 of the new Federal Republic of Germany, but also by the relaxation of the special restrictions placed on the entry of enemy aliens. The cabinet, on 21 December 1949, agreed that temporary entry into Canada could be extended to German business men engaged in international trade or to persons of German nationality "who were likely to make a definite contribution to the intellectual, scientific, commercial or cultural life in Canada," a category that included senior university students, students on scholarship in Canada, and fellowship holders. The last barrier to the immigration of German citizens (not including those who had been members of the Nazi Party, the Wehrmacht or the SS) fell on 14 September 1950 when PC4364 dropped Germans from the list of enemy nationals.⁷⁹

There were some final administrative details to be worked out before Matchbox ended. One, as Jolliffe reported on 2 December 1949, was the fact

that many of the contracts had ended and the affected individuals wanted to know if they could stay in Canada permanently. Because the government had not yet decided what to do about German immigration, Jolliffe felt he could not "recommend the granting of permanent status to these German technicians." He was willing, though, to give contract extensions to those "who had been in Canada two years or more and whose services are required and for whom favourable recommendation is made by the Department of Trade and Commerce."⁸⁰ This second proposal found favour with the cabinet which passed PC886 authorizing Trade and Commerce to extend the agreements "for a further period not in excess of two years."⁸¹ In a document submitted to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in October 1950, Hayden stated those still in Canada (42) would not have their contracts lengthened beyond their expiry dates. He asked also that any applications made by the Germans to stay in Canada be forwarded to Trade and Commerce for comment "on the desirability of granting permanent landing."⁸²

Was Matchbox a success? In terms of numbers, Canada, according to the Deschenes Commission, recruited only 71 German scientists and technicians, two of whom apparently never entered Canada.⁸³ By contrast, the United States employed 765 German specialists,⁸⁴ while the Australians accepted at least 73 and possibly as many as 94.⁸⁵ The levels for Britain or France were likely in the hundreds. That Canada could not approach the total taken by its southern neighbour is not surprising. One might even say that given the size of the United States relative to Canada, the Canadian effort was roughly proportionate to its American counterpart. However, given the effort involved, the acquisition of 69 warm bodies must be seen as a disappointment. That more were not found can be attributed to a number of factors: the chaos existing in Germany after 1945 which made the locating of relevant specialists difficult; the competition among the Western powers and the Soviet Union for German experts; the fact that Canada had relatively little to offer scientists in terms of professional and technological facilities and rewards⁸⁶; a cumbersome set of administrative procedures in Germany and Canada; and finally, the interaction of too many actors in the Canadian bureaucracy, each concerned with jurisdictional protection and turf wars. In retrospect, given these factors, Canada may have been lucky it managed to attract the 69 individuals that it did.

Of course, not all Canadians, if David Matas' comments cited at the beginning of this study can be said to be representative of some proportion of

Canada's society, were pleased to hear of their nation's part in Matchbox. Given that the project's "discovery" was made by a commission studying the possible existence of war criminals here, it is almost unavoidable that such a negative judgment would be made. The situation was not made any better by claims that four employees of the German firm I.G. Farben, a company charged with war crimes, sought admission into Canada after 1945 under Matchbox's provisions. Although it is unclear whether any or all of these individuals made it in, according to historian Alti Rodal (who carried out research for the Deschenes Commission) this episode indicates that "given the British and American record of overlooking possible war criminal background of the German scientists for the sake of denying them to the Soviet Union -... the security screening done on behalf of Canada by British and American authorities was not reliable."⁸⁷

For Rodal, the major motivation for British and American participation, and subsequently their Canadian ally, beyond the acquisition of German technological expertise, was the Cold War imperative of denying the Soviets access to that knowledge. Rodal makes much of Robertson's telegram of 27 November 1946 in which Canada's High Commissioner to Britain outlined the political setting in which the recruitment of German scientists was taking place. Most importantly, she asserts that security concerns about letting in possible war criminals were overcome by Howe's belief that effective security procedures were less important than the speedy admission of German specialists.⁸⁸ Rodal overstates her case. Certainly Howe was much less concerned about security considerations than others but there is no evidence Howe wanted the RCMP to do anything more than to be more efficient administratively. If the American and British authorities were turning a blind eye towards the past of some of the individuals they were recruiting, there is little evidence Canada was doing the same in Matchbox, despite claims by Reg Whitaker and Alvin Finkel that Canadian immigration policy after 1945 discriminated against prospective left-wing immigrants in favour of those on the right of the political spectrum.⁸⁹ Rodal sees problems with security where there are none. In her view, Bachand's problems with the Immigration Branch in 1948 were the result of irregularities in the recruitment of Germans as perceived by the Immigration teams,⁹⁰ rather than the communication problem noted above.

Moreover, Rodal's arguments are injured by her reliance on the conclusions

of Linda Hunt and Tom Bower. American scholar John Gimbel has attacked the work of both these individuals as “less than models of balanced historical analysis,” and for bashing the actions of the US military while paying “little or no attention to the broader base of the policy [to acquire German specialists].”⁹¹ Gimbel asserts the American program to use German experts was but one aspect of a much wider effort to exploit German “know-how for the benefit of the military and industrial establishments in the United States.” As such, the denial of German scientists to the Soviet Union was not a primary reason although “it did provide a convenient rationale for the program and helped make it acceptable to the American public at large,” as well as enabling the circumvention of American immigration and de-Nazification regulations.⁹²

Gimbel’s findings might easily be applied to Canada’s part in Matchbox. The Cold War context did provide a way to overcome any objections that might have arisen when the subject of importing German scientists and technicians came up. However, unlike the situation in the United States where there was significant bureaucratic tussling on the issue, the Canadian authorities spent little time pondering anything but the possible economic benefits to be gained. Departing again from American practice, where the bulk of the Germans were employed by the various military services, Canada chose to direct its recruits to industry and university research. Of some importance is that there was seemingly no connection made between bringing in selected German specialists and the question of German immigration as a whole. Matchbox proved not to be a precedent for relaxing the stringent measures which barred the entry of German citizens into Canada until 1950. Also vital is that Canada relied almost totally on British and American authorities to conduct the bulk of the security checks on the people recruited in Germany. This consideration became important later as claims emerged that both Britain and the United States knowingly took in Germans and other Europeans accused of war crimes. There is little evidence that the Canadian government acted similarly and any concerns about such individuals slipping through the security net were overcome quickly as Canada competed with its allies for the best brains. Reasons of economic and political expediency appear to have triumphed over any possible moral qualms. If one Canadian historian can describe Canada’s immigration policy towards Europe between 1945 and 1952 as defined by a combination of altruism and economic self-interest,⁹³ then Operation Matchbox can be seen as only a minor triumph of the politics of

The Triumph of the Politics of Economic Self-Interest?

economic self-interest given that the government departments, after so much squabbling and effort, could only bring 69 German specialists to Canada.

Notes

1. Canada. *Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, Report. Part 1: Public, Honourable Jules Deschenes Commissioner* (Ottawa 30 December 1986), 51-2, and 273-4.
2. "Canada Altered Its Rules for Scientists, Study Says," *Toronto Star*, 14 March 1987, A4; and David Matas with Susan Charendoff, *Justice Delayed: Nazi War Criminals in Canada* (Toronto 1987), 57.
3. National Archives of Canada [NAC], Immigration Branch, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, G.D. Mallory to A.L. Jolliffe, 6 November 1946.
4. NAC, RG25, vol. 2086, file AR22-/4, Shenstone to Massey, 16 July 1945; and Ibid., memorandum #A308, Massey to Secretary of States for External Affairs (SSEA), 30 July 1945, 6.
5. Christopher Simpson, *Blowback* (New York 1988), 25-6; and Tom Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Battle for the Spoils and Secrets of Nazi Germany* (London 1987), 79.
6. Clarence G. Lasby, *Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War* (New York 1975), 9; and John Gimbel, "Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 14 (Summer 1990), 348-56.
7. Lasby, 169-70; and Bower, 152, 164, and 172.
8. NAC, Privy Council Office, Central Registry Files, 1914-1945, RG2, file R-100-1, Robertson to the Prime Minister, 10 September 1946.
9. Ibid., Mackenzie to Howe, 26 September 1946.
10. NAC, Privy Council Office, Cabinet Conclusions, RG2, reel T-2365, minutes of cabinet meeting, 2 October 1947, 7.
11. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Mackenzie to Pearson, 11 October 1946; and NAC, RG25, acc.84-85/019, vol. 296, file 9294-Y-40, Pearson to Robertson, 18 October 1946.
12. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Mallory to Jolliffe, 6 November 1946.
13. Ibid., Heeney to Glen, 9 November 1946; Ibid., Jolliffe to Glen, 9 November 1946. The regulations Jolliffe had referred to were two Privy Council Orders, PC2653, dated 14 September 1939, and PC1373, 9 April 1946, which prohibited the entry of enemy aliens and nationals of any territory occupied by an enemy country; NAC, Privy Council Office, Orders in Council, RG2, vol. 1653, file 14 Sept. 1939, PC2653; and Ibid., vol. 1934, file 3411G, 9 April 1946, PC1373.
14. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Jolliffe to Heeney, 9 November 1946.
15. Irving Abella and Harold Troper claim Glen "was ineffectual in the cabinet and the puppet of his still restrictionist-minded civil servants," while Reg Whitaker says Glen's "next to useless" performance drew Prime Minister King's contempt and Howe's ire. Gerald Dirks believes Glen had "a laissez-faire attitude towards immigration," content to let government departments choose a course of action. Hugh Keenleyside, who served briefly as Glen's Deputy Minister, thought that "while he was not one of the strongest ministers, neither was he among the weaklings." Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933-1948* (Toronto 1982), 240; Reg Whitaker, *Double Standard: The Secret History of*

- Canadian Immigration* (Toronto 1987), 26; Gerald E. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?* (Montreal 1977), 148; and Hugh L. Keenleyside, *Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside. Volume 2: On the Bridge of Time* (Toronto 1982), 282.
16. NAC, RG2, reel T-2365, minutes of cabinet meeting, 12 November 1946.
 17. NAC, William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, MG26 J1, vol. 413, reel C-9176, Robertson to King, 9 November 1946.
 18. Ibid., notes of "conclusions reached at a meeting at the Dominions Office on 20th November, to consider procedure to be followed when the Canadian government wished to obtain German scientists," 20 November 1946.
 19. Ibid., telegram A.994, Robertson to the SSEA, 27 November 1946.
 20. Ibid., memorandum for file by Jolliffe, 16 November, 1946; Pearson to Jolliffe, 15 November 1946; Jolliffe to Mackenzie, 19 November 1946; Mackenzie to Jolliffe, 26 November 1946.
 21. Ibid., Jolliffe to Wood, 16 November 1946; and Wood to Jolliffe, 28 November 1946.
 22. Ibid., memorandum for file by Jolliffe, 2 December 1946.
 23. Ibid., minutes of meeting of CGS, 10 December 1946.
 24. NAC, RG2, vol. 102, file R-100-1, Wrong to the SSEA, 16 December 1946.
 25. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Wood to Jolliffe, 6 January 1947.
 26. Alti Rodal, *Nazi War Criminals in Canada: The Historical and Policy Setting From the 1940s to the Present*, report prepared for the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, September 1986, 333.
 27. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, LePan to the SSEA, 13 January 1947.
 28. Ibid., the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the SSEA, Canada, 1 February 1947; and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the SSEA, Canada, 1 February 1947.
 29. Ibid., Jolliffe to Mallory, 25 January 1947; Ibid., Robertson to the SSEA, 20 February 1947; NAC, RG25, acc.84-85/019, vol. 295, file 9294-R-40 pt.1, Pope to the SSEA, 28 February 1947; and NAC, RG2, vol. 102, file R-100-1, Pearson to Jolliffe, 8 February 1947.
 30. Ibid., Mackenzie to Pearson, 15 February 1947.
 31. Ibid., Jolliffe to the USSEA, 15 February 1947; and Ibid., Master to Pearson, 17 February 1947.
 32. Rodal, 330.
 33. NAC, RG2, vol. 102, file R-100-1, Pearson to Jolliffe, 8 February 1947; and Ibid., Master to Pearson, 17 February 1947.
 34. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, memorandum for file by Jolliffe, 13 March 1947.
 35. Ibid., Robertson to the SSEA, 12 March 1947; Ibid., Robertson to the SSEA, 13 March 1947; Ibid., Robertson to the SSEA, 21 March 1947; and NAC, RG2, 18, vol. 102, file R-100-1, P.M. Atkin, Board of Trade, German Division, to LePan, 18 March 1947.
 36. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, minutes of meeting of CGS, 15 April 1947.
 37. The contract was weighted heavily in favour of the government. The initial period of service was for twelve months, which could be extended for one year, and perhaps longer, by mutual consent of the employee and the Minister of Trade and Commerce. The Minister could terminate the service of the employee at any time. All discoveries or inventions were the property of the Crown; Ibid., copy of contract presented to the CGS, 22 April 1947. The covenant between the Crown and an employer also favoured the former, although the

The Triumph of the Politics of Economic Self-Interest?

- government pledged not to permit any other firm or person from using the services of a German assigned to the employer. The contractor was obliged to state up front what the rate of pay would be and to reimburse the government for the costs of bringing the employee to Canada; *Ibid.*, copy of contract presented to the CGS, 22 April 1947. The guide for the Canadian representatives in Germany outlined the information that the Germans were entitled to have, including rates of pay, accommodation, and security checks; *Ibid.*, "Notes for the Guidance of Canadian Representative Who Will Be Approaching Germans Accepted Under the Darwin Panel and Resident in British Zone," approved by the CGS, 22 April 1947.
38. NAC, RG2, vol. 102, file R-100-1, minutes of meeting of CGS, 22 April 1947.
 39. *Ibid.*, vol. 60, file C-10-12-D, memorandum, "Entry into Canada of Selected German Scientists," submitted to the Privy Council on Scientific and Industrial Research by the CGS, 29 April 1947.
 40. *Ibid.*, file C-10-12-M, minutes of a meeting of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research, 19 May 1947; and *Ibid.*, vol. 102, file R100-1, memorandum to the cabinet, "Admission of German Scientists," submitted by the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research, 20 May 1947.
 41. NAC, RG2, reel T-2365, minutes of cabinet meeting, 20 May 1947, 2-3.
 42. NAC, RG2, PC2047, 24 May 1947.
 43. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Smith to Jolliffe, 3 June 1947.
 44. *Ibid.*, minutes of the informal Committee on Selected German Scientists and Technicians, 3 June 1947.
 45. NAC, RG2, vol. 102, file R-100-1, Stannard to Heeney, 5 June 1947; and *Ibid.*, Stannard to Heeney, 7 June 1947.
 46. NAC, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, RG26, vol. 143, file 3-41-1, Heeney to Keenleyside, 11 June 1947.
 47. In November 1946 the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Professionally Trained Persons had lobbied for the admission of skilled personnel, particularly engineers, to meet an existing gap which required filling now rather than at some point in the future when Canadian universities could produce enough graduates; NAC, Department of Labour, RG27, vol. 3028, file "Inter-departmental Committee on Immigration Policy Minutes of Meetings 1946-47," minutes of meeting of Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration Policy, 24 February 1947.
 48. NAC, RG26, vol. 143, file 3-41-1, Jolliffe to Keenleyside, 12 June 1947; and *Ibid.*, letter, Keenleyside to Heeney, 13 June 1947; and NAC, RG2, vol. 60, file C-10-12-M, minutes of meeting of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research, 3 July 1947.
 49. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, minutes of the meeting of the CGS, 3 June 1947, plus attached draft letters to the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces, Canadian universities, and the Department of Labour; and NAC, RG2, vol. 60, file C-10-12-M, minutes of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research, 3 July 1947.
 50. NAC, RG2, vol. 1976, file 3638G, PC2417, 19 June 1947.
 51. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Department of External Affairs press release, 27 November 1946.
 52. NAC, RG2, vol. 102, file R-100-1, CGS to the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research, 21 April 1947.
 53. *Ibid.*, Wrong to the SSEA, 16 December 1946.

54. *Debates*, House of Commons, 1947, 16 June 1947, 4176-77.
55. *Ibid.*, 23 June 1947, 4491; and NAC, Parliament, RG14, D2, vol. 509, unpublished Sessional Papers, 3rd Session of the 20th Parliament, 30 January 1947, 17 July 1947, reel T-3530, 1-2.
56. NAC, RG2, reel T-2365, minutes of cabinet meeting, 10 July 1947, 6.
57. NAC, RG25, acc.84-85/019, vol. 295, file 9294-R-40, Leger to Warren, 21 October 1947.
58. *Ibid.*, vol. 2086, file AR22/5 pt.3, Broomfield to J.G.H. Halstead, Canada House, 27 October 1948; and *Ibid.*, acc.84-85/019, vol. 295, file 9294-R-40, Robertson to the SSEA, 27 October 1948.
59. *Ibid.*, vol. 2086, file AR22/5 pt.3, Broomfield to Halstead, 18 November 1948.
60. *Ibid.*, Frederic Hudd, Acting High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, to B.J. Bachand, Canadian Economic Representative in Germany, 21 December 1948.
61. *Ibid.*, acc.84-85/019, vol. 295, file 9294-R-40, J.W. O'Brien to Mr. Chance, 28 December 1948; and *Ibid.*, O'Brien to Hayden, 28 December 1948.
62. *Ibid.*, vol. 2086, file AR22/5 pt. 3, Broomfield to Halstead, 31 December 1948; and *Ibid.*, acc.84-85/019, vol. 295, file 9494-R-40 pt.2, Hayden to G.W. Hilborn, 20 January 1949.
63. *Ibid.*, Robertson to the SSEA, 27 January 1949.
64. *Ibid.*, vol. 2086, file AR22/5 pt.4, Hudd to the SSEA, 31 January 1949.
65. *Ibid.*, B.G. Silvertz to Robertson, 14 February 1949; *Ibid.*, Bachand to Halstead, 6 May 1949; *Ibid.*, telegram no. 998, Halstead to External Affairs, 11 May 1949; NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.2, Smith to Mallory, 16 May 1949; and *Ibid.*, Mallory to Smith, 21 May 1949.
66. NAC, RG25, vol. 2086, file AR22/5 pt.4, Warren to Robertson, 10 November 1947; and *Ibid.*, Broomfield to LePan, 25 November 1947.
67. *Ibid.*, acc.84-85/019, vol. 296, file 9294-A.D.40, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to the SSEA, 12 December 1947.
68. *Ibid.*, Mallory to Warren, 22 December 1947.
69. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.2, Hayden to P.T. Baldwin, 16 October 1950, plus attached document listing German technicians.
70. NAC, RG25, acc.84-85/019, vol. 295, file 9294-R-40 pt.2, Pope to the SSEA, and Pope to the SSEA, 17 December 1947.
71. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Hayden to Smith, 23 June 1948.
72. *Ibid.*, Smith to Hayden, 26 June 1948.
73. Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern* (Montreal 1988), 111 and 240-1.
74. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.1, Mallory to Smith, 9 June 1949.
75. NAC, RG27, vol. 278, file 1-26-4 pt.1, F.M. Hereford to MacNamara, 24 January 1949; and *Ibid.*, MacNamara to M.W. Mackenzie, 28 January 1949.
76. *Ibid.*, M.W. Mackenzie to MacNamara, 9 February 1949; *Ibid.*, Raymond Ranger to MacNamara, 16 February 1949. MacNamara claimed this decision was taken because "we all believe no undue publicity should be given to this matter"; *Ibid.*, MacNamara to M.W. Mackenzie, 21 February 1949.
77. *Ibid.*, Keenleyside to MacNamara, 25 February 1949.
78. MacNamara argued because Labour had to place 30,000 veterans and normal graduates, there was an

The Triumph of the Politics of Economic Self-Interest?

- obvious connection with Labour's interest in the importation of foreign technical personnel. The men at the 16 February meeting had come, in his opinion, to "what I submit is the practical course, namely, to find out, first of all, if there is any need to go outside of this country to fill the demand [for skilled labourers]." NAC, RG76, vol. 668, file C31,120 pt.1, reel 10,602, MacNamara to Keenleyside. Keenleyside refused to accept MacNamara's explanation because it failed "adequately to recognize that immigration is the responsibility of the Minister of Mines and Resources." Ibid., Keenleyside to MacNamara, 15 March 1949. For his part, M.W. Mackenzie apologized for not inviting Keenleyside to the meeting on 16 February and stated that "actually no infringement was attempted or carried out on the basic principle surrounding the operation of your immigration service." Ibid., Mackenzie to Keenleyside, 4 March 1949.
79. NAC, RG 2, reel T-2367, minutes of cabinet meeting, 21 December 1949; and Ibid., vol. 2086, PC4364, 14 September 1950.
80. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt.2, Jolliffe to Keenleyside, 2 December 1949.
81. NAC, RG2, vol. 2086, PC886, 23 February 1950.
82. NAC, RG76, vol. 649, file B6737 pt. 2, Hayden to Baldwin, 16 October 1950, plus attached document listing German technicians.
83. *Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals*, 273.
84. Linda Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 41 (April 1985), 23.
85. NAC, RG25, acc.84-85/019, vol. 295, file 9294-R-40 pt.2, C.M. Croft, Acting High Commissioner for Canada in Australia, to the SSEA, 27 October 1950.
86. Whitaker, 105.
87. Rodal, 341.
88. Ibid., 327-40.
89. Whitaker; and Alvin Finkel, "Canadian Immigration Policy and the Cold War, 1945-1980," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 21 (Fall 1986), 53-69.
90. Rodal, 341-42.
91. John Gimbel, "German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the Paperclip Conspiracy," *International Historical Review*, 12 (August 1990), 442.
92. Gimbel, "Project Paperclip," 343.
93. "Donald Avery," "Canadian Immigration Policy Towards Europe 1945-1952: Altruism and Economic Self-Interest," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft for Kanada-Studien*, 6 Jahrgang/NR. 1, 1986, 37-56.