

State Autonomy and Canadian Immigration Policy (国家の自律性とカナダの移民政策)

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SUMMARY IN JAPANESE: カナダは移民によって作られた国でありながら、移民政策が政治学者の中であまり活発に研究されてこなかったということは皮肉であった。理由として、一つには、この政策分野は人間を選択するという性格故に誰にとっても取り扱い難いということがあり、またもう一つには、歴史的に見ると理想的移民供給元の西欧から地理上比較的近かったことでカナダ国家はさほど移民の獲得に苦労をしなかったということが考えられる。そして、カナダ政治学そのものにおいて政策研究が分野を問わず一般的に盛んではなかったという点が強調されねばなるまい。

本稿ではそうした背景のもとで、国家を政策立案の中心に捉えるステータリスト理論の、カナダの移民政策への適用を試みたい。スコッチポル、クラナー、ノードリンガーといったアメリカ人の学者がこれを理論として精緻なものとする前から、カナダではその経験的妥当性が無批判に受け入れられてきた感がある。プリューラリズムとは対照的に、国家と社会の関係の把握において国家の絶対的優位性が唱えられ、国益とは、一般社会の漠然とした総合的利益でもなければ、特定の利益団体によって設定された結果でもない、国の政策決定者自身の想定生産物と見られている。

ところが、カナダの移民政策作成過程を厳密に吟味すると、それが決して国の政策決定者の単独行為ではないことが判明する。1950年代末に家族移民の制限をめぐる社会グループの利益と力を正しく評価せずに政府の独断による政策実行が失敗に帰した後、何か重要な政策変更の際には必ず利害関心のある

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団体との事前の相談が必要とされるようになった。

議会は国家と社会を結ぶ仲介役として大きな役割を果たすようになってきている。一方、州政府の移民政策への関与も決して無視できない。最近の難民事情を考慮すると、国が制御できない国際的環境も分析に取り入れられるべきである。

I. Introduction

This is an analysis of Canada's immigration policy from a statist perspective. Although there is a vast literature on immigration in various fields such as history and sociology, it seems to me that political scientists have not paid much attention to this important area of policy-making. This is partly because it is a sensitive subject not only for policy-makers but for academics. Immigration is a political hot potato that no one wants to get burned with. Selection of human beings necessarily involves some kind of personal discrimination, whether racial, ideological, cultural, or in skill. The lack of interest in immigration policy may also be due to the fact that the Canadian state, unlike Australia for example, has not had much trouble obtaining desirable immigrants because of its geographical proximity to a preferable source of immigrants, that is, Western Europe.

Alan Cairns explicated two decades ago that Canadian political science has been excessively concerned with the institutions and processes of government and inadequately concerned with the output of government, that is, with public (foreign) policy, as well as with the input of government, that is, with pressure group politics and political participation.¹ Douglas Verney aptly characterized it as 'government without politics'. Specifically with reference to foreign policy, Maureen Molot tells us that the study of Canadian foreign policy has been lacking an appropriate theoretical framework of policy analysis.² Although this academic gap in policy analysis is rapidly being filled in various fields, there are still not yet an adequate number of political scientists who do substantial work on immigration; Freda Hawkins, Gerald Dirks, Reg Whitaker, Jerome Black but only a few others.³

Immigration policy is a unique issue area in the sense that it can be regarded as public policy with an important bearing on the international environment and also as foreign policy wearing the shackles of domestic constraints. David

B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton remind us that "an issue area that clearly transcends the domestic/foreign policy dichotomy and impinges on the public is immigration".⁴ Thus, arguments are brought into this article from the study of foreign policy-making because we cannot ignore external factors which have an effect on immigration policy-making. This standpoint is supported by a general understanding of the state's position by leading American scholars: "Since states are intrinsically Janus-faced, standing at the intersections of transnational and domestic processes, their structures, capacities, and policies are always influenced by identifiable aspects of the particular world historical circumstances in which they exist".⁵

II. Analytical Consideration

Tom Keating correctly writes that "in recent years a number of scholars have revived interest in the state as a political phenomenon and as a focus for empirical analysis".⁶ Indeed, an active academic debate exists regarding the validity of the state as a focal point of political analysis and on the relationship between the state and societal interests. Theda Skocpol writes the following:

The meanings of public life and the collective forms through which groups become aware of political goals and work to attain them arise, not from societies alone, but at the meeting points of states and societies. Consequently, the formation, let alone the political capacities, of such apparently purely socioeconomic phenomena as interest groups and classes depends in significant measure on the structures and activities of the very states the social actors, in turn, seek to influence.⁷

Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon also explicitly writes that "few issues are more important or controversial than the relationship between the state and civil society in liberal democracies".⁸

An increasing interest in the relationship between the state and civil society is also a meeting point for American and Canadian political science. It seems the case that the statist approach, which is discussed in detail below, enjoys its greatest popularity among students of Canadian foreign policy⁹ and it has an intuitive appeal to a number of Canadian scholars of Canadian domestic politics.¹⁰ On the other hand, American political scientists in the mainstream have long advocated a society-centered way of explaining politics and

government activities, so-called liberal-pluralist, which takes the state merely as a neutral umpire.¹¹

The statist approach views the state as an autonomous actor vis-à-vis civil society. A leading American scholar of international relations, Stephen Krasner, writes the following:

The objectives sought by the state cannot be reduced to some summation of private desires. These objectives can be called appropriately the national interest.¹²

The state is thought to have its own interests distinct from those of civil society. Politicians and mandarins, each with their own perceptions of the national interest, interact to decide upon policies. This statist approach is judged to be empirically valid as long as state preferences and authoritative actions are coincident. By positing that the state's preferences are distinct from civil society's, this approach does not deny convergence between the two. Even in this convergent situation, in a statist view, it is the state that takes the initiative in changing convergent preferences into authoritative actions.

Moreover, it should be remembered that convergence may be a consequence of the state's purposeful control of societal interests to bring a shift from divergence. It is wrong to think that the statist approach ignores the element of societal interests by assuming that the state's objectives are unrelated to the needs of civil society. Eric A. Nordlinger argues that it is through a careful management of societal interests that the state can maintain autonomy by preventing divergence.¹³

As Keating points out, the need to limit or control societal pressures implies that "societal support is a necessary, though perhaps insufficient, condition for the state to implement its preferred policies".¹⁴

In short, societal constraints continue to operate although the state possesses the capacity to manage societal interests. ... In short, the state is autonomous if it can convince or coerce the public to support it. It is, however, the central motif of the statist approach that state preferences ultimately prevail over societal preferences when these two remain divergent.

The liberal internationalist approach, which is the most widely accepted in the academic community of Canadian foreign policy and also in popular thinking, is based on the assumption that Canada can be characterized as a middle power in an international society.¹⁵ Canada is viewed as constantly attempting to mitigate tensions and conflicts among great powers, through an

increasing institutionalization of international relations, as a result of which a middle power such as Canada becomes able to play an important role despite its lack of sheer force. The liberal internationalist perspective presupposes a popular consensus existing in Canadian society, although it does not explicitly mention societal interests.

The statist approach is tested in the case of Canada's immigration policy-making. Keating argues as follows:

... it becomes possible to dismiss societal forces only when and only because they have given their support to state actors to act on their behalf. When such support withers and when segments of society call into question either the means or ends of the state's foreign policy, societal forces assume greater significance.¹⁶

This article examines whether this depiction is appropriate or not over a period of time. It questions the validity of an orthodox school of Canadian foreign policy studies, that is, a statist-liberal internationalist approach.

III. The Supporting Evidence for the Statist Model

A statist model of public (foreign) policy-making emphasizes the integral autonomy of the state, which is capable of imposing its will on civil society. The state is defined, according to Nordlinger, as "all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and them only, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all segments of society".¹⁷ The state is made up of elected politicians and non-elected bureaucrats, although only senior-class civil servants are taken as significant in terms of the policy-making process. Lower-ranked public employees are differentiated from public officials (politicians and mandarins), who form the state, because the former hold publicly funded positions which do not involve them in making authoritative decisions. All individuals, other than public officials, comprise civil society.

Thus, the Canadian state contains the prime minister, his or her cabinet ministers, their principal secretaries, and deputy ministers of the bureaucratic departments and their assistant deputy ministers. The R. C. M. P.'s top officials and the military high officials can be counted as an important part of the state as they participate in the formulation of certain policies. However,

other organs of the state, such as Parliament and the judiciary, have not been treated as important elements of the state, because a Parliamentary system usually goes with the ideas of executive dominance and of relegation of the legislature to the role of rubber-stamping and because the judiciary is supposed to be a merely non-political impartial actor. Nonetheless, the politics involving ordinary M. P.'s and court judges should be pertinent to the analysis of what the state does, although Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics and organizational process models are concerned only with the internal dynamics of the state executive.¹⁸

Executive dominance is a proper expression to characterize the political system in which the executive branch of the state apparatus has been given a free hand in conducting Canada's immigration policy over a long period of time. Even though immigration acts have been passed by Parliament, the department in charge of immigration has always been a chief instigator of legislation. It may be more precise to say that not the executive branch but the administrative branch of the government has controlled immigration policy particularly in more recent times. Even the prime minister and the minister of immigration were only selectively informed of what was going on in the department by top functionaries. John Schultz seconds this view of the administrative branch's dominance in immigration policy.

Permanent civil servants, in a Parliamentary system, are often more effective policy makers than the Members and Governments they serve. Unrestricted by political consideration and secure in office, department heads can pursue private ends with a vigor and determination denied their nominal masters. Immigration has always been a leading concern of both federal and provincial governments, constantly scrutinized and criticized by Parliament and the Canadian public. But for most of the twentieth century, the actual policy was decided by the bureaucrats at Immigration Branch in light of what they regarded as fit and proper considerations for Canada.¹⁹

Irving Abella also argues that "Immigration was largely in the hands of a small number of bureaucrats".²⁰ He explains this by the fact that immigration was always a controversial issue which the government wanted to handle rather quietly.

These historians' analysis confirms the statist model in that the state, more precisely the federal bureaucracy, controlled immigration tightly, and

administered policy in secret. Two political scientists, Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, summarize the essence of the idea as follows:

State strength is a function of bureaucratic centralization, the quality of bureaucratic elites, and the degree of control exercised by the state over financial resources. Of these, the most important is centralization.²¹

The state has been able to resist Parliamentary checks and the attempts by various interest groups and individuals to influence policy in their favour have been at most meagrely effective.

It is accurate to say that Frederick C. Blair and A. L. Jolliffe, the two consecutive dominant directors of the Immigration Branch, principally fashioned Canadian immigration policy in the inter-war period up until Mackenzie King's 1947 public statement in Parliament. Jolliffe is the person who determined the timing of King's enunciation of Canada's post-war immigration policy principles.²² His minister had such total confidence in him as to accept any piece of advice.²³ It was the Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy that fundamentally determined the contour of King's speech. John Whitney Pickersgill, who was the ghost-writer of King's statement²⁴ and who became Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in the 1950s, based Canada's immigration policy squarely on his conception of 'national interest'. According to him, for anyone other than a Canadian citizen, immigration was not a right but a privilege selectively given by the Canadian state.

The state did not ignore society, as we can see from the existence of the Senate Committee in 1947. However, this can be understood as a strategy of the state to enhance its autonomy and hence translate smoothly its preferences into policy. The state chose policy options in accordance with its own priorities, while making a gesture to mediate among competing groups' various demands. This clever method pleased a shrewd politician like King, who was constantly sensitive to the political winds blowing in the country.

Thus, statist would argue that in the same fashion state autonomy in immigration policy has always been maintained. The Special Joint Committee on Immigration Policy was set up in the mid-1960s and in the mid-1970s; the second one was touted by some people as "an exercise in participatory democracy".²⁵ However, all these were camouflage to cover the successful implementation of state preferences. The cross-country hearings of the 1975 Committee were ironically branded as "public relations exercises" on

something the federal government found distasteful to enact.²⁶ The statist argument is strengthened by the most recent case of having the Senate Committee on Bill C-55 and Bill C-84.²⁷ Despite the appearances that the policy-making process may take, the state can always win over civil society. That is the statist approach.

IV. The Sponsorship Problem

The statist approach can be questioned by making a more detailed investigation of Canadian immigration policy. The most devastating blow to the model is the state's dealing with the sponsorship problem. Freda Hawkins writes: "The sponsored movement, that is, the movement of relatives and quasi-relatives, has played a very important role in Canadian post-war immigration and has been a source of great anxiety—perhaps over-anxiety—among those responsible for immigration policy and management".²⁸

Although the public discussion on immigration policy seems to have centred on racial discrimination before 1962, the sponsored movement in fact raised vexing problems for cabinet ministers and senior public servants who were afraid to place this touchy question before Parliament and the public. The first major public effort to restrict unlimited sponsorship was the attempt in 1959 to confine the admissible classes of relatives to the immediate family. Order-in-Council P.C. 1959-310 was revoked only a month later by Ellen Fairclough, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, who faced a storm of protest from the Liberal Opposition, the Progressive Conservative government in Ontario, which was concerned with its standing among a large immigrant population, the press, and some ethnic organizations.²⁹

The night Fairclough made a decision to ask the cabinet to rescind this nebulous regulation, she was interviewed on television. She did not admit that there was anything wrong with the Order-in-Council itself. She explained her decision as follows:

But the thing became so badly misunderstood that it was impossible to work with it and accordingly I thought, in all kindness to everyone, because a great many people were misled and felt badly about it, it was better to rescind it.³⁰

Hawkins comments on this incident by referring to a failure in diplomacy.

No attempt had been made to educate Parliament or the public in the real problems of the sponsored movement, particularly in relation to the very high rate of unemployment at that time. There was considerable secrecy surrounding the controversial order-in-council which does confirm the impression that it was hoped that no one would notice it. The order-in-council came into force on March 19, 1959. No publicity was given to it until April 1. As Mr. Pickersgill pointed out, it was not mentioned in the debated on departmental estimates.³¹

This valuable lesson, which embarrassed the Progressive Conservative government, was learned by the Liberal government, which made the second major effort to restrict the sponsored movement by publishing the White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy in October 1966. It was Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson who took the initiative to prepare a White Paper.³² This was prepared not only for consideration by Parliament but also for public attention and discussion, and generally focused on the way Canada's immigration should be conducted. John R. Nicholson, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, declared in the Cabinet Committee on Immigration that sponsored immigration was the most difficult aspect of immigration policy as evidence showed that Canada faced a dilemma: a growing need for educated and skilled immigrants and an increasing number of sponsored immigrants not required to meet any standards of education or occupation.³³

The White Paper was tabled in Parliament by the next minister, Jean Marchand, on October 14th. It presented a plan that all immigrants could sponsor their immediate family, with a bonus given to Canadian citizens to bring a wider range of relatives with at least seven years' schooling. As a result of the generally unfavourable reaction of the Special Joint Committee, the Department of Manpower and Immigration had to amend this part of the White Paper before the issuance of the 1967 Regulations. A special Task Force was appointed within the department to devise admission categories of sponsored immigrants. Thus, a new category of nominated relatives was invented, so that non-dependent relatives would be admitted subject to control based on economic conditions in Canada.

A series of events regarding sponsorship gives us a clear test case of what Nordlinger calls a Type 1 state-society relationship, although obviously the state's preferences could not prevail in the face of differing societal interests held by powerful societal groups.³⁴ However, it should be asked whether this

can be classified as an exception to the general pattern of Canadian immigration policy-making. Statists would argue that the state did win in its legislation of two refugee bills in 1988, despite a vehement protest from church, humanitarian, and refugee groups. However, they have to face other daunting criticisms to keep their approach valid.

V. Other Challenges to the Statist Approach

Even if we accept the excuse that the sponsorship problem the state faced in the 1950s and the 1960s was a mere anomaly in Canadian immigration, we can find some other aspects which challenge the validity of the statist proposition that the state is autonomous from societal groups in translating its preferences into policies. They are methodological, political, institutional, and environmental.

To assess the utility of the statist approach in explaining Canada's immigration policy, it is necessary to determine whether public officials have policy preferences which they seek to translate into policy and to ascertain what the state's preferences are.³⁵ If the state does not have definable preferences, it is impossible to say that the state is taking the initiative by acting autonomously from civil society in policy-making. It is not adequate to infer state preferences passively from policy output in the state-society relationships which Nordlinger calls Type 2 and Type 3. Type 2 refers to the situation in which the state brings, by deliberate efforts, societal groups into accordance with its policy orientation. In Type 3, there is no divergence between the preferences of the state and those of society and hence the state can act totally free from any societal opposition. It is sometimes the case in Type 3 that societal interests are not well aggregated to work effectively as an impediment to the state's policy-making.³⁶

To identify types of the state-society relationship, we have to be able to specify state preferences in clear terms. Anthony H. Richmond argues that, in the process of drafting Bill C-24, which became the 1976 Immigration Act, the government was not sure at all of the direction which future immigration policies should take, but was convinced of the highly politically sensitive nature of the issues.³⁷ It is highly probable that the state constantly probes what civil society wants until it comes to tight grips with how to cope with it.³⁸ Even

with the 1988 refugee Bills, it is possible to conclude that the anti-refugee backlash urged the state to take strong action in this policy field. To argue for the statist approach, it must be proven that the initiative was taken by the state with the internally generated solid preferences to defend the national interest. It is not fair to say that, except in the situation apparently classified as Type 1, state actions are state preferences, because they may be incessantly subject to societal influence.

Douglas C. Nord shows in definitive terms what the state wanted when it enacted Bill C-24.³⁹ If we do this kind of detailed analysis, it becomes evident that the final outcome of the Committee report is a mixed product of state preferences and societal interests. Further, to make the new immigration legislation, which Bud Cullen, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, praised as "balanced, human [*sic*] and flexible enough to meet the rapidly changing conditions which are part of a modern world",⁴⁰ the government accepted 60 of 65 of the Committee's recommendations.⁴¹ Hawkins writes, "by and large, the Bill lives up to expectations and does what the Special Joint Committee and many other Canadians who contributed to our short but useful national debate on immigration hoped it would do".⁴² Cullen opened the House of Commons debate on second reading of Bill C-24, with a lengthy statement of the government's aims while stressing that the Bill owed much to the efforts of the all-party Joint Committee.⁴³

Thus, Parliament plays an important bridging role between the state executive and people. Nord argues that the Joint Committee members "operated as policy 'middlemen', transmitting governmental policy intentions to the public and public responses to the government".⁴⁴ Some policy output derives from dialogues between the government and influential societal groups in a Parliamentary forum, while formerly powerful interest groups would focus predominantly on the state through cabinet and the bureaucracy and even this effect was questionable for statist. This interpretation is supported by Pross, who sees a general trend of a central gravity of power moving back to Parliament.⁴⁵ Pressure groups are increasingly active and considerably freer of agency regulation.

In addition to the improved position of Parliament in the policy-making process, the judiciary's importance has increased significantly. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched into the 1982 Canadian Constitution. It was predicted that the judiciary would play a more active role in a national

political life. A political scientist, Anthony H. Birch, argues that it was "something of a surprise when the Canadian Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 1985 that the exercise of administrative discretion in respect of claims to refugee status was an inadequate protection for the claimants, who, under the Canadian Bill of Rights and/or the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, were entitled to a full oral hearing of their claim plus the right to at least one appeal of the oral hearing went [*sic*] against them".⁴⁶ Once one reaches Canadian soil, he or she is protected by the Charter of Rights regarding rights to be enjoyed by everyone. This inadvertent intrusion of the judiciary into the domain of policy-making gave a shock to Department of Employment and Immigration officials, who lost a measure of control over the entry of people into Canada.

The atavistic revival of provincial government interest in immigration should be taken more seriously than that of statist à la Nordlinger. This American scholar completely omits activities of sub-national levels of government from his statist analysis, which is not surprising given the passivity of American state governments. However, the situation is radically different in Canada. Intergovernmental relations occupy a central position in national politics. The provinces should not be placed in the same category as the non-governmental societal groups, because provincial governments are public actors which can make authoritative decisions which bind people residing in those provinces. Although, strictly speaking, the provinces are part of the state, they should be treated as significant actors which are independent from the federal government.

The provinces have the constitutional authority to legislate in the area of immigration, which is shared with the federal government. In fact, they were quite active in the first decade after Confederation.⁴⁷ Since then, the provincial governments have virtually conceded this jurisdiction to their federal counterpart, with the exception of British Columbia's many unsuccessful attempts to exclude Asian immigrants. However, Quebec underwent the so-called Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, a consequence of which was a tremendous decline in its birthrate. This awoke Quebec's long dormant interest in the jurisdiction over immigration in order to maintain its numerical weight in the Confederation. The need for Francophone immigrants increased rapidly and the Quebec government started to demand a fair share of this vital task for national survival.⁴⁸ The other provincial governments, especially rich

ones like Ontario and Alberta, followed suit, not on nationalist grounds, but to link immigration more closely to their labour needs and in a broad sense to economic planning. They are getting involved actively in a business immigrant program.

Finally, it may be necessary to pay more attention to the influence of the international environment and foreign actors on the policy choices of the state and also to the potential significance of public opinion to policy-makers. The liberal internationalist perspective portrays Canada as a middle power with a public consensus on the state's foreign policy orientation. It seems the case that Canada abolished racial discrimination in its criteria of immigrant selection, not because of societal pressures from the inside, but due to the changing external environment in which many more non-white countries were becoming members of international society.⁴⁹ Canada, right after the Second World War, did away with the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act, which totally prohibited Chinese permanent settlement, in consideration of the United Nations Charter, which contained a clause encouraging and promoting humanitarian treatment of everyone.⁵⁰ Further, Canada's response to refugee problem was incited by the other advanced countries closing their doors to asylum seekers from the Third World. Two boat-loads of refugee claimants reached the Canadian shore and thousands of them crossed the U.S.-Canada border by land. This changed Canada's character from a country of resettlement to a first asylum country. This dramatically changed international environment made Canada act quickly on this urgent problem. The statist approach must be modified to incorporate external elements to be more complete.

Domestic society's influence on the state's policy-making is not exerted only by pressure groups but also by the general public. It may be true that, as an area of public policy, immigration has evoked mere conventional support but little real enthusiasm.⁵¹ Even so, as Denis Stairs argues, public opinion has become more meaningful to the foreign policy-making process, including immigration, in recent years.⁵² It is obvious that the Mulroney conservative government, whose popularity had sunk low in 1987, used the refugee legislation, which was supported by a clear majority of the Canadian populace, to recover from the bottom of the valley. As interdependentists in international relations argue, the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy has been blurred.⁵³ Stairs succinctly writes the following:

...public opinion emerges as a more important element in the making of foreign policy not only because the issues themselves are now more directly and visibly relevant than they used to be domestic affairs, but also because competing bureaucratic players are encouraged to exploit the opinions of their respective constituencies as a source of leverage in the policy process.⁵⁴

Immigration and refugee policy may be the best example of what Stairs is talking about. Immigration officials can appeal to the public on an issue very close to their heart. The state is, indeed, Janus-faced.

VI. Conclusion

The degree of state autonomy and the relevance of the statist approach in the case of Canada's immigration policy-making have been examined over a long historical period, beginning with the inter-war period. The author does not insist that the Canadian state did not enjoy any substantial autonomy from civil society, but the state cannot always control the policy-making process decisively free from societal constraints. The blunder the state made regarding the sponsorship question is good supporting evidence for this argument.

In order to be able to use the statist model effectively as an analytical tool for assessing its utility in the Canadian immigration policy-making process, the approach should be modified to a certain degree. State preferences must be clearly identified to prove that the state can override civil society or that the state is taking the initiative to create convergence. This is a methodological question. Further, the positions of Parliament, the judiciary, and provincial governments must be placed rightly in the policy-making process. It is also pointed out that the influence of the external environment on policy-making and the importance of the general public, whose interest is not as aggregated as powerful pressure groups, should be duly considered in a proper framework.

Immigration is a very important area of public policy in Canada as is amply demonstrated in the ongoing debate on the pros and cons of family-class immigrants. It should be the subject of more research by political scientist as an empirical question and also as a theoretical question. As a political scientist, I hope that this piece of work has made a contribution to the field.

Notes

- 1 Alan C. Cairns, "Alternate Styles in the Study of Canadian Politics", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.VII, No.1, Mar. 1974, pp.101-128.
- 2 Maureen Molot, "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: the Case of the Counter-Consensus", *International Journal*, Vol.XXXIX, No.1, Winter, 1983-84, p.99. However, for a dissenting opinion, see David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Dec. 1993, pp. 745-774.
- 3 For a recent development on ethnic studies in political science, see V. Seymour Wilson, "The Tapestry Vision of Canadian Multiculturalism", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXV, No.4, Dec. 1993, pp.645-669.
- 4 David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations*, John Wiley & Sons, Toronto, 1983, p.239.
- 5 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, "On the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State", in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, Ch.11, p.350.
- 6 Tom Keating, "The State, the Public, and the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy", in Robert J. Jackson, Doreen Jackson, and Nicolas Baxter-Moore(eds.), *Contemporary Canadian Politics: Readings and Notes*, Prentice-Hall Canada, Scarborough, Ont., 1987, p.356.
- 7 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", in Evans et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, Ch.1, p.27.
- 8 Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "State Autonomy and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Deep Seabed Mining", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXI, No.2, June 1988, p.297.
- 9 See Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, Prentice-Hall Canada, Scarborough, Ont., 1985, p.xv; Kim Richard Nossal, "Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Vol.XXXIX, No.1, Winter 1983-84, pp.1-22; John Kirton and Blair Dimock, "Domestic Access to Government in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process 1968-82", *International Journal*, Vol.XXXIX, No.1, Winter 1983-84, pp.68-98.
- 10 See Alan C. Cairns, "The Government and Societies of Canadian Federalism", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. X, No.4, Dec. 1977, p.699, 700, 706; Donald Smiley, "Federal States and Federal Societies, with Special Reference to Canada", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. V, No.4, 1984, p.447, 453.
- 11 See Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1961.
- 12 Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978, pp.5-6.
- 13 Eric A. Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, p.69.
- 14 Keating, *op. cit.*, p.358.
- 15 Nossal, *op. cit.*, p.25; John W. Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle", *International Journal*, Vol. XXXIX,

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- No.2, Spring 1984, pp.366-388; Annette Baker Fox, *The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977.
- 16 Keating, *op. cit.*, p.370.
 - 17 Nordlinger, *op. cit.*, p.11.
 - 18 See Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971.
 - 19 John Schultz, "White Man's Country: Canada and the West Indian Immigrant", *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. XII, No.2, Spring 1982, p.53.
 - 20 Irving Abella, Foreword, in Barbara Roberts, *Whence They Came: Deportation from Canada 1900-1935*, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 1988, p.viii.
 - 21 Michael M. Atkison and William D. Coleman, *The State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1989, p.54.
 - 22 National Archives of Canada [hereafter referred to as NAC], RG 76, Vol. 29, File 653, pt.18, Memo for Cabinet, Subject "Immigration", A. L. Jolliffe, Director of the Immigration Branch, Sept. 4, 1945; RG 76, Vol. 485, File 750043, Memo for Cabinet, Subject "Immigration", Minister of Mines and Resources, Sept. 4, 1945.
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 - 25 See Peter Dobell and Susan d'Aquino, "The Special Joint Committee on Immigration Policy 1975: An Exercise in Participatory Democracy", *Behind the Headlines*, Vol. XXXIV, No.6, 1976.
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