

The Clinton Administration's Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region*

(クリントン政権のアジア・太平洋における 政策の展開)

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SUMMARY IN JAPANESE: クリントン政権は米国の安全にたいする当面の重大な脅威がなくなった現在、冷戦のコストから解放され、米国の資源と関心を冷戦後の新たな課題に集中できるかにみえる。しかし、新政権は深刻な国内問題をかかえ、米国民の内向き指向と外交政策の優先順位についてのコンセンサスの欠如はリーダーシップの発揮を難しくしている。また、「ソ連の脅威」の消滅は米国内世論をまとめるのを難しくしているだけでなく、同盟諸国に対する米国の規制力の後退をも意味し、同盟諸国の協力もかつてのようには期待できない。そうした内外の状況変化をふまえて、クリントン大統領はアジア重視姿勢を打ち出した。また、アプローチとしては、単独主義、二国間主義に加えて、これまで以上に多国間主義を重視することを明らかにした。理念的には、民主主義、人権の拡大、経済競争力の強化が安全保障に密接につながっているとの考えが示されているが、このような安全保障観と理念にもとづく「市場重視民主主義国家共同体拡大戦略」(strategy of enlargement)は、アジア諸国、とくにアセアン諸国や中国とのあいだで摩擦を生み、この地域の不安定要因となる可能性がある。

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Introduction

President Bill Clinton came to office in a new world environment no longer split by confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The end of superpower confrontation has released the new administration from America's Cold War burdens and made it possible for the president to reallocate its resources to meet new situations because there is no imminent serious security threat to the United States. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in his Senate confirmation hearings on January 13, the United States is "now relatively more powerful and physically more secure."¹

The new secretary also noted that the end of the Cold War "has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict," and that the United States is confronted with new foreign policy and security challenges at the end of the East-West struggle. Therefore, the United States now has "the opportunity to create a new strategy that directs America's resources at something other than superpower confrontation."

Almost eleven months in office, the administration's new strategy is beginning to take shape. The purpose of this paper is to identify the broad trends that have defined U.S. foreign policy since the fall of the Berlin wall, examine the conceptual foundation upon which the Clinton administration's new strategy is being built, and consider some of the difficulties that the administration faces in its relations with China and Southeast Asia.

The Post-Cold War Environment

The end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of the "Soviet threat," real or imaginary. The post-Cold War world is considered a safer world by the U.S. national security establishment. "America's strategic position is stronger," states the *Secretary of Defense Report of 1993*, "than it has been for decades." The report observes that "No potential scenario leading to global or nuclear war appears on the horizon. No significant hostile alliance confronts the West."²

The absence of serious threats to America's security, however, creates a problem both at home and abroad for foreign policy makers. The crisis atmosphere posed by the "Soviet threat" often permitted a president to carry out his

policy with less domestic criticism because opponents were reluctant to challenge the government's position. With the Communist threat gone, Congress and the mass media are freed from self-restraint; and the president is often required to make a greater effort to obtain Congressional and public support for his policies.

In addition, America's isolationist tendency has become more pronounced in the post-Cold War era. The absence of a serious imminent threat to U.S. security has turned the attention of many Americans to domestic problems. Many now feel that American society is fraught with problems that need urgent attention: crimes, drugs, large federal deficits, the widening gap between rich and poor, skyrocketing health-care costs, pensions and retirement benefits, the humiliating rise in homelessness, and urban decay. Many Americans see "a shameful America unable to take care of its own."³

Moreover, President George Bush's handling of the Gulf War ironically reinforced this inward-looking attitude of the American people. Not only did his vision of a new world order fail to materialize, but he permitted President Saddam Hussein to stay in power. Disillusionment with the results of the Gulf War quickly spread and contributed to the isolationist mood in American society.

The combined effect of the absence of imminent threats and the rising priority of domestic issues in America also had an impact on America's relations with the outside world. Above all, the relationship between America and its allies has changed because of America's large trade deficits and its role as the world's largest debtor nation, and America's allies are substantially more independent. In addition, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union has further contributed to altered relations between America and its allies. The United States can no longer use fear of the Soviets to discipline its allies.

The pervasive feelings of "a shameful America unable to take care of itself" also tends to create an image abroad that the American model of development is not the only choice available to the leaders of other countries struggling to develop their economies. "The United States is losing its moral authority in the Pacific," testified Hunter College Professor Donald Zagoria before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "as many Asians conclude that the U.S. is in decline, that it cannot solve its own problems, and that it is increasingly resorting to scapegoating others, particularly Asians, for its own failures."⁴ Throughout

the Cold War period the United States had exercised its ideological appeal, an important source of postwar U.S. hegemony. The spread of American ideas and values, coupled with its huge flow of foreign aid, had made American leadership more effective. However, the American model of development has recently been tarnished both because of its poor economic performance dating back to the first oil shock of the early 1970s and the economic challenges of Japan, Germany and the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs).

Even the American conception of democracy is being challenged not only by China but also by some of the ASEAN countries. The Singapore government argues that what counts is not whether the government is democratic, but whether it is good or not. Indonesia and Malaysia are very suspicious of the U.S. insistence that they and other countries pay more respect to democracy and human rights. Thus America's ideological influence or moral authority, the key power resource in the Gramscian conception of hegemony, has been challenged or eroded.⁵

The post-Cold War world is regarded as "less dangerous than during the Cold War." At the same time, however, the American military establishment sees the world, in the 1990s as "more complex and uncertain." It anticipates the rise of regional aggressors, of crises stemming from instability in the developing world, and of dangers inherent in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Defense planners and decision-makers must plan for uncertainty and focus the new strategy on meeting the regional threats and challenges from these potential sources of instability and conflict.

However, the Clinton administration is beset with various domestic problems that call for an urgent response. Secretary of State Christopher is blamed for not showing leadership in persuading the Europeans to support the U.S. position on Bosnia, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was condemned for his indecision in handling the Somalian operations. But we must recognize that the difficulties that the Clinton administration faces in the field of foreign affairs are largely a reflection of both domestic constraints and the altered international environment. These situations, both domestic and external, seem to influence foreign and security policy formulation within the Clinton administration. So an examination of the emerging trends and features of the administration's approach and thinking in security affairs is now in order.

Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Multilateralism

Charles Krauthammer wrote in the aftermath of the dramatic victory in the Gulf War that the post-Cold War world was characterized by three elements: the unipolar nature of the international system, the reemergence of isolationism and the new strategic environment of weapons of mass destruction. He added that the United States is the only superpower in the post-Cold War world and that the country, "acting unilaterally and with extraordinary speed" prevented Iraq from taking effective control of the entire Arabian peninsula.⁶ In Krauthammer's view, then, the post-Cold War era is controlled by the unipolar nature of the political world, isolationism, a new strategic environment, and unilateralism.

These four elements can still be recognized as effective in varying degrees of intensity in the Clinton administration. The new administration's foreign policy is constrained by the increasingly inward-looking attitude of the public, but this does not mean that they are ready to abandon the nation's international commitments. During the 1992 presidential elections, 15% of the electorate could be counted as in favor of isolationism while 71% thought that America must take an active part in world affairs. But the fact that there is no consensus about U.S. foreign policy goals among American opinion leaders other than halting nuclear proliferation and ensuring energy supplies poses a vexing problem for the Clinton administration.⁷

The perception of a unipolar world is no longer as influential as it was immediately after the Gulf War. Still, such thinking seems strong in the Pentagon. *The Defense Guidance for fiscal years 1994-1999*, the Department of Defense policy statement, made a case for a world dominated by one superpower and rejected collective action through the United Nations. The first Pentagon document after the end of the Cold War emphasized the importance of "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the United States" and that the country "should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated" or in a crisis that demands quick response. However, the earlier document was later revised and the new draft did not advocate the perpetuation of a one-superpower world in which the United States would work to prevent the rise of any "competitors" to its primacy in Western Europe and East Asia. At the same time, the new document stressed the American commitment to collective military action as a "key feature" of U.S. strategy.⁸

The foreign policy establishment's departure from the idea of a one-superpower world reflects its recognition that the post-Cold War international system is more diffused and the United States needs to adapt its strategy to the altered international security environment. It is natural that this recognition should lead to more emphasis on collective action to preclude threats or solve disputes.

We should, however, note that the abandoning of a one-superpower world does not mean that the United States will not resort to unilateral action when necessary. Nor does it mean that the United States has abandoned its will to lead as supreme arbiter in a multilateral framework. *The Department of Defense Report of 1993* clearly states that the United States, though expressing its preference for a collective response, "must be prepared to defend its critical interests unilaterally if necessary." *The Defense Planning Guidance* also confirms this position.⁹

Unilateralism and bilateralism are also the important elements of the Clinton administration's security policy. Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state for East Asian Affairs, confirming the importance of bilateral alliances in early July 1993, stated "We must ensure that our bilateral ties" in the Asia-Pacific region "do not become frayed or fragile" in the post-Cold War era. This is not much different from the Bush administration's security approach which described its defense structure for the region as "a loose network of bilateral alliances" with the U.S. at its core, like "a fan spread wide, with its base in North America and radiating west across the Pacific."¹⁰

What is novel in the Clinton administration's approach is a new emphasis on multilateralism. On March 31, 1993, at his confirmation hearings, Winston Lord indicated a new U.S. receptiveness to dialogue on new multilateral security arrangements. "To complement our alliances and our military presence," explained Lord, "we are willing to engage in more regional security consultations." President Clinton also stated in his address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 9, 1993, that America "must not hesitate to act unilaterally when there is a threat to our core interests or to those of our allies" but would often work in partnership with others and through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations.¹¹ So to Clinton and administration officials, unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism are not exclusive, but complementary. And it seems there is a growing emphasis on multilateralism in the new administration.

The Conception of Security in the Clinton Administration

The Cold War was characterized by the struggles over power, ideology, systems and world order. The United States tried to create a capitalist world order and its main enemy was Soviet Communism. U.S. interventions were justified more often in the name of containing Communist expansion rather than for promoting democracy and capitalism, even though the ultimate foreign policy goals remained those of promoting democracy and capitalism. It is logical then that these ultimate foreign policy goals have come to be expressed in a more pronounced manner in the post-Cold War era, and anti-Communism is seen as less important. "During the Cold War," declared Clinton at the U.N. General Assembly, "we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions." "Now," he continued, "we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions."¹²

Also, during the height of the Cold War, the U.S. considered military power the essential means for winning the struggle with Communism. However, this military aspect of the struggle became less important in the 1970s. Instead, economics became a major concern for Washington not only as a foreign policy goal but also as a power resource to influence other countries.

Such a trend coincided with the rapid economic growth of the Asian NICs, which recorded an average annual growth of about 9%. This rate declined in the 1980s but continued showing an average annual growth of 6% to 7%. The remarkable economic growth of the Asian NICs was made possible by their exports to U.S. markets. The result was the increased U.S. trade deficits with the Asian countries. Accordingly, U.S. policy makers have begun to link the American economic renewal and amelioration of the U.S. federal deficit with opening the markets of the Asian economies. These interlocking economic and political forces are a major consideration in forming the Clinton administration's national security policies.

(1) Economic Security

One of the three pillars of the Clinton administration's policy is economic security. The pursuit of economic security stems from the administration's awareness of the following factors. First, the American foreign and security policy must be founded on a renewal of U.S. domestic strength in which rebuilding the economy is given the highest priority. Clinton declared as early as

January that economic security constitutes one of the three pillars of his foreign policy. He later created the National Economic Council, a somewhat diluted economic version of the National Security Council. America must advance its "economic security," stated Secretary of State Christopher, "with the same energy and resourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War."¹³ America's security and the renewal of its domestic strength are inseparably linked with each other.

From this perspective, it is the policy-makers' conviction that the American economy must be provided with the stimulus of a thriving world economy, particularly the economic dynamism of Asia. In this connection, the Asia-Pacific region is considered more important for the United States than Europe. "As we approach the next century," said Secretary of State Christopher in his speech at the APEC summit in Seattle in late November 1993, "America must once again look west-west to Asia, and west to the Pacific future." "For today," continued the Secretary, "no region in the world is more important to the United States than Asia." Consequently, America must remain fully engaged in this region. Isolating America from Pacific sources of prosperity would cost it dearly and there are "high rewards for continued engagement."¹⁴

Economic policy stands out in Clinton's Asia policy, and economics is security because the U.S. failure to participate in the rewards of Asian economic dynamism would seriously threaten the renewal of the American economy.

(2) Democratic Security

Democratic security constitutes the second pillar of the administration's security policy. The administration's concept of democratic security was revealed clearly in Clinton's address to the U.N. General Assembly in which he stated that "the habits of democracy are the habits of peace." What he meant by this is that "democracies rarely wage war on one another. They make more reliable partners in trade, in diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment." In the words of Winston Lord, "open democratic societies make more peaceful neighbors. Open societies do not attack each other, they do not produce refugees, they do not practice terrorism, and they make better trading partners."¹⁵

Therefore, the spread of democracy and human rights around the world is regarded as essential to U.S. security and fostering global stability. In this connection, the possible return of hostile authoritarian regimes, especially in the

former Soviet Union, is a key concern for Washington policy makers. The same principle also applies to Asia as a whole. Christopher made it clear at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993, that the United States “will pursue human rights in our bilateral relations with all governments—large and small, developed and developing.” America’s commitment to human rights and democracy “is global.”¹⁶ Clearly, the spread of democracy and human rights as well as the promotion of economic security has strategic and security implications under the Clinton administration.

(3) American Military Power, Alliances and the Forward Military Presence

The third pillar of Clinton’s conception of security is more familiar and traditional. As previously noted, maintaining bilateral alliances and a substantial forward military presence also constitutes an important element of Clinton’s security policy. The Clinton administration emphasizes multilateral discussions in security affairs, unlike previous administrations.

Thus, from the above analysis, we can conclude that there is both continuity and change between the Clinton administration and its predecessors. We can find more continuity in the first and second pillars of foreign policy objectives. The new administration’s emphasis on multilateralism in foreign policy and security affairs departs from the previous administrations’ traditional dependence on unilateralism and bilateralism to protect America’s vital interests. As already discussed, such a change in approach is largely a product of the international and domestic constraints that America faces today.

Promoting democracy, capitalism, and human rights has been the goal of American foreign policy during the Cold War. What is novel today is that the spread of such ideas is assuming strategic and security implications in the post-Cold War world. The Bush and Clinton administrations seem to have learned from the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen Square bloodshed that in the post-Cold War era security is influenced by an information revolution in which ideas travel with commerce, trade and capital across national boundaries and different political systems. Thus after the Tiananmen tragedy, President Bush adopted “a strategy of engagement” in order to encourage China further down the path of reform. It was designed to “integrate the PRC into the world system” and to induce China into playing a more constructive and stabilizing role in Asia.¹⁷ The same goal of integrating the Soviet Union

into the world system was pursued when the Bush administration shifted from containment to peaceful coexistence after the Malta meeting of December 1989.

The Clinton administration is placing new emphasis on relations with Asia. There were a few signs that the Bush administration attached importance to Asia. Under the Clinton administration, however, U.S. foreign policy gives more weight to Asia than Europe or any other region in the world. The new orientation reflects the administration's growing recognition of economic interdependence with Asian economies. In 1992 U.S. exports to the region reached \$128 billion and provided 2.4 million American jobs. In 1991, its trans-Pacific trade exceeded \$316 billion, compared with its \$221 billion trade with Western Europe. Clinton's task of domestic renewal will have little chance of success if America is isolated from Pacific sources of prosperity. So Clinton's "look-west" policy has strategic and security implications as well as obtaining economic rewards.

The Implications of Clinton's Policy for a Post-Cold War World Order

(1) Sovereignty, Self-determination, Democracy, Human Rights

During the Gulf War President Bush announced that he would work toward a "New World Order." The concept reflected the administration's attempt to create a post-Cold War order based upon the traditional values of America such as human rights and democracy. The United States, with the blessing of U.N. Security Council resolutions in 1991 such as those of April 3, Number 687 and April 5, Number 688, continued sanctions against Iraq aimed at destroying the weapons of mass destruction and protecting the human rights of the oppressed. Strobe Talbot, who would soon become ambassador to the former Soviet Union under President Clinton, was of such an opinion at the time. He argued that the U.N. resolutions gave the President a chance to give meaning to the slogan of creating a New World Order.¹⁸

In the wake of the debates that ensued, there has emerged a powerful voice that tries to justify intervention in the internal affairs of developing countries in the name of promoting democracy, protecting human rights and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Larry Diamond, for example,

argues that the international community should impose severe sanctions including military attacks upon those countries that are uncooperative on such issues as the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles or the promotion of democracy and human rights. Specifically, he cites as examples such countries as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan and Serbia.¹⁹

As Diamond's list of countries demonstrates, this kind of argument is likely to provide a rationale to intervene in the internal affairs of countries that are seen as hostile to America or that have a system or ideology different from it. As *the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1994-1999* shows, the Pentagon takes a similar attitude. Emphasizing the use of military force, if necessary, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the document cites as possible targets North Korea, Iraq, and some of the successor states to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.²⁰

Here we should recall Stanley Hoffmann's arguments that the four principles of sovereignty, self-determination, democracy and human rights are flawed and in conflict with one another. The principle of state sovereignty is inadequate today due to interdependence and tolerance of domestic atrocities. The principle of self-determination is currently a factor in disintegration and conflict, as is visible in such countries as the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. While these two principles are related to international legitimacy and many theorists have supported external intervention to ensure self-determination, democracy is related to the question of domestic legitimacy. Democracy cannot be imposed on nations from the outside because this would "open the way to constant foreign intervention, manipulation and domination." Many people agree that human rights must be universally protected, but the same people disagree on "which rights are essential ones."²¹

As Hoffmann's discussions indicate, it is very difficult to pursue simultaneously the four principles upon which discussions of world order may be based. Here we can see the prospect for continued interventionism by the United States in the internal affairs of developing countries in the name of promoting democracy and protecting human rights which, as we have discussed, constitute one of the three core principles of the Clinton administration's foreign and security policy. The United States frequently intervened in other countries during the Cold War in the name of fighting the 'Communist threat.' In the post-Cold War world the rationale is most con-

spicuously the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights. Less frequently, U.S. justifications are based on anti-drugs, anti-terrorism, and environmental protection stance. The question of when and how outside interventions will be justified by the new administration still remains unclear.

(2) Multilateralism and Burden-sharing: Prospects for the Militarization of Asia

The U.S. security system during the Cold War was based on America's offensive and defensive military power buttressed by a network of bilateral and collective alliances. The Clinton administration's new emphasis on a multilateral approach and downsizing of American foreign policy reflects the post-Cold War national priorities revealed in the 1992 presidential votes. President Clinton seems to share the voters' concern that the nation's preeminent goal is domestic revival and that significant resources must be shifted from foreign/defense policy programs to domestic programs.

In America's relations with other countries, the post-Cold War adjustment of priorities has found expression in increased demand for burden-sharing with other industrialized and industrializing countries. The U.S. demand for burden-sharing or cost-sharing has been a constant theme in American foreign policy since the Nixon Doctrine of 1968. Under the new administration which regards Asia as of utmost importance to its domestic renewal, its emphasis on multilateralism means more cost-sharing by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN countries. Moreover, the American defense industries suffering from defense budget cuts seek to sell arms to the economically prosperous Asian countries. These pressures in both the government and private-industry enhance the danger of accelerating the militarization of Asia.

The causes of Asia's militarization are multiple. But as America is the largest arms exporter in the world, the U.S. role is crucial. Orders from overseas purchasers for U.S. arms tripled in the three fiscal years from 1991 to 1993.²²

The consequence of these combined factors is the rush for weapons procurements in Asia. The total world arms trade in 1991 was \$22.1 billion, 25% less than the 1990 figure. But the Asian percentage of the total increased from 15% in 1982 to 32% in 1991. These figures contrast with those of the Middle East whose share declined from 32% to 21% for the same years. In terms of the total amount spent for weapons for the five years from 1986-1990, India, Japan, Afghanistan, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia,

Singapore and China are the largest Asian purchasers, in that order. Also, particularly conspicuous in the increase of military spending in Asia are the Northeast Asian countries that include Japan, China, North and South Korea, and Taiwan. These five countries as an aggregate spent five times as much as five of the ASEAN countries combined (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Some of the ASEAN countries' military spending has also shown a substantial increase in the 1980s.²³

In view of the Clinton administration's expectation that Japan should play a more active political role in the international arena, the American emphasis on multilateralism in security affairs has important implications for the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is now searching for a role to play in the region, but the Japanese public is still divided over whether the role should be restricted to non-military activities or include military contributions. So Japan's course of action will be influenced by what directions the domestic debates lead to as much as by what the United States expects.

First and foremost, the Clinton administration's handling of the North Korean nuclear issue is crucial. It is no exaggeration to say that U.S. policy on the issue is highly influenced by the effect on Japan's course of action in the area of security. Japan's becoming a nuclear power is a nightmare for Washington as well as it is for the rest of Asia. So the Clinton administration is urgently searching for a way out of the present dilemma: normalization of relations and abandonment of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises that Pyongyang earnestly desires or the danger of nuclearization of the Korean peninsula and its far-reaching consequences for Asia, especially Japan. It is clear that North Korea's nuclear issue should be approached so that it will not encourage Japan's further militarization.

The recent U.S. statements supporting Japan's permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council also need close watching. Apart from the Japanese government's purposes, the U.S. government is apparently motivated by its expectation of increased financial contributions from Japan. President Clinton indicated this in his address to U.N. General Assembly on September 27, 1993, by stating that he was committed to work with the U.N. to reduce the nation's assessment for the U.N. peacekeeping missions. He made it clear that the U.S. rates "should be reduced to reflect the rise of other nations that can now bear more of the financial burdens."²⁴ What kind of requests the U.S. government would make of the Japanese government beyond its financial contributions

remains to be seen. But U.S. reactions on this question will be very important.

There are other U.S. moves which may lead Japan toward militarization. In late September 1993, the Japanese government changed its past interpretation of the U.S.-Japan executive agreements concluded under the security treaty and decided to cover the expenses necessitated by the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' transportation support for U.S. personnel and equipment during military exercises. These expenses had been paid by the U.S. until that time. As a result, Japan's share reached 70% of the total costs for the U.S. troops stationed in the country. In the same month, the U.S. government made a proposal to the Japanese government to develop theater missiles jointly. The latter responded on September 24 by agreeing to set up a working group to explore possible areas of cooperation on the proposal.²⁵

These U.S. moves that expand Japan's room for military contributions in the future may be destabilizing for the peace of the region. On this point it is important to place the trend of postwar Japanese politics in a historical perspective. The postwar trend has been clearly toward the militarization of Japan. Moreover, other Asian countries, particularly those of Northeast Asia, are still very suspicious of Japan due to their bitter wartime experiences and memories. The Japanese government had not done much to gain their confidence until the coalition government led by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa made a more serious effort to apologize for past aggressions.

Sources of Uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific Region

Secretary of State Christopher said in his speech in Seattle last November 17 that "ultimately, all our efforts to advance American prosperity in Asia depend on the peace and security of the region." It is therefore in order to examine some of the potentially destabilizing factors in the region and analyze how the U.S. government is responding to them.

The name of the game in the region is economics but there are issues and problems that are disruptive to the peace and prosperity of this region: uncertainty about America's future commitments to Asia; sources of threat stemming from Russia itself and its relations with the other republics; dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that might be triggered by developments on the Korean peninsula; danger of conflict arising from the

North-South division on the Korean peninsula; tensions and conflict related to democratization and protection of human rights; directions of China's reforms and their impact on both party control over the masses and the socialist system; sources of instability and conflict deeply rooted in territorial, religious and ethnic rivalries.

The focus in this section is on U.S. relations with Southeast Asia and U.S.-China relations under the Clinton administration. Such a focus can be justified because there have been significant new developments in the region, notably the ASEAN Regional Security Forum, that are particularly relevant to the new administration's conception of national security already discussed. In addition, the region contains the seeds of tension and conflict, such as the disputes over the Spratly Islands and Parcel Islands. In the same vein, discussions of U.S.-China relations are relevant because one of the core elements of the new administration's conception of security is the pursuit of democracy and human rights, the most thorny and delicate issues between the two countries. Moreover, the bilateral relations contain other complicated and difficult issues that Washington policymakers regard as quite important: opening Asia's markets to American goods and services and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology.

(1) U.S.-Southeast Asian Relations and Sources of Tension and Conflict

Southeast Asia includes the ASEAN countries with fast growing economies. With the Cambodian conflict being brought to an end, the region faces no major security threat for the moment. However, that does not mean that there are no sources of instability and conflict in the region.

The region contains potential sources of conflict: a dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over sovereignty in Sabah; Indonesia's East Timor's autonomous movement; the Vietnam-Cambodian border disputes; an unsettled territorial dispute between Cambodia and Thailand; the Vietnam-China dispute over borders and the Gulf of Tonkin area; and conflicting claims in the South China Sea.

In November 1991 Indonesian troops fired upon crowd attending a funeral in East Timor, killing at least 50 people. High-level officials met in late August 1993 to negotiate the territorial disputes between Vietnam and China. Both sides agreed to draft basic principles to solve the border conflict, which involves more than 20 points and the boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin. But they

made no progress on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Even though the Cambodian conflict came to an end, both Vietnam and Cambodia have yet to solve its border disputes and refugee problems. On August 25 1993, the governments issued a joint statement in which both countries expressed their desire to improve relations. But with respect to the border question and the repatriation of more than 20,000 Vietnamese refugees in Cambodia, they merely agreed to set up a working group of experts to discuss them.²⁶

The biggest threats to the peace and security of this region are the disputed claims in the South China Sea. The islands and underwater resources in the area are claimed by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In March 1988 an armed clash broke out between China and Vietnam, in which more than 20 Vietnamese troops were killed. In January 1991, Indonesia hosted an informal ASEAN workshop and a second round of talks held in mid-July 1991 in which China and Taiwan participated. The participants agreed to exercise self-restraint and try to solve the issue through dialogue and negotiation. In the meantime, during his visit to Singapore on August 13, Chinese Premier Li Peng called for joint efforts to develop the Spratlys, "putting aside for the time being the question of sovereignty." The third round of talks which took place from late June to early July in Jakarta postponed the question of sovereignty and explored possibilities for the joint exploitation of resources around the Spratlys.

In defiance of these Indonesian efforts, the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, despite Li Peng's earlier call for joint efforts, unilaterally moved to pass a law on February 25, 1992, that converted the waters around the Parcels and Spratlys into Chinese territorial waters. In May China signed a contract that allowed a U.S. company to explore for oil and gas in the disputed area. These Chinese moves provoked sharp reactions from Vietnam and Malaysia.

In order to prevent the further exacerbation of the situation the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference on July 22, 1992, adopted the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea emphasizing the need for a peaceful solution to the issue and urging all parties with interests to exercise restraint. However, the talks between the Vietnamese leaders and Premier Li Peng who visited Hanoi on December 2 of that year produced no results. The joint statement announced at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference held in July 1993 again urged the countries concerned to support the Declaration on the South China Sea.

The Indonesian foreign minister at the fourth informal workshop held in Jakarta in late August proposed that the talks be elevated to a more formal meeting among government officials of the parties with interests, but they could not reach a decision. All that was agreed upon at the talks is that they would begin collecting data on the South China Sea and would invite outside powers, such as Japan, America, Australia, and the EC, to their future joint enterprises. They also consented to inviting Cambodia to the next workshop.²⁷

The ASEAN-China dialogue on the South China Sea shows that ASEAN efforts at mediation and persuasion are limited. The ASEAN countries had until the late 1980s respected the principle of solidarity and non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries and dealt with security and other sources of conflict through collective self-reliance. The traditional approach of collective self-reliance has been relatively effective in managing intra-regional issues like joint patrols on borders, anti-guerrilla campaigns and problems involving overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones. But ASEAN proved only a limited vehicle for dealing with such issues as the South China Sea.

The ASEAN experience with issues like the South China Sea suggests that ASEAN states need to involve external powers in the dialogue as a counterweight to China. The existing Five-Power Defense Arrangements (Singapore, Malaysia, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) would be one such element, though not sufficient itself.

There is an increasing recognition among ASEAN countries that Japan would be welcome in such multilateral security arrangements. But a unilateral move by Japan to provide a security shield in this region would be quite unwelcome. The ASEAN position is that Japan's role in security matters must be within the U.S.-Japan security treaty system. U.S. involvement, from this point of view, would be inevitable.

For all these reasons the ASEAN states in the post-Cold War era feel the increasing necessity of strengthening security dialogue with outside powers. The ASEAN response to this new challenge was to convert into a security forum the post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), a vehicle for discussions of trade and economic issues with seven dialogue partners (the U. S., Japan, Canada, EC, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea since 1991). As a result, the participants agreed at the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 that they would henceforth include discussions of security affairs at the PMC. Moreover, China and the Soviet Union

were given guest status at this meeting. China on this occasion not only called for cooperation in the fields of security, politics, economics, and scientific technology but also expressed support for the ASEAN idea of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear-free region.

Another move to meet the new security needs was an attempt to expand membership. At the PMC, held in Manila in July 1992, Vietnam and Laos were invited as observers and they acceded to the Bali Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a prelude to full membership in ASEAN for the two countries.²⁸

The Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Manila before the PMC officially accepted the American military presence in Southeast Asia for the first time in 20 years. The foreign ministers also agreed to work toward collective security arrangements in the region. This decision marked a major reorientation of the ASEAN states' security policy and eventually led the way to the start of an ASEAN Regional Security Forum. The ASEAN Regional Security Forum was established at the 26th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Singapore in July 1993 and is designed to discuss security matters in the Asia-Pacific region.

The ASEAN Regional Security Forum is composed of cabinet-level representatives including the PMC members and China, Russia, and Vietnam. The establishment of the forum is a significant development because the region lacked a formal security mechanism comprehensive enough to include major powers of the Asia-Pacific region. The new security needs of the ASEAN states in the post-Cold War environment made such a forum necessary.

The U.S. governments watched all these developments carefully and with great interest. Washington policy makers were cautious because the ASEAN countries were suspicious of great power dominance in such a cooperative mechanism.

On the question of the South China Sea, the Bush administration shared the view expressed in the ASEAN declaration on the South China Sea that any conflict in the area would affect the peace and stability of the region. Such a conflict the U.S. government feared, would accelerate the arms race in this region. So Washington made it clear that the United States was opposed to the solution of the problem by force. Along this line, Secretary of State James Baker, for example, supported Indonesia's initiatives on the informal talks among the parties with interests, including the proposal that they postpone the question of sovereignty and explore possibilities of joint exploitation of re-

sources.²⁹

On May 9, 1992, Creston Energy Corp., an American company, signed an agreement with the Chinese Offshore Petroleum Corporation, and obtained the right to explore for oil and natural gas. Vietnam charged Washington with connivance by pointing out that an American government official was attending the signing ceremony held in Peking. Washington denied it, and further pointed out that it was a private company's business over which the government had no control.³⁰

As the above case demonstrates, the problem of the South China Sea is a complicated issue for Washington. On the one hand, the U.S. government has to take into consideration U.S. companies' growing interest in exploitation of natural gas and petroleum in the area. On the other hand, any stand Washington takes on the issue may antagonize the countries concerned. As a result, Washington has so far taken the position that the U.S. government makes no judgment as to the legal ownership of these islands, urging a peaceful solution to the conflicting claims.³¹

Like the ASEAN states, Washington also finds it in its interest to build some kind of multilateral framework in which security issues can be discussed. Secretary of State Christopher, visiting Singapore in July to attend the PMC, welcomed the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Security Forum and expressed the hope that it would become an important basis for President Clinton's recently announced goal of a New Pacific Community.³²

The primary significance of the forum from America's point of view lies in promoting mutual understanding and confidence-building through multilateral dialogue and consultation, not in resolving the issues. In other words, the forum is expected to supplement, but not replace, the U.S. security alliances. The Forum will provide a mechanism through which the United States can serve as an "honest broker" in a dispute, the role that the Department of Defense envisions in its report called *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*.³³

However, the ASEAN states and Washington have different expectations about the forum. While the ASEAN states expect the forum to provide an opportunity to present their views and solicit the support of external powers on the security-related issues of this region, Washington wants to discuss other wide-ranging issues from the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and trade liberalization to human rights and democracy. Particularly annoying to the ASEAN states are the issues of human rights and democracy. Both sides at the

ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference in Singapore clearly diverged in their responses to the measures to be taken toward the military regime in Myanmar. The ASEAN countries were also worried that U.S. pressure on China on the issue of human rights and democracy would have a destabilizing effect on the region. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference, therefore, pointed out that to use the issue of human rights as a condition for economic cooperation and developmental aid would be counterproductive in terms of international cooperation.³⁴

The post-Cold War security needs have changed the traditional ASEAN approach of collective self-reliance and led member nations to establish the ASEAN Regional Security Forum, a welcome development for the Clinton administration at a time when it was seeking a multilateral security framework in Asia. However, we should also bear it in mind that the U.S. indiscriminate attempt to press the issues of human rights and democracy upon other Asian countries at the forum may have a destabilizing effect on the peace and stability of the region.³⁵

U.S.-China Relations

In his Seattle speech of November 18, 1993, Secretary of State Christopher described the unsatisfactory state of U.S.-China relations as follows: "Recent problems have created the risk of a downward spiral in our relationship."³⁶ He also noted that on human rights, unless there is overall significant progress, the president would not be able to renew China's most-favored-nation status. He listed the other issues that need to be addressed: trade issues involving market access, textiles, intellectual property, and non-proliferation of weapons. In addition to these issues mentioned by Christopher, for a longer-term perspective, it is also important to examine the military implications of China's vibrant economy, the leadership succession problem after Deng Xiaoping, and the prospect of China's reforms as these all affect not only the stability of China but also the peace and stability of Asia.

Growing economic interdependence is basically a positive element for the bilateral relations. The total amount of trade between the two countries in 1992 exceeded \$30 billion. U.S. exports reached \$8 billion, creating about 150,000 jobs in the United States. Exports expanded at an annual rate of about 30%.

Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord has recently observed that the China area is most promising in terms of investments as well.³⁷ Such increase in economic interdependence may help U.S. policy makers respond to China in a more measured and studied manner.

However, economic interdependence, when it is asymmetrical, becomes a cause of friction and tension. Like the increasingly acrimonious exchanges between Japan and America, trade becomes particularly relevant when economics is elevated from the level of low politics to that of high politics. Moreover, the trade frictions between China and America are more or less likely to develop into pressures upon the different systems.

What makes economic friction more complicated in the bilateral relations is that trade issues are almost always linked by America to human rights and democracy. Such an inclination has become more salient in the post-Cold War American foreign policy. The first hurdle that the Clinton administration had to clear in American-Chinese relations was the extension of most-favored-nation status to China. How it would be handled was an important clue to the new administration's China policy as Clinton, during and after the presidential campaign, had called for a more principled policy toward China on such issues.

Clinton's decision on May 28, 1993, to renew China's MFN status for another year shows that the new administration, at least for the time being, has given priority to economic relations over the other issues. Moreover, Clinton has proved to be more flexible in dealing with China, given the fact that he had made it known after he assumed the presidency that he would make MFN renewal for China conditional on overall improvements on human rights, non-proliferation, and trade imbalances. His decision of May 28 made overall significant progress on human rights issues contingent on MFN renewal for China for the next year, but separated non-proliferation and trade imbalances from its renewal.³⁸

The issue of human rights remains a potential source of tension between the two countries. Secretary of State Christopher unequivocally said the U.S. government would not be able to renew China's MFN status without improvements on human rights, trade practices and non-proliferation. President Clinton, after a 90-minute meeting with Secretary General Jiang Zemin in Seattle in November, confirmed that human rights are "a barrier to the full resolution of normal and complete and constructive relations" between the two nations.

Behind the president's attempt to clarify the U.S. position lies his concern with Congressional critics on the issue. U.S. Democratic Representative Nancy Pelosi's letter, about which Clinton told Jiang during their meeting, already had more than 270 signatures, well over a majority of the House of Representatives. It means Clinton might face a situation next year in which another NAFTA-like battle will have to be fought.³⁹

The U.S. trade deficit with China is its second largest, after Japan, and is expected to grow in the future. One estimate predicts that the U.S. trade deficit with China will be larger than that with Japan in the year 2000.⁴⁰ Increased economic friction, linked with the issues of human rights and democracy, will be a potential source of tension. The search for a way to break the link between these issues is an important task for the Clinton administration. So far, none has been found and it is a tough question for Clinton because, as will be discussed shortly, the issue of human rights and democracy has long-term strategic implications for his China policy.

Attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, besides securing energy sources, is the only foreign policy objective that has a consensus among the leaders of various fields in America. President Clinton confirmed in his address to the U.N. General Assembly that the issue is "one of our nation's highest priorities." For that, the president has taken various steps such as to control materials for nuclear weapons and strengthen both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime. He also has recently reversed the past U.S. position and announced he would work toward a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

On the issue of non-proliferation the two countries have had a series of sharp exchanges. In fact, the relationship became so bitter that both the Chinese foreign minister and the secretary of state in their meeting in Washington on September 30 admitted to each other that bilateral relations were in a very difficult situation.⁴¹

On August 25 the U.S. government imposed sanctions on China for its shipment of M-11 missile components to Pakistan. China made a strong protest and said that to impose sanctions against a sovereign state by evoking a U.S. domestic law is action of hegemony that violates the minimum rules of international relations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed its intention to reconsider the Multilateral Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Again, the U.S. government clashed with China over the unilateral inspection of the Chinese

freighter that was suspected of carrying ingredients for chemical weapons to Iran. The inspection did not produce any evidence that would confirm the U.S. charges. The Chinese authorities immediately began a series of anti-hegemony campaigns and further demanded an official apology and compensation from the U.S. government. Washington refused to comply with these Chinese demands.⁴²

What further inflamed the Chinese was the U.S. action on September 3 to sell four E-4 Hawke early-warning aircraft and lease three Knox-class frigates to Taiwan. Two days later, it was also reported in a Taiwanese paper that Washington was going to sell 41 short-range missiles of the Harpoon type and that a contract had already been signed between the two parties. Previously, the Bush administration had also announced a decision to sell as many as 150 F16 fighters to Taiwan. Naturally and expectedly, the Chinese reaction was furious. China expressed its grave concern and strong dissatisfaction and denounced the U.S. government for both its violation of U.S.-China communiqués and its interference in China's internal affairs.⁴³

U.S. sales of weapons to Taiwan has a history dating back to the negotiations leading to the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. On the one hand, U.S. governments have continued to refuse the Chinese demand that they stop providing arms to Taiwan because such an action constitutes infringements on China's internal affairs given the U.S. government's admission that Taiwan is part of China. On the other hand, the Chinese have refused to accede to the U.S. request that the Taiwan question be solved without recourse to force. However, the worsening of relations that was triggered by the Reagan administration's arms sales to Taiwan led to the signing of the communiqué of August 17, 1982 which not only committed Washington not to increase arms sales to Taiwan above the 1980 level but also pledged the U.S. to "reduce arms sales to Taiwan, leading over time to a final resolution." The U.S. governments' decisions in recent years seem to be a departure from the agreement and to imply that there was a change in policy on the arms sales to Taiwan. If so, the issue will be another source of tension between the two countries.

U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is more difficult for China to accept. First, the Chinese objection to arms sales to Taiwan is a matter of principle to China. Such an action is regarded as intervention in China's internal affairs. Second, U.S. actions are inconsistent because Washington criticized China's sales of arms to Iran and Pakistan while continuing to provide arms to Taiwan.

The Chinese authorities think U.S. behavior demonstrates a double-standard.⁴⁴

On the question of non-proliferation and arms sale to Taiwan, the Clinton administration will have to take these Chinese criticisms into consideration because the U.S. governments' policy on this issue has not been even-handed.

There are two long-term challenges that the Clinton administration faces in its China policy. One is related to the question of 'the Chinese threat.' China may be potentially a threat to the United States because of its acquisition of a blue water navy, long range ballistic missiles, and growing economic base. According to a report completed on September 19, 1993 by the World Bank, in 2002, eight years from now, the Chinese economic zone including China, Taiwan and Hong Kong will have the largest GDP if the area continues to grow at the annual rate of 7%, surpassing the United States in real terms.⁴⁵ Such a rapid economic growth would expand the economic basis for military spending in absolute terms. The proportional increase of China's military capability means a security challenge to Washington policy makers.

The Clinton administration is also confronted with another challenge that involves his policy objective of promoting human rights and democracy in China. Clinton's policy of promoting these ideas in China seems to have strategic implications of long-term consequences.

As discussed in the second section, the U.S. governments have learned by watching developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as from the Tiananmen incident that China's opening to the outside world is closely linked with its reforms on every front. President Bush supported China's reforms by granting it MFN status. The rationale was that the withdrawal of MFN status would damage the reformists and bolster the position of the conservative elements who wanted to restrict Western influence, give internal policies a more ideological orientation and apply stricter government controls on the economy and society. So to support the reformists' policy of opening the door to the outside world would be in the U.S. interest. Trade is not just an economic act: it is "a force for change." In other words, it is "a primary channel for contact between Americans and Chinese, for interchange of ideas and values" that has contributed significantly to the progressive changes in China including political reforms and a market-oriented economy.⁴⁶

A similar thinking and rationale is also embraced by the policy makers of the Clinton administration. The spread of democracy and human rights is believed to be "the foundation for security." "More open societies make for a more

stable region. Democratic nations make better neighbors and better trading partners.... As more Asians enter the middle class, they will seek a greater voice in their communities. As factories bloom across China, political power will increasingly come from the end of an assembly line."⁴⁷ In these words from a speech by Secretary of State Christopher we can read the foreign policy establishment's insight that successful economic reform cannot occur in the absence of political reform and that China's economic linkages with the world economy will encourage China toward a more democratic, market-based society.

Such a strategy, however, is perceived by the Chinese leaders to be subversive. It puts them under a kind of siege mentality, and they strongly suspect that there may be a massive external effort to subvert their rule and bring about a peaceful revolution of their system. The overthrow of the East European communist regimes and the collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced this siege mentality. So what kind of effect China's open door policy will have on the stability of the system remains to be seen. We should be prepared to face the possibility that such economic reforms in China will not necessarily result in a harmonious political situation.

President Clinton in his press interviews after his talks with Jiang Zemin on September 19 frankly stated that China must not be isolated in view of its fast growing economy but that both countries must make progress on human rights, non-proliferation, and trade. Nonetheless, clearly the meeting was less than satisfactory to the president. He admitted so in interviews by saying the mere fact that both leaders had frank exchanges of views with each other was a big step toward the solutions of pending issues between the two countries. Clinton's statement demonstrates the state of affairs between America and China. *Newsweek* of November 29, commenting on the achievements of the APEC held in Seattle, said that the participants "left with a nagging sense that 1994 could see a real crisis" in bilateral relations and that they were "heading for a collision on the issue of Chinese human rights." *Newsweek* comments are a little overstated but even the first highest-level contact since Tiananmen in 1989 revealed that there were deep-seated discrepancies in the outlooks of the two countries.

Conclusions

The Clinton administration's first priority is America's renewal and that in turn largely depends on America's economic competitiveness in the world economy. For that, Asia occupies a more important place in the new administration's strategy of renewal than Europe. This is the first administration in the postwar years to give substance on the policy level to the idea of "looking west-west to Asia."

The rationale upon which Clinton's look-west policy is based is the dynamic economic growth shown by Asian countries. "I look at the flower of Asian prosperity," said the secretary of state, "and I see the seeds of American renewal." Washington policy-makers believe that, without U.S. engagement in Asia, America's renewal will be very difficult, if not impossible. Thus Clinton's foreign and security policy team has repeatedly stated that the United States would maintain its military presence in Asia even though its actual continuance is probably more difficult than is admitted.

For America to continue its military presence, however, Asia's markets must be open to U.S. goods and services. In the post-Cold War world, the American people must be convinced of the value of the military commitments there. So far the most convincing rationale is the economic benefit of such engagements in Asia.

Less appealing to the American people but equally important for the Clinton administration is the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia, the important conditions for the region's continuing economic growth. As already discussed, the ASEAN states in their search for a new mechanism for security have finally shifted their approach and admitted officially the necessity of the U.S. military presence in the region. The ASEAN states' shift in their security approach has led to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Security Forum. The forum was welcomed by the administration because Washington was exploring a new multilateral framework that might supplement the network of alliances.

However, as pointed out in this paper, Clinton's conception of national security and the security policy pursued embraces a potential source of tension and conflict. Such a dilemma is especially pronounced when the principles of human rights and democracy are applied to the ASEAN countries and China. These Asian countries argue that the U.S. applications of these principles are double-standard. They also convincingly assert that East and West have differ-

ent conceptions of human rights and democracy. With respect to human rights, the Asians tend to emphasize social and economic rights rather than civil and political rights.

How to find a way to break the link between trade and political stability, on the one hand, and human rights, on the other, is a challenge that the Clinton administration faces today. President Clinton has not found a solution, and it sometimes seems doubtful that the new administration can, given the philosophical foundation of its foreign and security policies that has been discussed here.

President Clinton's multilateralism is linked to the pressures for burden-sharing by Asian countries. This approach seems to be pushing Asia toward militarization. The problem of militarization in this region is particularly alarming given the trend of Japanese politics in the 1980s and after, and in view of Japan's earnest search for a new political and security role. How the U.S. government handles the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is most critical and urgent to this question. But there are other U.S. moves that require close attention.

In the field of trade and investment the Clinton administration made remarkable achievements at the APEC forum in Seattle. Just before the APEC forum President Clinton also succeeded in pushing the NAFTA bill through the Congress. Such achievements will be belittled if he should bungle in his relations with Asia.

Notes

- 1 BB-93-25, January 19, 1993. USIS, American Embassy, Tokyo.
- 2 *Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Dick Cheney)* (January 1993), p.1. Hereafter it will be referred to as the *DOD Report of 1993*.
- 3 Daniel Yankelovich, "Foreign Policy after the Election," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1992), p.2.
- 4 Donald Zagoria's testimony, *The Straits Times* (February 19, 1993).
- 5 *The Straits Times* (January 20; January 31, 1993).
- 6 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70, No.1 (1991), pp.23-24.
- 7 *Foreign Policy* editor Charles W. Maynes' remarks at Fukuoka American Center (December 5, 1993).
- 8 *The New York Times* (March 8; May 24, 1992).
- 9 *The DOD Report of 1993*, p.1; *The New York Times* (May 24, 1992).
- 10 BB-93-43, July 5, 1993. USIS, America Embassy, Tokyo. James A. Baker III, "America in Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1991/1992), pp.4-5.

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- 11 OT-93-7, September 29, 1993; BB-93-43, July 5, 1993. For Clinton's speech in Korea, July 10, 1993, see *Asahi Shimbun* (July 11, 1993).
- 12 OT-93-7, September 29, 1993.
- 13 *The Straits Times* (January 20, 1993). Christopher's Senate confirmation testimony, BB-93-25, January 19, 1993.
- 14 Christopher's Seattle speech, OT-93-8, November 17, 1993. Winston Lord's speech, BB-93-43, July 5, 1993.
- 15 OT-93-7, September 29, 1993; BB-93-43, July 5, 1993.
- 16 BB-93-43, July 5, 1993.
- 17 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Clark, Jr.'s speech to the Mid-America Committee in Chicago, December 4, 1992. OT-92-30, December 7, 1992. See also, Statement of Richard Solomon before the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization, Asian and Pacific Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade, May 24, 1990. Lawrence Eagleburger's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 7, 1990. East Asia/Pacific Wireless File 026, February 7, 1990.
- 18 Strobe Talbot, "Post-Victory Blues," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.1 (1992), pp.53-69.
- 19 Larry Diamond, "The Twin Pillars of a New U.S. Foreign Policy," *The World and I* (April 1993); "Amerika Shin-Gaiko no Nihonbashira," *Trend* (July/August 1993), p.48.
- 20 *The New York Times* (March 8, 1992).
- 21 Stanley Hoffmann, "Delusions of World Order," *The New York Review of Books* (April 9, 1992), pp. 37-38.
- 22 *Asahi Shimbun* (January 6, 1994). For discussions of the relevant factors leading to the possible acceleration of Asia's arms race, see Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), pp.136-152. However, his analysis is a little exaggerated.
- 23 *SIPRI, Yearbook, 1992, World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.254-268; 271-275. *Asahi Shimbun* (June 19; July 3, 1992).
- 24 OT-93-7, September 29, 1993. With respect to the U.S. government's recent statements supporting a permanent seat for Japan on the U.N. Security Council, see *Asahi Shimbun* (July 25; September 11 [evening edition,] 1993).
- 25 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 9; 23; 25; 26, 1993).
- 26 *Asahi Shimbun* (August 26; 30, 1993).
- 27 *Asahi Shimbun* (July 23; December 3, 1992; July 24; August 24; 25; 26, 1993).
- 28 *Asahi Shimbun* (July 21 [evening edition]; July 22, 1991).
- 29 Susumu Awanohara, "South China Sea," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (August 13, 1992), p.18.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 *Asahi Shimbun* (July 25, 1993).
- 33 *Ibid.* Christopher's Seattle speech, OT-93-8, November 18, 1993.
- 34 *Asahi Shimbun* (July 25, 1993).
- 35 *The Straits Times* (January 20; 26; 28; 29; 30; 31, 1993). The ASEAN countries feel that the United States focuses almost exclusively on civil and political rights, whereas social and economic rights are equally im-

portant. Also, some of the ASEAN states think that the U.S. is not even-handed in advocating these principles.

- 36 OT-93-8, November 18, 1993.
- 37 *Asahi Shimbun* (May 21, 1993).
- 38 *Asahi Shimbun* (May 21; 29, 1993).
- 39 *Yomiuri Shimbun* (October 21, 1993). Michael Elliott and Bill Powell, "Pacific Overtures," *Newsweek* (November 29, 1993).
- 40 *Asahi Shimbun* (October 2, 1993).
- 41 *Asahi Shimbun* (October 1, 1993).
- 42 *Asahi Shimbun* (August 26 [evening edition]; September 6; 9, 1993). *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (August 28, 1993). International Herald Tribune (September 3; 6, 1993).
- 43 *Asahi Shimbun* (September 5; 6, 1993). International Herald Tribune (September 6, 1993).
- 44 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (August 28, 1993).
- 45 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (September 19, 1993).
- 46 Statement of Richard Solomon, May 24, 1990 (*op. cit.*). For a more detailed discussion of the Bush Administration's China policy, see my article, "The U.S. Policy in East Asia," Chapter 1 in Akira Nishimura and Akio Watanabe (eds.), *Kan Kokai Keizai Ken* (The Pan-Yellow Sea Economic Zone) (Kyushu University Press, 1991).
- 47 OT-93-8, November 18, 1993.

