Canada and Japan in the "Pacific Age"*

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I am extremely honored and privileged to be given this chance to address you on the theme, "'The Pacific Age' and Japan," for many reasons. For one thing it gives me a chance to come back to your beautiful country for the second time in a year, to the country I visited for the first time in 1956 while I was a student in the United States. For another, the theme "The Pacific Age" gives a very significant ring in my mind, not the least because of the personality whose self-assigned task was to be a "bridge across the Pacific" and who died in 1933 in this part of your country. His name is Nitobe Inazô.*** In May 1984, the East Asian Studies Center of U.B.C. hosted the Nitobe-Ôhira Conference. One of the panels was about Nitobe Inazô. I participated and presented a paper.[1]

Perhaps it is appropriate for me to begin my presentation with a description of what the Pacific and its rim countries were in his day and compare them with conditions today.

Nitobe was born five years before the civil war that was touched off by the Meiji Restoration of 1868. He studied in the northern island of Hokkaido, and traveled to the U.S. in 1885 for the first time,

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*** All Japanese names in this text are given as they are customary in Japan with the family name first followed by the given name.

entering the North American continent at the port of San Francisco. Afterwards he traveled to the U.S. several times. In 1898, he produced a book, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*[2] which won him worldwide acclaim. And in 1912, he lectured at many universities in the U.S. as the first exchange professor from Japan. He was married to an American Quaker from Philadelphia and made many friends in the United States. But he decided not to visit the United States in 1924, when it passed legislation to bar Japanese from entering the country as immigrants. He represented the Japanese national sentiment of the day over this humiliating piece of American law. He insisted he would not return until the law was rescinded. But eventually he had to retract his own words. In the aftermath of the Mukden Incident of 1931, which touched off Japan's invasion of China's North Eastern Provinces, he crossed the Pacific to defend Japan's case before American and Canadian audiences. Even his old friends now thought Nitobe had become a fellow traveler of Japan's militarists. During a lecture tour in Canada, he fell sick and passed away at a hospital in Victoria. The "bridge" of goodwill he had built across the Pacific was falling. In spite of efforts on the part of his admirers and students, war eventually broke out between Japan and the allied nations. They were engulfed by the rising tide of the era and the bridge collapsed.

Forty years after the end of that war and Japan's defeat, we find his portrait on the ¥5,000 bank note, which was put into circulation in November 1984. He was chosen along with Fukuzawa Yukichi and Natsume Sôseki whose portraits appear on ¥10,000 and ¥1,000 bank notes, respectively, all of which were introduced at the same time. These personalities were chosen for their internationally renown merits. Apart from these men, Nitobe's appearance in this manner reflects the postwar trends which resulted in his rehabilitation. Nitobe's respectability had been somewhat damaged by the association of his name with Japan's overseas expansion in prewar times.

Nitobe's "bridge" of goodwill fell partly because of its intrinsic, or perhaps you might say, structural weakness. It was built upon the imagined commonalty of human actions and reactions. Let me explain this a little. He was the foremost interpreter of Japan and Japanese to the West in his times. He wrote innumerable essays and books on Japan

and things Japanese and had them published in English abroad. *Bushido* was but one of them. He was quite eloquent. Lord James Bryce called his book a gem of English literature.[3] It won many admirers, including the U. S. president at the time of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05, Theodore Roosevelt.[4] The president believed that the book gave the best explanation to the riddle of little Japan's victory over the big Russian Empire: The self-sacrificial devotion of the samurai to the cause of his lord in feudal times survived into the modern age, and realigined and strengthened.

Here we have to pause to think. When something is explained away convincingly, is it proof enough, even if the explanation is 100% warranted? From our own experience we know that it is not always the case. This must be especially true with riddles involving cross-cultural problems. To make things easier for a national to understand, the foreigner tries to make the most of his command of the language of that national to explain away these riddles by making good use of the concepts and historical parallels the national may be familiar with within his own cultural environment. But when the national cultures of the two parties, Japan and the United States, were so dissimilar, unintentional misrepresentation may take place not infrequently. This can be aggravated when the explanation is made more convincing by the excessive use of locally more intelligible references.

This method of explanation was unavoidable in Nitobe's age, for there were only a few Westerners who had bothered to learn the culture of that remote and quaint country of Japan. These people more or less depended on native interpreters like Nitobe. Through Nitobe's explanations, the mysterious "Oriental" way of life became somewhat intelligible. Then a sudden turnabout took place. Nitobe began to speak in a language disturbingly similar to that of Japanese militarists as Japan began to fade behind the threatening fog of "Oriental" inscrutability. Why was this so? The answer is simply that the knowledge of Japan was derived from a reality made easier to understand but inevitably distorted, being lifted out of a living cultural context. In other words, it was more a one-way passage of information from Japan's side of the Pacific to America without the feedback which would make Japanese directly realize that something had gone wrong in this manner of communica-

tion. I am sure that Nitobe for one would have liked the idea that Western people should try to master the language and culture of the Japanese people and to solve for themselves the riddle of "Oriental inscrutability" always associated with Japanese when Americans deal with them. But more than half a century after the unsuccessful efforts of Nitobe to ameliorate trans-Pacific communication, in May 1984 when Canadian specialists of Japanese affairs mentioned the need for intensive training in the Japanese language at the Nitobe-Ôhira Memorial Conference on Japanese Studies, it is said that some participants from Canadian business circles reportedly commented that it was not necessary for foreigners to speak Japanese well.

To learn a language is a way to develop sensitivity for the people who speak that language. Canadian business people should at least learn the importance of this fact, and support the ideas and activities of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada which has been at last inaugurated recently. Among the major powers of the Pacific, Canada has lagged behind the United States with its Japan Society of New York established in the 1910s, and Australia with its Australia-Japan Society of a few year's standing.

In the private sector, as opposed to the governmental, Canadians had not always been like this. At Sophia University in Tokyo from which I come, the Canadian Center headed by Father Conrad Fortin has been working for over a quarter of a century to bring Canada and Japan closer together by various activities.[5] Further, I can mention the parish church in Tokyo that was founded immediately after World War II by priests of the Scarborough Foreign Mission of Ontario. These missionary people are very competent in the Japanese language, and convey the warmth of Canadian culture to the Japanese they associate with.

Among these Canadians, there are two people who merit special mention in connection with my topic, "Canada and Japan in the 'Pacific Age'." Let me first make a brief mention of Ranald MacDonald (1824-94), the Canadian-born North American who went to Japan and made friends with samurai scholars of foreign studies, and prepared the first English-Japanese and Japanese-English dictionary in the late 1840s while Japan was still closed to Western nations under the

policy of seclusion and exclusion under the Shogun. He did not represent Canada formally, not only because Canada did not become independent until 1867, a year before the Meiji Restoration in Japan, but also because the part of the Oregon country where he was born——of a Scottish father in the employ of the Hudson's Bay Company and a Chinookan chieftain's daughter—— had been formally integrated into the United States in 1846. Yet he believed it to be his task to act as interpreter in the negotiations for the opening of Japan by the United States, which appeared to him already quite imminent. Unfortunately for him and for his personal ambition, and perhaps just as unfortunately for the Japanese, the chance did not present itself. It is possible that if his competence had been fully employed, the government of the Shogun might have saved itself from an embarrassing situation which arose a few years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854 with Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States. It was a case of misunderstanding due to a linguistic defect in the Japanese version of the treaty. The Japanese did not expect the arrival of Townsend Harris, the first American and, or for that matter, the first foreign consul to reside in Japan, although it was clearly stipulated in the English text of the document. It is very touching that the last words uttered by the dying MacDonald in North Dakota in 1894 were "sayonara, sayonara," to his niece.[6]

The other Canadian I consider especially important in connection with today's topic is E. Herbert Norman (1909-1957), a son of a Canadian Methodist missionary, raised through most of his teen-age years in Japan. Having been educated at Toronto, Cambridge and Harvard Universities, he entered the Canadian Foreign Service in 1939. At the end of the war, he came back to Japan as head of the Canadian liaison mission. Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, found his expertise in Japanese affairs exceptionally valuable during the U.S. Occupation of Japan. In 1940, he published a historical analysis, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, which received immediate and long-lasting acclaim by Japanologists everywhere. The Japanese translation appeared in 1953. Thus, Norman's ideas had a profound impact upon Japanese historians, too. In 1976, when I was doing a research at the MacArthur

Memorial Library in Norfolk, Virginia, I came across an impassioned and intimate letter Norman addressed to the general that he had found a 18th century Japanese thinker, Andô Shôeki, who would provide the endogenous grass-roots for democracy in Japan something MacArthur had asked him to look for in order to re-educate Japanese for democracy. Norman's analysis along this line was presented orally in Japanese in front of Japanese scholars at the Imperial University of Tokyo in May 1948. In December 1949, his study of Andô Shôeki was published as a number of the organ of the Asiatic Society of Japan, and a copy of the text was obviously dispatched to MacArthur. I suspect MacArthur must have been encouraged by evidence the Japanese were not totally without a tradition of grass-roots democracy, and that given a chance, having had the militaristic superstructure of society removed, Japanese would develop along the lines of Western institutions of democracy, reinforced by its own traditions set forth by people like Andô Shôeki. Oddly enough, although the Japanese version of Norman's study of this anarchistic philosopher of 18th century Japan was already published in January 1950 by the prestigious and highly influential publisher Iwanami Shoten in a popular paperback series, its English original was never made commercially available.

Norman was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), which was founded in 1925 as a non-governmental research organization for problems concerning the international affairs of the Pacific Rim countries. Nitobe was an original member and participated in the 1933 IPR Conference held in Banff, Alberta. Norman, who later joined the IPR in 1938 as a research associate at its International Secretariat in New York City, made a major contribution to reconstructing the trans-Pacific bridge that Nitobe had failed to sustain. It was very tragic that this organization was regarded as subversive by the McCarthy Committee. The organization was disbanded, and Norman took his own life in 1957. Among the subjects for study he left unfinished was a comparative study of utopian ideas of Japan and Europe. In 1977, the Iwanami publishing house came out with the entire works of Norman in four volumes. It was a way to eulogize this great Canadian Japanologist. The postwar rehabilitation of Japan as a member of the international community of nations owes much to the contribution Norman made

and the country he represented. In 1954, Canada's motion led to Japan's membership in the Colombo Plan. In the same manner, with Canadian support Japan became a member nation of GATT in 1955, and in the following year Japan was admitted into the United Nations. In 1963, it was again Canada who strongly supported Japan's entry into OECD.

In land area, Canada is the second largest country in the world. It is 27 times as large as Japan's archipelago. Most of Canada lies to the north of Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan. Canada, with its population of 24 million, has always enjoyed one of the world's highest per capita incomes. Japan's population is almost five times as large, and has recently achieved a similar per capita income. Japan's GNP is second only to the United States. Japan's ODA (official development aid) in 1984 was $3.76 billion, placing it second to the United States if France's colonial spending is subtracted from its ODA of $3.81 billion. In terms of percentage of GNP, Japan's ODA was 0.33% of its GNP, while the United States' was 0.24%. This is one way Japan, whose military spending is as little as 1% of GNP, tries to fulfill its international responsibility for peace in a non-military way. In contrast, Canada's ODA was 0.45% of its GNP, making it the ninth highest, while Japan was the twelfth, and the United States the fifteenth.

In the recent past, among Pacific countries, New Zealand suddenly endeared itself to the hearts of peace-loving Japanese, when its prime minister, David Lange, declared he would keep its ports closed to visiting American ships if they were armed with nuclear weapons. In 1984, Japan sent by far the largest number of signatures to the United Nations urging nuclear disarmament of the nations concerned. Japan, as you know, is the first and so far the only place where humanity has experienced the use of nuclear bombs in an international conflict. The Japanese believe that they owe it to themselves to stand for pacifist values and forestall the recurrence of that nuclear holocaust that took place in two of their cities. The Japanese felt they had found a most like-minded nation in New Zealand, and to some extent in Australia, whose prime minister had taken a similar but less radical stand toward the United States in spite of the ANZUS military alliance among these

three nations.

Reflecting the pacifist wishes of the Japanese people, the Japanese government maintains an anti-nuclear weapons policy. The Japanese will not produce them, own them, or allow them to enter their country. Prime Minister Lange paid high respect to these principles when he was recently interviewed by an *Asahi* correspondent. He added that each nation has its own geopolitical conditions and that New Zealand does not need an American nuclear umbrella. It would be more harmful to New Zealand's security. Lange said New Zealand honors the ANZUS treaty, but he maintained that at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, shortly after World War II, nuclear weapons were not considered as part of its obligations.

Naturally, every nation has different geopolitical conditions. Canada is no exception. In the postwar years, Canada made significant contributions to the cause of general peace in the world by helping ease tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. Canada's efforts resulted in the formation of the Far Eastern Commission in 1945 for the Occupation of Japan, by keeping the USSR and the U. S. at the same conference table. Another example is the recognition of China in 1970 by the Trudeau government, setting a pattern for a number of nations to follow, including the United States. This Canada did when 70% of its foreign trade was with the United States, and the rest of the world, especially ill-informed Japan, did not consider Canada much more than an appendage of the territorially contiguous superpower, America.

Prime Minister Trudeau's "third option" was especially refreshing to a world accustomed to bipolar politics. It prompted a Canadian scholar to present a concept of regional cooperation, the North Pacific Rim.[7] It would appear to pair off neatly with NATO, one on the Atlantic side of Canada and the other on the Pacific side. The similarity does not go much beyond this, for one is a military organization which immediately induced a countervailing alliance, while the other was to be composed of not only of the United States, Japan and Canada, but also the USSR, China and Korea, both North and South. This must be the logical development of the "geopacifics," which Canadian geographer Griffith Taylor, then at Toronto Univer-

sity, had already proposed in a book published in 1946.[8] Defined as the "study of geography to promote peace," geopacifics was his professionally conceived answer to the nightmarish war of human misery that German geopolitics had justified. For this middle-nation tradition alone, I can admire Canada's contribution and further potential for peace and justice in the world.

If the notion of the North Pacific Rim comes naturally to the mind of a Canadian as he looks around to build a bright future for his own nation, the Japanese used to have the notion of an East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere as a similar economic development plan in prewar years. In other words, the Japanese look toward the south, whereas the Canadians look to the west across the Pacific. In the minds of Japanese, the Pacific Ocean is practically identical with what they know as *nan yô*, or the southern seas, with its image of a carefree life on tropical islands. The Tokyo Geographic Society, which was established in the 1870s was very concerned with the southwestern Pacific. Today, more than a century later with its history of Japanese military expansion, withdrawal in defeat and economic return, some Japanese still entertain a somewhat nostalgic attachment to these islands, some of which had been managed by Japan as "Class C" mandated territory after World War I. While doing research to get ready for this lecture, I found a journal published by a Tokyo organization called The Pacific Society, headed by the president of a big business concern.[9] Their area of concern is professedly limited to "all about the Pacific islands." This is characteristic enough for the Japanese. Interestingly the people of the United States often seem to define the Pacific region in the same limited terms. In December 1983, the Pacific Studies Association was inaugurated, headquartered at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. The association defines the Pacific as "a region" of "Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia."

Why do not Japanese look at the Pacific the way Canadians do? Among conceivable reasons here I would like to point to some historical developments relating to the Russians in the north. These are rather altogether unpleasant memories for Japanese, and it seems they turn away from them for the more pleasant image of the tropical islands. Perhaps it is correct to say Russians have at least as much

claim as Americans or Canadians to be called the first Westerners to colonize North America. Beginning with Alaska in the 17th century, by the 1820s the Russians were as far south as San Francisco in California, and sailing toward the Kingdom of Hawaii to realize their dream of turning the Pacific Ocean into their Mediterranean. Their movement was not necessarily bellicose in nature. To the contrary, a Russian intellectual went so far as to recommend the formation of a confederation across the Pacific between the United States of America and a proposed "United States of Siberia" separate and distinct from the Romanov autocracy of Moscow.[10]

Soon the Russians were in Japanese waters, too. Here again they were not necessarily bellicose. In fact, a high official who met Russian naval officers held them in high esteem by samurai standards. As a whole, the samurai officials seem to have liked the Russians better than the Americans they met at the opening of Japan in the 1850s. The Americans came in superior steamships, supported by the self-confidence of a growing industrial society, and were domineering. In contrast, the Russians were gentler and more submissive. The Treaties of 1855 and 1875 with the Russians settled the border issues, stipulating that all the Kurile Islands were to be Japanese, and all of Sakhalin was to be exclusively Russian. And then, after all, Russia was the "Giant of the North," and Japan's course of expansion was set to the east on to the Asian continent. This trend of expansionism was continued on the whole, and after every conflict with the Russians, it was readjusted, and eventually redirected toward the south. Toward the end of World War II, which arose from this trend of southward expansion, the Soviets intervened in spite of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. It was only after Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers that the Russians landed and militarily occupied the Kurile Islands and other islands off Hokkaido. Then the Cold War ensued. It should appear only natural for Japanese to come up with a dark image of the USSR, and tend to look away from it.

A most characteristic attitude of the Americans during these years of contact with the Russians in Asia is found, I believe, in the speech Commodore Perry made at the American Geographic Society of New York upon his return from his successful trip to Japan in 1855:

> It requires no sage to predict events so strongly foreshadowed to us all; still "Westward" will "the course of empire take its way." But the last act of the drama is yet to be unfolded; and notwithstanding the reasoning of political empirics, Westward, Northward and Southward, to me it seems that the people of America will, in some form or other, extend their dominion and their power, until they shall have brought within their mighty embrace the Islands of the great Pacific, and placed the Saxon race upon the eastern shores of Asia. And I think too, that eastward and southward will her great rival in future aggrandizement (Russia) stretch forth her power to the coasts of China and Siam: and thus the Saxon and the Cossack will meet once more, in strife or in friendship, on another field. Will it be in friendship? I fear not! The antagonistic exponents of freedom and absolutism must meet at last, and then will be fought that mighty battle on which the world will look with breathless interest; for on its issue will depend the freedom or the slavery of the world, —despotism or rational liberty must be the fate of civilized man, I think I see in the distance the giants that are growing up for that fierce and final encounter; in the progress of events that battle must sooner or later inevitably be fought.[11]

Americans were interested in the vast potential market of China, whose population already then was on the order of 400 million. An "Open Door" policy for China was proposed in 1898 by the U. S. for all the powers inside China to honor. It promptly followed the American acquisition of the Philippines, which made the United States a major Pacific power of the conflicting national interests of Pacific Rim nations over the China market, mention must at least be made of Siberian "Intervention"—— described by Soviet historians as the intervention by capitalist nations in the Russian Revolution. The U. S. had extended the Open Door policy for China, applying it to the former Czarist territories in East Asia, upon which the aggressive Japanese wanted to encroach. In the so-called intervention, the Japanese sent in some 70, 000 troops and the U. S. some 7,000. The American troops were in

control of the trans-Siberian railroad, somewhat reminding us of the continuity of the dream of constructing a transworld railroad system from the United States, the West coast of Canada, Alaska and then into Eastern Siberia from Dalny in Manchuria, the dream which had been entertained untill his premature death in 1908 by the American railroad tycoon, Edward Harriman. The Americans withdrew from Siberia by April 1, 1920, without correctly notifying the Japanese government beforehand.[12] The Japanese occupation continued through November 1922 in Siberia, and in Northern Sakhalin until 1925.

One primary objective of Japan was concerned with the strategic material of petroleum. It was estimated that there were a number of promising oil reserves as yet untapped beneath the vast surface of eastern Siberia. It was not a mere coincidence that Japan was driven into World War II in 1941 in search of an assured supply of this raw material in Southeast Asia. The Japanese answer to this predicament was, as sloganized, a call for constructing a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." When this policy was made known in the summer of 1941, a Japanese political scientist tried a cautious application of geopolitical analysis to Japan's international environment. The model was Hitlerian Germany. He thought that an economic bloc might become a going concern as far as Japan, "Manchukuo" and China were concerned with a little more effort, but he believed that to integrate Southeast Asia into this bloc would be very difficult without political integration first. Japan had practically no economic presence in that area, a sharp contrast with the role of Western colonies there. In comparison, the German share in the Balkan states' trade was nearly 40%.[13]

Without a going economic compliment of significant size, political integration could be facilitated only by military conquest. Problems arising from a war economy eventually forced Japan into conflict with the United States, whose general productivity was assessed at ten times the size of Japan's. Oddly enough, Japan's declared war objectives and those of the U. S. corresponded at least in one direction, national independence for colonial countries. Other Western nations in the region, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France all meant to come back in the postwar period as colonial powers, restoring their rule

there. After the war, Japanese reparations to the newly independent nations of Southeast Asia helped build new economic ties as the Americans cast an understanding eye.[14]

In the postwar world, many alliances were formed. Fearing the recurrence of militarist expansionism in Japan, Australia and New Zealand formed the ANZUS arrangement with the United States. Canada belongs to NATO. South Korea has its own bilateral security pact with the United States. So does Japan and the Philippines. Needless to mention, the leading nation was the United States, as it occupied one of the poles between which nations were divided in the Cold War confrontation. Economic interchange across the Pacific had increased quite significantly by the middle of the 1960s. For example, Japan-Australia trade for the year 1961-62 saw Japan already overtaking the United Kingdom as a market for Australia's exports, becoming the No. 2 country. In 1971-72, Japan became the No. 1 importer of Australian goods, followed by the United States with less than half of Japan's Australian imports, and the U. K. In 1983-84, of all its trading partners Australia imported most from Japan and exported most to Japan, more than two-and-a-half times of what was exported to the United States. In contrast, Canada's interchange with Japan is smaller relative to its relations with its North American neighbor; only 7% with Japan, although Japan is its second largest trading partner, the third being the U.K. with 3%, and 70% with the United States. Constraints such as these on Canada's potential as a major mover of the concept of the North Pacific Rim might make its prospect appear dim, but the Canadian record in diplomatic affairs as a "middle nation" regarding the USSR and the People's Republic of China makes its possible contribution very important for the realization of the Pacific community.

Since the mid-1960s, concern for the future of the international economy in the Pacific began to involve not only the government officials but also academics. They met with foreign representatives and scholars in various conferences. On the part of Japan, there emerged in 1980 the final report on "The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept." The prime minister at the time, Ôhira Masayoshi, who had been pushing the idea had passed away suddenly a little before its publication.

Despite the loss of its prime backer, the basic concept of closer cooperation for peace and development in the region lingers on.

When the interim report of the study group for the PBCC came out, I made a study of Filipino responses to the emerging concept. It mostly consisted of interviews with people who had some form of contact with Japanese. One general reaction was that Japan had virtually realized the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." It failed during the war when it wanted to do it by military force, but in the postwar period, it succeeded by peaceful means. The PBCC would be useful for constraining the otherwise selfish, orderless behavior of business people from Japan.[15]

Shortly after this field research, I went to Mexico City to read a paper at an international symposium on the theme of "Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Region." A Mexican international economist surprised me and my Japanese colleagues by asking us to tell him what Japanese thought of Americans and what relations Japanese wanted to maintain with them. He said these were prerequisites before entering into any meaningful exchange of ideas. We were surprised and appreciative of what this giant to the north meant to the Mexicans.

I could not cover all the things I set out to do during the given time. And then I am not a professional international economist, but only a historian and an interested observer of current developments in the Pacific.

Notes

1 This is available from Sophia University Institute of International Relations as Research Paper Series, A-50, "Nitobe Inazo and the Development of Colonial Theories and Practices in Prewar Japan."(1987).

2 Published originally in English by The Leeds & Biddle Co., Philadelphia, Pa., U.S.A., it was made available in German, Bohemian, Norwegian, Mahratti, Chinese, Polish and French languages by 1905.

3 Tsurumi Yûsuke, "Nichi-Bei kôkan kyôju jidai no Nitobe sensei," Maeda Tomon and Takagi Yasaka (eds.), *Nitobe hakushi tsuioku shû* (Tokyo: Nitobe hakushi kinen jigyô jikkô iin, 1936), p. 223.

4 Elting E. Morrison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 777.

5 The center was incorporated into the Institute of American and Canadian Studies when it was inaugurated in April 1987. The activities of the center included building a library, giving lectures, carrying out researches and publishing their results as well as helping Japanese immigrants to Canada and conducting home-stay summer study programs for students.

6 Kimura Ki, "Nichi-Bei bungaku kôryû shi" in *Nichi-Bei bunka kôshô shi*, IV (Tokyo: Yôyô sha, 1955), pp. 55-56.

7 J. Arthur Lower, *Ocean of Destiny: A Concise History of the North Pacific, 1500-1978* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1978), pp. 1-3.

8 Griffith Taylor, "Geopolitics and Geopacifics," G. Taylor (ed.), *Geography in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 3rd ed.

9 Gotô Noboru, Chairman of the Tokyu Corp., and former chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce.

10 David J. Dallin, *Russian Rise in Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 17.

11 Samuel Eliot Morison, *"Old Bruin": Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 1794-1858* (Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 388.

12 Hosoya Chihiro, "Shiberia shuppei o meguru Nichi-Bei kankei," *Kokusai seiji* No. 17 (Tokyo: Yûhi kaku, 1961), p. 90.

13 Rôyama Masamichi, "Dai Tôa Kôiki ken ron," Taiheiyô kyôkai (ed.), *Taiheiyô mondai no sai kentô* (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun sha, 1941), pp. 41-44.

14 William S. Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), pp. 106, 139-141.

15 An interview with Father Pacifico Ortiz, S.J., February 8, 1980, referred to in Kimitada Miwa, "Japan in Asia, Past and Present: How the Southeast Asians View the Japanese and How the Japanese Ought to Implement their Newly Emergent Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept" (Research Papers Series A-42, Sophia University of Institute of International Relations, 1981), p. 12.