

Bonner Fellers and U.S.-Japan Relations,
June 1945-June 1946

(ボナー・フェラーズと日米関係:
1945年6月から1946年6月)

Haruo Iguchi*

SUMMARY IN JAPANESE: 本稿は、太平洋戦争末期から連合国による対日占領初期における、ダグラス・マッカーサー將軍の信任が厚いとされた軍人ボナー・フェラーズの考えと行動を考察の対象としている。フェラーズは、1944年から1946年までマッカーサーの副官を務め、また、終戦までマッカーサーのもとで推進された対日心理作戦の中心人物であった。本稿で紹介されている、フェラーズの天皇・天皇制と日米戦争終結に対する見解、フェラーズが1946年夏に退官を決意するに至った理由と状況、そして最も重要である終戦後フェラーズが滞日中に行ったことなど、フェラーズに関する詳細の多くは、いまだ紹介されたことのないものである。終戦前後の日米関係におけるフェラーズの多大な貢献は、マッカーサーが指揮する軍隊内で、天皇制を利用することにより、終戦、武装解除、占領改革を達成するという見解を積極的に後押ししていったところにあったといえよう。フェラーズは、滞日時代に日本が降伏を決断するに至った経緯に関する歴史資料や証言を集め、これらをもとに1946年の最初の三ヵ月間で1944年から1945年にかけて彼が推進した対日心理作戦を総括する報告書を書き上げたが、この執筆作業を通じて彼は、ドイツの降伏から広島へ最初の原爆が投下されるまでの期間、日米両国は、太平洋戦争を早期に終結させる機会をなぜ有効利用できなかったのかという疑問に関心を強めていったのであった。

* 井口 治夫 Associate Professor, Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Division of Social and Human Environment, Law and Politics Program, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan.

Introduction (Abstract)

This paper explores the thoughts and activities of Bonner Fellers from June 1945 to June 1946. Fellers served as General Douglas MacArthur's trusted military secretary from 1944 to 1946. Until the Japanese surrender, he was also in charge of MacArthur's psychological warfare against Japan. Many of the details regarding this topic in this paper are new, including Fellers's view of the Japanese Emperor, his thoughts about how the war between Japan and the U.S. had ended, his thoughts about and the circumstances surrounding his retirement, and most importantly his activities in Japan. Fellers's major contribution to the American efforts toward Japan was spearheading within the military organization commanded by General MacArthur the argument to use the Imperial Throne so as to induce the Japanese to surrender and carry out disarmament, demobilization and reforms in Japan. He also gathered historical documents and other evidence during his days in Japan, which were used in writing during the first three months of 1946 a report on the Psychological Warfare against Japan from 1944 to 1945 and contributed to his argument that between the time of Germany's surrender and the first atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima, the two countries had missed opportunities to reach an early settlement of the Pacific War.

Bonner Fellers and the Pacific War, June-August 1945

Toward the end of the bloody Okinawa campaign MacArthur still thought Russian entry was necessary. Fellers noted on June 12 that MacArthur had "made it very clear to [Joint Chiefs of Staff George C.] Marshall that it is of Paramount importance for Stalin to strike *before* we do" and on June 18, the day his commander of the Tenth Army in charge of the Okinawa campaign Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner was killed in action, that MacArthur "urged Truman to induce Stalin to attack with Red Army well before our scheduled date for Olympic so that Japanese Army would have a major commitment prior to our landing."¹

But if Olympic got carried out and if the Emperor's role would be most useful in inducing surrender before such a landing took place, would there be less need for using the Emperor to achieve a Japanese surrender after the battle in the home islands began? On July 12 Fellers attended a dinner hosted by MacArthur for a British military delegation. Fellers noted in his Military Secretary Diary that

while MacArthur stated that the Japanese Government was “eager to talk peace,” he had to wait for the outcome of the Potsdam Conference. Furthermore, he stated his hope “to destroy Emperor who is Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces.”²

Should MacArthur’s statement be interpreted as a warrior’s rhetoric or should it be interpreted as expressing the possibility that the idea of keeping the Imperial Throne as reflected in Fellers’s Psychological Warfare Plan be scrapped after the start of an anticipated bloody incursion into the Japanese home islands? Before the Potsdam Proclamation, MacArthur seemed to have become more neutral in his approach toward the Japanese Throne; his attitude is reflected in the fact that Fellers’s Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) published a background report on July 22 entitled “The Emperor of Japan.” Although this comprehensive July report pointed to the fact that “The Constitution recognizes that the Emperor is all powerful, but in practice he exercises his powers only upon the recommendation of his numerous advisers,”³ and introduced detailed aspects of the political structure under the Meiji Constitution, it focused on the following question and did not mention PWB guideline on the Emperor:

Discussion among the Allies, as they consider what to do with their inevitable victory over Japan, centers on Hirohito. In the process of liquidating Japanese militarism, must Hirohito, too, be liquidated? If so, how will the resultant political vacuum in Japan be filled?⁴

In analyzing the above questions, the report drew on interrogation reports of Japanese prisoners, and various publications and public statements in the U.S. by public officials, journalists, and academics in favor of or against the retention of the Imperial Throne, and the aforementioned June 1945 Gallup poll of average Americans.⁵ The report introduced the ideas by Joseph Grew regarding the retention of the Imperial Throne in the State Department by using his public statement⁶ and magazine articles such as in *Nation* (October 14, 1944), *The American Mercury* (January 1944), and *Time* (Pacific Edition, May 21, 1945), that discussed the internal developments in the State Department that argued for the retention of the Imperial Throne; the last two articles indicated that the Department found the Throne useful for carrying out occupation reforms and *Nation* introduced Eugene Dooman as a key player in spearheading this approach to retain the Throne.⁷ The only part in this report that used Fellers’s July 1944 “Answer to Japan” is:

The mystic hold the Emperor has on his people and the Spiritual strength of the Shinto faith properly directed need not be dangerous. The Emperor can be made a force for good and peace provided Japan is totally defeated and the military clique destroyed.⁸

At the same time, this July 22 report used the aforementioned *Time* article,⁹ Owen Lattimore¹⁰ and others to make the following point: "To pass off the Emperor as a puppet without political responsibility of any kind or as an institution which can be directed toward good ends hardly merits serious consideration."¹¹ With regard to the opinions on the Imperial Throne among Britain, China and the Soviet Union, the report stated that "Britain has been in favor of retaining the Emperor as a 'control' of the disillusioned conquered nation." In discussing the Chinese government's position, the report introduced Chiang Kai-shek's speech used by Grew in his May 28 memorandum of conversations with President Truman while also showing that government's announcement of its perception of Emperor Hirohito as Asia's War Criminal No. 1. In other words, the report indicated China was undecided on the Emperor issue and it also stated this was also the case for the Soviet Union.¹²

After the Potsdam Proclamation on July 26, Fellers recorded on July 27 that MacArthur was "not as favorably impressed with Berlin peace terms as I" because he thought Japan "must reject them."¹³ Fellers wrote his wife on the same day regarding his optimism about the war and that he felt no need to change the guideline for his psychological warfare program:

I am elated over the Berlin terms for the Japanese. Unconditional Surrender was a most unfortunate phrase to define it at this time—when we are in a position to make good with force—is especially suicide. It will shorten the war and *anything* could happen *Now*. . . .

Our Psychological Warfare program does not have to make a single adjustment in view of Berlin announcement.¹⁴

But the assumption regarding a Japanese surrender was based on the notion that it would take an American landing in the home islands to create the momentum for it. Fellers reflected such thinking on July 30 in a letter to his wife:

We are in the midst of a hot Psychological Warfare campaign as a result of

the Potsdam Declaration. It gives us a lot of ammunition. No one thought they'd quit now but every day sees the military gov[ernment] more and more discredited and the peace movement growing slowly stronger. Some day—after we land—the scale will tip.

Do you think Stalin will enter? Think he wants a slice of that will be the best and most honorable way.¹⁵

On August 2 an American military delegation from Potsdam visited MacArthur to brief him on the Conference and Fellers noted in his Military Secretary Diary that they had a long discussion on the subject of the Soviet entry into the war.¹⁶ Indeed, it was during this meeting that MacArthur learned for the first time the secret Yalta agreement between President Franklin Roosevelt and Stalin regarding Soviet entry into the war against Japan within three months after Germany's surrender. On the previous day, MacArthur was briefed for the first time by Air Force General Carl Spaatz about the existence of the atomic bomb.¹⁷

On August 3 Fellers expressed his anxiety about the war when he wrote in his Military Secretary's Diary that "Japan is in bad shape frantically trying to" use the "Potsdam proclamation as a basis for talks." On the one hand he thought peace was coming any day, but on the other hand that it would not arrive until December.

Then on August 5, Fellers wrote in his aforementioned diary that a new bomb was about to be used:

B-29's will drop mammoth bomb in an industrial area south of Yokohama tomorrow at 9:30. They hope this bomb will be so devastating that Japan will see the futility of further resistance. It will be interesting to learn its effect.¹⁸

The day after the first atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima, Fellers wrote to his wife in a letter dated 7 August 1945 from Manila:

What do you think of the atomic bomb. If it works it will end war for no one can afford to toy with anything so destructive. We have had no technical report yet.

Things are so unsettled we are here for a while. Anything could happen—even surrender Now! Certainly the Nips all know by now their cause is hopeless.¹⁹

Fellers was scheduled to leave for Okinawa with other military officers but “the tense situation” prevented this trip.²⁰ This situation reflected uncertainty as to the exact timing of a Japanese surrender and the future course of the war in Asia. On August 10 MacArthur wrote a cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff General Marshall that Fellers had been chosen to head MacArthur’s military mission to the Soviet Union and requested Marshall to have Fellers elevated one rank from Brigadier General to Major General for the task, as MacArthur thought Fellers well qualified based on his experience as a military observer with the British military in Africa from 1940 to 1942 and on his extensive knowledge of the Far East and the Soviet Union.²¹

Fellers’s military mission and promotion to Major General never happened for Japan announced its acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation on August 10 by notifying Switzerland. On August 12 Fellers wrote to his wife the following letter that emphasized MacArthur’s military campaigns, the atomic bomb, air power, and psychological warfare as factors leading to a Japanese surrender but ignored the Russian intervention:

Well the Atomic bomb—Air power—and PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE did the job. Of course after Mac licked them on land and Nimitz on the sea. The Jap indeed had a belly full of war. What fate for those great samurai warriors.

As paragraph 12 of the Potsdam Declaration indicated, the idea of explicitly allowing the retention of the Imperial Throne got stalled²² not only because of disagreements among the American policymakers over assessing the internal political conditions in Japan as well as the progress in the development of the atomic bomb, but also because of the divisions among the Japanese policymakers on the issue of whether or not to surrender or fight to the bitter end.

In the end, after attempting to persuade the Japanese to surrender, two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan based on the decision by top American policymakers led by Truman, Stimson, James F. Byrnes, who had replaced Edward Stettinius as Secretary of State on July 3, and Marshall. On August 8, shortly before the second atomic bomb explosion in Nagasaki, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. For former president Herbert C. Hoover, it probably was ironic that his casualty estimate of half a million to a million was used as Truman’s and Stimson’s rationale for dropping the atomic bomb to save American lives

because he believed it was possible to achieve a Japanese surrender through less destructive means. Hoover commented on his feelings on August 8 about the first atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima in his letter to a friend: "It revolts my soul The only difference between this [atomic bomb] and the use of poison gas is the fear of retaliation. We alone have the bomb."²³

Fellers and the American Occupation of Japan, 1945

Whereas both Hoover and Grew did not mention the democratization of Japan in their discussions with Truman, and Grew clearly indicated that democracy would not take root in postwar Japan, the GHQ headed by MacArthur moved quickly to democratize Japan. Although the Psychological Warfare Branch had indicated its skepticism about democracy taking root in Japan, on the night before leaving for Atsugi airfield, MacArthur told Fellers in Okinawa the following:

At night on his front porch the General outlined his policy in Japan:

1. Disarm Japanese forces
2. Demobilize and send to their home
3. The heavy industry which remains be divested from war activity
4. Open all schools—no check on instruction—except insert course in civics
5. Hold free elections
6. Introduce trade unions

See the above will be accomplished through the Imperial Government machinery.

The fourth point would undergo considerable change during the occupation.

When MacArthur's plane *Bataan* landed at Atsugi airfield Fellers was writing in his diary the following: "Japan beautiful from air. Atsugi good airport. No trouble anticipated."²⁴ On the following day he wrote his wife the following:

The people are friendly and a vast army is disarming and demobilizing. If they cared to turn on us Custer's last stand would be a pale infusion. But

the gov[ernment] and people are sincere and all will go well. But disarmament and demobilization will require some 6 weeks. . . .

This is the strongest victory and surrender in history. 6 1/2 million soldiers laying down their arms. The Air Force and Navy and merchant marine are all gone home. Really our PWB [Psychological Warfare Branch] scored a 10 strike but I doubt if ever credit is given.²⁵

Then on September 6 Fellers wrote his wife about using the Emperor:

What a miracle that 7,000,000 Japanese surrendered. Think what it would have cost to take Japan. Then suppose the idealists who are too precious to fight would have had us clean up China. It's better to let Charlie Mac Hirohito do it. . . . *[I]t was well to use the Emperor even if later he does not fit into the picture.* (Italics mine.)²⁶

Early in the occupation, Fellers, though feeling justified about maintaining his policy regarding the Emperor from the war years, was unsure how the Imperial Throne would fit in the reforms of Japan's political, economic and social structures. On the following day, Fellers wrote his wife:

Please don't be alarmed at brave columnists crying for revenge and attempting to push MacArthur into a blood bath. . . . There need be no alarm over MacA[thur] not doing justice to his enemy of the past four years and acting for the best interests of our people.²⁷

As disarmament and demobilization neared their end, Fellers commented to his wife about the Emperor again, this time rather more humbly than when calling him "Charlie."

Soon—a month—we shall be as strong as we care to be—for a while however we were completely at the Emperor's mercy.²⁸

According to Fellers, he and MacArthur talked from 11 p.m. to 12 a.m. each night for the three weeks until Mrs. Jean MacArthur's arrival on September 19.²⁹

In a September 10, 1945 memorandum to MacArthur, after stating that "Loyalty to the Emperor brings ready acceptance of the Supreme Commander's poli-

cies,” he argued for the need to disseminate information that would further MacArthur’s military, economic, political, and psychological objectives in Japan, the last two being the following:

c. Political

- (1) To use rather than support the existing Japanese government.
- (2) To encourage the removal of obstacles to democratic tendencies.
- (3) To promote political and civil liberties, right of assembly, public discussions, education, free elections, and respect for human rights.
- (4) To encourage a free government responsible to the people.
- (5) To advocate conditions which will permit Japan’s eventual admission as a respectable and peaceful member of the family of nations.

d. Psychological

- (1) To make clear the fact of Japan’s defeat.
- (2) To acquaint the Japanese with their responsibility for the war, with the atrocities they have committed, and with their war guilt.
- (3) To make the Japanese realize that their militarists are to blame for their defeat and suffering.
- (4) To emphasize there is no intention to enslave the race.
- (5) To promote religious, political, class and racial tolerance.
- (6) To explain that occupying forces are necessary to destroy Japan’s war potential but will be withdrawn as soon as objectives of occupation have been accomplished.

Fellers also sent this memorandum to his former colleague at the Office of Strategic Services and now its director, Major General William J. Donovan.³⁰

Although the September 10 memorandum was silent on the future treatment of the Emperor, this issue was taken up by Fellers in early October. On October 2, 1945, the day MacArthur dissolved U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific Military Government Section and established General Headquarters (GHQ), Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), Fellers submitted a memorandum to MacArthur about the need to preserve the Imperial Throne so as to provide social stability in the midst of social change and chaos resulting from the war, the spread of Communism and Occupation reforms. Fellers argued that the Emperor had been instrumental in effecting Japan’s surrender and its peaceful disarmament and

the demobilization of Japanese forces, had a major spiritual value in the minds of most Japanese and would not be an obstacle to creating a democratized Japan. While vaguely referring to the September 25, 1945 article by a *New York Times* Tokyo correspondent in which the Emperor, in answering four questions that the reporter had submitted to him at the time of their meeting, stated that "he had no intention to have the War Rescript used as Tojo used it" when the war began and while emphasizing that "it can be established that the war did not stem from the Emperor himself" based on "the highest and most reliable sources," Fellers argued the following:

The attitude of the Japanese toward their Emperor is not generally understood. Unlike Christians, the Japanese have no God with whom to commune. Their Emperor is the living symbol of the race in whom lies the virtues of their ancestors. He is the incarnation of national spirit, incapable of wrong or misdeeds. Loyalty to him is absolute. Although no one fears him, all hold their Emperor in reverential awe. They would not touch him, look into his face, address him, step on his shadow. Their abject homage to him amounts to a self abnegation sustained by a religious patriotism the depth of which is incomprehensible to Westerners.

It would be a sacrilege to entertain the idea that the Emperor is on a level with the people or any governmental official. To try him as a war criminal would not only be blasphemous but a denial of spiritual freedom.

The Imperial War Rescript, 8 December 1941, was the inescapable responsibility of the Emperor who, as a head of then sovereign state, possessed the legal right to issue it. From the highest and most reliable sources, it can be established that the war did not stem from the Emperor himself. He has personally said that he had no intention to have the War Rescript used as Tojo used it.

It is a fundamental American concept that the people of any nation have the inherent right to choose their own government. Were the Japanese given this opportunity, they would choose the Emperor as the symbolic head of the state. The masses are especially devoted to Hirohito. They feel that his addressing the people personally make *[sic]* him unprecedentedly *[sic]* close to them. His rescript demanding peace filled them with joy. They know he is no puppet now. They feel his retention is not a barrier to as liberal a government as they are qualified to enjoy.

In effecting our bloodless invasion, we requisitioned the services of the Emperor. By his order seven million soldiers laid down their arms and are being rapidly demobilized. Through his act hundreds of thousands of American casualties were avoided and the war terminated far ahead of schedule. Therefore having made good use of the Emperor, to try him for war crimes, to the Japanese, would amount to a breach of faith. Moreover, the Japanese feel that unconditional surrender as outlined in the Potsdam Declaration meant preservation of the State structure, which includes the Emperor.

If the Emperor were tried for war crimes the governmental structure would collapse and a general uprising would be inevitable. The people will uncomplainingly stand any other humiliation. Although they are disarmed, there would be chaos and bloodshed. It would necessitate a large expeditionary force with many thousands of public officials. The period of occupation would be prolonged and we would have alienated the Japanese.

American long range interests require friendly relations with the Orient based on mutual respect, faith and understanding. In the long run it is of paramount, national importance that Japan harbor [*sic*] no lasting resentment.

After MacArthur received this memorandum, whose content maintained what Fellers had been advocating since the days of Psychological Warfare, he "thanked [Fellers] for the studies, kept them in the top left hand drawer of his desk, and referred to them time after time," Fellers told Hoover. In sending this memorandum to Hoover on October 3, Fellers argued to the former president that "The Soviets want blood and revolution in Japan: hence to them all stabilizing influences are taboo." On October 15 Hoover replied, stating that "Your memorandum on the Emperor is so true, and without disclosing the source, I have given a copy to General McCoy." Frank McCoy was another person relatively close to Hoover since the early 1930s and was recently appointed to represent the U.S. in the Far Eastern Commission. Around this time Fellers also sent the memorandum to his wife and commented that "Things out here look rather sinister to me. The occupation progresses satisfactorily [*sic*] but the over all prospects are none too good."³¹

In writing the above memorandum, Fellers was perfectly aware of the fact that the American government was still considering to putting the Emperor on trial for war crimes and such a demand was also being made by the Soviet government and

by some American newspapers. He showed these examples to MacArthur in a memorandum on October 4 and argued that trying the Emperor, whom Fellers thought the Soviets wanted to remove, "will lead to a general uprising" in Japan and help, in Fellers's opinion, stage a revolution in Japan as desired by the Soviets. Fellers also doubted that trying the Emperor would lead to his conviction³² in a "democratic court of law" in spite of his signing of the declaration of war because "He did not exercise free will," "Fear of life, threats by military clique, lack of knowledge of true state of affairs were involved," and "Attempts to effect surrender were accomplished at risk of [his] life."³³

Fellers's arguments above regarding the Emperor in many ways were a continuation of the arguments he had made during his days in the Psychological Warfare Branch. Although Fellers's friend Kawai Michi, the founder of Keisen Women's College and a founding member of the YWCA in Japan, did tell Fellers during dinner on September 22 that "If Emperor is liquidated there will be a bloody uprising" and the "Emperor is close to people, closer than any other Emperors has been recently" and was "a good man," Kawai Michi's influence on Fellers in writing the above October 3 memorandum may not have been decisive. Nonetheless it is safe to say it had some effect. Fellers noted that Kawai "had no idea of atrocities and military reverses" because of censorship.³⁴

On October 4 the Supreme Commander met Prince Konoye Fumimaro with Chief of Staff Sutherland and Political Advisor George Atcheson. Fellers recorded in his diary that Konoye "blamed Communists and Militarists for the war and exonerated the Royalty and Capitalists." MacArthur told him to "Liberalize Constitution," "extend suffrage to women," "have an election," and "clear militarists out of control." When Konoye "protested that he did not have authority to do this," MacArthur replied that "I shall authorize all these changes—get busy."³⁵

On September 23 Fellers told his wife that he had been thinking about retiring from the Army for a long time. He also stated the reason he had managed to survive was because of MacArthur but Brigadier General was as far as he could climb in the Army. Because Fellers was homesick and wanted to see his family, whom he had not seen for over two years, and because he felt he could not get any higher in the Army and was thinking about his post-retirement career options, he took home leave starting on November 18.

Shortly before his departure for the U.S., Fellers met his old friend from their years in West Point (Fellers was Class of 1918 while Wedemeyer was Class of 1919 and both attended the Army Command and General Staff School at Fort

Leavenworth from 1933 to 1935), Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commander of U.S. Forces China Theatre, who wrote him the following on November 11:

As you aptly stated, our two classes [at West Point] have served through the years in the traditionally friendly atmosphere of members of the same class.

Particularly did I enjoy the discussions we had concerning the situation in the Far East. You have a fine grasp of the situation and I know that the General [MacArthur] leans upon you heavily in the solution of his many ticklish jobs. I am sorry that you could not accomplish your important tasks under more pleasant circumstances; but, Bonner, throughout my service it has been my experience that envy and jealousy often raise their head and prevent officers working together in harmony. I wish that there was something that I might do to alleviate that situation. But I can assure you that a man of your character and ability with a straight forward approach will win out in the end. You have lots of admirers and friends there and elsewhere, so do not become discouraged.

Conditions in China appear to be serious. Perhaps my estimate is a little hasty for I have only been back a few days but the attitude of Soviet Russia as well as the ever increasing clashes with Chinese Communists, would indicate that China will experience another civil war. If this occurs, I believe that Americans should be evacuated immediately for they would inevitably become involved. We have been walking a tight rope for the past 12 months and had only enjoyed a modicum of success because we could focus the attention of dissident groups on the common enemy, the Japanese. Now, powerful forces interested in self-aggrandizement are on the rampage.

Wedemeyer's words of consolation to Fellers may have soothed his feelings and his analysis of the situation in China reaffirmed Fellers's aforementioned analysis of the postwar situation in the Far East in spring 1945.³⁶

While in the U.S., Fellers met several representatives from both houses of Congress, business leaders, a labor movement leader, and government leaders, and journalists and gathered information about the domestic political situation for MacArthur and submitted a report regarding this issue on the day of his return to Tokyo on January 19.³⁷ In addition, Fellers discussed post-retirement careers

with George E. Ijams, Director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Herbert Hoover and General Robert Wood, Chairman of Sears and a leading member of the MacArthur-for-President movement during wartime.³⁸

Upon his return to Tokyo on the night of January 19, 1946, Fellers learned that though he would continue to serve as MacArthur's military secretary his chief task would be acting as Secretary General of the Allied Council for Japan. In addition, Fellers was depressed by the news that he would be demoted to his prewar status from his wartime temporary status of Brigadier General. Fellers regretted that had he known this he would have chosen not to return. On February 4 Fellers learned that his status would go down to the temporary rank of Colonel as of April 25, 1935 and was depressed by the fact that his final rank might even go down to Lieutenant Colonel; this change in his military status became effective immediately. (Fellers would retire in the fall of 1946 a Colonel but later his permanent rank was restored to Brigadier General.) Finally, two other things depressed Fellers. First, the fact that even though he would still be MacArthur's Military Secretary, his office would no longer be right next door to him after he became Secretary General of the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) in February, Fellers wrote his wife on January 24, that "The new job will be interesting but again I'm pick and shovel boy while a two star man takes the job as Mac[Arthur]'s Deputy." Second, while Fellers was the chief confidant of MacArthur before the former's home leave, he discovered and wrote his wife on January 27 that Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, with whom he did not get along, was now "the big shot";³⁹ as D. Clayton James points out, by "the autumn of 1945 Whitney had replaced [chief of staff Lieutenant General Richard K.] Sutherland at the top of the list of MacArthur's confidants, and he was the only one who had the privilege of entering the Supreme Commander's office without an appointment, except for the chief of staff and the senior aides," which included Fellers.

Whitney clinched the top of MacArthur's list in December 1945 while Fellers was away at home in Washington, D.C. After the dissolution of the United States Armed Forces in the Pacific Military Government Section and the establishment of the General Headquarters (GHQ), Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) on October 2, 1945, Whitney was appointed by MacArthur in December to replace Brigadier General William E. Crist as the head of the Government Section in the GHQ that undertook the legal, political and constitutional reforms of Japan. In December Sutherland left Tokyo for retirement and Major General

Richard J. Marshall, deputy chief of staff, became MacArthur's chief of staff.⁴⁰

So anguished was Fellers by these developments that on January 28 he submitted a request for transfer to Washington, D.C. to MacArthur. On the following day, Fellers, probably for the first time in his life had a brush with his Commander-in-Chief, which he described as "somewhat like this":

Q[uestion by MacArthur]	Why do you want to go to Washington?
A[nswer by Fellers]	That's where my wife and child are.
GO [MacArthur]	I mean why do you want to leave, you are not mad are you?
A	No-Sir.
GO	I have given you the most responsible job under my command. I thought you wanted it.
Me [Fellers]	I like the new job all right.
GO	Is it because I am changing your assignment?
Me	No, Sir.
GO	Then it must be because of your reduction.
Me	No Sir. I expected that.
GO	To Dickey M (Richard J. Marshall, chief of staff). Show Bonner my last efficiency report on him.
	[Dickey—I will tomorrow—he ain't yet.]
Me	Don't you know why I put in to go home?
GO	No I don't.
Me	Because you asked that certain officers reduced be permitted to continue as brigadiers and did <i>not</i> include me on your list as among those to be retained.
He the GO	That is not entirely correct. I asked that the AG [Adjutant General], G1, G2, G3 and G4 continue until June 30. It was on the basis of jobs not efficiency. I created the job of Mil[itary] Sec[retary], which Washington frowned upon. I had no possible chance of holding your B[rigadier].

and MacArthur, who was serving as Military Adviser to the Philippines. In this same letter, however, Fellers indicated that his prospects for a post-retirement job may be gaining momentum because on that day he received a letter from his friend Congressman James Van Zandt about the V.F.W. considering hiring him as a public relations director. On April 10 Fellers received a letter from George E. Ijams dated April 2 saying that Fellers, if he wished, was likely to get that job.⁴⁵

In spite of these events and thoughts they did not affect his professional life. Fellers wrote his wife on January 24 that he considered his new task at the Allied Council for Japan as “a real good job.” As Fellers wrote his wife on January 30 MacArthur thought the Russians were going to use it to “de-horse” the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and Fellers thought his “OSS experience [from 1942 to 1943 in Washington, D.C.] might help [him] a bit” because “[w]e may have a hot time” at the Council. When the Council met for the first time on April 5 with representatives from the U.S., China, Britain and the Soviet Union (as well as a Japanese observer), MacArthur declared that it was merely an advisory organization and delegated his chairmanship to his deputy William F. Marquat. MacArthur never again attended any ACJ meetings afterwards. As Fellers stated in his letter to Dorothy Fellers on April 14,

It is becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan is out to make trouble. They have started a propaganda war from Moscow that the Emperor must go, that MacA[rthur] is too soft to administer, etc. In the election the Commies scarcely got to first base altho[ugh] they had money, plans and leaders. One reason is they are opposed to the Emperor and the Japanese people are not.⁴⁶

From February to the time of his departure from Japan in late July, Fellers had three tasks in addition to help setting up the Allied Council on Japan: (1) finish writing the “Report on the Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-1945” (PWB report), which he submitted to MacArthur on March 15; (2) collect historical documents on the Japanese-American war for Herbert Hoover, who was writing a book highly critical of New Deal diplomacy and for himself, part of which were used to write the PWB report; and (3) act as a liaison between MacArthur and people close to the Emperor to reassure the latter that MacArthur was preventing the prosecution of the Emperor as a war criminal.

The most important task for Fellers, then, was to continue handling the ques-

tions regarding the Emperor. While Fellers was away, MacArthur had received a secret directive cabled from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dwight Eisenhower that requested MacArthur to secretly gather evidence for the issue regarding the Emperor's connections to war crimes. The fact that MacArthur did not respond to this directive until January 25, 1946 most reasonably can be explained by the absence of Fellers. And when a cable was sent back to Eisenhower on this issue on January 25 in MacArthur's name, the real author was Fellers because the cable was based on the October 2 memorandum; the cable emphasized that the Imperial Throne was revered by the Japanese and general chaos and an uprising would result if the Emperor was tried as a war criminal, an unreasonable situation because there were those in Japan who believed the Emperor was a figurehead in declaring war against the U.S. and resisting such a measure would have endangered him and because tremendous increase in occupation forces and manpower would be needed to recreate social stability.⁴⁷ And given the fact that on March 20 Fellers, most probably at his own discretion, revealed the content of and probably showed this cable to the diplomat and interpreter for Emperor Hirohito, Terasaki Hidenari, with whom Fellers got acquainted on February 20, the day Terasaki was appointed as an interpreter for the Emperor, and became friends after finding out on March 8 that Terasaki's American wife Gwen was a relative of his.

These developments back up the point that the January 25 cable was written by Fellers. While one cannot dismiss the possibility that MacArthur may have written that cable because he always had the Fellers memorandum in his desk, it seems reasonable to think that Fellers was entrusted to handle matters concerning the Emperor.

On March 6, the day after Australia submitted its list of names of war criminals to be tried in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to the International Prosecution Section of GHQ, Fellers met former Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa. Fellers, following the line of thinking revealed to his wife in September, told Yonai that although he did not worship the Emperor and did not care what would happen to the Emperor or the Emperor system fifteen or twenty years from now, GHQ needed the cooperation of the Emperor to carry out the reforms. Fellers also told Yonai that certain Allied powers and some American policymakers with "un-American" view wanted the Emperor tried as a war criminal, particularly the Soviet Union which wanted revolution in Japan. The two men agreed that in preparing for the upcoming International War Crimes Tribunal

of the Far East starting in early May, the Japanese government should place the entire blame of war responsibility on Tojo and Fellers told Yonai that the Japanese government should make sure Tojo would state that he would have declared war on the U.S. even if the Emperor had opposed it. Yonai told Fellers that he was sure that Shimada Shigetaro, the Navy Minister in the Tojo cabinet, was prepared to take such a position and that Tojo's Japanese lawyer, upon receiving a call from Yonai about the content of the meeting, had visited Tojo at Sugamo Prison who told him he was prepared to take such a stance. On March 20 the deputy chamberlain of the Imperial Throne, Kinoshita Michio, received a report from Terasaki about the conversations he had had with Fellers about the Emperor. According to this report, which most probably the Emperor was informed about, Fellers told Terasaki that though he never had discussions with MacArthur about the Emperor's abdication, MacArthur did not want the Emperor to step down, and Fellers referred to the January 25 cable that MacArthur had sent to Washington, D.C. When Terasaki asked Fellers if it was possible for MacArthur to make a public statement to quiet the media and public opinion about the possibility of the Emperor's abdication, he responded that it was impossible. Furthermore, when Terasaki commented that the Emperor seemed to feel morally responsible for the war, Fellers, following his line of argument since the days of Psychological Warfare, stated that the Emperor was technically responsible for the war but was not responsible for it politically, legally and morally. In closing his conversations with Terasaki, he stated that the content of the cable to Washington, D.C. should be treated as a highly confidential matter.⁴⁸

“The Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-1945” (PWB Report) by Bonner Fellers

In his “Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-1945,” which he submitted to General MacArthur on March 15, 1946, Fellers had the following to say about his activities:

Although the Japanese Government took stringent measures to discredit our news and prevent its reaching the people, the majority either had grapevine knowledge of our broadcast or had seen leaflets and news sheets. Nearly all of the people disbelieved the news we disseminated until the

heavy bombings during the Spring and Summer of 1945. Extensive interrogation reveals that at the time of their surrender the people were beginning to believe our leaflets and news sheets. Nearly all of those interviewed admitted the effectiveness of our activities and a number were convinced that Psychological Warfare hastened the end of the war and facilitated the occupation. . . .

In the Pacific, Psychological Warfare influenced the enemy forces and civil population. As a corollary, a free flow of news in time of peace leads to better understanding among peoples and thereby lessens the likelihood of war. In peace the psychological weapon of the military establishment gives way to the free and unrestricted dissemination of information by civil agencies.⁴⁹

In describing the impact of psychological warfare on Japan's decision to surrender and emphasizing the Emperor's leadership in terminating the war as well as disarming and demobilizing the armed forces, Fellers used the English translation of the extracts from the Kido Diary, a memorandum of conversations regarding the process leading to Japan's surrender from April to August 15 between Sakomizu Hisatsune, Secretary General in the Suzuki Kantaro cabinet, and Max Bishop at the latter's residence in the Imperial Hotel on November 9, 1945, Interrogation Records and personal interviews with Japanese public figures who played important roles in the war, particularly his interview with Kido, to write up the section on the final months of the Japanese-American War. The main point in the psychological warfare report stressed the fact that psychological warfare played an important role in inducing the Japanese surrender. Incorporating the arguments made in spring of 1945, the report stated that

In April 1945 it had become clear to Psychological Warfare planners that all the elements essential for surrender already existed. Japan had lost her fleet and merchant shipping; her air force was becoming impotent; her troops had been destroyed in the Philippines and key Pacific Islands; her industry was disrupted. The only obstacle preventing surrender was *psychological*.⁵⁰

In writing the section on the Emperor's decision to surrender, Fellers in annex 28 of the report introduced the interview that he had with Kido on February 24, the content of which somewhat overlapped with the January 24 interview.⁵¹

Early in the morning of August 14, Japanese translations of the Potsdam Declaration and the Allied reply amplifying its terms were dropped on the Palace grounds. Kido went directly to the Emperor with a leaflet. He explained that the leaflets would have a profound effect on the Armed Forces and the people, and that every moment peace was delayed was dangerous. . . .

On the other hand, Kido believed the Potsdam Declaration would mean something else to the people. They too had been deceived by the militarists, but they had seen more of the devastation from our air strikes than had the troops. What was more important to Kido, the people had learned the true military situation from our leaflets and news sheets. Many reports had come to the Emperor personally from all over Japan that the people wanted peace, realized Japan had been defeated, and would welcome the Imperial Rescript ending the war.⁵²

In recording this, Fellers showed the draft of his Psychological Warfare Report completed on February 23 to Kido and Kido commented on it.⁵³ These interviews with Kido were also important in that in Annex 27 Fellers wrote a more detailed version of Japan's decision to surrender than in the section pertaining to this topic in the main report introduced below. It was from the Kido Diary and probably during his interviews with Kido that he learned that "Some time in May the Emperor confided in Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, his desire to expedite the termination of the war. . . . [O]n June 22, the Emperor entirely on his own initiative, invited six members of the Supreme Council for the Directors of War to a conference to his Palace. He directed that steps be taken immediately to bring about an early end to the war." Afterwards, Fellers, using the Konoye memoirs and Kido Diaries, discussed the attempt by the Emperor and the Japanese government to send Konoye to Moscow to negotiate peace and the Soviet unwillingness to receive him. Then, Fellers in Annex 27 stated that the two atomic bombs and the Russian declaration of war against Japan permitted the Emperor to take "advantage of the drama created by these terrific events" and insist "that peace be made at once and on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration."⁵⁴

The following section in the main report reflected Annex 27 and the continuity in Fellers's argument regarding the importance of the Emperor in securing Japanese surrender mentioned in his October 2, 1945 memorandum and documents from the Psychological Warfare years.

The Emperor, who knew the true military situation, was unwilling to permit the war to drift until invasion. As early as May, he had expressed his determination to stop the war, and on 22 June had directed the Supreme Council for the Directors of War to terminate hostilities. His decision was prompted by:

- Military disaster
- Heavy destruction by air strikes
- Impairment of war production
- Suffering of the people

After much wrangling in Council and as a result of the Emperor's repeated commands, Ambassador Sato in Moscow was instructed on 12 July to approach the Soviet Government with a view of opening peace negotiations. However, not only did the Russians fail to give Sato a reply, but Stalin and Molotov left Moscow on 14 July to attend the Potsdam Conference. Meanwhile, Tokyo continued to press Sato for Stalin's answer. . . .

The reaction to the Potsdam Declaration by members of the Supreme Council for the Directors of War resulted in a deadlock, but to the Emperor the Declaration offered a satisfactory peace and he directed its acceptance. But the Council bickered further. Finally, at 11:00 pm, 9 August, the Emperor again personally directed its acceptance and gave his reasons:

From the start of the war, the militarists had misrepresented the true situation.

To prolong the war would destroy the Japanese people and be disastrous to the world situation.

Although moved by the sacrifices of the Japanese, he was convinced that termination of the war was in accordance with the will of God.

However, the Council still continued to ponder. Finally, on the 14th, the Emperor, who sensed that the crisis might momentarily become chaotic, issued his Imperial Rescript ending the war.

The Emperor realized the risk he was taking, for the young militarists were determined to fight it out. He could expect therefore violent and fanatical counter-measures against the action upon which he had determined. His movement would be restricted; his Imperial Rescript would be branded as a fake not to be followed. Extreme haste was essential lest, when the Army Forces learned of the terms of surrender, they would turn against their government.

But the Emperor felt our air strikes had discredited the militarists in the eyes of the people; that the population was war-weary and that they had knowledge of and would accept the Potsdam Declaration and the Allied reply amplifying its terms. He accordingly issued his Imperial Rescript and broadcast it to the people, confident that somehow they would understand and permit his leadership to prevail.

Thus seven million soldiers, tough physically and spiritually peacefully laid down their arms and turned toward home. This historically unprecedented surrender possibly shortened the war twelve to eighteen months and, on the basis of experience in the Philippine campaign, prevented some 450,000 American battle casualties.⁵⁵

In addition to this presentation, Fellers, referring to the aforementioned interview with Kido on February 24 and the August 14 diary entry, presented the case that the leaflets dropped on August 14 to inform the Japanese about the response by the Allies to the Japanese query on the Imperial Throne prompted the Emperor to commence the meeting to finalize the decision to surrender.⁵⁶

When comparing Annex 27 and the aforementioned section of the main report, Fellers seemed to have deliberately left out the atomic bombs and the Russian entry to war against Japan as well as their impact on Japan's decision to surrender. Fellers may have done this to emphasize the impact of the psychological warfare. It is interesting in that, whereas in the aforementioned August 12, 1945 letter to his wife Fellers acknowledged the contribution of MacArthur's military actions, air power, atomic bombs and psychological warfare but ignored the Russian entry as a factor, Annex 27 acknowledged the impact of the Russian intervention. As the conversations between Hoover and MacArthur in early May will reveal later, MacArthur had changed his position about the need for Russian entry which he had been advocating prior to Japanese surrender and Fellers, who had always been wary of the Soviet Union, perhaps took this shift into consideration and decided to leave the Russian entry factor presented by Japanese policymakers outside of the main report in Annex 27.

On March 10, as the report was all but finished, Fellers wrote his wife that on March 9 he had received the following message from the Emperor through Terasaki, who met the Emperor for the first time at Fellers's prodding and was probably asked by Fellers to ask the Emperor about the above point.⁵⁷

[T]he PWB report is all over but putting it together. Final typing starts tomorrow. It's only 18 pages long—well documented, however. I hoped to hold its length back so the GO (MacArthur) would read it. We shall see. If I say it myself it's free of punch. Yesterday obtained a statement from the Emperor sent to me personally. Like this: That Psychological Warfare was very effective—maybe too effective that P.W. [Psychological Warfare] prompted him to cancel a scheduled critical meeting of Marshals over which he was to have presided and that *P.W. forced him to hasten* the end of the war because he feared that if the soldiers got hold of those leaflets they might take drastic measures such as a coup d'etat.⁵⁸

In hearing this response from the Emperor, Fellers may have lent a copy of at least some sections of the report and perhaps some other documents from his Psychological Warfare days pertaining to his view of the Emperor to Terasaki on March 8, because on April 1 Terasaki wrote in his diary that he had returned “the document(s)” to Fellers.

On page 16 in the main section of the PWB report, Fellers incorporated the above message from the Emperor by stating that on March 9, Terasaki, the liaison officer for the Emperor, had conveyed to him the following:

That the Psychological Warfare leaflets and newspapers were very effective; that Psychological Warfare prompted him to cancel a scheduled . . . conference on the critical war situation over which he would have presided and that Psychological Warfare forced him to hasten the end of the war because he feared that if the soldiers got hold of those leaflets they might take drastic measures such as a coup d'etat.

On April 6 Fellers sent seventeen to eighteen copies of the PWB report with all the annexes to the War Department and his wife; Colonel D.W. Johnston, Chief of Propaganda Branch in the War Department's Military Intelligence (G-2) Division was impressed by Fellers's report and requested him in June to send additional sets of the report so that he could distribute them to relevant government organizations including the Navy.⁵⁹

On April 20, although MacArthur called on Fellers to praise him for the fact that the State Department in Secretary Byrnes's name had sent a telegram to MacArthur on April 19 to express the Department's favorable view about Fellers's

argument that "Free flow of news in time of peace leads to better understanding among people and thereby lessens likelihood of war," and asked for furnishing evidence supporting this opinion, Fellers was shocked to find out that MacArthur still did not have the copy of the report that was sent to him through deputy Chief of Staff Major General Stephen J. Chamberlain, who disliked Fellers ever since he had bypassed Chamberlain, who was his boss in G-3 (War Planning), to receive authorization from MacArthur to execute the plan to land in Hollandia, New Guinea formulated by Fellers, a plan that was completed very successfully. Fellers briefly stepped out of MacArthur's room and got a copy of the PWB report from a colleague in a nearby office and handed it to MacArthur, who told Fellers as he was leaving the room, "Bonner, I assure you I shall read this report with great interest."

During his conversation with MacArthur, Fellers also found out that Chamberlain had deliberately delayed MacArthur's order to recommend the War Department give Fellers a Distinguished Service Medal for his Psychological Warfare activities during wartime. This matter had been addressed by Woodall Greene to MacArthur during their conversation on March 2 and MacArthur, who had a high opinion of Fellers's psychological campaign, was perplexed because he had put Fellers's name on the list but apparently somebody had deleted it; when MacArthur asked Greene why Fellers did not address the issue by himself, Greene stated "he's too good a soldier to complain." Fellers wrote his wife on March 21 that MacArthur "simply hit the roof" and a short while later Fellers's name was put back on the list. But the processing of sending his name to the War Department seemed to have been deliberately delayed. Furthermore, because Chamberlain was the one who actually wrote the recommendation letter (MacArthur did not bother with administrative details), it was not until May 30 that the situation got straightened out.⁶⁰

Fellers and the English Version of the Emperor's Monologue

The Emperor made a similar remark about the leaflet dropping on August 14 in his recollection of the war years, which we will now examine.⁶¹

Shortly after Fellers completed the "Report on Psychological Warfare," a letter dated April 22, 1946 from Fellers to his wife shows that the Emperor was eager to contact him.⁶² On May 3 Terasaki, with authorization from the Emperor and

encouragement from Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru, told Fellers about the details of the Emperor's monologue, a record of the Emperor's own recollection of wartime created with the assistance of his aides including Terasaki during four days in the second half of March and early April (March 18, 20, 22 and April 8), and secured an English translation of the Emperor's monologue from Terasaki Hidenari.⁶³ This document was created in case the Far Eastern War Crimes Tribunal decided to have the Emperor testify or tried. Some differences in the Japanese version and the English version include the fact that the latter does not have sections on Hirohito's recollection of post-Pearl Harbor years leading to Japan's surrender. Hence, the English version does not include the Emperor's discussion of his decision to surrender but discusses why he could not oppose the decision to go to war:

If I as Emperor would have exercised veto around November or December 1941 there might have been terrible disorder. The trusted men around me would have been killed, I myself might have been killed or kidnapped. Actually I was virtually a prisoner and powerless. My opposition would never have been known outside the Palace. It might have gone to most barbaric war, and it would have been impossible to stop the war at all, no matter what I did.⁶⁴

This argument is similar to the views of the role of the Emperor in Japan's decision to attack the U.S. as argued by Fellers above. Furthermore, it is similar to the aforementioned September 25 *New York Times* interview article.

Finally, an English translation of the sections covering the post-Pearl Harbor years to the Emperor's decision to surrender may exist because Fellers had the following in his Terasaki file:

The following is told by the Emperor

When did I think Japan would meet certain defeat? When American soldiers penetrated, or pushed back through Stanley Mountains in New Guinea.

I was trying to take advantage of a good opportunity to discuss the peace, but I did not want to surrender before German surrender because Japan and Germany had an agreement not to go on separate peace.⁶⁵

May 1946: MacArthur, Hoover, Fellers

Shortly before Hoover visited Tokyo in early May 1946 as part of his global tour on famine relief mandated by President Harry S. Truman, a visit that coincided with the opening of the Far Eastern War Crimes Tribunal on May 3, MacArthur appointed Fellers to work closely with Hoover while the former President was in Tokyo.⁶⁶ Hoover stayed at the American Embassy where Fellers also resided and the two were together frequently.⁶⁷ During Hoover's visit, Fellers informed him about the Emperor's monologue, a document prepared by the Emperor and translated by the diplomat Terasaki Hidenari whose wife, Gwen, was a relative of Fellers. Hoover told Fellers that publicly disclosing the document was premature, given the global animosity towards Hirohito, including in the U.S. Hoover told Fellers during the visit the following regarding the recent Japanese-American War and the Japanese documents Fellers presented to Hoover:

It is essential, Mr. Hoover believed, for the Americans to understand Japan thoroughly. If civilization is to survive, he feels we must live together in harmony for the thousands of years to come, and that the hates and prejudices and misunderstandings of the recent war must be buried as promptly as is humanly possible. In the United States at present the hatred for Japan engendered by the war is still keen and fresh. It will be some time yet before an unbiased presentation and evaluation of Japan can be made by the American people. This is the time, however, to collect the essential source material, so that it may be studied and evaluated and prepared for release to the American and Japanese public at the proper time.

Mr. Hoover was tremendously gratified that the Konoye Memoir had been made available and that information from the Emperor, explaining his position during the war and in forcing the peace, is being prepared. Because of American bitterness, Mr. Hoover said that material from the Emperor would not be as effective now as a little later. He would use it, however, the moment an emergency justified.

The "emergency" Hoover was referring to was most likely the possibility that the Emperor might be tried in the war crimes tribunal that began on May 3.⁶⁸ Fellers may have showed Hoover the English translation of the monologue that covers from 1927 to Pearl Harbor but this is unclear. Furthermore, there is a possibility

that there is an English version of the monologue covering the post-Pearl Harbor attack until the Japanese surrender because there are some documents in the Terasaki file of the Fellers Papers English translation of the Emperor commenting on why he decided to seek surrender in May 1945, all of which are in the Japanese version.⁶⁹

Hoover told Fellers “if former Premier Suzuki kept a diary, it would perhaps be among the most valuable of all documents” because “the appointment of Suzuki . . . was the Emperor’s signal to the United States that he was seeking peace”; although Suzuki did publish a short memoir entitled *Shusen no Hyojo* from Rodo Bunkasha in August 1946, it is unknown whether Hoover and Fellers got hold of this.⁷⁰

On the day of his departure, Hoover told Fellers “Go call on Suzuki for me—I have not the time—and tell him that I think his appointment was a signal the Emperor was trying to surrender.” When Fellers visited Suzuki with an interpreter and told him “what Mr. Hoover said, he jumped to his feet and started pacing the floor. ‘It *was* a signal, and we never knew why we didn’t hear from the United States on this thing.’ He repeated it *was* a signal!” Later, Fellers obtained a three-page English translation of Suzuki’s recollections about the pre-surrender period, in which Suzuki stated the following:

[T]he Emperor called me, at the age of 77, from retirement and on 7 April 1945 made my [*sic*] Prime Minister. It was the Emperor’s signal to his people and to the world that he was seeking peace. This was evident to all for in no way could I be considered as a militarist; rather for many years I had been the especial target of the militarist.

On the night of August 14, 1945, the Emperor forced his Cabinet to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. As Prime Minister I had strongly supported the Emperor in his demand for immediate peace. I returned to my home about two-thirty the morning of 15 August. We all feared a coup d’état from the militarists who were unwilling to surrender—even after the Emperor had so directed. I had been warned that some soldiers and radical students planned to surround my house in the early morning hours. Mrs. Suzuki and I left the house just before they arrived. The rebels set up machine guns and riddled my house, thinking we must have been killed by the machine gun fire. Then the soldiers burned my house down to ashes.⁷¹

If Hoover told Fellers his views on Suzuki, did he tell Fellers about his efforts in late May 1945? During his stay in Tokyo, Hoover told Fellers about his meeting with Truman in late May and the memorandum he later submitted to him.

Mr. Hoover suggested that the President should make a public speech defining specifically the term unconditional surrender, and explaining that the United States had no intent to enslave the Japanese or interfere with their government so long as it represented a free expression of the people's will, removed for all time the militarists and eliminated obstacles to democratic processes.

Mr. Truman agreed, took notes as Mr. Hoover talked, and said he would ask the State Department to prepare a speech along the line indicated. But this speech was never made. Mr. Hoover gave the clear impression that it might easily have been Soviet influence in the State Department which insisted that the war continue until the USSR entered, and could have a hand in the peace and postwar settlement.⁷²

Fellers's record of the conversation differs from the record kept by Hoover in late May 1945 in that Hoover back then did not talk about bringing democracy to Japan, although he discussed the need to bring back liberal forces to Japanese polity. Furthermore, Hoover's impression of why his May 30 memorandum to the President was not followed is influenced by his notion, which was shared in American society in the early postwar years, that the State Department was infiltrated by Soviet agents; in the aforementioned response to Fellers's memorandum regarding the Emperor in early October 1945, Hoover had told Fellers that "Among the men sent from the Department of State to Japan are some former Communists or fellow-travelers," including John Service, who was later unfairly persecuted during the McCarthy era.⁷³ Finally it is unclear whether Truman told Hoover during their meeting that Hoover's suggestion was going to be evaluated to the State Department and whether Truman took notes of their conversation; regardless of what Hoover thought, his ideas as well as Grew's had met opposition expressed by Byrnes, Acheson and McLeish.⁷⁴ Fellers seemed to have not kept this episode regarding Hoover's request to convey a message to Suzuki to himself. On May 14 Terasaki seemed to have talked for a long time to the Emperor regarding Fellers's meeting with Suzuki.⁷⁵

Since meeting Hoover in December 1945 in New York, Fellers had been helping

him gather historical documents pertaining to Japanese military aggressions since the late 1920s. Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, which Hoover founded right after World War I, had established an office in the autumn of 1945 in Tokyo to start collecting documents on wartime Japan.⁷⁶ On March 21, Fellers wrote Hoover that he and Lieutenant Colonel Hubert G. Schenck, a former Stanford geologist who was now the head of the GHQ's Natural Resources section, "a two-volume typewritten copy of Prince Konoye's memoirs." Fellers told Hoover that this was lent by the Imperial Household Library and the Emperor had authorized this decision. Although Fellers could not secure the original from the Konoye family, the memoirs were microfilmed and sent to Stanford's Hoover Institution in late March. On June 10 the English translation of the Konoye memoirs were completed and afterwards Fellers undoubtedly sent them to Hoover.⁷⁷ In addition, on May 21 Fellers sent Hoover the English translation of the extracts from the Diary kept by the former top advisor to the Emperor, Marquis Kido Koichi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Shortly before his departure from Japan, Fellers visited Kido in Sugamo Prison. After telling Kido that *Life* magazine had won the copyright to publish the Konoye memoir, he asked Kido to grant Hoover the copyright to publish the Kido Diaries in the U.S.; Kido wrote in his diary that he saw the political value in maintaining ties with Hoover and Fellers and preferred Hoover as his first choice if he were to grant such a right but could not decide upon it given the fact that the diaries were being used for the war crimes tribunal.⁷⁸

While Fellers was with Hoover, he told the former president about taking the offer from the V.F.W. Hoover encouraged him to do so. Afterwards, on the night of May 5 Fellers informed MacArthur that he was going to take an offer from the V.F.W. The General encouraged him to do so and stated that Fellers was the right person for the job but suggested he make sure the offer was for at least two to five years; on that point, Van Zandt informed Fellers in late May that he would take care of the issue regarding Fellers being retained by the V.F.W. for two years.⁷⁹

In pursuing his new job at the V.F.W., Fellers was expected by Director Ijams to do the following:

The Veterans of Foreign Wars is the fastest growing veterans organization in the country. We now have about 1,400,000 World War II members and applications are piling in faster than they can be processed. The Organization needs some top-flight liaison work with the Army, Navy, Marine

Corps and Coast Guard, contacts with columnists and feature writers to see that the work the V.F.W. is doing be kept before the public, to act as advisor of international affairs and various similar types of work. We maintain a Public Relations Office here in Washington, and it is not our thought that you would do routine work of public relations, but that you would act in more of a liaison capacity with the writers and columnists whom you know on general policy matters. . . . The position such as I have in mind [for you] would place you in a most advantageous post to accomplish many constructive things, some of which we discussed in your office nearly a year ago. Because of the large number of veterans in the country today I need not remind you of the influence which they will have in determining the destinies of our country. Our veterans will continue to be a constructive and stabilizing group, if they are properly led.⁸⁰

Conclusion

Although Fellers must have felt miserable about the fact that Whitney and his men were in charge of restructuring the Imperial Throne and the Japanese Constitution under MacArthur's orders after February 3, 1946,⁸¹ he was undoubtedly not opposed to these developments as the Throne and the Emperor were being preserved under a new and democratic political system. Fellers's greatest contribution during the first twelve months after the Japanese surrender was his influential role in spearheading the argument to protect the Imperial Throne and the Emperor. Without Fellers, MacArthur probably could not have formulated a relatively coherent strategy to address the question of retaining the Imperial Throne. The other contribution by Fellers was his role in constructing the "missed opportunity" thesis among leading political figures in the U.S. and Japan.

Many years after his departure from Japan for retirement from the military, Fellers wrote in his recollection of his participation in the American Occupation of Japan about why he wrote the memorandum and how helpful Kawai Michi was:

Among a very few influential members of General MacArthur's staff there were sinister convictions implied, but most carefully expressed, that the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal. To me this was not only unjust, it was frightening. The success of the entire Occupation was depen-

dant [*sic*] upon implementing the program with the Emperor's endorsement. Without this, the whole concept would collapse. So disturbed was I that I drafted a statement for General MacArthur outlining the chaos which would follow were the Emperor to be falsely accused.

Hoping accurately to present this delicate situation, I took a draft of my study to my life-long friend Miss Michi Kawai. She was most helpful in shaping the statement accurately to reflect the Japanese reaction should be Emperor be indicated.⁸²

Shortly before his death in October 1973, Fellers granted an interview to Dale M. Hellegers, a researcher on the Japanese Constitution. When Hellegers asked Fellers whether "MacArthur himself always opposed the idea of trying the Emperor, or was he converted to it," Fellers replied, "I don't know. I talked to him about it, but he never expressed it to me."⁸³ When asked if anyone in MacArthur's staff supported trying the Emperor, Fellers replied, "I had a very strong view that a good deal of MacArthur's staff was in favor of trying him."⁸⁴

As Takeda Kiyoko noted, GHQ did use the Emperor as the cornerstone as it promoted political, economic, educational and social reforms but in the process these reforms helped to dismantle the Emperor system and encouraged the resurgence of the democratic or liberal elements and thoughts dating back to the 1920s. The outcome of this change did not mean going back to Japanese society of the 1920s but a transformed Japan in which democracy took root under the new Constitution (promulgated on November 3, 1946 and put into effect on May 3, 1947) and the Emperor became "the symbol of the unity of the people" based on the sovereign will of the people under the new Constitution. Takeda also pointed to the fact that public opinion polls taken in late 1945 and the first half of 1946 showed that the overwhelming majority of the Japanese public during the immediate aftermath of the war supported the retention of the Throne and the current Emperor but supported the purges of leaders in the military and bureaucracy.⁸⁵

But these developments and the fact that the Emperor was never summoned to testify or be tried in the war crimes tribunal did not mean the Showa Emperor's war responsibility would disappear as an issue. This issue was seriously discussed in Japan and abroad after the Japanese surrender in the 1940s and after September 1988, that is shortly before the Emperor's death, and continues to this day.⁸⁶

Notes

This Paper is based on Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) provided by Japan Society for Promotion of Science.

- 1 Bonner F. Fellers Papers, MacArthur Memorial Library (hereafter MML), Norfolk, Virginia (hereafter Fellers Papers), Box 5, Folder 27.
- 2 Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27.
- 3 "The Emperor of Japan," 13, Fellers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 36. PWB had the following guideline: ignore the Emperor and concentrate on attacking the militarists and emphasize their responsibility for bringing Japan military disasters and encourage the people to overthrow the militarists. See "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area," July 26, 1944 in Appendix "A," p. 6 of Annex 4 in Bonner Fellers, "Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-45," Mar. 15, 1946 (hereafter PWB report), RG 4, Box 56, "Report on Psy-War in the SWPA, 1944-45," MML.
- 5 33 % favored execution of the Emperor, 17 % favored a court decision on his fate, 11% favored life imprisonment, 9 % favored exile, 4 % favored doing nothing because the Emperor is only a figure-head, and 3 % favored using him as a puppet to rule Japan.
- 6 "The Emperor of Japan," 37.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 37-38, 40.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 37.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 49.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 55-56.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 55.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 39.
- 13 Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27.
- 14 Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 1.
- 15 Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27.
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 Carl A. Spaatz, Aug. 1, 1945 diary entry, "Diary Mar.-Aug. 1945 (Personal)," I:21; War 37683, July 24, 1945, "Atomic Bomb Directives," I:73, Carl A. Spaatz Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
- 18 Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27.
- 19 Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 1.
- 20 Aug. 8, 1945, Military Secretary Diary, Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27.
- 21 Fellers Papers, Box 3, Folder 22.
- 22 For the quote, see Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 1. Waldo Heinrichs, *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 376-78.
- 23 For the quote, see Hoover to John Callan O'Laughlin, editor of the *Army-Navy Journal*, Aug. 8, 1945, Box 171, "O'Laughlin, John Callan Correspondence," PPI, Hoover Papers, Hoover Presi-

Bonner Fellers and U.S-Japan Relations, June 1945-June 1946

- dential Library. In addition, see D.M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," *The Journal of Military History* 61 (July 1997), 541-43; Timothy Walch and Dwight M. Miller, *Herbert C. Hoover and Harry S. Truman: A Documentary History* (Worland, Wyoming: High Plains Publishing Company, 1992), 50-53.
- 24 For the quotes, see Aug. 29, 30, 1945, Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27. With regard to Hoover, see Walch and Miller, *Hoover and Truman*, 50-53. With regard to Grew, see The U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. VI: The British Commonwealth, the Far East* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), 546. Finally, with regard to PWB skepticism about democracy taking root in Japan, see PWB report, Annex 6, p. 7, RG 4, Box 56, "Report on Psy-War in the SWPA, 1944-45," MML.
- 25 Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 1.
- 26 *Ibid.*
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 *Ibid.*
- 29 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Sept. 19, 1945, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 1.
- 30 Fellers to Donovan, Sept. 15, 1945, Fellers Papers, Box 1, Folder 13.
- 31 Fellers to Hoover, Oct. 3, 1945; Hoover to Fellers, Oct. 15, 1945; Fellers to Hoover, Nov. 15, 1945; Bernice Miller, Secretary to Mr. Hoover, to Fellers, Dec. 20, 1945; Fellers to Miller, Jan. 26, 1946; "Fellers, Bonner," Post-Presidential Individual File, Herbert C. Hoover Papers, Herbert C. Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. The same memorandum can also be found in Bonner Fellers Papers, Fellers Papers, Box 5; "World War II Memos to the Commander in Chief," Box 8, Folder 3. The quote on MacArthur thanking Fellers for his submitting him this memorandum is on page 10 of "Japanese Background" in Box 8, Folder 3. Higashino, Makoto, *Showa Tenno Futatsu no "Dokuhakuroku"* (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppankai, 1998), 24-25. Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 1. Finally, for the Oct. 2 reorganization, see D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur Volume III: Triumph and Disaster* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 41.
- 32 Fellers Papers, Box 5, "World War II Memos to the Commander in Chief." The same document can be found in Fellers Papers, Box 8, Folder 3.
- 33 Oct. 1, 1945 Memorandum, Fellers Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.
- 34 "Military Secretary Office Diary," Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27.
- 35 Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 27.
- 36 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Sept. 23, 24, 29, 30, Oct. 1, 7, 8, 28, 30, 31, Nov. 3, 1945, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 1; Wedemeyer to Fellers, Nov. 11, 1945, Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 12; "Efficiency Report," Jan. 10, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 1, Folder 16.
- 37 See Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Jan. 20, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 26.
- 38 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Jan. 13, 1946, Apr. 10, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 39 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Jan. 20, 24, 27, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 40 James, *The Years of MacArthur Volume III*, 41-44, 63 (for the quote).
- 41 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Jan. 29, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 42 Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.

- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Feb. 26, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 45 For quotes, see the following in Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2: Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Mar. 1, Apr. 4, 1946. Fellers received the news that he is most likely to get a job offer from V.F.W. on Apr. 10; see, Ijams to Fellers, Apr. 2, 1946, Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Apr. 10, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. In Fellers Papers, Box 1, Folder 15, there is a letter dated Apr. 24, 1946 from Fellers to James Van Zandt regarding Fellers's continued interest in the V.F.W. offer as well as delight in hearing their friend former Tennessee Congressman Carroll Reece, a pro-MacArthur man, became the Chairman of Republican National Committee. With regard to relations between Fellers and Eisenhower as well as MacArthur and Eisenhower, see the following: Oct. 8, 1937 diary entry in Daniel D. Holt, ed., *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905-1941* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 225-28; Fellers Papers, Box 5, Folder 16; Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Jan. 24, 1937, Fellers Papers, Box 1, Folder 19.
- 46 For the quotes from the three letters from Fellers to his wife, see Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. With regard to MacArthur and Allied Council for Japan, see James, *The Years of MacArthur Volume III*, 39-40, 237-38; Michael Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 62-63 and *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 123.
- 47 With regard to Nov. 29, 1945 and Jan. 25, 1946 cables, see *Showa Tenno Futatsu no "Dokuhakuroku,"* 90-91, 100-101; Takeda, Kiyoko, *Tenno kan no Sokoku: 1945 nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), 274-77.
- 48 On April 3 Fellers wrote his wife "Did I write about an American girl who married a Jap and who could be a cousin of mine from Tennessee? See Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. With regard to relations between Fellers and Terasaki, see the following diary entries in Terasaki, Hidenari, *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku Terasaki Hidenari Goyogakari Nikki* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1991) (hereafter Terasaki Diary): Feb. 20, Mar. 8, 1946; in addition, see what Fellers told Terasaki on Mar. 20 in Kinoshita, Michio, *Sokkin Nisshi* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1990) (hereafter Kinoshita Diary), 222-23. With regard to Fellers-Yonai meeting on Mar. 6, see Masumi, Junnosuke, *Showa Tenno to sono Jidai* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1998), 76-77.
- 49 PWB report, 16, 18, RG 4, Box 56, "Report on Psy-War in the SWPA, 1944-1945," MML.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 4. For Sakomizu-Bishop talk, see Fellers Papers, Box 7, Folder 5; for others, see the PWB report.
- 51 Fellers wrote that the interview was conducted on Jan. 23 but Kido wrote in his diary that the interview was done on Jan. 24. Kido Nikki Kenkyukai, ed., *Kido Koichi Nikki Tokyo Saibanki* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1980).
- 52 PWB report, Annex 28, RG 4, Box 56, "Report on Psy-War in the SWPA, 1944-1945," MML.
- 53 See *Kido Koichi Nikki Tokyo Saibanki*; Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Feb. 23, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 54 PWB report, Annex 27, RG 4, Box 56, "Report on Psy-War in the SWPA, 1944-1945," MML.
- 55 PWB report, 13-15, RG 4, Box 56, "Report on Psy-War in the SWPA, 1944-1945," MML.

Bonner Fellers and U.S-Japan Relations, June 1945-June 1946

- 56 *Ibid.*, 16. The above section in the main report has one minor error in that the Emperor made his speech in the early hours of Aug. 10, not 11 p.m. on Aug. 9.
- 57 See Terasaki Diary entries for Mar. 8 and 9 as well as Kinoshita Diary, Mar. 9. The latter shows that Fellers thought Terasaki was deliberately being prevented from seeing the Emperor but Kinoshita wrote the delay only had to do with the fact that the Emperor was suffering from a cold.
- 58 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Mar. 10, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. In the same folder there is a letter he wrote to Dorothy Fellers on Mar. 1 that states Woodall Greene, Fellers's trusted friend and former subordinate in the PWB, was assisting him in going over the report, which was ready except for the annexes. On Mar. 13, Fellers wrote his wife that he did not care whether MacArthur liked the PWB report or not.
- 59 PWB report, 16, RG 4, Box 56, "Report on Psy-War in the SWPA, 1944-1945," MML. See Apr. 1, 1946 entry in the Terasaki Diary; Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Apr. 6, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2; D.W. Johnston to Fellers, June 17, 1946, RG 44 a, Box 1, Folder 15.
- 60 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Mar. 3, 5, 21, Apr. 20, 1946; Bymes, Apr. 19 cable to MacArthur, May 30, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 61 See *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku Terasaki Hidenari Goyogakari Nikki*, 133.
- 62 Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 63 Terasaki Diary entries for Apr. 24, May 3, 1946. In addition, see the Japanese version of the Emperor monologue in *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku Terasaki Hidenari Goyogakari Nikki*, including pp. 19-20 for Terasaki's record of when this oral history project was conducted. Terasaki finished the final copy of the Japanese transcript of the Emperor's monologue on June 1, 1946. Finally, see the Kinoshita Diary entries for the aforementioned dates when the oral history project was conducted.
- 64 9, Fellers Papers, Box 4, Folder 23.
- 65 Fellers Papers, Box 4, Folder 23. For a corresponding section in the Japanese version of the monologue, see *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku Terasaki Hidenari Goyogakari Nikki*, 102.
- 66 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Apr. 27, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 67 "Oral History Interview with Bonner Fellers," June 23, 1967, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, 19-20.
- 68 n.d., Fellers Papers, Box 3, Folder 1.
- 69 Fellers Papers, Box 4, Folder 23.
- 70 Fellers Papers, Box 3, Folder 1.
- 71 "Oral History Interview with Bonner Fellers," June 23, 1967, 20; "Grand Chamberlain Suzuki's Memoir," Fellers Papers, Box 4, Folder 23.
- 72 Fellers Papers, Box 3, Folder 1.
- 73 Hoover to Fellers, Oct. 15, 1945, Fellers Papers, Box 3, Folder 1.
- 74 *Hoover and Truman*, 50-52; *American Ambassador*, 376-77.
- 75 See Terasaki Diary entry for May 14. Shortly after Hoover's visit, Joint Chiefs of Staff Eisenhower visited MacArthur but Fellers felt relieved when he was not asked to see Eisenhower during his Japan tour; see Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, May 10, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 76 "Oral History Interview with Bonner Fellers," June 23, 1967, 22. Hoover to MacArthur, Aug. 27, 1945, "Office of Military Secretary Correspondence, 'Hoover,'" RG 5, SCAP Papers, MML.

- 77 Fellers to Hoover, Mar. 21, 1946; Fellers Papers, Box 7, Folder 2; Fellers to Hoover, Mar. 29, 1946, Box 3, Folder 1.
- 78 Fellers to Hoover, May 21, 1946; Hoover to Fellers, June 20, 1946; the Kido Diary English extracts; and Hozumi and Logan to Fellers, July 22, 1946 in Fellers Papers, Box 3, Folder 1; July 21, 1946 diary entry in *Kido Nikki Tokyo Saibanki*.
- 79 Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, May 7, 8, 29, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. In the May 29 letter, Fellers told his wife that his chances of serving in the Philippines as a Major General were nil, although his Filipino friends would welcome him. On June 27 Fellers finally received the final reply from V.F.W. to be appointed as its director of public relations, an offer he had been anxiously awaiting for the past few months. Fellers wrote his wife on May 16 that the only thing that he regretted about leaving Japan was he was "getting some scoops on what happened during the war," particularly how the war ended. (Fellers to Dorothy Fellers, Feb. 18, 19, 22, 1946, Apr. 17, 26, May 16, 23, 25, 28, June 15, 24, 27, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2; Ijams to Fellers, May 14, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 3, Folder 6).
- 80 Ijams to Fellers, Apr. 2, 1946, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.
- 81 *The Years of MacArthur Volume III*, 126-27.
- 82 Fellers Papers, Bonner Fellers, Box 8, Folder 3, "Japanese Background," n.d., 5.
- 83 "Interview with General Bonner Fellers," Jan. 19, 1973, 5, Fellers Papers, Box 2, Folder 18.
- 84 *Ibid.*, 5-6.
- 85 *Tenno kan no Sokoku: 1945 nen*, 266-70.
- 86 The discussion in Japan in 1946-1948 tended to center around whether or not the Emperor should abdicate in favor of his son. See "The Emperor System in Modern Japan," Richard Storry Memorial Lecture, Oxford University, Nov. 2, 1989, 11-12 and 14-15; with regard to the discussions in Japan regarding the Emperor's war responsibility in the 1940s, see *Tenno kan no Sokoku: 1945 nen*, 301-307.

