Interracial Marriages between American Soldiers and Japanese Women at the Beginning of the Cold War
（冷戦初期に生じたアメリカ人兵士と日本人女性の異人種間結婚について）

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SUMMARY IN JAPANESE: アメリカ占領期にアメリカ人兵士と日本人女性（通称：「戦争花嫁」）との結婚が生じた。その数約3〜4万人と言われている。それまでの歴史上、これほどまでに多くのアメリカ人男性と日本人女性の結婚が生じたのは初めてであった。近年の先行研究では、冷戦初期に生じた結婚として、アメリカの人種寛容政策の中で理解される傾向が強かった。本論文では、冷戦初期に生じたアメリカ人兵士と日本人女性の結婚がどのように理解されたのか、「人種概念」に留意して論じる。具体的には、当時結婚に関して統制をこなしていたアメリカ占領軍当局GHQ/SCAPがこの結婚をどのように捉え、議論を行ったのかを検証する。それにより、以下のことが明らかになる。まず、1947年に制定された日本人花嫁法は日本人女性と日系アメリカ人兵士の結婚のみを想定したものであった。1924年の帰化移民法（別称：「排日移民法」）で日本人の移住が不可能である中制定されたこの例外的な法律は「日系」という人種を超えないことが前提とされていた。しかし、冷戦初期、アメリカが民主的な国家政策を打ち出す中、法律には人種の制限が明記されなかったため、実質日系アメリカ人以外の兵士との結婚が多数生じた。1950年の法律改正時のアメリカ占領軍当局における黒人兵士と白人兵士の結婚の解釈の違いは興味深い。黒人兵士は優生学の観点から日本人女性との結婚は人種を「発達」

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さまざまな要素として許容された。一方、白人兵士との結婚は白人の血統に混じるべきではない黄色人種の血との理解から「危険な結婚」として扱われた。

第二次世界大戦後、アメリカ人兵士と結婚してアメリカへ渡った日本人女性の移住は、アメリカ人男性の人種がその意義に大きく影響した。アメリカ戦戦初期にアメリカ人兵士と結婚してアメリカへ渡った日本人女性移民の研究は、アメリカの「人種寛容」政策の中で見えにくくなっていた人種概念を浮き彫りにする。

Introduction

Right after Japan’s defeat in World War II, tens of thousands of American soldiers came with the occupation forces to Japan. American GIs were seen all over Japan during the period of occupation. Japanese people had many informal contacts with American GIs, and as a result a number of Japanese women married American servicemen. However, the legitimacy of these marriages came under question in the United States. An article in the Los Angeles Times on February 24, 1946, six months after the occupation started, nicely presents the questions that emerged out of the U.S. occupation of Japan, in which the sight of “American soldiers strolling the streets with arms about Jap girls” came to be seen. The newspaper posed the question of whether “such young couples could be married” and asked, “Is such a marriage legitimate?” Throughout the occupation, the military authority, SCAP (the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers), had the ultimate authority to grant permission for marriage between American soldiers and Japanese women and consistently took a determined attitude to prohibit these “mixed marriages.”

Marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women becoming subject to regulations, discussions, and control, marked a historically significant phenomenon, since American soldiers who desired and requested marriage with Japanese women were not necessarily of Japanese descent. This phenomenon created a debate about race and sexuality, and particularly about miscegenation. It was during the occupation that American men and Japanese women became so intimate, crossing constituted racial categories, that these marriages became big national and social issues.
This paper examines how Japanese war brides, or Japanese women who married American soldiers after World War II, were incorporated into the postwar U.S. nation. It avoid simply situating Japanese war brides as postwar immigrants who were supposed to “melt” into the nation, but instead looks closely at how they became American subjects. Previous studies have tended to celebrate the legal incorporation of the Japanese war brides as a democratic gesture on the part of the United States at the beginning of the Cold War. However, these studies have not paid close attention to how the brides were incorporated into the postwar nation, where such interracial couples consisting of American soldiers and Japanese women were not regarded as desirable American subjects. It was the first time that a considerable number of interracial marriages between American “men” and Japanese “women” had become an ideological and material issue for the United States.

This thesis gives attention to the 1947 and 1951 Japanese Soldiers Act, which allowed some Japanese wives and fiancées of American servicemen to enter the United States as exceptions at a time when persons who had more than fifty percent Japanese blood were not eligible to immigrate to the United States, on account of the 1924 Act. The paper foregrounds the gap between the American nation’s disavowal of racism, which prevented the stipulation of a racial component in the Acts, and its unexpected consequences. In doing so, it analyzes how SCAP approached the issue of marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women. It illuminates the racial ideas that adhered to each group in Japanese women’s marriages with Japanese American, black, or white U.S. soldiers. SCAP initially thought that only a small number of soldiers would marry Japanese women, and that these would be predominantly Japanese Americans. How SCAP understood these marriages is an important element of the postwar conciliation process whereby the United States redressed Japanese Americans for their treatment during the war as a result of lobbyists’ pressure. As SCAP came to recognize that some black soldiers would marry Japanese women, the discussions by SCAP about marriages between black soldiers and Japanese women reflected ideas of racial improvement based on the eugenic theories that had gained currency since the late nineteenth century.

Finally, this paper highlights the fact that possible marriages between white soldiers and Japanese women were racially radical, and were taboo under prevailing anti-miscegenation attitudes. Anti-miscegenation laws made interracial marriages between East Asians and whites impossible in the domestic context.
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states had anti-miscegenation laws as of 1945, when the occupation started. Of these, fourteen states prohibited marriages between whites and “Mongolians” and six states considered interracial marriages void or illegal. The marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women, occurring in an international context, were considered deviant by the nation. These men and their wives were not seen as productive citizens or people that the nation wanted to welcome at the beginning of the Cold War.

**Japanese Woman as an Unthinkable Wife to an American Soldier**

Before discussing how marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women became a national issue, it must first be pointed out that such marriages were unthinkable and impossible because of the legal immigration restrictions. Since the 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration and Naturalization Act, or Asian Exclusion Act, made Japanese ineligible for citizenship, persons who had more than fifty percent Japanese blood were not eligible to immigrate to the United States. The legal restrictions made it impossible for American soldiers and Japanese women to marry during the U.S. occupation of Japan and thus SCAP initially did not discuss such marriages. However, what was an acceptable marriage for SCAP was a marriage which could be established within Japan’s jurisdiction. Who fell into this category? SCAP considered those eligible to be Nisei men whose wives were Japanese women. As of the U.S. occupation that started in 1945, there were more than 10,000 Japanese who also had American citizenship in Japan. Most of them were Nisei who were stranded in Japan at the outbreak of war and some worked for SCAP. There were also thousands of Japanese American soldiers who were stationed in Japan, some of whom had Japanese citizenship. By the time the 1947 Soldier Brides Act was enacted, which allowed Japanese wives who married American soldiers to enter the United States, there were 50 marriages between Japanese Americans and Japanese women admitted in Japan. By the time the 1950 Soldier Brides Act was enacted, about 700 marriages between Nisei and Japanese women had been permitted in Japan.

Soon after the U.S. occupation of Japan started, SCAP was concerned about Japanese marriage law in terms of how these Japanese American men could marry Japanese women. On December 2, 1945, three months after the occupation started, SCAP raised two points about who could marry and what constituted a
marriage in Japan. SCAP found that a marriage in Japan consisted merely of notifying the Japanese registrar of the desire to have the wife’s name changed on the census registration from that of her family to that of her husband’s. By comparing marriage rituals in other locations, such as “the performance of a civil ceremony by civil officials (Dutch New Guinea), registered clergyman (Australia), or Army and Navy Chaplains who have been locally certified (Philippine Commonwealth),” SCAP required a substitute to effectuate marriage in Japan. It decided to have the U.S. consul issue a certificate on receipt of information that the requirements of Japanese law had been fulfilled following the pattern prior to the war.

SCAP initially assumed that only Japanese Americans would desire to marry Japanese women, and these could marry within Japan’s jurisdiction. It decided to make American soldiers who desired to marry Japanese women submit all the required documents to register their marriages with the American Consulate at Yokohama or Kobe. Then, “[U]pon a consular finding that no legal grounds exist which would incapacitate an American party for marriages, the application is then transmitted to the Registry Office of the Japanese Government at Naka Ward in Yokohama where it is accepted by the Japanese officials.” SCAP’s policy articulated which American personnel could marry within Japanese jurisdiction while it treated other potential marriages of American personnel with Japanese women as an extralegal matter. SCAP dealt with the marriages’ “eligibility under the law of their own domicile.”

This is not to say that marriages between Japanese American personnel and Japanese women did not cause any problems. They became a problem when Japanese American men desired to bring back Japanese women to the United States and attempted to come into the realm of American jurisdiction. Indeed, SCAP received many requests for permission from Japanese American soldiers who desired to marry Japanese women. However, it rejected them by repeating that “Except under very unusual circumstances, United States military personnel, and civilians employed by the War Department, will not be granted permission to marry nationals who are ineligible to citizenship in the United States.” For example, ex-Sergeant, Robert Kitajima married Mary Enta Kitajima, a Canadian Japanese, in February 1946. While they were permitted to marry, the immigration authorities refused to allow him to bring back his Japanese wife. As another example, Mikio Uchiyama, a civilian employee of the Army in Japan, requested permission to marry a Japanese woman. For “security reasons,” the petition was
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denied when he was in the Armed Services’ counter intelligence corps on January 11, 1949. A member of Congress, Cecil White, renewed his petition when he quit the counter intelligence section, but his request was denied again because his intended bride, Tomiko Henmi, a Japanese national, was not eligible to enter the United States.18

SCAP’s discussions on whether they should give Nisei soldiers permission to marry highlighted American racial ideas about citizenship: in March 1950, J.R. Farrington, a Congressman from Hawaii, advocated that Nisei should be permitted to marry Japanese nationals inasmuch as they had the same blood lines and racial background. SCAP replied that this premise appeared to have some validity, but “while Nisei had the same blood lines as Japanese nationals, the Nisei were nonetheless U.S. citizens and, therefore, subject to all the laws and restrictions to which any other U.S. citizen was subject and that citizenship not race, color, or religion was the criteria.”19 Nisei, who were designated as “enemy aliens” and interned during the war regardless of their American citizenship, were now “American citizens” who could not marry and bring back Japanese women, or “girls of their own race.”

While Japanese Americans had “the same blood lines and racial background” as Japanese women, marriages between Japanese American soldiers and Japanese women were not regarded favorably because of racial ideas about reproduction. In the light of the nation’s racial history with Asians since the late nineteenth century, Asians were not fit subjects for constructing the national family, but were fit to supply cheap labor. In the nineteenth century, first Chinese and later Japanese and Filipinos went to the United States as cheap labor for enterprises in Hawaii and the West Coast. These men were young laborers who intended to return to their home countries. Because the immigration law restricted Asian women’s immigration and the anti-miscegenation law prevented them from marrying women of other races, specifically white women, Asians were American subjects only as cheap labor, and not for building families and engaging in reproduction. After the 1882 Immigration Act banned Chinese immigration, Japanese men were recruited as labor. Since a 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement allowed Japanese men to bring their wives and children, Japanese women who married in Japan immigrated to the United States.20 Social scientific knowledge about sexual relations between Asian (American) men and white women was linked to fears about Oriental men’s sexual desire. Based on the idea that men of inferior races harass and rape white women, interracial relations between Orientals and whites were
interpreted as a “Yellow Peril” and a threat to the white race and its popular preconceptions about protecting white womanhood. Peggy Pascoe asserts that while most anti-miscegenation laws perceived Negro men as threats who harass white women, the American West targeted Japanese men after Japanese labor replaced Chinese laborers.21 Within the American legal context of anti-miscegenation where Asians could not marry white American women, the immigration law primarily allowed Japanese labor to bring over women of their own race in order to form families. However, once Japanese labor became subjects who could form families and engage in reproduction, the nation came to consider Japanese as a threat and “Yellow Peril” who degraded the nation and contested white supremacy. Historian Natalia Molina argues that Japan as an economic menace was entangled with the Japanese as a racial threat to white Americans in the early twentieth century. She shows that when public health officials in Los Angeles explained how Japanese farmers had become a threat to the agricultural industry in California, they brought into the argument the fact that Japanese births outnumbered white births. She says, “Citing birth rates as evidence of this looming menace also helped focus attention on Japanese women and the ‘double threat’ they constituted. . . . Pomeroy [a health officer in the Los Angeles County Health Department] pointed out that the effects of Japanese women’s fertility could be seen already in the ‘growth of a large American citizenship, yellow in color.’”22 Japanese women were subjects who reproduced “Japanese-blood” children as American citizens, considered a “Yellow Peril” who might dominate white Americans. The argument of Japanese as a threat to white Americans triggered the enactment of Alien Land Laws in 1913 and 1920 and finally of the 1924 Immigration Act which ended all Asian immigration.23

With the American nation’s idea of Japanese women as a threat to white Americans, SCAP did not support the marriage of Japanese American soldiers with “girls of their own race” and taking them back to the United States. So when and how did American soldiers’ marriages become possible if Japanese women were a menace who would reproduce and increase the “Japanese race”? 

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The Japanese Soldier Brides Acts Established in the Realm of America’s Jurisdiction

During the American occupation, two U.S. policies affected the immigration of Japanese women who married American soldiers to the United States: the 1947 and 1950 Soldier Brides Acts. While previous studies have tended to celebrate these special laws as a democratic gesture, this essay suggests it was a compromise that emerged out of JACL’s efforts to make Japanese eligible for citizenship and immigration quota.

The 1947 Soldier Brides Act became possible because of the tremendous effort made by a Japanese American human rights organization called the Japanese American Citizen League (JACL). JACL was a civic and patriotic organization “concerned with well-being and political and economic progress of American citizens of Japanese ancestry.” In the immediate postwar period, JACL attempted to overcome the stigma for Japanese Americans of being interned as “enemy aliens” and to emphasize their loyalty to the United States. JACL believed that most Nisei soldiers, known as the 442nd, and other personnel who served as interpreters and translators, had shown their loyalty and contributed to the American nation during the war. Some 33,330 persons of Japanese ancestry, most of whom were Nisei, served in World War II. President Harry Truman recognized their loyalty and praised the 442nd upon this return from Italy and held a parade in celebration. He told the Nisei, “You fought for the free nations of the world. You fought not only the enemy, you fought prejudice—and you won. Keep up that fight. Continue to win. Make this great republic stand for what the Constitution says it stands for: ‘The welfare of all the people, all the time.’” In the postwar period, proud of the contribution that Nisei made during the war, JACL started activities aimed at eliminating racial restrictions from the Nationality Act as well as removing the legal discrimination against Issei and making them eligible for citizenship. JACL formed an Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) to eliminate racial discrimination in immigration and naturalization matters, assigning Mike Masaoka as the director and lobbyist. On January 13, 1947, Delegate Joseph R. Farrington of Hawaii submitted a bill (H.R. 857) which would eliminate racial bars against naturalization and immigration. A month later, on February 22, Senator William Langer introduced a companion bill (S. 602) to Farrington’s proposal in the House. Both of them declared that “right to become a naturalized citizen under the provisions of this chapter (National Act of 1924
Section 303) shall not be limited by race or national origin” and sought to amend certain sections of the Immigration Act of 1917 to permit the entry of those nationalities now excluded on the quota basis.

In the move to amend the immigration and naturalization law, JACL also supported the bill, which would allow Nisei servicemen to bring back their wives of Japanese ancestry, a breakthrough for opening Japanese immigration. Supporting the Act also merged with JACL’s activities to aid the 10,000 Nisei stranded in Japan who now desired to return to the United States. Some Nisei had Japanese wives but could not bring them back to the United States under the immigration and naturalization law. With JACL’s efforts, Chairman Frank Fellow of the Subcommittee for Immigration and Naturalization submitted a bill, H.R.3149, on April 22, 1947. The Act, which was finally signed by President Truman in July, amended the Soldier Brides Act of 1945. The Act had a 30-day clause indicating that it applied only to soldiers “who were married prior to or within 30 days of the enactment of the Soldier Brides Amendment.” Masaoka explained, “Although this amendment will affect beneficially those servicemen who already are married to racially inadmissible women, it will not apply to many who are planning to get married.” Most of the soldiers who had married Japanese women were among the 2,800 Nisei men in Japan, since the headquarters of Far East Command did not permit marriages beyond Japanese jurisdiction. There were also 100 to 150 GIs who were awaiting the passage of the bill before getting married. Masaoka opposed the 30-day clause since it was too short to apply to the marriages. However, it was already a compromise because the original amendment proposed by the House judiciary committee limited eligibility to those who had married before January 1, 1947. The House judiciary committee explained the 30-day clause as indicating an intention “not to promote marriage between United States servicemen and racially admissible aliens.”

In the House Reports, it clearly stated that the Japanese Soldier Brides Act was indicated to support citizen soldiers who had married “girls of their own race”:

Under the so-called GI Brides Act, Public Law 271 of the Seventy-ninth Congress, the alien spouses of United States citizens serving or honorably discharged from the armed forces of the United States are eligible for admission to the United States as nonquota immigrants [ . . . ] As an example, a number of the United States citizen soldiers of the Japanese or Korean race
have married girls of their own race while serving in the Pacific. These girls, under present law, are ineligible for admission and the only relief in such cases is through private legislation.\textsuperscript{35}

This special law was race specific, only indicating marriages between soldiers of Japanese descent and Japanese women.

SCAP also emphasized that the suspension of the prohibition of the marriages through this law did not indicate the desirability of such a marriage. Masaoka wrote the assistant secretary of war a letter to ask about the effect of the 1947 law on future immigration law. F. P. Munson, an assistant secretary of war, replied, “It was not intended nor desired that the usual standards under which the desirability of marriage is determined prior to granting approval be relaxed.”\textsuperscript{36} Against the requests for marriage permission after application expiration dated on August 21, 1947, Adjutant General Edward F. Witsell, for example, took the same position, saying “The suspension of this prohibition [through this law] did not, of course, relax the usual standards under which the desirability of a marriage was determined prior to granting approval.”\textsuperscript{37}

Another opportunity for American soldiers to marry Japanese women and take them back to the United States came through the 1950 Japanese Soldier’s Act, or Public Law 717. It, again, became possible because of JACL’s ongoing efforts to introduce private bills for the entry of Japanese wives, fiancées’ and children to the United States. In 1949, it was still hard for JACL-ADC to move Congress to admit their entry. There had been only about a dozen marriages permitted.\textsuperscript{38} However, Masaoka constantly submitted private bills for Japanese wives’ entry to the United States with their American husbands. While Congress and SCAP still frowned upon marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women, Congress had “become a little more willing to act on private bills than was the case even a year ago,” according to Masaoka in March 1950.\textsuperscript{39} Since then, dozens of private bills were approved.\textsuperscript{40} In a sign of alleviation, the House passed two private bills admitting Japanese fiancées into the United States on May 18. Two of them were soon to be wives of non-Nisei: Masae Marumoto, fiancée of Capt. Harry Ost, Fredonia, N.D., and Sumiko Kato, fiancée of Thomas D. Jacobs Jr., a World War II veteran. The private laws required them to marry their fiancés within three months after entering the United States, or be subject to deportation.\textsuperscript{41} On June 3, 1950, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably admitted 19 House bills to admit Japanese wives, fiancées, or children of American citizens.
Masaoka said, "This is the largest group of such bills ever reported to the Senate for action at one time." Then, 30 more House bills were approved by the Senate and sent to the president on June 17, 1950.42

In the currency of the increasing introduction and admission of private bills to permit the entry of Japanese wives, fiancées and children, President Truman signed another Soldier Brides bill on August 20. This bill was enacted to avoid the necessity of a considerable number of private bills:43

The committee is informed that there are approximately 760 alien wives and alien minor children of United States citizen servicemen mostly in Japan. These wives and alien minor children will be unable to accompany the citizen husband and father upon his return to the United States unless the racial bar is removed. A number of these servicemen have already returned to the United States but were obliged to leave their wives and children in Japan. A considerable number of the citizen servicemen involved are themselves of Japanese descent.44

Here again, the bill was also for soldiers and veterans who were of Japanese descent. Further, the bill was specifically for "760 alien wives and alien minor children of United States citizen servicemen"—wives whose husbands mostly had gone to the United States and who were forced to remain in Japan because of the immigration law’s restriction.

Ideologically, both the 1947 and 1950 Soldier Brides Acts were not beyond the idea of "Japanese American servicemen and veterans who married girls of their own race." However, there were not only Japanese American soldiers and veterans who married Japanese women through these Acts. Through the 1947 Soldier Brides Act, 823 Americans married Japanese women during the 30-day period between July 22 and August 21. Of these, 597 were Nisei GIs and veterans, 211 were Caucasians and 15 "Negro."45 Rep. Frank Fellow’s comment nicely presents the ideology embedded in the Act and the social and material conditions caused by the Act. He said, "The bill is designed to correct an injustice to Americans of oriental ancestry. . . . But it also permits American soldiers" to bring back their Japanese wives to the United States.46 The 1950 Soldier Brides Act even changed the ratio of racial demographics of American soldiers who married Japanese women. In September 1952, the American Consulate reported that 8,381 marriages had occurred since the occupation started in August 1945.47
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The ratio of the racial demographic was as follows: "73 per cent were white, 15 per cent Nisei and 12 per cent Negro." White soldiers became the majority of those who married Japanese women through the 1950 Soldier Brides Act. I would emphasize here that marriages between white American soldiers and Japanese women were an unexpected consequence of the postwar pluralist nation's disavowal of racism that prevented the stipulation of racial components in the Acts.

Anti-Miscegenation Marriages and Their “Mixed-Blood” Children

Given that the Japanese Soldier Brides Act caused marriages beyond blood lines and allowed any American soldiers' wives to be issued with a non-quota visa, SCAP became concerned about how many soldiers would marry Japanese women, and of which race. How SCAP discussed the racial components of potential marriages triggered by the 1950 Soldier Brides Act underscores American racial ideas, entangled with ideas of marriage, reproduction, and racial improvement. When SCAP recognized that there may be a number of "mixed marriages," it was finally based on an anti-miscegenation idea that SCAP was concerned about the legitimacy of the marriages. This section highlights how this became a problem by arguing how SCAP officers discussed such marriages between white American soldiers and Japanese women, as well as black American soldiers and Japanese women.

First, while SCAP recognized the rationality of marriages between Nisei and Japanese women, I would point out here that SCAP discussed the marriages between “Negro” soldiers and Japanese women as an improvement of “Negroes”:

There is little doubt that the blood line of the Nisei and Japanese national are the same and, if such marriages were permitted, there is reason to believe they would be successful. *By the same token, if negro personnel were permitted to marry Japanese, no doubt the result would be an improvement in the first mentioned race.* However, color and religion cannot be used as a basis for decision in permitting marriages.⁴⁹

SCAP's view that “Negro” marriages with Japanese women would be an improvement of the “Negro” highlights American racial ideas about interracial mixing and blackness. It was the idea of racial improvement based on a theory rooted
in eugenics that had developed since the late nineteenth century. Industrialization and Imperialism caused a change in the racial demographics of immigrants in this period: different from Western Europe, so-called “new immigrants” mostly came from Eastern Europe and Asia and increased fears about the American future in terms of the degrading of whiteness. Scientific knowledge about race proliferated and whiteness became something that the nation needed to protect from inferior races. The idea of white supremacy and protection was consolidated based on social Darwinism and eugenics. Darwinist arguments endorsed the idea of race as being different stages on the evolutionary scale with the white race at the top and explained racial evolution from savagery to civilization. Eugenics was rooted in the belief that geniuses tended to come from superior human stock, and that feeblemindedness, criminality, and pauperism are strongly influenced by heredity factors. Eugenicists’ theory that racial differences were rooted in heredity explained and legitimized the separation of “Negroes” from the white race. Discussions of racial difference and heredity were also entangled with the permeating idea of “keeping America white” and protecting civilization from savagery: white was the most civilized race while “Negro” was savage. Within this racial idea, eugenicists advocated that “Negroes” desire to rape white women because an inferior race desires a superior race to improve itself. Based on this idea, African American separation in society was explained by the idea of their fundamental difference in heredity and was even legitimized out of fear of racial mixture. Asian immigrants tended to be interpreted as being in the middle between white at the top and Negro at the bottom.

Within the idea of “Negroes” who desire marriage with a superior race to improve their own race, SCAP considered the Negro soldiers’ desire to marry Japanese women to be quite understandable. When the Department of Justice enacted Public Law 717 in August 1950, SCAP came to be concerned about how many and which soldiers would marry Japanese women if Congress allowed the issuance of no quota visas to Japanese nationals. SCAP did preliminary research:

Preliminary surveys, which have been made, indicate that somewhere between 2500 and 7500 US personnel plan to marry Oriental spouses. Not all of these will be military personnel. Probably about 20% will be civilian employees. By race, a fairly large proportion will be Nisei and at least a proportionate share will be Negroes. Air Force as well as Army personnel
will be involved. The exact effect on the occupation mission of such a large number of intermarriages is hard to determine.\textsuperscript{51}

How SCAP discussed the racial proportion of who would marry Japanese women did not contradict the eugenicist theory of racial desire: the lower race has sexual desire for members of the higher race. In addition, anti-miscegenation laws enforced in the early twentieth century intended to protect whites from mixture with non-white races, and ideologically marriages between “Negro” and Japanese women were as not strongly banned.\textsuperscript{52} Along with Nisei personnel, marriages between Negroes and Japanese women were thinkable subjects for SCAP. In addition, the absence of any estimate of marriages between white soldiers and Japanese women indicated that they were unthinkable and impossible marriages even when marriages between American men and Japanese women became legally possible.

Within the idea of eugenics, wherein Japanese women were of an inferior race and were not desirable for white American men who were of a superior race, SCAP discussed white American men’s desire to marry Japanese women as “a most unwise thing to do.” Throughout the occupation, especially after the 1947 law was passed, many American soldiers requested permission to marry Japanese women and most of the requests were refused under SCAP’s policy on prohibition of marriages with aliens who are ineligible for citizenship. Under the American legal context and idea of miscegenation, American soldiers’ desire to marry Japanese girls “would be a disaster” so that American soldiers needed to “look over the situation in an objective manner.”\textsuperscript{53} For example, SCAP received a request for permission to marry a Japanese woman from Private Bryant on his return on October 11, 1949. SCAP replied, “Private Bryant will be able to consider the matter objectively and determine in his own mind the desirability of any future course of action without being influenced unnecessarily by his immediate situation.”\textsuperscript{54}

Indeed, when SCAP considered possible marriages between white American soldiers and Japanese women, these marriages became an anti-miscegenation issue. Throughout the occupation, SCAP received many requests concerning marriages with Japanese women from white soldiers. There was a set formula in which SCAP repeatedly explained to these soldiers why headquarters did not permit marriages with Japanese women:
Some fifteen states do not recognize marriages between American citizens and foreign nationals ineligible for United States citizenship and consider cohabitation of such couples unlawful. Sanction of such a marriage places upon the Department of the Army a difficult determination as to assignment and scheduling of necessary travel involved in changes of station. The value of the soldier to the service is correspondingly reduced. Experience in occupied countries has proven that it is not feasible to retain service personal in the theater after marriage to a foreign national. As a result, were approval granted to such a marriage, it is readily apparent that the family would immediately be separated by reason of the soldier’s transfer to another station outside of the Far East Command.55

Prioritizing considerations about the soldiers’ usefulness, the War Department concluded that couples consisting of Orientals and whites hampered the assigning of soldiers in certain cases. These laws were anti-miscegenation laws, which prohibited marriages between white Americans and “Orientals” or “Mongolians.” Within the pervasive idea of anti-miscegenation in American society, a fundamental problem was more about these couples’ intimacy itself than assignment issues.

With this miscegenistic idea, the subject of interracial marriages between Orientals and whites itself was held to be too radical and extreme. Historian Henry Yu explains that the subject of intermarriage between Orientals and whites themselves was a taboo which “only pornographic novels or pulp fiction dared to explore.”56 Persons who engaged in interracial marriages were perceived as abnormal and of “extreme type.” Below is one of the letters in which C.G. Blakeney, an officer of the General Staff Corps, replied to a Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, who wrote a letter on behalf of a soldier about the permission for marriage with Japanese women. In the letter, Blakeney expressed his view that such a marriage was an “extreme” action and that the soldier had taken an impulsive action driven by sympathy. He wrote:

*It is indeed unfortunate that a young man in a foreign country, who has had a difficult life to lead from his school days on, should fall back on the sympathetic treatment given him by foreigners, particularly those who were our former enemies and who, by law, may not enter the United States. I agree with you that to renounce his American citizenship would in later years cause him more heartbreak and difficulty than any possible course of action
he could take. The means of effecting such an action is not within the province of the Department of the Army and I, therefore, hesitate to suggest a way to undertake this action, in case he should go to this extreme. *In my opinion, it would be most wise for your constituent to accept his discharge in the United States where he can look over the situation in an objective manner and determine in his own mind the desirability of any future course of action without being influenced unnecessarily by his immediate situation.*

Along with eugenic ideas, white American soldiers’ desire for marriage with Japanese women was not considered as rational and objective, but as influenced and unnecessary. In this discussion, I have asserted that Japanese women were not marriageable subjects for white American soldiers. Indeed, marriages were discussed as something that SCAP had to protect their soldiers from.

Considering the interracial marriages between white American soldiers and Japanese women as a taboo subject for discussion, given the notion of fear rooted in anti-miscegenation, SCAP suggested a rotation policy when it realized there would be a considerable number of marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women as a result of the 1950 Act. On December 7, the Adjutant General’s office proposed, “supplementary action in the form of a mandatory rotation policy of Armed Forces Personnel to the United States after marrying an Oriental bride may be required.” As the Army often referred to the concurrently ongoing occupation in Germany, the supplementary action was discussed with reference to how rotation policy was effective in Europe. It says:

In order to prevent hasty marriages and to maintain the integrity of the occupation forces, EUCOM established a policy of mandatory rotation to the United States within thirty days after the marriage was approved. . . . EUCOM could, in this manner, send personnel back to the United States within thirty days after the marriage with a foreign national without violating theatre rotation criteria or without violating any civilian contracts already in effect.

With this policy, it says, “In Europe this mandatory marriage rotation policy, effective thirty days after completion of the marriage, was premised entirely upon the end of a man’s overseas tour and affected the strength of the command”
and recognizes the rotation policy was effective in affecting the strength of the command. Followed by European cases, it suggested: (a) Rotation to U.S. of personnel within six weeks after their marriage to an Oriental is approved, (b) Rotation upon completion of overseas tour (with no further extensions thereof granted).

Although it seems to suggest that the same rotation policy was in effect as that in as Europe, the meaning of rotation policy for the Japanese cases was crucially different from their European counterparts. The Adjutant General’s office writes:

Any type of forced rotation from FEC [Japan] of the mixed couples marrying under PL 717 would have certain definite advantages. (1) It would remove the mixed couple from Japan and would prevent complete intermingling of the occupying forces with the occupied peoples which would otherwise occur. (2) It would also enable the alien spouses and children to receive their indoctrination in the customs, manners, and traditions of the US while living in the US. (3) It would eliminate the requirement to provide government dependent housing for such personnel whose grade would otherwise entitle them to such housing. (4) It would remove from the theater a suggestive influence to other service men to marry Orientals.60

While rotation policy was used in Europe to strengthen the command there, rotation policy applying to soldiers whose fiancées and dependents were Japanese implied a different meaning: the Army’s purpose was removing the mixed couples from Japan as soon as possible. It clearly stated that removal would prevent further production of these mixed couples. For example, an Air Force commander replied, “It is doubtful whether an American could be required to take his Oriental spouse to the US on a rotation policy or subsequent thereto. Consequently, the mandatory rotational policy with reference to the American service man will tend to increase the number of service men desiring to marry Orientals.” Another officer, General Milburn, “recommends that any policy, which is adopted, include provisions which will serve as effective deterrents to this type of marriages.” In addition, SCAP viewed the situation in which American soldiers who had Japanese wives or fiancées tended to request an extension of duty as a problem. On December 16, 1950, along with the second Soldier Brides Act, SCAP prohibited American soldiers who married Japanese women to “serve the
command beyond the extension of the minimum required oversea tour of duty." 61 SCAP dealt with the marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women as producing a number of miscegenous couples.

**Situated Out of the American Family: “Mixed-Blood” Children within the Idea of Anti-Miscegenation**

Within the pervasive idea of miscegenation, children born to American soldiers and Japanese women themselves were a crucial factor that made these marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women problematic in the United States. In 1949, there was a discussion about how SCAP should deal with marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women in response to many soldiers’ requests. They raised the existence of children as the fundamental problem of these marriages, saying “frequently illegitimate children are present or expected.”62 Here, when these children were considered as possible American subjects, they were viewed as a problem for the nation. Seen as an inferior race, “mixed-blood” children were not desirable additions to the American family.

Therefore, SCAP freed American soldiers from responsibility to a child or its mother and sent soldiers who had completed their assigned duty to the next station, without any special consideration.63 In May 1947, representatives from the Army and Navy held a conference with voluntary agencies and the national social welfare assembly to discuss “families and children who need case work assistance for problems arising out of the presence of American troops in foreign lands.”64 At the conference, the chairman of the national social welfare assembly, Robert E. Bondy, articulated that the agencies had received a great number of requests for service for women and children who were dependents of, or who claimed dependency upon, U.S. servicemen and veterans. However, he finally just concluded, “If the man denies the paternity, nothing further can be done.”

This irresponsible policy triggered Japanese women’s paternity claims as a large and continuing issue during the Occupation. In August 1949, the vice president of the Red Cross, Dewitt Smith, and directors from overseas commands held a conference in Washington to discuss how the United States should deal with these children. The Department of the Army confirmed that the Department of State would not support unmarried mothers and children:65 “I am informed that the Department of State decided not to recommend to Congress that benefits be paid
by the United States Government on behalf of these mothers and children. The United States Government did not deal with these mothers and children as potential American subjects.

The discussions between military authorities and voluntary agencies indicated that any unions created by American soldiers, Japanese women and their children were not even recognized as a potential American family. Conversations during these two conferences revealed that what they believed needed to be protected was the American family that soldiers had in the home country. This point was emphasized in both conferences over and over again. For instance, the discussions held in 1947 revealed that voluntarily agencies had made every effort to protect the soldiers’ family relations in the United States. Because of their “destructive effect,” the agencies did not send allegation letters from Japanese women to soldiers’ American families. The 1949 conference also stated that the potential demerit in contact with veterans who were living with their families was of course well known. All these statements indicated that the issue of the paternity of soldiers’ children with Japanese women was just a nuisance factor which destroyed soldiers’ formal American families in the United States.

Indeed, American soldiers were not subjects as fathers of children mothered by Japanese women. The SCAP policy produced illegitimate children and left stigmatized mothers deserted. I would here point to the unknowability of the number of children born to American soldiers and Japanese women. Given that SCAP tried not to make the issue of these children its own problem, it prohibited taking an official census of mixed-blood children that would have revealed the situation. For example, in 1947 the Institute of Population Problems of the Japanese Ministry of Welfare proposed taking statistics on the babies born between American fathers and Japanese women. However, Col. Crawford Sams, the chief of Public Health and Welfare of SCAP, prohibited them from officially gathering statistics. It is difficult to know the numbers of such babies since mixed-blood children were stigmatized subjects and therefore tended to be kept hidden. It ranged from thousands to hundreds of thousands, as estimated by newspapers, magazines, some offices of the Japanese Government, and nonprofit organizations. In addition, hundreds of thousands of babies were literally aborted. In 1952, more than a million abortions took place. It is said that considerable numbers of babies were fathered by American GIs. These babies were undesired and thus subject to abortion in the postwar period.
Conclusion

This paper has examined how interracial marriages between American soldiers and Japanese women were discursively incorporated into the postwar U.S. nation as a result of arguments taking place within SCAP. I argued that marriages between white American soldiers and Japanese women made them into participants in “deviant” miscegenation, but that marriages between Japanese American and black soldiers and Japanese women were less stigmatized. In developing this thesis, I focused on the fact that the 1947 and 1951 Japanese Soldier Brides Acts were aimed at American Nisei soldiers who wished to take back their Japanese wives to the United States. However, marriages between white American soldiers and Japanese women had unexpected consequences triggered by the increasingly pluralist postwar nation’s disavowal of racism, which prevented the stipulation of racial criteria in the Acts. In sum, this paper challenges the simple understanding that the decision to allow Japanese war brides into the postwar nation was a benevolent gesture on the part of the victor nation or evidence of its tolerant attitude; instead, it highlights the contradictory and complicated processes of how marriages between different groups of American soldiers and Japanese women were seen as undesirable or permissible, allowed these women to become American subjects, and spurred discussion of and changes in American racial discourse at the beginning of the Cold War.

Notes

1 Since 1945 there have been recorded at the American Consulate, Tokyo, between 12,000 and 13,000 marriages of Japanese nationals to American citizens—the large majority of whom are servicemen. Since 1950 there have been about 5,000 marriages in the Tokyo-Yokohama area alone. (“Brides’ Schools” RG 200, Box 1280, September 20, 1955, American Red Cross). The record of the Immigration and Naturalization Office showed that 5,111 entered the United States as wives of American citizens up until 1952 when the occupation ended and an additional 29,824 entered up until 1959.


4 The Walter McCarran Act, enacted in June 1952, provided naturalization opportunities to all legally admitted residents regardless of race or national origin.
Tomoko Tsuchiya

5 Following chapters (chapters four and five) highlight how racially radical and taboo subjects were incorporated into a *culturally* pluralist nation.


7 Since Japan adapted to blood lineage, some Japanese American men had Japanese citizenship (Koseki) and dual citizenship. If Issei parents registered their child’s birth, their child holds Japanese citizenship.

8 “Soldier Brides Act Passed; Awaits President’s Signature,” *Rafu Shimpo*, July 19, 1947.

9 “Marriage of Military Personnel,” RG 331, Box 433, File 291.1, December 2, 1945, National Archives.

10 Article 775 of Japanese Civil Code is quoted in part as follows: “Marriage takes effect upon notification thereof being made to the Registrar. Notification under the preceding paragraph must be made by both parties and two or more witnesses of legal age, either orally or by a document signed by them.”

11 “Marriage of Military Personnel,” RG 331, Box 433, File 291.1, December 2, 1945, National Archives.

12 While SCAP did not assume that such a case would happen, there were some cases in which American soldiers who did not have Japanese citizenship gave up their own American citizenship and married within Japan’s marriage law. For example, William Miller who was stationed in Japan without Japanese citizenship married under Japan’s jurisdiction. After he was discharged from the military, he decided to stay and live in Japan with his Japanese wife since he realized that he could not take his wife back to the United States. He lost American citizenship and was adopted by his wife’s family. “Nippon Musume to Kekkon shi Shiminka Houki [Abandoned his Citizenship by Marriage with Japanese Girl],” *Rafu Shimpo*, June 5, 1947.

13 “Laws and Regulations Regarding Method of Contracting Marriage in Japan,” RG 331, Box 1260, File 291.1, September 22, 1949, National Archives.

14 Until the Nationality Act was enacted in 1950, Japanese women who gained the citizenship of their husbands lost their Japanese citizenship. According to the Old Nationality Law which was effective until May 4, 1950, foreign men could be adopted by the wife’s family. Under the new Nationality Law, which became effective July 1, 1950, Japanese nationals could marry foreign citizens who lose their foreign citizenship by marriage with Japanese nationals. Japanese women who engaged in unrecognizable marriages with American personnel were termed “Only.” A woman called “Only” had a relation with an American man, but was not his wife.

15 Here, I should add that SCAP was very inconsistent in deciding to whom it gave marriage permission and the right to take a wife back to the United States. There was no firm policy, but SCAP tended to issue permission to the higher class of soldiers and well-known people. One example was the marriage between a Nisei soldier, Lieutenant George H. Goda and a famous Japanese actress, Mitsuko Miura, in early April 1946. After Lt. Goda received permission from the commanding officer, he and Miura married, and he could return to the United States with his wife in early May 1946, even before the first Soldier Brides Act was enacted in July 1947 (“Lt. Goda’s Marriage to Japan Movie Actress,” *Rafu Shimpo*, April 9, 1946).
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16 When he approached the immigration officials, immigration authorities told him that he could take back his wife because they thought she was Chinese.

17 Pacific Citizen reported that the 1947 Soldier Brides Act finally allowed them to go back to the United States.

18 “Transmittal of Letter from Member of Congress re Marriage to Japanese National,” RG 331, Box 643, File 291.1, April 12, 1949, National Archives.


20 Along with the enactment of a Gentlemen’s Agreement, there were Japanese women who married Japanese men in the United States at a distance. These women were called “picture brides.”

21 For example, within the idea of protecting white womanhood, the Oregon miscegenation law prohibited marriages between whites and “Mongolians.” The category of “Mongolian” which initially indicated Chinese when it was added to the law in 1893 was extended to Japanese in the early twentieth century. Refer to Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally (New York: Oxford University Press 2009), 88-89.


23 Alien Land Laws aimed at preventing immigrants from possessing land for no longer than three years. The Land Acts intended to drive out Japanese since farming was their main source of livelihood. In 1920, the Japanese Government unilaterally abolished the picture bride system and stopped sending Japanese women as wives to the United States in exchange for preventing the enactment of the alien land law in California. But it was enacted in 1920 nonetheless and highlights a source of threat to white America, namely Japanese women, which the Japanese Government attempted to remove from the realm of the American nation and citizenship. The 1924 Immigration Act was called the Japanese Exclusion Act since other Asians were already excluded in previous Immigration Acts and the Act aimed to exclude Japanese.

24 It was established in Seattle in 1930.


26 Masaoka, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, 179 and Rafu Shimpo, May 20, 1947.

27 Masaoka, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, 190.

28 JACL put much effort into enactment of the bill which made Issei eligible for citizenship. Since Issei were ineligible for citizenship, they faced a lot of legal discrimination such as being denied the right to own farmland. Alien Land Laws prohibited people ineligible for citizenship to own lands in sixteen states in the West. Another JACL concern in the postwar period was prevention of deportable aliens who entered the United States as students or treaty merchants and were subject to deportation since they were left in the United States and their status changed during the war. As a result of the ADC’s effort, on June 1, 1947, President Truman signed a bill opening citizenship to aliens “irrespective of race” who had served in the U.S. forces in World War I and II. (The bill HR 6505) was introduced by Rep. Walter H. Judd, R. Minn., and provided that alien Japanese who rendered “outstanding service” to the United States between December 7, 1941 and September 2,
1945, be allowed to remain in the United States permanently. The bill also protected those persons from deportation in the event they had dependents who are American citizens. The bill benefitedIssei who volunteered for special service against Japan. A month later on July 1, 1947, Truman signed the bill banning indiscriminate deportation of treaty merchants. See Masaoka, *They Call Me Moses Masaoka*, 207. Finally, the Walter McCarran Act which Masaoka supported was enacted in June, 1952. The Walter McCarran Act provided naturalization opportunities to all legally admitted residents regardless of race or national origin. For JAACL, the Walter McCarran Act made 88,000 aliens, 85,000 of whom were of Japanese ancestry, eligible for citizenship. It provided an immigration quota for all countries under the 1924 National Origin Quota Act. For Japan, the number was a token 185 per year.

29 Roger N. Baldwin, special representative of JAACL, engaged in activities to help about 10,000 Nisei who were stranded in Japan at the outbreak of war. As of July 1947, about 3,000 Nisei had applied for certificates of United States citizenship to the American counsel and 2,250 had been cleared. Some Nisei lost American citizenship by service in the Japanese Army or Government by voting and by naturalization. (Pacific Stars and Stripes, May 3, 1947) This issue originally emerged soon after the occupation started (June 16, 1946).

30 The Soldier Brides Act of 1945 only allowed GI spouses of alien ancestry eligible for citizenship to enter the United States. It did not apply to Japanese, Korean, Canadian Nisei, Guamanian, Siamese and people of other ancestry not admissible under the racial restrictions in the immigration laws. It was the amendment of PL 271, which was a temporary law, expiring December 27, 1948 and therefore couples who were permitted to immigrate to the United States had to do so by this time.


33 Masaoka contested the 30-day clause since it was too short to apply to the marriages. The House Judiciary Committee explained the 30-day clause as indicating "not to promote marriage between United States servicemen and racially admissible aliens," from Masaoka, *They Call Me Moses Masaoka*.

34 Both Senate and House reports stated, "In order not to encourage marriages between United States citizen service people and racially admissible aliens the subcommittee felt that a date should be placed in the bill making it applicable only to those marriages occurring before January 1, 1947. After further deliberation, however, it was discovered that many of these servicemen are awaiting the enactment of this measure before getting married and that many of the commanding officers in the Pacific are withholding the necessary permission until the passage of this legislation. Therefore, the subcommittee has amended the bill by striking out the date 'January 1, 1947'," as it appears on page 1, line 9, and inserting in lieu thereof the word "thirty days after the approval of this Act."


36 "Amending the Act to Expedite the Admission to the United States of Alien Spouses and Alien Minor Children of Citizen Members of the United States Armed Forces," House Reports, 80th
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Congress 1st Session.
37 RG 407, Box 717, File 291.1, September 22, 1947, National Archives.
38 Because the deadline for Japanese wives’ entry to the United States was December 1948, Masaoka asked the House Judiciary Committee to eliminate all racial restrictions in amendments under study to extend the deadline of the Soldier Brides Act at least another year.
40 Pacific Citizen reported that Joseph R. Farrington, R. Hawaii, on January 31 had introduced several bills to permit the marriages of American soldiers in Japan to Japanese women.
41 “House Passes Bill to Admit Brides of Two American GIs,” Pacific Citizen, May 27, 1950.
42 A Pacific Citizen article on June 17, 1950 also reported that the Senate passed three House bills admitting a Canadian Japanese bride and two children in addition to three other private bills. On July 15, 1950 an article was carried stating that the President signed nine private bills admitting Japanese brides and children to permanent residence in the United States.
45 Total also includes 54 men on occupation duty in Okinawa. Pacific Citizen, August 30, 1947; Pacific Stars and Stripes, August 22, 1947.
49 “Application for Permission to Marry Japanese Nationals” from G1 to C/S, RG 338, Box 115, File 291.1, National Archives.
50 Historian Matthew Jacobson argued that the racial conception of immigrant “difference” changed in this period. Immigrants were discussed “not as a source of cheap or competitive labor, not as one seeking asylum from foreign oppression, not as a migrant hunting a less strenuous life, but as a parent of future-born American citizens—so must have ‘heredity stuff’ that would have to be compatible with the ‘American ideal.’”
52 There were some states where interracial marriages were banned by anti-miscegenation laws.
53 RG 407, Box 363, File 291.1, National Archives; SCAP received many requests for marriages with Japanese women and responded by giving “advice” that soldiers needed to have second thoughts, since they had made their decisions about marriages without deep consideration.
54 RG 407, Box 363, File 291.1, National Archives.
55 RG 407, Box 363, File 291.1, October 10, 1949, Legislative and Liaison Division, National Archives. Emphasis mine.
56 The Chicago School of Sociology led by Robert Park was interested in interracial marriages be-
tween Orientals and whites to prove their assumption that physical differences, such as skin color, between the two cultures were erased through sexual contact. See Henry Yu, *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exotism in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 56. However, their examination of interracial marriages between Oriental and whites was very radical and provoked the American public when they conducted questionnaires in Seattle. Sociologists along with missionaries interpreted interracial marriages as the successful end of American assimilation within their interest in two different cultures coming into intimate contact (61). For Park, "the relationship between a man and a woman of two different cultures and races was the perfect experiment for discovering how different cultures and race could coexist." Park was not interested in whether these "hybrid" children would be biologically inferior or superior, but was interested in the children's relation with ethnic communities and their families. Park also situated intermarriage "as the ultimate solution of the problem of race prejudice" toward the melting pot (61).

57 RG 407, Box 363, File 291.1, October 10, 1949, Legislative and Liaison Division, National Archives. Emphasis mine.


60 Emphasis mine.

61 "Mandatory Rotation of Personnel in FEC Marrying Persons who are not Citizens of the United States," RG 338, Box 200, File 291.1, National Archives. The minimum duty was three years.

62 "Marriage Policy," RG 319, Box 570, January 3, 1949, National Archives.

63 The usual tour of overseas duty was three years. RG 200, Box 1279, May 16 1947, National Social Welfare Assembly, Inc, National Archives.

64 RG 200, Box 1279, May 16, 1947, National Social Welfare Assembly, Inc., National Archives.

65 The statement says that the Department of State considered any support to unmarried mothers and their children in response to the fact that the Governments of Great Britain and Iceland had decided to give support to unmarried mothers and their children. The discussions were not only for the cases in Japan, but for all American military cases.


68 Based on the discussions, the office of the secretary of defense made the policy regarding paternity claims by non nationals against members or former members of the Armed Forces, so it was left up to the Red Cross to handle this subject. On March 13 in 1952, Dewitt Smith, Assistant General Manager of the Red Cross, stated that based on the policy, "no constructive service can be given" in relation to inquiries and requested the Army to review the policy.

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70 The numbers of estimated children varies. An article written in 1948 reports that by mid-1948, the estimate of the babies ranged from 1,000 to 4,000. Takada Masami, chief of the Children’s Bureau of the Welfare Ministry, estimated the figure at around 150,000. In 1952, the Children’s Bureau finally conducted the first official census on the number of mixed-blood children and its result was 5,002, which was far below earlier estimates. In the same year, the Ministry of Welfare also conducted a statistical check and came up with the figure 5,013.