

## **Across the Pacific: Overseas Chinese Franchise and Chinese America, 1912-1914**

(アメリカ合衆国における中国系移民社会と華僑  
参政権、1912-1914——第一次国会を巡って)

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**SUMMARY IN JAPANESE:** 本稿の目的は1912年に中華民国で制度化された華僑参政権に注目することで、アメリカ合衆国（以下、アメリカ）の中国系移民とその代表者が本国の議会政治を通じて何を達成しようとしたのかを明らかにするものである。満洲王朝を打倒した中国では議会政治を制度化した結果、海外移民までもが国会議員になることが可能となった。その斬新性から既存の研究ではその制度設計に主眼を置く一方で、この制度を利用した当事者に関する分析が欠如していた。彼らの試みは1914年の国会解散で頓挫したが、本稿では在米中国人社会の「代表者」たる華僑議員は国家主体として米中関係に介入することでアメリカにおける中国系移民の差別待遇問題の解決を企図したと論じる。華僑議員を含め在米中国人社会の世界認識の背景には、共和主義を共通の価値観とする良好な米中関係の将来像に加えて、移民・通商問題を巡って競合関係にあった日米関係が大きな役割を果たしていた。

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## Introduction

Tong King Chong (Tang Qiongchang, 1869-1917), a Chinese immigrant community activist-intellectual who settled in San Francisco for 30 years, was staying in Peking, China in 1913 for a special mission. One year prior, the Government of the Republic of China had institutionalized parliamentary politics with a bicameral system and representative democracy. In doing so, the Chinese government extended the franchise to overseas Chinese. Surprisingly, this meant that Chinese migrants all over the world could become lawmakers in the National Assembly (*zhonghua minguo guohui*) in the same way as normal Chinese nationals, as long as they met the bare minimum requirements. Tong King Chong won the national election and acquired the status of overseas Chinese assemblyman (*huaqiao yiyuan*). “[My] overseas brethren, if you want to propose something to the National Assembly, I am glad to introduce it to the best of my ability,” he said to his Chinese co-ethnics in San Francisco on May 18, 1913, by telegram. His mission in Peking was to represent the interests of his Chinese fellows in U.S. and bring the matter to debate in the National Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

This essay explores the engagement of U.S.-based Chinese migrants with homeland politics in 1912-1914 by examining the overseas Chinese franchise (*huaqiao canzhengquan*), the political rights of Chinese migrants to participate in parliamentary politics in China. As the historian Yinghui Li has pointed out, enfranchising overseas nationals was unprecedented in human migration history.<sup>2</sup> Given that traditional Chinese beliefs had long stigmatized Chinese migrants as “abandoned people,” this development also marked a watershed for overseas Chinese in terms of inclusion in the ancestral nation. Chinese migrants worldwide would continue to exercise their right to pursue their own interests when parliamentary politics operated in Mainland China throughout the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>3</sup> Despite its innovation and significance, the overseas Chinese franchise has been understudied. Previous scholarly works, mostly published in Chinese, have explored the factors that enabled this enfranchisement in the early Republic of China. The prevailing view is that the Overseas Chinese Federation (*huaqiao lianhehui*) played a crucial role in lobbying activities, and the primary motivation for enactment was the Chinese government’s expectations for overseas Chinese financial support for state-building in exchange for the franchise.<sup>4</sup> While these insights

are important, some questions remain unanswered. The overseas Chinese enfranchisement allowed six overseas Chinese to become assemblymen in the 1913 national election, with three of them having close ties to U.S. territory.<sup>5</sup> What was debated among Chinese immigrant communities in the U.S. leading up to the national election? What did these three assemblymen attempt to achieve in the National Assembly?

Chinese immigrants' commitments to the national election and the campaign promise revolved around the U.S.'s racism-driven discriminatory treatment of Chinese. This article argues that overseas Chinese migrants' first-ever experience in transition from non-state actors to potential state actors made possible their intervention in the U.S.-Sino relations. In doing so, they used republican ideology as a common ground to better bridge U.S.-Sino relations. This argument has relevance in understanding the intersection of *transnational* and *international* in the scholarship of (Chinese) migration history.<sup>6</sup> Chinese American historians have delved into how transnational movements of human bodies, ideas, goods, capital, and institutions across the Pacific shaped Chinese migrants' experiences.<sup>7</sup> Yet, this does not mean international relations—inter-state orders handled by state actors such as politicians or diplomats—lost their analytical significance. Broadly speaking, migrants were well aware of the potency of international relations in terms of their welfare in the interest of their host country and their ancestral nation. The lobby activities by Jewish people, Koreans, and Cubans—the list goes on and on—are examples of migrants' engagement in U.S. foreign relations.<sup>8</sup> Chinese migrants were no exception. Overseas Chinese enfranchisement institutionally enabled Chinese migrants to be state actors of China and affect their homeland government's policymaking toward the U.S., rather than just accepting ready-made U.S.-Sino relations from above. As detailed later, the stakeholders for Chinese in the U.S. articulated republicanism as a symbol of U.S.-Sino affinity in the process of exercising their overseas Chinese franchise.

However, U.S.-Sino bilateral relations do not suffice to account for Chinese migrants' worldview that led to their acquisition of the franchise. Their actions and discourse point to the fact that they recognized a great power as their strategical reference point—namely, Japan. This article thus situates Chinese migrants in U.S.-China-Japan relations that can be called inter-imperial relations. Augusto Espiritu asserts that inter-imperial relations

of cooperation, competition, and conflict between empires in the Asia Pacific world shaped the Asian American experience. In his view, overseas Asians recognized that their stance for or against the Japanese empire had a vital impact upon their social standing in the American racial configuration and that, at the same time, the American empire's support was crucial to the success or failure of their homeland's national (or imperial) projects.<sup>9</sup> It seems to me that empire as an analytical framework that came into use in trans-pacific history tends to focus on Japanese migrant-settlers, colonial subjects, and Pacific Islanders.<sup>10</sup> Yet, the U.S.-Japan inter-imperial relation more broadly overshadowed other historical actors, including Chinese migrants.<sup>11</sup> As Walter LaFeber and Akira Iriye emphasize, U.S.-Japan relations in the first half of the twentieth century were centered on the China issue between the U.S.'s open door policy and Japan's continental policy since the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>12</sup> This essay demonstrates that Chinese migrants were conscious of this international order and attempted to alter U.S.-Sino relations by emulating U.S.-Japan relations.

Along with this framework, my research largely relies on Chinese-language primary sources. The crucial information for my analysis more often appears in Chinese than in English-language documents. This article could not offer fresh insights into Chinese migrants' devotion to the homeland politics around 1913 without their community newspapers, Chinese government's records, and other publications in mainland China. The outstanding advantage of making use of these sources is that they reflect the voice of Chinese migrants from their own perspective. Under the circumstance where Chinese migrants at that time, most of whom were first-generation, had no high level of English proficiency, Chinese as their mother tongue functioned as the space in which Chinese immigrants could share and disperse key information among their fellows.

### **Chinese Migrants in the Pacific at the Turn of the Twentieth Century**

Chinese immigration to the U.S., beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, reflected the global affairs of the time. America's westward

expansion, accompanying the Mexican American War, paved the way for the discovery of gold mines in Northern California in 1848. The news of the Gold Rush spread worldwide and attracted Chinese locals in the Pearl River Delta, Canton. The fact that Euro-American businessmen and missionaries who were stationed there brought the information implies Western power's intrusion into China, conditioned by the Qing government's loss in the Opium Wars. Driven by economic, social, and political unrest, Chinese headed for California, leaving their families at home. During the Gold Rush period, mining was their major occupation. The U.S.'s burgeoning capitalism continued to attract Chinese laborers as a substitute for black slaves. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868, signed by the U.S. and the Qing governments in the wake of the Civil War, further boosted Chinese migration. Their workplaces increasingly expanded to include the railroad, the factory, the cannery, and so on. Leland Stanford, an entrepreneur engaged in the Transcontinental Railroad project, praised the industriousness of Chinese workers under the dangerous working conditions. As the railroad project came to an end, Chinese immigrants flocked to San Francisco and assisted the city's industries, such as shoes, textiles, and cigars. While San Francisco became the hub of the Chinese community in the U.S., they spread across other West Coast states, the East Coast, the Midwest, and the South to seek economic opportunities.<sup>13</sup>

The growing presence of Chinese immigrants induced anti-Chinese sentiments and movements. As early as 1850, California legislated a foreign miner's tax that implicitly targeted the Chinese. The California Supreme Court ruled in 1854 that Chinese, African Americans, and Native Americans held no rights to give testimony in court when involving a white person. The anti-Chinese movements became a dominant force in California by the 1870s. Denis Kearny (1847-1907), a leader of the Workingmen's Party of California, addressed economic insecurity that could be induced by competition with Chinese workers. Not only the economic and cultural threat, but also white Americans' sexual anxiety with regards to Chinese women contributed to Sinophobia, leading to the enactment of the Page Act (1875), a federal law banning Asian women suspected of prostitution from entering the U.S. Anti-Chinese discrimination culminated in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. This first federal immigration law banned a specific immigration group based on race, prohibiting the entrance of Chinese

laborers. Even after Chinese exclusion was institutionalized, anti-Chinese violence persisted in Los Angeles, Wyoming, Tacoma, and continued beyond the 1880s.<sup>14</sup> Chinese exclusion overshadowed almost every aspect of their life. Chinese became “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” Chinese children had educational opportunities but were segregated from white pupils.<sup>15</sup> By the early 1900s, Chinese immigrants in the U.S. made a living by running ethnic businesses: laundries, restaurants, and grocery stores, because of limited work opportunities.

Their on-the-ground experiences of racial discrimination directed Chinese immigrants’ eyes to the homeland politics. Behind this lay their growing worldview that the Qing government’s weak status in international relations coincided with Chinese immigrants’ miserable status in the U.S. Their hope that a strong/modernized China would uplift Chinese immigrants’ racial status engaged them with Chinese politics.<sup>16</sup> Under the rule of the Qing dynasty, the racially Manchurian and politically monarchical government, the turn of the twentieth century centered around, by and large, two political factions that rivaled each other for China’s future vision. The first was the reformist party organized by Chinese scholar-bureaucrats and intellectuals such as Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao (1873-1929) to propel constitutional monarchism. They were advocates of the reform-minded Emperor Kuang-hsu (1871-1908) to create a constitution and congress, but the attempt resulted in failure because of a coup d’état executed by the Chinese Empress Dowager. In the aftermath, Kang Youwei fled to Canada and founded the Chinese Empire Reform Association (*baohuanghui*) and branches in North America to restore the power of Emperor Kuang-hsu.<sup>17</sup> The second was the revolutionary and republican party spearheaded by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). This highly westernized man ascribed the downfall of China to the Qing government’s incompetence. His Han-race nationalism led him to organize the Revive China Society (*xingzhonghui*) in Hawaii in 1894 to overthrow the Qing government, which was later reorganized to the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (*zhongguo tongmenghui*) in Tokyo. These two parties’ political activism increasingly gained traction in overseas Chinese communities, while causing intra-community partisan division. In San Francisco, for example, the reformer’s daily organ *Mon Hing Bo* (which later changed its name to *Sai Gai Yat Po*) and the revolutionary’s *Young China* functioned as vehicles to propagate their political tenets.<sup>18</sup>

As a result of the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, the Republic of China came into being with the demise of the Qing government. In the shift from monarchy to a republican state, how to activate the congress surfaced as a crucial matter. What merits attention is the enfranchisement of overseas Chinese, which arose due to two factors. The first factor is overseas Chinese participation in local politics in the late 1900s. In order to establish a constitutional monarchy by modeling European countries and Japan in the late Qing era, the Qing government set up the advisory council (*zizhengyuan*) and local Assembly (*zhiyiju*). Some provinces, such as Canton and Fujian, granted political rights for overseas Chinese to serve as assemblymen. In fact, some Chinese from Japan and the Dutch East Indies participated in local assemblies.<sup>19</sup> The second factor is the changing legal definition of Chinese citizenship. The Manchurian government enacted the first-ever Chinese nationality law in 1909, namely the Great Qing Nationality Act. The *jus sanguinis* law automatically granted citizenship to children if their parents were Chinese. This Nationality Act became a requirement for the overseas Chinese franchise in 1912.

The overseas Chinese enfranchisement in 1912 owed its success to the activism of Chinese return migrants. Xie Bitian, a Chinese living in the Dutch East Indies, returned to China in the middle of the Xinhai Revolution and claimed the right to engage in policymaking with the Provisional Government. His attempt failed because the provisional constitution of the Republic of China did not prescribe overseas Chinese political participation in national politics. However, Xie Bitian and his fellows continued to work toward enfranchisement.<sup>20</sup> In the meantime, other return migrants, largely from Southeast Asia, formed the Overseas Chinese Federation in Shanghai to function as an intermediate association between the Republic of China and overseas Chinese communities. The purpose of the Overseas Chinese Federation was to communicate with overseas Chinese, assist in politics, economic activities, and diplomatic activities of the Republic of China, survey overseas Chinese interests, and address discrimination against Chinese in foreign countries.<sup>21</sup> The Overseas Chinese Federation contacted Xie Bitian and welcomed him as a member. They lobbied the government and influential statesmen like Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) and Li Yuanhong (1864-1928) for overseas Chinese enfranchisement.<sup>22</sup> Unlike the failed attempt during the Provisional Government, they accepted the petition, and Chinese statesmen

discussed the possibility of enactment.

The enactment of overseas Chinese enfranchisement stirred controversy, dividing the legislators into three positions: proponents, opponents, and centralists. The proponents argued that overseas Chinese should enjoy political rights because a great number of them supported the Xinhai revolution. Another reason is that enfranchising overseas Chinese could foster their “national pride.” Their economic power was also crucial; the enfranchisement could be a tool for the Chinese government to reel in financial support from overseas Chinese. The opponents first based their argument on the practical issue: how can the Chinese government manage the election outside China, not accurately grasping the demographic data of Chinese residents all over the world? Chinese migrants’ dual citizenship had the possibility to cause trouble with foreign countries. The centralists admitted that overseas Chinese could hold the right to attend the Assembly and have a say but denied overseas Chinese legislative power. In the end, the issue of overseas Chinese enfranchisement was resolved. This resolution was largely influenced by Chinese statesmen who had to weigh the benefits of overseas Chinese financial support. According to Yinghui Li, the enactment of overseas Chinese enfranchisement was due to the efforts of Chinese returnees to garner favor from officialdom, celebrities, and public opinion.<sup>23</sup>

The efforts of the Overseas Chinese Federation bore fruit with the enactment of the National Assembly Organization Act (*zhonghua minguo guohui zuzhifa*) and the Senatorial Election Act (*canyiyuan yiyuan xuanjufa*) in the summer of 1912. These acts assigned six seats to overseas Chinese congressmen in the Senate. Overall, eligibility was quite loose, as seen in no clauses regarding nationality, gender, and class. Yet, two remarkable requirements informed the qualification and election process. The first is proficiency in Chinese. The second is that overseas Chinese assemblymen had to be elected by and among the members of the Overseas Chinese Election Association (*huaqiao xuanjuhui*) located in the Chinese government. The Senatorial Election Act provided that the Association consisted of each Chinese candidate who was elected in one Chinese Chamber of Commerce (*shanghui*) authorized by the Chinese government in foreign countries. To put it differently, the electoral process was supposed to proceed as follows: each Chamber of Commerce elects and dispatches one Chinese representative; next, representatives organize the Overseas Chinese Election Association



in China; finally, they elect six assemblymen.<sup>24</sup> This meant that one foreign country could have more than two overseas Chinese assemblymen only if multiple Chinese Chambers of Commerce existed there.

### **Dispatching Representatives from the U.S. to Peking**

The news that overseas Chinese could acquire six seats in the Assembly set the Chinese immigrant community in New York and San Francisco in motion toward the national election. The Chinese Empire Reform Association recommended Chu Shao-hsin (Zhu Zhaoxin) to be their representative.<sup>25</sup> Chu Shao-hsin, a highly educated figure who graduated from the Imperial University of Peking, was staying in New York at the behest of the Qing government's board of education to pursue advanced studies and open a Chinese public school for local Chinese.<sup>26</sup> He purportedly met the requirements to run for the election. Yet, the process of the election caused disputes among the Chinese community. The local Chinese could not convince themselves that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce exclusively had the rights to engage with the election. The complaint to the effect that the candidate did not represent all Chinese in New York made sense because the Chamber of Commerce had fewer than 40 members.<sup>27</sup> Chu's status as an international student rather than an immigrant-merchant became the target of criticism along with his past pro-Qing government political stance.<sup>28</sup> Despite these issues, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of New York, a ruling local Chinese immigrant organization, admitted Chu Shao-hsin as their representative ad hoc in late October because of "financial problems" and the limited time left before the national election on December 10.<sup>29</sup>

Chinese community in San Francisco followed that of New York. The process by which Fong Ukiah (Kuang Yaojie) won the race offers an overview of how the local election played out. Fong Ukiah was born in Sacramento, California, to parents who migrated from Xinning prefecture in Canton, China. This U.S. citizen of Chinese ancestry was serving as the director of the Ning Yung Benevolent Association and the president of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association.<sup>30</sup> Since the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants had formed several associations called *huiguan*, which had roots in their ancestral hometowns for mutual help, information-

sharing, and friendship. The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association was the ruling organization that consisted of such associations to represent the interests and well-being of Chinese immigrants in the U.S., with the Ning Yung Benevolent Association constituting an integral part of their number.<sup>31</sup> This means that Fong Ukiah held a higher social status in his Chinese community.

The community election in San Francisco did not proceed as prescribed by the Senatorial Election Act because the Chinese Chamber of Commerce did not dominate the election rights as in New York. After discussions among stakeholders, they reached a procedural agreement that each benevolent association would elect one candidate respectively, and then one of the candidates would be the official representative by a majority vote under the stewardship of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association.<sup>32</sup> Following these guidelines, the Ning Yung Benevolent Association implemented its own election to choose the candidate on October 12, 1912. Three potential nominees appeared at the venue: Fong Ukiah, Ng Poon Chew (Wu Panzhao), and Liang Chaojie. The race revolved around their political stance for China. Fong Ukiah allegedly advocated republicanism, while Ng Poon Chew, a prominent Chinese immigrant leader and Christian, played an important role in shaping public opinion in the Chinese immigrant community with his politically neutral daily Chinese newspaper, *Chung Sai Yat Po*. Liang Chaojie, an editor of *Sai Gai Yat Po*, had propagated a pro-constitutional monarchy regime. The result ended with Fong Ukiah's victory.<sup>33</sup> He went to the final stage of the election, which was scheduled to be held on October 16. Six candidates, all of whom represented their own associations, joined the competition. Fong Ukiah won again and got elected as the official representative.<sup>34</sup>

The leaders of the Chinese immigrant community convened several meetings to cheer on Fong Ukiah and gave him opportunities to state his campaign promise. The conversations made by the participants are important for us to know what goals they strove to achieve by means of the overseas Chinese franchise. The Ning Yung Benevolent Association held a farewell party for Fong Ukiah on October 25. The presidents of each Chinese association, the representatives of Chinese commercial associations, and Chinese Consul General Li Yung Yew took part in the gathering. Their expectations for Fong Ukiah were high because he could have a say in the

Chinese government's policymaking if he won the coming election. Wang Jingchun, a Chinese government official staying in San Francisco to observe the venue of the Panama-Pacific International Exposition (PPIE) scheduled to be held in 1915 stated his hope for the development of U.S.-Sino relations. He said, "Americans have sympathy for the Republic of China and expect the U.S. government to acknowledge it because the U.S. government has a 'deep feeling' for China. . . . Why does the U.S. respect the Republic of China? This is because our nation overthrew the Manchurian government that stole our China and because our nation ended a thousand years of despotism. Now China has changed. You are a national of republicanism. You can fulfill the responsibility for the Republic of China by supporting Chinese government diplomacy."<sup>35</sup> Wang Jingchun was not a migrant, but this remark shows how important it was for Chinese in the U.S. to bridge U.S.-Sino relations. The rationale is built on eclecticism: Chinese as residents of republic America and as citizens of the Republic of China. Fong Ukiah, a dual citizen of the U.S. and China, had the best possibility to fulfill the mission.

Besides U.S.-Sino relations, the central concern for Chinese Americans was finding a solution to the Chinese Exclusion Act and other laws that were unfavorable to China. At a farewell party organized by the Chinese Chambers of Commerce on October 28, Wong Bock Yue, a member of the Chinese American Citizens Alliance who supported the Xinhai Revolution, voiced his complaint about the unfair treatment of Chinese laborers compared to European white laborers. Notably, he sought a resolution to immigration issues through the Japanese government's self-restriction (*zijin*), a reference to the Gentlemen's Agreement signed by Japan and the U.S. in 1907. Following the Chinese Exclusion Act, the influx of Japanese immigrants reignited racial tensions on the West Coast. When the San Francisco earthquake destroyed whole sections of the city in 1906, the Board of Education ordered all Japanese and Korean pupils to join Chinese students in the Oriental School. This incident escalated into an international problem known as the segregation of Japanese children in San Francisco.<sup>36</sup> The Japanese government protested this segregation, arguing that Japanese citizens should be treated equally with Euro-Americans. Considering Japan's geopolitical influence in East Asia and the potential threat to the Philippines, Theodore Roosevelt ordered the rescission of segregation in exchange for the Japanese government's self-regulation of immigration to the U.S.<sup>37</sup> Fong

Ukiah stated, “If I could win the election in China, I would promise to fulfill my duty and meet your expectations. I pledge to do my best to address the American laws that ban the entry of Chinese labor and tax collection because these issues concern overseas Chinese.”<sup>38</sup>

Fong Ukiah left for China on November 2, 1912, shouldering his Chinese immigrant community’s expectations.<sup>39</sup> However, the proclamation of the bylaws for Implementing the Senatorial Election Act (*canyiyuan yiyuan xuanjufa shixing xize*) in November 1912 made these preliminary local elections go back to the drawing board because it amended the existing the Senatorial Election Act.<sup>40</sup> The notable difference is that birthplace associations, *huiguan* (association of people from same region), *gongsuo* (guild), and *shubaoshe* (publishing company) each acquired the qualification to choose one representative in addition to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Behind this change lay the Overseas Chinese Federation’s claim that other overseas Chinese organizations deserved their electoral rights as well.<sup>41</sup> The age requirement and Chinese nationality further clarified the eligibility. The property provision requiring that one holds property corresponding to over 500 yuan enforced classism.<sup>42</sup> Chinese immigrant associations in the U.S. took advantage of the opportunity and dispatched their new candidates.

What merits our attention about the Chinese community in San Francisco is Tong King Chong’s entry into the election. Tong King Chong was born in Enping district, Canton. He went to the U.S. for education at the age of 13 and graduated from a law school in San Francisco. His lawyer’s license made him the earliest Chinese student in the U.S. to practice law. As he thought that, “if [one] wishes the country to make progress, the only way is reform. If [one] wishes politics to make progress, [one] needs to overthrow the imperial dominance of Manchuria-Qing Government,” he had strong complaints against the corrupted Qing dynasty. His anti-Qing sentiments paved the way for him to become a member of Chee Kung Tong, a Chinese secret society that raised the banner of “oppose Qing and revive Ming [dynasty].” He played an important role as the chief manager of Chee Kung Tong’s running *Tai Tung Yat Po* to propagate the anti-Qing revolution.<sup>43</sup>

As the days of the national election in February 1913 approached, many Chinese candidates were gathering in Peking from all over the world, ranging from Japan, Australia, British Malaya, Hong Kong, Russia, Canada,

the Philippines, Cuba, and so on. In addition to Chu Shao-hsin, Fong Ukiah, and Tong King Chong, the Chinese communities of Boston, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Maryland, etc., dispatched their candidates. Reportedly, the election faced administrative troubles stemming from the difficulty of verifying the identity of the candidates.<sup>44</sup> In the end, the six seats for overseas Chinese congressmen got split into three from Southeast Asia and three from the U.S. territory: Tong King Chong, Chu Shao-hsin, and Lu Hsin (Lu Xin). Fong Ukiah lost the game. Lu Hsin was serving as a politician of the Nanking government in 1912. This status may strike us as if he were not qualified to run for the election as an *overseas* Chinese assemblyman, but his history of working as a journalist in Hawaii and Cuba's Chinese communities allowed for his entry into the election.<sup>45</sup>

### Between U.S.-Sino Relations

The first Parliament of the Republic of China convened in Peking on April 8, 1913. A review of *the Bulletin of the House of Representatives (canyiyuan gongbao)* and other government-related publications reveals that Lu Hsin took few actions to serve the interests of Chinese in the U.S. On the other hand, Chu Shao-hsin and Tong King Chong acted on behalf of their fellow countrymen. When Chu Shao-hsin became the representative of the New York Chinese community in October 1912, he promised to solve two issues: the anti-Chinese labor treaty (*jingong tiaoyue*) and the unequal U.S.-Sino tax system. Reflecting on the history of U.S.-Sino immigration treaties, Chu Shao-hsin highlighted Chinese immigrants' bitter experiences in the detention center of Angel Island, California, such as the intrusive inspections for trachoma and hookworm.<sup>46</sup> His complaints against Chinese exclusion were followed by concerns about unfair taxation. While the Qing Government imposed no tax on imported goods from the U.S., the U.S. taxes put Chinese communities at a disadvantage. The 50-60% tax rate on goods from China and the ban on specific items, like processed meat, were examples.<sup>47</sup> Chu Shao-hsin told his co-ethnics that serving as an overseas Chinese assemblyman would enable him to negotiate with the Chinese and U.S. governments to address these issues.

Chu Shao-hsin did not directly address specific issues in the House

of Representatives but instead dedicated himself to fostering better U.S.-Sino relations. He believed that the improvement of U.S.-Sino relations would benefit Chinese immigrant communities in the long run. Despite the U.S. expansion into Central and South America and the Pacific Islands, Chu Shao-hsin perceived the U.S. as a “world peace”—oriented state, unlike certain European countries that preyed on China. Notably, the U.S. government had returned the indemnity owed by China for the Boxer uprising in 1900-1901, demonstrating diplomatic tolerance that convinced Chu Shao-hsin that an alliance with the U.S. was the best strategy for China’s survival in the world. Chu Shao-hsin’s rhetoric of a “sister republics of East and West in the Pacific” reflected his positive view and reliance on the U.S. He proposed that the Chinese government dispatch envoys to the U.S. to officially recognize revolutionary China over the Manchurian government and express gratitude for the approval of the Republic of China. Sixty-six assemblymen, including Tong King Chong, supported Chu Shao-hsin’s proposal by signing their joint names. Despite this support, the proposal ultimately did not receive official sanction. This was partly because Chinese government took the position that Brazil had recognized the Republic of China first and the diplomatic protocol for expressing the gratitude should begin with Brazil, rather than the U.S.<sup>48</sup>

Here, we can tell that “republic” or “republicanism” appeared in the remarks or writings by Chinese who had connections to the U.S. This indicates that the stakeholders for Chinese migrants in the U.S. used republicanism as a language to emphasize the common ground of the U.S. and China, despite the different connotation. As Gordon S. Wood set forth, the underlying belief of American republicanism was egalitarian politics embodied by virtuous, independent (or individual), and property-holding citizens who were willing to sacrifice their private and selfish interests for the good of the whole community.<sup>49</sup> By comparison, republicanism that Chinese intellectuals and activists envisioned around the turn of the twentieth century was elite-minded. Whether Sun Yat-sen-lead revolutionaries or constitutional monarchists such as Liang Qichao, they understood republicanism as an opposite concept to hereditary monarchy but also assumed that the general Chinese public was incapable of collective and public-oriented activities because under the influence of Confucian values, the basic unit of the Chinese public sphere was families rather than individuals.<sup>50</sup> While supposedly knowing the difference

between what republicanism meant in the U.S. and China, Chinese who represented their co-ethnics in the U.S. and hoped for better U.S.-Sino relations symbolically pushed forward republican ideology.

It might be Tong King Chong who most eloquently spoke on behalf of Chinese immigrants, although he seemingly did not make active remarks in the Assembly. Two matters occupied the central position in Tong King Chong's mind. The first is the request for the Republic of China to prepare for the PPIE, scheduled to be held in San Francisco in 1916. The PPIE was a local- and state-sponsored world fair commemorating the opening of the Panama Canal and the 400th anniversary of the discovery of the Pacific Ocean. The city leaders and local entrepreneurs discussed this project as early as 1904. Since the 1906 earthquake hit San Francisco, the expo carried the meaning of lauding the city's recovery from the devastation. San Francisco's businessmen and federal politicians thought that hosting the PPIE would be an integral step toward strengthening commercial relationships with Asia. China and Japan's participation was therefore much in demand.<sup>51</sup> Since the underway PPIE project garnered attention among local Chinese, they might expect Tong King Chong to play the role of gaining backing from the Chinese government.<sup>52</sup> The Republic of China's dedication to the PPIE was crucial for Tong King Chong from the standpoint of industry and national pride.<sup>53</sup> Since the PPIE was supposed to function as the key site where China and the U.S. as the states of "material civilization" exchange products, it would offer a good opportunity to showcase how much Chinese industry had developed.<sup>54</sup> The Chinese government's ill-preparedness meant that the Chinese immigrant communities would lose face if China's exhibition gave the impression of China's backwardness to the visitors.

In Tong King Chong's proposition for China to make ready for the PPIE, he mentioned Japan's participation in St. Louis Exposition (1904) as a model-cum-precedent. "At the time of the Japan-Russo War in A.D. 1904, while Japan and Russia were preparing for the war, they were preparing for the St. Louis Exposition. [Japan] took the balance well and thereby became rich and strong in the end. This is a precedent that we can emulate," he wrote.<sup>55</sup> Japan's engagement in the St. Louis Exposition was the product of U.S.-Japanese racial rivalry and geopolitical cooperation. The large factor that made the U.S. invite Japan was to maintain amicable relations against the backdrop of Japanese exclusion on the West Coast. For Theodore Roosevelt's

administration, hurting the feelings of the Japanese government as to the race issue would just heighten the tension in East Asia. For the Japanese government's part, joining the Expo played the role of boosting the sales of Japanese goods in the U.S. and maintaining cooperative relations with the U.S. on China issues vis-à-vis other European powers, especially Russia.<sup>56</sup> The Japanese government's method of commitment to St. Louis Expo struck Tong King Chong as better than that of the Qing government. When the Qing officials joined the Expo, it ended in an epic failure because the government officials in charge were not the right staff and because the low-quality exhibition caused ridicule from the audience. The humiliating and shameful memory lingered in Chinese immigrant communities in America.<sup>57</sup>

The second matter that Tong King Chong addressed was the U.S.'s race issue. Overseas Chinese seemed pitiful to Tong King Chong because their sojourner position made them curry favor with foreign locals to make a living. He attributed the miserable status of Chinese immigrants to the absence of overseas settler ideology (*haiwai zhimin sixiang*) in China.<sup>58</sup> Tong King Chong's racial worldview was evident from his question: "How can the yellow race(s) survive in the white race-dominated world?" Even when discussing the PPIE, he employed racial language: "the day will never come when the yellow race will extend their influence and resist the white race unless [we] investigate the economic trend from the global perspective."<sup>59</sup> To be more specific in this context, "extend the influence" meant to enhance China's economic status in the world and strengthen U.S.-Sino relations. It follows from this logic that Chinese immigrants would no longer have to endure racial discrimination if China could maintain better relations with the U.S. through participation in the PPIE. Since Tong King Chong had connections to influential merchant groups in San Francisco that occupied the organizing committee of the PPIE and lobbied the U.S. government to approve the Republic of China, he believed that China-friendly Americans would help end Chinese exclusion as China and the U.S. moved toward more amicable relations.<sup>60</sup>

He proposed another solution to racial discrimination, suggesting that the Republic of China dispatch new and capable diplomats to the U.S. The first few years following the inauguration of the Republic of China presented the best opportunity to renegotiate existing anti-Chinese treaties signed by the Qing government. Tong King Chong stated, "If [we] get



the new envoys to fairly negotiate with the U.S. to revise [discriminatory treaties], Chinese in the U.S. will naturally enjoy the due rights and receive legitimate protection.”<sup>61</sup> He drew this inspiration from the Japanese government’s approach to dealing with the U.S. racism. He knew that Japanese diplomat Sutemi Chinda vehemently protested the ongoing attempts by white Californians to legislate anti-Japanese laws, such as the Alien Land Law (1913). Tong King Chong believed that the Republic of China could protest the U.S.’s racial exclusion, similarly, emphasizing the common heritage of Japanese and Chinese as people of the same continent and race. His statement, “our country has to model itself after the front-running car” indicates that Japan served as a reference point for China in addressing race-related issues.<sup>62</sup>

Unluckily, their role as overseas Chinese assemblymen was abruptly terminated when the National Assembly dissolved on January 10, 1914, by the order of Yuan Shikai, who sought to establish his dictatorship. Considering that the Chinese government participated in PPIE with better preparation than in previous international expositions, Tong King Chong’s efforts might have paid off.<sup>63</sup> Yet, issues related to taxes did not seem to progress, and the most crucial problem of Chinese exclusion remained unsolved. The first-ever participation of overseas Chinese in homeland politics by means of overseas Chinese franchise came to a halt halfway through.

## Conclusion

For a fuller understanding of the overseas Chinese franchise that was set into motion in the early 1910s, this article analyzed the vision of Chinese migrants in the U.S. as they engaged with parliamentary politics in the Republic of China. Previous research often focused on the institutionalization of overseas Chinese franchise in the Chinese government, neglecting the perspectives of overseas Chinese themselves. With the enactment of overseas Chinese enfranchisement in 1912, Chinese migrants in San Francisco and New York initiated community elections to select representatives for the national election scheduled to be held in Peking in 1913. The interest of Chinese immigrants in overseas Chinese franchise was rooted in their

national and political sense of belonging to China, developed in response to racial exclusion in the U.S. since the late nineteenth century. The pursuit by U.S.-based Chinese to become overseas Chinese assemblymen is itself an indicator of a strong connection to their ancestral nation. At the core of these transnational political activities always lay concerns about socio-legal status and living conditions in the U.S. Those representing the interests of Chinese America sought to protect their fellow ethnics from discriminatory treatment by intervening in U.S.-Sino relations, while also monitoring Japan's growing presence in the Asia-Pacific.

### Notes

1. Qiongzhang Tang, "Shenxuan zhumeigongshi bing gaipai gongshi fenzhu mogumiguo zhi yijianshu" [My opinion: cautiously choose a minister of the United States and renewedly dispatch the minister to Mexico, Cuba, and Peru] in *Minguo jingshi wenbian: neizheng/waijiao* [Collection of administration of affairs: domestic affairs and diplomacy], ed. Yun-long Chen (Shanghai: Jingshi wenhuashe, 1970): 2683-90; "Tang Qiongzhang zhi zhonghua shanghui gonghan" [Tong King Chong's open letter to Chinese Chamber of Commerce], *The Young China*, June 12, 1913.
2. Yinghui Li, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzu zhuyi, yijiuier-yijiusijiu* [The origins of overseas Chinese nationalism, 1912-1949] (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1997), 148.
3. On the historical overview of overseas Chinese participation in parliamentary politics in China, see Jiancheng Yang, *Huaqiao canzhengquan zhi yanjiu: Zhonghua minguo qiaojū guowai guomin dui zuguo zheng zhi canyu shili zhi tongji fenxi* [Study on overseas Chinese franchise: statistical analysis of political participation in homeland by the Republic of China's nationals living overseas] (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1992).
4. Siyun Xia, "Minchu huaqiaolianhehui shulun" [The federation of overseas Chinese in early republican China], *Huaqiaohuaren lishiyanjiu* 2, (2009): 36-44; Yugen Du, "Lun huaqiaolianhehui de chuangujian ji qilishi zuoyong" [Discussion on the making of overseas Chinese federation and the historical role], *Suzhoudaxue xuebao* 1, (2003): 105-9; Yang Lu, "Minguoshiqi huaqiaoyiyuan xuanjuzhidu ji shijianjianxi" [Analysis of election system and its practice by overseas Chinese in the time of Republic of China (1911-1949)], *Dongnanya yanjiu* 2 (2015): 98-106; Huiyue Ma, "Minguoshiqi huaqiao daiyiquan lifawenti chutan" [Research on the electoral law of overseas Chinese in the period of the republic], *Dongfang luntan* 3 (2014): 25-30; Saiqun Zhang, "Jindai huaqiao guonei canzhengyi zheng tantao" [Analysis of modern overseas Chinese franchise and the discussion of government], *Bagui qiaokan* 3 (2006): 41-47.
5. Kaori Shinozaki discusses one of the elected overseas Chinese assemblymen. Kaori Shinozaki, "Chūkaminokoku no seiritsu to Penan no kajin: ekkyō o ikiru tame no fukusū no ba niokeru seiji sankā" [The birth of the Republic of China and Penan Chinese: political participation in multiple places to survive transnationally], *Chiiki kenkyū* 14, no.2 (2014): 178-98.
6. The definition of *transnational* as the adjective of transnationalism is based on the view addressed by

- Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton. Transnationalism is the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations—familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political, that span borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, and feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, “Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 645, no.1 (1992): 1-2.
7. Madeline Yuan-yin Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and South China, 1882-1943* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000); Yong Chen, “Understanding Chinese American Transnationalism during the Early Twentieth Century: An Economic Perspective,” in *Chinese American Transnationalism: The Flow of People, Resources, and Ideas between China and America during the Exclusion Era*, ed. Sucheng Chan, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006); Hima Mark Lai, *Chinese American Transnational Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010); Haiming Liu, *The Transnational History of a Chinese Family: Immigrant Letters, Family Business, and Reverse Migration* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005). On related Japanese language scholarship, Setsuko Sonoda, *Nanboku amerika kamin to kindai chūgoku: 19 seiki toransunashonaru maigurēshon* [Overseas Chinese in the Americas and modern China: transnational migration in the nineteenth century] (Tokyo: Tōkyōdaigakushuppankai, 2009).
  8. For example, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Farrar, New York: Straus and Giroux, 2007); Hideaki Kami, *Diplomacy Meets Migration: US Relations with Cuba during the Cold War* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Richard S. Kim, *The Quest for Statehood: Korean Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty, 1905-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
  9. Augusto Espritu, “Inter-Imperial Relations, the Pacific and Asian American History,” *Pacific Historical Review* 83, no.2 (2014): 238-41.
  10. For example, Eiichiro Azuma, *In search of our Frontier: Japanese America and Settler Colonialism in the Construction of Japan’s Borderless Empire* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019); Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Jordan Sand, Eiichiro Azuma, Katherine Benton-Cohen, Takashi Fujitani, David A. Chang, Jun Uchida & Paul A. Kramer, “Pacific Empires Working Group Forum,” *Amerasia Journal* 42, no.3 (2016): 1-41. Seema Sohi discusses Hindu migrants in North America in the British-U.S. inter-imperial context. Seema Sohi, *Echoes of Mutiny: Race, Surveillance, and Indian Anticolonialism in North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
  11. By connecting Chinese migration history with Asia-Pacific international context, my research will also contribute to the burgeoning research field of global Asia, which decentralizes the Euro-American centric view of world history from the viewpoint of Asian studies. Global Asia brings various Asia-oriented fields and disciplines—history and literature, Asia and Asian America, East and South, modern and premodern—closer together. Tina Chen and Eric Hayot, “Introducing *Verge*: What Does It Mean to Study Global Asias,” *Verge: Studies in Global Asias* 1, no.1 (Spring 2015): vi-xv.
  12. Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (Chicago: Imprint

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- Publications, 1992); Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
13. Erika Lee, *The Making of Asian America: A History* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2021), 59-79.
  14. *Ibid.*, 89-103.
  15. Joyce Kuo, "Excluded, Segregated and Forgotten: A Historical View of the Discrimination of Chinese Americans in Public Schools," *Asian American Law Journal* 5, no.1 (1998): 181-212.
  16. Lai, *Chinese American Transnational Politics*, 11.
  17. *Ibid.*, 10-13. On more detailed portrayal of these two parties' activities, see L. Eve Armentrout Ma, *Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990).
  18. On the history of Chinese immigrant community's publications, Him Mark Lai, "The Chinese American Press," in *The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook*, ed. Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 27-43.
  19. Zhang, "Jindai huaqiao guonei canzhengyi zheng tantao," 42.
  20. Ma, "Minguoshiqi huaqiao daiyiquan lifawenti chutan," 25-27; Du, "Lun huaqiaolianhehui de chuangujian ji qilishi zuoyong," 106.
  21. "Wu Shirong deng zuzhi huaqiao lianhehui qingqiu lian chengji neiwubuyu," [The request of Wu Shirong etc.—organized overseas Chinese federation for legislation to the ministry of internal affairs] in *Zhonghua minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian daierji*, [Collection of the Republic of China's historical archives (2)] ed. Zhongguo dier lishi dangangan (Jiangsu: Jiangsu renminchubanshe, 1981), 20-23.
  22. *Ibid.*
  23. Li, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzu zhuyi, yijiyier-yijiusijiu*, 154.
  24. "Zhonghua minguo guohui zuzhifa" [The National Assembly Organization Act], *Shenbao*, August 21, 1912; "canyiyuan yiyuan xuanjufa" [The Senatorial Election Act], *Shenbao*, August 13, 1912.
  25. "Baohuanghuidang yundong pai Zhu Zhaoxin wei guohuixuanju daibiao zhi yifang" [We should prevent Chinese empire reform association to campaign to dispatch Chu Shao-hsin to be our representative for national election], *The Young China*, October 6, 1912.
  26. Chih-hsiang Hoh, *Whos' Who in China: Containing the Pictures and Biographies of China's Best Known Political, Financial, Business and Professional Men* (Shanghai: The China Weekly Review, 1931), 229-30.
  27. "Niuyue huaqiao fankang shanghai xuandaibiao dian" [Telegram of New York Chinese to oppose Chinese Chamber of Commerce electing our representative for national election], *The Young China*, October 24, 1912.
  28. "Baohuanghuidang yundong pai Zhu Zhaoxin wei guohuixuanju daibiao zhi yifang."
  29. "Niuyue xuanjuhui daibiao yi juding" [New York Chinese election committee has already elected the representative], *The Young China*, October 27, 1912.
  30. "Ningyang juchu meiqiao houxuan daibiao" [The Ning Yung Benevolent Association elected the representative of Chinese in America], *The Young China*, October 13, 1912.
  31. Him Mark Lai, "The Historical Development of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association/Huiguan System," *Chinese America, History and Perspectives* 1 (1987): 13.

32. “Xuanju huaqiao guohuixuanju daibiao zhi banfa” [Method to elect and dispatch our Chinese representative to national election], *The Young China*, October 9, 1912; “Siyi shanghui yian” [Agendas of Sze Yup chamber of commerce], *The Young China*, October 11, 1912.
33. “Ningyang juchu meiqiao houxuan daibiao.”
34. “Kuang Yaojie jun huoxuan wei huaqiao daibiao” [Mr. Fong Ukiah won the competition to be our representative], *The Young China*, October 17, 1912.
35. “Ningyang zujian Kuang daibiao jisheng” [The Ning Yung Benevolent Association’s farewell to Fong Ukiah was lively], *The Young China*, October 26, 1912.
36. Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 31-45. For more detailed explanation on this incident, see Mari Kagawa, *San Furanshisuko ni okeru Nihonjin gakudō kakuri mondai* [The segregation issues of Japanese children in San Francisco] (Tōkyō: Ronsōsha, 1999).
37. Lafeber, *The Clash*, 87-92.
38. “Huashangzonghui zujian Kuang daibiao jisheng” [Farewell of Chinese Chamber of Commerce to Fong Ukiah was lively], *The Young China*, October 29, 1912.
39. “Song Kuang daibiao guiguo” [Dispatch our representative Fong to China], *The Young China*, November 2, 1912.
40. Ibid.
41. Liu, *Huaqiao canzhengquan quanan*, 67-71.
42. Ibid., 83-84.
43. Fang Sun and Xuhua Liu, *Haiwai Hongmen yu xinhai geming: wai yi zhong, Xinhai geming shiqi Hongmen renwu zhuangao* [Overseas Hongmen and the Xinhai revolution: appendix: special essays on Hongmen figures during the Xinhai revolution] (Beijing: Zhongguo zhigong chubanshe, 2011), 273-76.
44. “Xu huaqiao xuanju ji” [Note on Chinese election (2)], *Bincheng Xinbao*, April 8, 1913; “Xu huaqiao xuanju ji” [Note on Chinese election (3)], *Bincheng Xinbao*, April 9, 1913; “Xu huaqiao xuanju ji” [Note on Chinese election (4)], *Bincheng Xinbao*, April 9, 1913.
45. Youchun Xu, *Minguo renwu dacidian* [Major dictionary of figures of the Republic of China] (Yangzhou: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1991), 2596; Ma, *Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns*, 119-22. The primary sources referenced in this article are largely Chinese community periodicals from mainland America. Further archival research in Hawaii and Cuba is needed to uncover the reasons behind why Chinese communities in those regions dispatched Lu Hsin as their representative. This task will be pursued in the future.
46. Zhu Zhaoxin, “Huaqiao xuanjuhui niuyue daibiao: Zhu Zhaoxin’s Declaration” [The representative of New York Chinese election committee], *The Young China*, October 28, 1912.
47. Zhu Zhaoxin, “Huaqiao xuanjuhui niuyue daibiao: Zhu Zhaoxin’s Declaration (2)” [The representative of New York Chinese Election Committee], *The Young China*, October 29, 1912.
48. “Meiguo chengren minguo ying xianpai zhuanshi fumei daxie jianyan” [Proposition that our government should first dispatch the mission to express gratitude for America’s approval of the Republic of China], *The Young China*, August 5, 1913; “Guowuyuan zifu bu chengren Zhu yiyuan Zhaoxin deng qianpai zhuanshi fumei zhixie jianyan zhi liyouwen” [The reason why the State Council does not approve the assemblyman Chu Shao-hsin’s proposition that Chinese government dispatch special envoy to the United States to

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49. Gordon S. Wood, "Republicanism," in Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, ed. *The Reader's Companion to American History* (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 930-31.
  50. Guantao Jin and Qingfeng Liu, "From 'Republicanism' to 'Democracy': China's Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924)," *History of Political Thought* 26, no.3 (Autumn 2005): 467-501; Leigh K. Jenco, "Chinese Political Ideologies," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. Michael Freedman and Marc Stears (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013), 649.
  51. Abigail M. Markwyn, *Empress San Francisco: The Pacific Rim, the Great West, and California at the Panama-Pacific International Exposition* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 1-16; William Lipsky, *San Francisco's Panama-Pacific International Exposition* (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 2005), 7-8.
  52. "China Is to Have Great Exhibit at Exposition," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 25, 1912.
  53. *Ibid.*
  54. *Ibid.*
  55. Qiongchang Tang, "Canyiyuan Tang Qiongchang wei Banama bolanhui shishang dazongtong shu" [Tong King Chong's petition to the president about the Panama-Pacific International Exposition], *Xiehebao*, October 28, 1913.
  56. There are many scholarly works in Japanese and English that discuss Japan's participation in St. Louis Exposition. For the one that highlights the dimension of U.S.-Japan relations, see Eriko Kato, "Sentoruisu Bankokuhakurankai niokeru Nichi Bei kankei: seiki tenkanki no Nichi Bei no gaikōteki ito ni chakumokushite" [Japan-U.S. relations in St. Louis Expo: With a focus on diplomatic intensions of Japan and the U.S. at the turn of the century], *Ochanomizu shigaku* 61 (March 2018): 1-38.
  57. *Ibid.*
  58. Tang, "Canyiyuan Tang Qiongchang wei Banama bolanhui shishang dazongtong shu" [Tong King Chong's petition to the president about the Panama-Pacific International Exposition], *Xiehebao*.
  59. *Ibid.*
  60. Tang, "Canyiyuan Tang Qiongchang wei Banama bolanhui shishang dazongtong shu" [Tong King Chong's petition to the president about the Panama-Pacific International Exposition], *Shenbao*, June 9, 1913. Tong King Chong mentions the American merchant groups as "the Western Chamber of Commerce (*xi shanghui*)." The association supposedly refers to the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce.
  61. Tang, "Shenxuan zhumeigongshi bing gaipai gongshi fen Zhu mogumiguo zhi yijianshu," 2683-90.
  62. *Ibid.*, 2689.
  63. Min Ma, "Youguan Banama taipingyang bolanhui de jidian buchong" [Some complements to the Panama-Pacific International Exposition], *Jindaishi Yanjiu* 4 (1999): 206-10.