Haruo Iguchi*

SUMMARY IN JAPANESE: エルバート・トーマス(Elbert Thomas)は、1933年から1951年までユタ州選出の連邦上院議員(民主党)であった。当時の連邦議会には中国通のウォルター・ジャッド(Walter Judd)下院議員と元大学教員(東アジア史)のマイク・マンスフィールド(Mike Mansfield)下院議員のうち上院議員、駐日大使)がいたが、当時の議会では東アジア情勢に詳しい議員はこの3人しかいなかった。彼らのうち、トーマスが最も注目された政治家であり、また、米国の東アジア政策をめぐる議論で足跡を残したのであった。トーマスは、日露戦争直後にモルモン教の宣教師として妻とともに来日し、6年ほどの滞在中に日本社会に溶け込んだのであった。トーマスとその白人の妻は日本で生まれた長女にチヨという日本人名をつけたのであった。トーマスは帰国後、上院議員になるまでの時期の大半をユタ大学で東アジア研究の教授として教鞭をとっていた。

本論文は、トーマスの日米関係、太平洋戦争、対日原爆投下、対日占領に対する考えを、太平洋戦争に看護婦として従軍した娘チヨとの書簡、トーマス文書、トーマスの著書、演説そして論評を通じて考察したり、分析を行う。トーマスは、日米関係が悪化している1930年代前半軍拡競争ではなく日米文化交流の活性化を推進すべきであると提唱したり、対日原爆投下直後に原爆使用の意味を歴史的洞察力に富んだ論文で考察して

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本論文の構想は、フルブライト研究費の期間中に描かれ、論文執筆は科学研究費基盤研究Cの下で行われた。
Virtuallly forgotten in U.S.-Japan relations is Elbert Duncan Thomas (1883-1953) who served as the U.S. Senator from Utah from 1933 to 1951. During The Second World War Thomas served as a member of the influential Senate Steering Committee, Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor and a ranking member of the Military Affairs Committee. Thomas was instrumental in the establishment of the War Labor Board that mediated wartime disputes between industry and labor. He sponsored the GI Bill of Rights whose passage by Congress in 1943 enabled thousands of returning soldiers to attend colleges and universities in the postwar years. As a scholar he was Vice President of the American Society of International Law and Chairman of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Commission. Thomas’s thoughts and activities deserve a historical analysis in order to better understand American thinking and actions about the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This article will present and analyze his relations with Japan from his missionary years to the time of his untimely death in February 1953 from pulmonary infarction. Thomas’s observations of Japan and East Asia were deeply rooted in his experience in Japan as a Mormon missionary. His perception of Japan and the Japanese reflected humanitarianism and missionary internationalism that overlapped with Wilsonian internationalism. During the Pacific War, Thomas supported the policy advocated by Joseph Grew in the State Department to use the Emperor to induce Japan to surrender. He favored modifying the demand for unconditional surrender by Japan and was critical of the usage of atomic weapons against Japan. In the immediate aftermath of Japan’s surrender Thomas advocated what Nobel laureate P. M. S. Blackett would plead for a few years after him—the need for nuclear arms control. By
1948 Thomas argued that atomic weapons were not the main factor in inducing Japan’s surrender.

**Childhood, Mormon Missionary, and University of Utah**

Thomas’s obituary in *Time* magazine noted that the Senator from Utah would doodle in Japanese. His Japan experience had a deep impact on his view of Japan and the Japanese.

Born in Salt Lake City in 1883 to Mormon parents who had immigrated from England, Thomas received his education in the city’s public schools before attending the University of Utah. Upon graduation Thomas married Edna Harker, a fellow Mormon. As a young man, Thomas was restless and wished to travel overseas. Such an opportunity came in 1907.¹

In 1901, when Japan was in midst of a Christian religious revival, the Mormon Church began its mission. The Mormons had encountered the Japanese for the first time when the Iwakura mission made a brief stop in Salt Lake City in the early 1870s.

American missionaries of various Christian sects and denominations, particularly American Protestant missionaries, were very active in the Near East and the Far East from the 1880s to the 1920s in spreading their gospel. In the Far East these Protestant missionaries established their churches in China, Korea and Japan. Because the Qing dynasty pursued an anti-Christian policy, American missionaries cultivated ties to non-governmental groups, including rebellious groups such as those who led the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864). Among the notable missionaries in China was Henry W. Luce, a Yale graduate who promoted the YMCA as a member of the Student Volunteers Movement. After receiving his Bachelor of Divinity from Princeton Theological Seminary, Luce went to China in 1897 with his wife, a staffer at the Young Women’s Christian Association in his hometown of Scranton, Pennsylvania, as missionary educators at the first Christian college established in that country in Tengchow by a famous American missionary, Dr. Calvin Mateer. Henry W. Luce’s son, Henry R. Luce, born in 1898, launched a publishing enterprise in 1921 which became the Time-Life empire and was an influential member of the Republican internationalists and pro-KMT China lobby. In Korea, a Protestant minister, Horace Allen, who arrived in Seoul in 1884 as a secretary to the American legation there, later rose to the top position...
of minister to the Hermit Kingdom and won the confidence of the Korean King, a trust that permitted him to not only spread the word of God but more importantly win various mining and other economic concessions for American economic interests until the State Department relieved him of his duties in 1905. In Japan, various Christian churches were established after the government’s decision in 1873 to abolish the 250-odd year ban on Christianity. The promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 further encouraged Christianity as the document protected freedom of religion. The Mormons ran their mission in Japan from 1901 to 1924 and after closing it for over twenty years because of language and cultural difficulties, reopened it in the aftermath of the Pacific War.

The opening of the Mormon mission in 1901 was led by Apostle (later President of the Mormon Church) Heber J. Grant and three Mormon colleagues. The departure of young newlyweds for Japan were “blessed” by Grant and a junior apostle (later the President of the Mormon Church), George Albert Smith. Grant ordained Thomas to be a Seventy prior to Thomas’s departure for Japan. In Japan, Thomas worked hard with his wife to become part of Japanese society. Thomas promoted baseball in Japan, including a game between American sailors, whose ships made a stopover in Yokohama, and the Waseda University baseball team that had beaten the University of Utah baseball team during their American tour. Thomas also participated in baseball games between Americans and Japanese as well as among Americans so as to get to know not only Japanese citizens but also American missionaries, teachers, ministers and soldiers. The efforts of Thomas and his wife in Japan are well reflected in their letters and diaries. Thomas witnessed the visit of President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet. He also witnessed Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910. By then, Thomas was the head of the Mormon mission in Japan; as an ambitious leader of his Mission, “pride” tempted him to annex the Mormon mission in Korea to be part of the Japan mission but he was glad in retrospect that he was cool enough to keeping the two missions separate.²

In 1911 Thomas was invited with other leaders of all the religious sects in Japan for a conference in which the Minister of Interior asked them to help formulate “a national religion” for the development of Japanese nationalism. As he recalled years later, his “answer was the same as most of the Christian, Jewish, and Mohhammedian answers would have been, dominated by the concept of revelation which [sic] concept, of course, the Japanese Minister did not understand. ‘Our religion is not made by man but by God. We believe that our religion
is the best religion for the Japanese people. Therefore, we can take no part in trying to work out another.”

Although the Mormons seemed to have shunned actively cultivating ties to powerful figures as Allen did in Korea, Thomas did approach such figures. One of the first persons whom he contacted was by accident. Shortly after his arrival in Japan, he walked through a neighborhood and decided to visit the biggest house which turned out to be the residence of Prince Iesato Tokugawa; Thomas handed the servant who answered a translated book of the brief history of the Mormons. Later in his life in the 1920s Thomas met the Prince during the latter’s brief stopover in Salt Lake City; in Honolulu in 1951 he met his nephew who was a part of the delegation on their way to signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Thomas delivered the same book to the Imperial Palace and also paid his respects to Emperor Meiji (kicho) at the time of the latter’s death.

While Thomas was the head of the mission, the elders making important decisions in Salt Lake City set a guideline for the length of stay in Japan for Mormon missionaries; whereas Mormons sent to other foreign countries stayed there for two to two and a half years, the Mormon Church decided those sent to Japan would be there no more than four years. As Thomas had suggested, it took about three years for Americans to become fluent in the Japanese language. Thomas was delighted about the decision and soon afterwards was called back home with his wife and a younger colleague of his whose father had pleaded with President Smith to have his son return to Salt Lake City because of the prolonged assignment in Japan of over five years.

Thomas left a large imprint on the Mormon mission in Japan, including a book published in 1914 consisting of his sermons that he had given all over Japan in Japanese, a language in which he achieved an impressive level of fluency. His book was used as a text at Mormon Sunday Schools in Japan for many years.4

But the imprint of his Japan experience on his mind was greater. Thomas and his wife named their first daughter born in 1910 in Tokyo Chiyō. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, it was popular among colored races around the world to name their boy Togo after the famous Japanese admiral who had defeated the Russian Baltic fleet. Such a naming had anti-colonial or anti-white undertones or both. Such was not the case for Thomas and his wife. They became fond of the Japanese and their culture. Two of Thomas’s American successors gave their Caucasian offspring a Japanese name, one to his daughter, Ai, and another to his son, Taro.5 After living in Japan until shortly after the beginning of the Taisho era
in 1912 and traveling through China, the Middle East and Europe from 1912 to 1913, Thomas and his wife and Chiyo returned to Salt Lake City where he taught Greek and Latin from 1914 to 1916. Thomas served as the secretary of the University’s Board of Regents from 1917 to 1922, a period in which he was also a Utah National Guard, a position he kept until 1926. In 1924, the year he received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley for his dissertation on ancient Chinese political thought, Thomas began to teach East Asian Studies at the University of Utah as a professor in the department of history and political science.

**New Deal Senator from Utah and Japan**

In 1932 Thomas, running as a Democrat, defeated a Republican incumbent in Utah’s Senatorial race. The Democrats were sweeping to overwhelming electoral victories throughout the country because of the Great Depression in midst of Republican leadership.

Until the late 1930s Senator Thomas favored appeasing Japanese militarism. In 1935 he worried that lack of understanding between the two nations would lead within ten years to “the bloodiest war ever known in the world.” He thus called for exchange of students between the U.S. and Japan as a means to achieve greater understanding and peace between the two nations. Senator Thomas opposed intervening in the Far East on behalf of China based on his belief that Japan could be won over by peaceful means. He worried that if the U.S. invoked the neutrality law towards the undeclared war between Japan and China, Japan could retaliate against American interests in China. When the Japanese military attacked the *Panay* in the Yangtze River, Senator Thomas appealed to the American public and Congress for calm by pointing to the fact that the Japanese government had apologized for the sinking of the American naval vessel and also agreed to pay compensation for those Americans killed and wounded during this incident.

By 1939, however, Thomas was increasingly unwilling to put up with Japanese military aggression in China. In February 1939 he unsuccessfully introduced a Senate resolution which would have given the President the possibility of lifting embargoes on a country he judged to be a victim of aggression and invoke embargoes on a country he judged as the aggressor. By 1940 Thomas supported Roger S. Greene’s American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression.
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Thomas lamented that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had terminated in the early 1920s and hoped that the U.S. could guide Japan towards peaceful behavior through American tutelage on issues concerning morality, diplomacy and peace.

When the Konoe cabinet collapsed in mid-October, Thomas sensed that war would occur between the two countries; Mrs. Thomas made such an observation in her diary on October 16, an observation undoubtedly shared by her husband. Hideki Tojo, war minister and a war hawk in the Konoe cabinet, formed a new cabinet under his premiership on October 18.6

On November 26 the crisis between the U.S. and Japan took a nose dive when Secretary of State Cordell Hull handed a note to the two Japanese ambassadors in Washington, Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu, calling for Japan’s complete withdrawal from China and Indochina. Upon hearing of this event, Thomas remarked that if the U.S. went to war against Japan the U.S. could not easily win against battle-hardened Japanese forces and would have to make the most serious undertaking to defeat Japan. For this remark Senator Thomas was widely criticized by the press. His November 26 comment coincided with ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu sending a cable to the Japanese government that urged an exchange of telegrams between President Franklin Roosevelt and Emperor Hirohito aimed at avoiding war between the two nations. Kurusu originally got this idea from hearing about a rumor that some quarters in Washington had considered sending a telegram of goodwill from the American President to the Japanese Emperor so as to avert the downfall of the Konoe cabinet in October 1941. Upon arriving in Washington in November to assist Nomura, Kurusu learned from his subordinate Hidenari Terasaki that such an idea was still being suggested by influential men such as Senator Elbert Thomas. Around the time of Thomas’s November 26 remark, Langdon Warner, a Harvard Japanese art historian, had been contacting Thomas about sending a Presidential message to the Japanese Emperor to avert war.7 Senator Thomas cancelled his scheduled trip to California on December 1 because he sensed war was imminent between the U.S. and Japan.8

On December 6 President Roosevelt sent a telegram addressed to the Japanese Emperor. The American ambassador in Tokyo, Joseph Grew, was supposed to receive that cable but because of a deliberate delay by military officers in the handling of this cable in the Tokyo Central Postal Office, the details of which are discussed in Takeo Iguchi’s article, Grew did not receive the message in a way that would have permitted him to have an audience with Emperor Hirohito before the
surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. During the war, Senator Thomas argued that “[t]here is pretty good evidence that Emperor Hirohito was not even allowed to receive the [cable] sent to him by President Roosevelt just before Pearl Harbor, at least until war broke out, and it was too late.”

Thomas and the Office of War Information (OWI)

Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Thomas began his monthly radio broadcast to Japan sponsored by the Office of War Information (OWI). He aimed his broadcasts at both American and Japanese listeners on the seventh day of each month, the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, urging Japanese listeners “to return to constitutional government, to reject their war lords, and to follow the ideals laid down for them 60 years ago by Emperor Meiji when he issued his famous rescript on government.” Senator Thomas sent his OWI message beamed at Japan every week during the last few weeks prior to the Japanese surrender on August 15. He continued to work with OWI until the fall of 1945.

Edward Barrett, chief of the Overseas Bureau of OWI, found it useful to have Thomas and three other speakers make their broadcasts to Japan during wartime. The other three were Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, former chief commander of the U.S. Naval fleet in the Far East, Raymond Swing, an influential radio commentator, and retired Major General George Fielding Eliot, an influential military analyst. Thomas made 44 monthly broadcasts to Japan during wartime, in addition to his weekly commentaries shortly before Japan’s surrender. His senatorial colleagues, impressed by his activities, urged him to insert some of his messages in the Congressional Record. Such insertions included his broadcasts right after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In his August 7 broadcast Thomas urged the Japanese to overcome the resistance of the Japanese militarists to accept the Potsdam Declaration or face another destruction such as that which befell Hiroshima; Thomas cited some potential cities that could suffer from future nuclear destruction if Japan did not immediately surrender. Thomas urged Japanese listeners to stay away from the cities cited as well as others that produced military goods and served as military installations, including Nagasaki. Thomas argued the U.S. had three “huge plants” capable of producing many atomic bombs that unleashed the same destructive energy as that emitted by the sun. Thomas emphasized that both the U.S. and the U.K. had no intention of enslaving the
Japanese population and only the militarists stood in the way of Japan’s accepting the terms expressed in the Potsdam Declaration. On August 9 Thomas made his regular broadcast to Japan to essentially reiterate his August 7 broadcast in commenting about the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.\textsuperscript{11}

Looking back at these OWI broadcasts, Thomas recalled in 1948 that “All during the war, both in our own country and in Japan, not much was publicly said and not much was quoted that went out in our psychological warfare. But if what was said had not been very effective, why was so much attention paid in replying?” Although Thomas avoided making an assessment about the actual impact of his broadcasts in inducing Japan to surrender, he argued that he had “maintained from the very beginning” of the war with Japan that it was possible to achieve a Japanese surrender “if any of my words got to the Emperor.”\textsuperscript{12} Because Thomas had learned from his friend Kenneth Colegrove, who had an audience with Emperor Hirohito in June 1946, that “the Emperor expressed to me his deep appreciation for the lenient policy toward Japan which he felt had been developed by President Roosevelt, Ambassador Grew and Senator Thomas,”\textsuperscript{13} Thomas in his 1948 essay wrote he was convinced that the Emperor had heard his OWI messages during wartime. Thomas undoubtedly felt vindicated by Emperor Hirohito’s invitation for an audience with him to Colegrove and Langdon Warner on the same day; Warner was in Japan at that time to help GHQ recover stolen Chinese and Korean artifacts as well as assess war damage inflicted on Japanese artifacts; while Warner’s audience with the Emperor had to do with widespread reports in Japan at that time that Warner had been instrumental in sparing Kyoto and Nara from being targeted for atomic explosions,\textsuperscript{14} Thomas, undoubtedly aware of Warner’s audience with Hirohito through Colegrove, interpreted the audience of these two men with Emperor Hirohito as vindicating his efforts before and during the war against Japan.

\textbf{Elbert D. Thomas and the Publication of his \textit{Four Fears}\textsuperscript{15}}

Thomas published this book in the spring of 1944. \textit{Four Fears} called for Americans to embrace the principles presented in the Atlantic Charter (August 1940) and President Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech in January 1941 that called for a postwar world that assured freedom of speech, freedom of worship,
Senator Elbert D. Thomas and Japan

freedom from want (economic deprivation) and freedom from fear (being killed in war). Thomas argued that Americans should not shy away from these ideas based on the fear of idealism that resulted from the defeat of Wilson’s idealism after the First World War. Instead, the U.S. should take a leadership position in international affairs after the war; this was his point in discussing the second of the Four Fears, the fear of entangling alliances. America should work with the U.K., a fellow democracy, and the Soviet Union, a Communist power, to achieve a stable world order; this was his point regarding fear of the U.K. and Russia. Thomas foresaw underlying postwar problems between the U.S. and the U.K. regarding the idea of decolonization and between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. regarding Soviet absorption of the latter’s adjacent territories such as the three Baltic States but he, like Franklin Roosevelt, was convinced of the need to work with these two powers in creating a stable world order. The United States should not fear rapid international change resulting from this war (fear of revolution) because such rapid changes would provide a wonderful opportunity to realize the Four Freedoms throughout the world. In Thomas’s mind, part of achieving the Four Freedoms, that is freedom from want and fear, was to create an economically interdependent international economic system that ensured nations had adequate access to economic resources and markets worldwide, a system envisioned in the Atlantic Charter. Economic interdependence and mutual economic prosperity would significantly diminish the likelihood of a major world war.16

Hence, the arguments presented in Thomas’s book were similar to what Henry R. Luce argued in his call for the “American Century” in the postwar world ten months before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. In Henry Luce’s case, however, he exhibited open concern about containing potential Soviet and Communist expansionism after 1944 and from that standpoint argued behind-the-scenes after German surrender in May 1945 for clarifying unconditional surrender to the Japanese so that they could decide on the fate on the Emperor after they surrendered. Thomas’s view of the Soviet Union was the same as that of Franklin Roosevelt and Henry Wallace during wartime.17

A striking aspect of Thomas’s book is the fact that Thomas shared Joseph Grew’s opinion about the Japanese Emperor in the aftermath of Grew’s December 29, 1943 speech that received widespread criticism from the American press because Grew had hinted at protecting the current Japanese Emperor from dethronement in the postwar years. As a result of these wide negative social responses to his speech in Chicago, Grew, who had received clearance from the
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State and War Departments as well as the OWI in making his Chicago speech, was asked by Secretary of State Hull to not make further public statements about the future of the Emperor and the Japanese throne.\textsuperscript{18}

In spite of this social background, in his book Thomas openly supported what Grew had in mind when the latter made his speech in Chicago. As ranking member (and after January 1945 chairman) of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Thomas was aware of experiments that would end with the successful development and use of the atomic bombs against Japan.\textsuperscript{19} Thomas argued for the retention of the Imperial throne at a time when the controversies over Grew’s statement had still not subsided.

In his \textit{Four Fears}, even though his statements in his book seemed to have not gathered media attention, Thomas, in rejecting a Japanese-led world order and calling for changing Japan after American-led victory, wanted the U.S. to achieve the objective of making Japan conform to an American-led world order by using a central feature of the Japanese political system:

What is wicked is the perversion of all Japanese purpose to warmaking ends. They have planned and offered a program for all of Asia. We have not done so. We do not like their plan, and we mean to keep them from putting it into effect. It is a very bad plan for it cuts the world in two, and the modern world cannot be cut in two. For us the question is how much understanding we can bring to the problem some ways even more serious than the problem of Germany. How will we apply the sound truth that to introduce changes in a culture, especially a very proud and able culture, you work with an established pattern?\textsuperscript{20}

In other words, Thomas argued for using the Imperial throne in carrying out reforms in Japan after the Japanese surrender:

It is simple, for example, to say get rid of the Emperor. But if we are to deal with important realities as they exist within a country, we have to give a little more care to the problem than to say flatly, dismiss the Emperor. Although I have been called the World’s Public Enemy Number 2 by the Japanese because of my monthly talks to them, I still believe that we should retain the Emperor, for some time at least; therefore I wish to state my position here. It is not easy for us in this country to understand the place
he occupies. The mystic union of the divine and the political is something we have never accepted (except in our safely dead heroes).

Thomas judged that Emperor “Hirohito is probably no [Emperor] Meiji,” and Japan, the Emperor and “the war lords are separate in the people’s minds.” Hence, if Americans “insist at the outset on a complete identification of them we shall achieve the opposite of what we intend.” Thomas opined that the manipulation of the Imperial throne by the militarists “today to give authority to the excesses of the war lords is pure perversion” of the “Mikado cult.” Thomas argued that to the Japanese people “the Emperor represents a symbol, somewhat as the King of England represents” because “neither has real political power.”

In making such an argument, Thomas defended Emperor Hirohito as a puppet of the militarists. In doing so, he argued that the Japanese Emperor was different from the King of Italy, a country that had recently surrendered to the Allies:

[The Japanese Emperor] does not make political decisions. His appointments are all routine. Only on rare occasion does the government report a decision for imperial actions, and then it is only to give finality to something already decided. To say, as Mr. John Goette does in Japan Fights for Asia, that the Japanese Imperial headquarters admitted in March 1943, that the whole war program had been submitted to the Emperor for his approval does not mean much. Of course it was submitted. But the Emperor is almost a prisoner of his government. He could not have raised public objections to the plans. Maybe he did like them, but if he had not, he could have done nothing about it. What his final say-so does is to unite all for action. When the Congress of the United States declared the existence of a state of war after Pearl Harbor, followed by similar resolutions about Germany and Italy, each of the declarations ended with the statement, “to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States”—that is, Congress declared that the United States had one single objective on which all people and resources must be united. Everything done since by law or directive is built upon that pledge of a united aim. The report by the government of Japan to the Emperor does just that. It has all the force of constitutional pronouncement and unites the people to a given end. . . . There is no similarity between the position of the King in Italy and the
Emperor in Japan. The royal house in Italy is not very old, and it was discredited in the eyes of its subjects more than twenty years ago. The King has neither a political nor a religious role, much less a combination of the two. He represents nobody and nothing, and there are known and respected republican elements ready to take over. The situation in Japan is different. The Emperor has never been regarded as a free individual. His rigorous training, his long isolation, the grueling ceremonies he must go through—all point to his enslavement to the people rather than the other way around. He is, as one authority has expressed it, more of a high priest than a ruler.

Thomas painted the image of Emperor Hirohito as “a high priest” more so than “a ruler” who could not wield political power because not only was he a puppet of the Japanese militarists but also enslaved to the Japanese people as their “high priest.”

But even if the Japanese Emperor acted as the “high priest” of the Japanese, was not he the source of Japan’s fanatical patriotism? Although Thomas acknowledged that “The religious sanction given to the Emperor is a very intense form of patriotism which is nothing like ours,” he believed that the militarists had manipulated this patriotism for their agenda of conquering Asia. Furthermore, Thomas cautioned American readers not to think their patriotism was superior to Japanese patriotism:

We may laugh at [Emperor worshipping] and say that it had been put to evil use. The Japanese do not think making their country great is an evil use for patriotism, but even if they admitted it, we can hardly claim never to have done the same thing ourselves. No country in the world has failed at one time or another to use patriotism for expanding its power or its territory. In fact, some students who object to patriotism altogether do so on the ground that it is almost always fostered for warmaking powers or purposes. Everything good can be put to bad use, however. Look at Christianity. The Japanese sense of mission to “liberate” the East from the white man does not seem a wicked purpose to a Japanese. It is as strong a passion with the Japanese to win a leading place in the world as it is ours to keep it. There is little use in calling our ambitions virtuous and the Japanese ambitions “vicious fanaticism.”

21
In spite of his call for retaining the Imperial throne, Senator Thomas certainly did not want the U.S. and its allies to permit Japan to move simply back to the situation shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and he gave suggestions for reforming the Japanese political economy based on his outlook that Japan could move back to a trajectory based on the idea of cooperation in the family of nations and constitutionalism. The key features he saw in Meiji Japan:

Mr. Edward Hunter, writing in the Nation for March 4, [1944] under the title “Can We Make Use of Hirohito?” takes me to task for a shortwave broadcast to Japan, one of a regular series I have given since the outbreak of the war, in which I said, “On some future day . . . the Japanese people may again bring forth the red-and-white victory lanterns. . . . That victory will commemorate the defeat of all Japanese militarists and the return of the Japanese people to the ideals of his Imperial Majesty—the Tenno.” Mr. Hunter asks, “Can we blame the Japanese people, then, for cherishing the comforting thought that if and when the war turns decisively against them, all they need to do is drop a few well-known generals and admirals, and lo, they may return to the status quo of December 1941?”

This seems to me to show a mistaken view of what I am after and what the status quo of December 6, 1941 was. The status quo of December 6, 1941, was precisely what brought on December 7, 1941. What I am after is a complete overthrow of that kind of rule and a return to the ideals of the most democratic period Japan has ever known—the spirit of the restoration under Meiji Tenno (1852-1912). During that period the Emperor, who really did rule, declared that “intercourse with foreign countries shall in future be carried on in accordance with the public laws of the world.” That period . . . in general, accomplished mainly through peaceful change more than any other country has done in the same space of time. . . . Whatever we may think of the Japanese, they are a virile and able and tenacious people, and the world cannot well spare such talents. It is true they have always admired the soldier too much, and though Meiji democratized the army, very little in Western imperialism could undo such belief in the importance of military power. In their period of greatest development, however, they were beginning to find a balance in their national ideals, Domestic economy, constitutionalism, and of ideas not exclusively Japanese—these are the aspects of Japanese aims we ought to encourage. These were the aims of the
rule of Meiji. . . . The feelings of Japan have to be changed just as ours must be. Japan will have to devote herself not to a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere but to a Greater World Co-prosperity Sphere. . . . In Japan militarism will make this very hard, but as her values have been known to change in the past, they may be expected to change in the future.

In order to achieve what Thomas perceived as the idealism explored during the Meiji period, Thomas prescribed economic and political and constitutional reforms in postwar Japan in addition to removing Japan’s colonial and conquered possessions:

Japan’s entire economy must be subject to control and inspection. Production of airplanes and armaments must be forbidden, and all territorial conquests, with the exceptions made earlier, disgorged. . . .

One way to bring about change is for postwar liberal leaders to press for a reform in the Constitution itself. . . . Military control must be replaced by civilian political control. . . . All those responsible anywhere for acts outside the accepted rules of warfare must be made to bear their guilt. . . . How [Germany and Japan] can be brought into the family of nations and be given and guaranteed the right of peaceful relations and trade under the Atlantic Charter will depend on their own readiness to co-operate with the rest of the peoples of the earth. . . . We shall make no “soft” peace, but let us above all, leave no ways unexplored that promise us a lasting peace.

Thomas expressed optimism that Germany and Japan could be brought back to the family of nations. “There are millions of decent Japanese and millions of decent Germans. We may not want to believe that now, we may find it easier to fight if we hate. But it is doubtful if the best fighters waste their energies hating. We must find those decent Germans and those decent Japanese, for on them, quite as much as on ourselves, rest the hopes of mankind.”

In thinking about bringing the war to an end, Senator Thomas, in defending the need for the time being for retaining the Emperor, had in mind the necessity of achieving an orderly Japanese surrender. Using the Emperor for that purpose was particularly important because, as he wrote in his autobiography some time in the early 1950s:
I knew how the Japanese constitution worked. I knew that the generals in the field were absolute. They could not be controlled by the home government. I knew, therefore, that we had to have a constitutional surrender under the auspices of the Emperor, or would turn loose on the world millions of guerillas who had learned how to live on the land and that our soldier boys would be chasing those guerillas over half the world. 

In *Four Fears*, Thomas, for some unknown reason—perhaps for security reasons—did not spell out the above argument but only alluded to it in the following way:

If it is argued that the same technique could be used in Japan under any other kind of head, the answer is that as yet Japan has no republic. In fact, in the last few years the notion of where authority lies in governments has gone through a great change. When Hitler became the head of his government he also became head of the state. When Hitler talks it will be not just the talk of a government but the talk of a state. Germany has no real constitutional entity at the moment. To survive as entities, states must have one continuing thing which persists whatever happens to the particular government in power. This is a commonplace that is often forgotten. Under the Mikado cult the Japanese Emperor represents that continuing thing in his person better than any other single factor in Japanese political life. To urge this fact, however, is not to excuse reaction under the plea of “legitimacy.” Nobody can possibly claim that even reactionary forces among the United Nations want to keep a Mikado in power because we want a powerful, imperialist Japan in the Far East or because we do not wish democratic government there. . . . Japan would countenance no provision that placed a military leader under the control of civilian political power. That has not been changed to this day. A general in the field is boss in his field of operations. Each theater of operations is virtually a separate war. It may be that we shall end one war somewhere in the East but still have to fight a series elsewhere there. The commander and his forces in the Philippines, for example, in the minds of those at home, are completely expendable. They fight to succeed or they die. They do not like death any better than any other soldier, but what looks like fanaticism to us is simply the soldier’s knowledge that he will probably not be rescued by his own side. He is, in
In a sense, fighting an individual war under an individual general. That is why peace negotiation with political figures rather than with war lords is the most impractical way to secure an admission of defeat. Each general must be licked, and licked so decisively that he cannot escape from the admission of defeat. And the generals must be made to witness the surrender documents of one another.25

Thomas knew that the Japanese Emperor was the only figure who could issue an Imperial rescript for Japan’s surrender, a document without which the Japanese armed forces would not lay down their arms en masse. But he could only indirectly refer to this issue in his Four Fears; he argued in his book that the Emperor was completely powerless and was more of a high priest than a ruler whom the militarists manipulated as their puppet. Because Thomas “insisted on attempting to get a constitutional surrender from Japan, to avoid an anarchy incident to the complete destruction of the Japanese State, [he] was called a pal of Tojo.”26

**Thomas and the Debate over the Unconditional Surrender of Japan**

On July 14, 1945 Senator Thomas, in a debate over a nationally broadcasted NBC radio program, continued to maintain his view of the Japanese Emperor mentioned in his Four Fears. Although Thomas was concerned that the Suzuki cabinet was having the Emperor, whom Thomas considered to be “a god-like symbol,” take an active part in Japan’s military policy, he argued that the Emperor was a puppet of Japanese militarism and would serve as a stabilizing force in carrying out Japanese occupation after Japan surrendered. Thomas, however, agreed with his opponent in the radio debate Senator Thomas Hart (Dem.-Conn.), admiral of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet at the time Japan attacked Manila, that unconditional surrender meant the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces. The two also agreed that the zaibatsu should be dismantled. Senator Thomas, unlike Senator Hart, was open to the idea expressed by Senator White from Maine that the U.S. should clarify to the Japanese government the meaning of unconditional surrender. Senator Hart, though willing to use the Emperor for carrying out the orderly initial execution of the occupation, did not mind abolishing the Imperial throne at the risk of creating chaos in Japan because he did not see such turmoil as
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having any real consequence in the international system. Senator Thomas ex-
pressed pessimism about the survivability of the Imperial throne as Japan was
destined to be a third-rate power, a status that would undermine the prestige and
glorification of the Imperial throne. \(^{27}\)

Thomas did “not want a complete collapse of the Japanese constitution” be-
cause such a situation would mean no functioning central government to oversee
an orderly surrender throughout areas in Japan under Japanese military control; a
complete constitutional collapse, like the one in Germany, would mean chaos
throughout Asia because the Japanese military commanders in various military
theaters in Asia were virtually fighting their own wars. Thomas gave such an
opinion to Bernard Baruch, an influential Jewish-American statesman, and in-
directly indicated to Baruch the need to use the Japanese Emperor to induce an
orderly surrender of the Japanese armed forces. He told Baruch his OWI mes-
sages beamed at Japan appealed to the Japanese people to undermine the Suzuki
cabinet whose reply to the Potsdam Declaration was tantamount to ignoring it,
although Prime Minister Suzuki meant “no comment” about the Declaration.
Thomas’s stance differed from Bonner Fellers’s psychological warfare under
General MacArthur in the Pacific theater; even though Fellers tried to appeal to
the Japanese people to overthrow Japanese militarists, he was cautious about the
idea of undermining the Suzuki cabinet because he and his staff believed the
Suzuki cabinet was exploring Japan’s surrender. \(^{28}\)

As Thomas had predicted, Emperor Hirohito played the crucial role in Japan’s
decision to surrender and in the ensuing orderly surrender across the Japanese
empire and the areas it occupied throughout Asia.

**Thomas and the Atomic Bomb**

Japan’s decision was secured with the usage of two atomic bombs over Japan,
a weapon whose secret development Thomas knew about as chairman of the
Military Affairs Committee. As he recalled shortly before his untimely death in
February 1953:

While most of my work as Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee
[Jan. 1945-Fall 1946] had to do with the war activities, I could never rid
myself of the idea that ultimate victory can come only through a change in
men’s hearts and ideas. More with that zeal than the idea to destroy, I supported the experimentation which resulted in the atomic bomb. (brackets mine)  

Thomas was apparently aware that Congress was funding a top secret military research project but he, like all the members in Congress, was not informed of the details of the project, including the fact that the United States was developing nuclear weapons. 

In an October 1945 article he wrote for an academic journal, Thomas, based on an unpublished interview he had with a student Glenn Everett the day after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, argued that this weapon was equivalent to “all other types of bombs dropped over Germany and Japan,” was “just another weapon” and “not as deadly as biological warfare would be if we stopped at that, nor as destructive as the use of rays or chemicals on a major scale.” Thomas believed that it was a stroke of luck that the U.S. was the first to develop this weapon and had both the U.S. and an enemy such as Germany developed the weapon simultaneously, they would have decimated each other. Thomas did not believe, as some did, that the atomic bomb would maintain peace since the world, with the possibility of other powers developing the atomic bomb, faced a bleak future of “total decimation of a race, or a people, or a world” unless mankind resorted to maintaining peace through law. Otherwise, “the bomb can, and perhaps may, destroy much of world civilization.” Thomas warned that “if man insists upon keeping his concepts of strict nationalism, absolute independence, and complete state sovereignty, this common effort must fail and man’s new inventions, such as atomic dissolution, will be used for destructive purposes in the ultimate collisions of states’ wills which are bound to occur.” 

Looking back at world history, Thomas concluded that man could “endure to live in such an anarchic world with the seeds of destruction sprouting all around him,” in spite of the fact that atomic destruction was far more terrible than any natural disasters since the former is “man planning his own destruction.” Thomas argued that “The world is not going to be changed overnight by any single invention. Man’s mind moves slowly, over a period of years, and his laws and customs change slowly with his thinking. It is not war and not the atomic bomb which has changed the world; it is man’s mind, making use of these terrible tools, that has changed it.” 

Thomas’s analysis of the atomic bomb was a precursor to an argument made by
Nobel laureate P. M. S. Blackett in his book entitled *Fear, War and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy* published in 1948. In this book, British scientist Blackett, analyzing the aftermath of the failure to internationally control atomic energy, observed that atomic bombs could be used between the U.S. and Russia as tactical weapons when the Soviets succeeded in developing nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union succeeded in a nuclear detonation in August 1949. Blackett’s answer to decreasing the chances of nuclear war was pursuing general disarmament that included cutting nuclear arsenals but not abolishing them because he found that to be unrealistic.\(^3\)

While very critical of Japanese war atrocities such as the indiscriminate bombings near Shanghai in 1932 and the Bataan death march in 1942,\(^3\) Thomas argued that the West was “rapidly developing . . . this same callousness and indifference to human values in its international society” as the East, such as Japan. To make this point, Thomas referred readers to not only the Nazi holocaust but also to America’s compromise of its “best standards,” including the usage of the atomic bomb which indiscriminately took away life, including innocent women and children.\(^3\)

**Thomas’s Observations of Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations**

In 1948, Thomas recalled his wartime view of the Emperor and his attempts to send a message to him before Pearl Harbor. He defended his wartime call for the need to retain the Emperor by pointing to Emperor Hirohito’s role in bringing about an orderly Japanese surrender. Finally, he emphasized the fact that the nuclear bombs were not the main factor in inducing Japanese surrender. Instead, it was the decision by the Emperor and the willingness of the Japanese people to embrace surrender based on their trust of Americans. Here, Thomas completely ignored the Russian intervention as a major factor in bringing about Japan’s surrender; by 1948 Thomas seemed to have dropped the idea of postwar U.S.-Soviet cooperation:

> As time moved on we were thus in a strong position of being able to explain what was meant by unconditional surrender, and ultimately we were able to unite the Japanese people to the thought that it was not necessarily the aim of America to destroy their basic institutions. We repeated that surrender
with honor was attainable if it were lived up to in honor, and thus came the unheard-of surrender and almost universal respect for what the Emperor had done. . . . Calculate if you can the loss of life to our boys and the millions more of destruction that we would have had to fight through if we had not secured the type of surrender we did! . . . If the Japanese leaders had succeeded in convincing their people that Japan should fight, as the last machine gunner fought at Iwo Jima or Okinawa, to utter destruction, who can figure how long it would have taken our soldier boys to burn and blast out of China and other places of Asia all the Japanese who were there?

In presenting this point, Thomas recalled the aforementioned July 1945 NBC radio debate. “The convincing of our own people of the necessity of avoiding anarchy in Japan was not an easy task. I call to mind now one radio program in which the great man with whom I carried on the discussion maintained that anarchy in Japan would be welcomed.”

Thomas firmly believed that “surrender had to be organized, and was not an impulsive thing resulting from the destruction of Hiroshima and part of Nagasaki.” Thomas argued he believed from the beginning of the U.S.-Japan war that the surrender of Japan was possible and that Japan’s decision to surrender was the beginning of “the future success of American and Japanese co-operation in bringing stability to Asia” based on “common viewpoints from which we [could] operate and through which there [would] be joint agreement.”

In his wartime OWI messages to Japan Thomas “took the stand that modern Japan was at her very best in thought and in action during the days of the Meiji era when such men as Admiral Togo and General Nogi were the instructors of the present Emperor.” Thomas claimed that he “knew both Togo and Nogi” and “their lives and . . . their ideals.” In addition, he “knew what the present Emperor had been taught as a boy.” Finally, he “knew also Admiral Nomora [sic]” who “had become an instructor of the princes in the peers’ school.” Thomas was familiar with Nomura’s “philosophy about the world and what the result would be if Japan and America should fight.” Thomas “knew that the present Emperor and his little brother, Prince Chichibu, had both been taught that friendship with America was of prime importance for the success of Japan and that if Japan went to war it would end with the destruction of Japanese prestige in the world.” Thomas “knew these boys could never forget these teachings.”
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Precisely because of this knowledge, Thomas “had such faith in the effectiveness of the two messages which some of us urged President Roosevelt to send directly to the Emperor before Pearl Harbor.” Thomas “knew that my appeal to the Japanese people would also bear fruit if any of [his] words got to the Emperor.” Based on learning from Colegrove about his July 1946 audience with the Emperor, Thomas was convinced that the Emperor had read Roosevelt’s message, even though it was after the militarists had deliberately delayed the presentation until after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Based on these observations about Japan, Thomas argued the following:

Have we not in the basic teachings of the necessity of friendship with America, which was drilled into the mind of the present Emperor as a child, a key to the position of the future Japan in the world? Is there throughout all of Asia another nation with the educational system which, when properly cleansed of propaganda, can unite a people as Japan was united for evil? Can this not be turned to good purpose with lasting effect if the good purposes are based upon truth? . . . Under the old theory the Emperor owned all the land and the people, and was father of all. The people in a paternal sense were never forgotten. They had no rights, but they needed no rights because the Emperor was all-benevolent. That was theory. We have today in Japan a constitution based on our own American notion that governments exist for the benefit of the people; that governments themselves have no rights, but that the rights belong to the people; that the property is the property of the people, and the governments only use the property for the people’s benefit and for public use. The Emperor in this picture is a guardian, therefore, of the people’s property and the people’s well-being. That, too, is theory. It is the key to American-Japanese cooperation.  

Thomas expressed his optimism that Japan, under its new postwar constitution that brought sovereignty to the Japanese people and a symbolic monarchy, would be able to establish firm friendship and cooperation with the United States. America’s mission in the world had to be achieved partially through its friendship and cooperation with Japan; in 1948 the Chinese civil war looked bleaker for the American plan to create a stable KMT-led China as America’s junior partner in the Far East.
In thinking about postwar U.S.-Japan relations Thomas expressed his confidence that Japan would effectively democratize under the new postwar Constitution:

The trends toward political, economic, and social democracy set in motion by General MacArthur’s directives culminated in the new constitution promulgated on November 3, 1946. Much ill-informed criticism has been directed at this constitution. There are those who say that the document is alien to the Japanese character—that in allowing it to be promulgated General MacArthur has provided the shell of democracy without the substance.

The fact remains, however, that the document is one of the most democratic fundamental laws ever devised. It conforms in every respect to the most advanced concepts of the political, economic, and social responsibilities of government. That it is un-Japanese does not destroy its basic purpose. Almost everything that we attempt in Japan at this time might be labeled un-Japanese, since we are attempting to reform and redirect Japanism, not to preserve it intact. The process of giving substance to a fundamental social concept is something which can be undertaken only by the people who live under it. The task is a timeless one, and we shall not know soon with what degree of success the Japanese will discharge it. Knowing the Japanese and knowing that the seeds of democratic thought are already there, I am convinced that democracy has taken genuine root in Japan and that it will endure.\textsuperscript{39}

On economic issues, Thomas judged the dissolution of the \textit{zaibatsu} as a correct policy to “break up excessive concentration of wealth in impoverished Japan and to diversify economic power and responsibility.”\textsuperscript{40} On the other hand, if the U.S. becomes Japan’s “sponsor and . . . economic ally in raising her own standard of living and help her to get her goods into the markets of the world, she will become a profitable ally, not only to us but to the whole world.” Thomas urged the allies to advise Japan of the terms for the reparations settlement and permit Japan to resume her foreign trade so as to ease tax burdens on Americans and prevent starvation in Japan.\textsuperscript{41}

For Senator Thomas, the European orientation of the American focus in foreign relations was a source of frustration. As he had written to his friend for over
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twenty years, Kenneth W. Colegrove, professor of political science and an expert on the Japanese political system:

It will take a long time for the President to learn the many things that have been done to bring about the peace in Japan. And, of course, if he is surrounded by advisors who had their training mostly in other places it may take a long time for him to get the proper sense of values which is related to the world of a strong prosperous nation anywhere in Asia. Everything is big in Asia, comparatively speaking, and, with the exception of the problem of Russia, everything is small in Europe. Yet most of our efforts, most of our energies, and practically all of our thoughts are given to the European field. No wonder world organization and world peace are taking so long in being born.\(^4\)

In 1948 Thomas expressed his confidence that under American tutelage, Japan will exert leadership in Asia and under the new constitution democracy was taking root in Japan. He firmly believed having a democratic system in Japan was “the key”\(^4\) to cooperation between the two nations. Thomas argued that “long after Asia . . . ceased to be a theater of military operations it will be predominant; for the three greatest social, political, and economic revolutions—the Chinese, the Indian, and the Russian—are essentially Asiatic.” Thomas ended his essay by reiterating the argument he made in *Four Fears*:

Our fundamental concepts of democracy and our religious and political recognition of the dignity of the individual and his inherent rights are necessary to the solving not only of Europe’s problems but also of Asia’s. Our belief in the right of revolution gives us confidence in the face of change. With faith, then, in our idealism, the world will go forward as it follows American leadership.\(^4\)

What was the American role in the future course of the world? Thomas argued that “the earth is a unit and the nations of the earth are but individual entities within that unit and must adhere to the prevailing will of the community of nations.” The U.S. had a mission to expand the ideals of the American Revolution by expanding the order it had created in the U.S. based on the American Constitution to the entire world. Thomas hoped that Americans would unleash their
imagination so that “peoples of the earth unite and live in a peaceful community of nations for the benefit of mankind.”

This proposal for America’s new mission echoed a point he had made in 1943. Thomas, like Bonner Fellers during the Pacific War and Brooks Adams at the turn of the century, foresaw the importance of East Asia in postwar American foreign relations:

The after-war world will be a world with the center of interest shifted away from the Western Hemisphere to the East; Asia, like Europe, is allied with distant powers and divided within. Yet the preponderance of Asiatic populations will throw the center of gravity in the Eastern Hemisphere. Since the beginning of time Asia has been a world problem. Now it is the world problem. The conflict in which the four major allies—Russia, China, the United States, and Great Britain—are fighting are Asiatic conflicts.

Thomas’s Career after His Senatorial Years

Serving in the Senate since 1933 with a distinguished career as being not only a member of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee but also chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor (1937-1944), the Committee on Military Affairs (1945-1946), and the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (1949-1950), Senator Thomas lost to a Republican candidate in one of bitterest races in the 1950 Senatorial elections; during the race Thomas’s opponents accused him of being a Communist sympathizer, a tactic that Congressman Richard Nixon, the future President of the United States, used against his Democratic opponent in winning the 1950 U.S. Senate race in California.

After the election, President Truman appointed Thomas to serve as High Commissioner with an ambassadorial rank to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Thomas succeeded to this post from Admiral Arthur Radford who became commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet. Shortly after Thomas arrived in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to commence his ambassadorial assignment the jurisdiction of the Pacific Islands within the U.S. government was transferred from the Department of the Navy to the Department of the Interior. As aforementioned, Thomas had been interested in developments in Asia and the Truman administration was putting his talent and expertise to use in American foreign relations in the
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Asia-Pacific region, something Thomas coveted; back in mid-1945 when Thomas was touring Europe shortly after the German surrender, Secretary of State Byrnes had considered Thomas to be appointed as chairman of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee (later succeeded by the Far Eastern Committee) and Thomas was willing to accept the offer but Byrnes in the end decided someone not connected to the Senate would be a better pick and chose Frank McCoy. Thomas’s untimely death in February 1953 while serving his assignment was a great loss for U.S.-East Asia relations.49

With Thomas gone from Congress, the remaining members in the U.S. legislature knowledgeable about East Asia were Representatives Walter Judd and Mike Mansfield. The former had extensive experience in China as a missionary doctor (1925-1931 and 1934-1938) and the latter had served in China as a Marine in 1922 and taught U.S.-East Asia relations at Montana State University as a professor from 1933 to 1942. Whereas Judd’s influence on U.S.-East Asia relations was primarily observed on issues related to the China Lobby and the support of Chiang Kai Shek, Mansfield’s stature as rising Democratic leader permitted him to exert influence on a wide range of domestic and foreign issues. Judd was a Republican whose career in the House began in 1943 and ended in 1963. Mansfield’s influence rose with the strength of the Democrats over the Republicans in Congress and his successful switch to become Senator from Montana in 1953; although starting as a House Democrat in 1943 Mansfield’s status and influence soared after 1953 as he became the Democratic Whip from 1957 to 1961 and Senate Majority Leader from 1961 to 1977. As an Asahi Shimbun journalist pointed out in an essay, Japanese opinion, political, and business leaders flocked to Senator Mansfield for advice on U.S.-Japan relations in the 1960s and 1970s as tensions mounted over bilateral trade issues.50

Conclusion

Looking back shortly before his death in February 1953, Thomas wrote an essay about his life. In it was the essence of his Wilsonian world view combined with his experience in Japan:

When the Second World War started, as I look back on my feelings in regard
to if and what I did, I discovered that I reacted wholly and completely to form. America must win, so that American theories could be spread throughout the world. The American Revolution seemed to have meaning in thinking of the two world wars, and the dignity of man could only become worldwide under American auspices. . . . I also gave myself over wholeheartedly to psychological warfare. I had studied in Italy, Germany, and Japan. The Office of War Information used my name almost everywhere, but I, in a sense, concentrated my own efforts on my messages to the Japanese people, which I started in December, 1941, right after Pearl Harbor, and continued up until 1946. In those messages I had but one theme, and that was that Japan was ruining herself, because she had turned apostate to the best ideals that Japanese civilization had developed.

In insisting on a constitutional surrender, Thomas was criticized for his support for retaining Japanese Emperor for that purpose but in retrospect he argued that he was proven right by Japan’s orderly surrender after the Emperor issued the rescript. “The opposition to my ideas by those who wanted to destroy and bring anarchy in Japan, hurt me in much the same as all prejudicial opposition has hurt me. But in this activity, as in my religious activity, I was sustained by a sense of knowing that I was right.”

Towards the end of 1952 Thomas visited Japan with a group of American government officials for the first time since 1912. Thomas’s visit to Japan occurred shortly after the U.S. tested in November the hydrogen bomb in the South Pacific, an area that fell under his ambassadorial jurisdiction. Given his October 1945 article about atomic weapons, Thomas undoubtedly felt uneasy and sensed danger for mankind in facing new advancement in nuclear weapons. During his brief stay in Tokyo Thomas visited the Yasukuni shrine to pay his respects to thousands of Japanese soldiers who perished in the Pacific War. His ambassadorial jurisdiction was not only the center of a potential nuclear nightmare but grave sites for thousands of Americans, Japanese, Pacific Islanders, and others who lost their lives in the Pacific War.
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Notes

1 Thomas’s biographical chronology used in this paper is found in the finding aid for the Elbert D. Thomas Papers, Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereafter referred to as the Thomas Papers). With regard to Thomas’s obituary, see the 23 February 1953 edition of Time.


3 Thomas, “Elbert D. Thomas,” 147-50. On Thomas’s meetings with the Tokugawas, see Thomas to Chiyo Telford, 14 September 1951, Chiyo Thomas Telford Papers, Special Collections, University of San Diego, La Jolla, California.

4 Seiki o Koete: Beyond the Century Suejitsu Seito Iesu Kirisuto Kyokai Dendo Hyakunen no Ayumi, 78-82, 86-88, 93, 100-01.


8 See the 1 December 1941 entry of the diary kept by his wife in Box 4 of the Thomas Papers.
10 See the transcript of the 14 July 1945 broadcast by the National Broadcasting Company, 5, “1945 Aug. 18 Japan after Surrender,” Box 78, Thomas Papers.
11 Congressional Record, Appendix, 6 September 1945, A4065-A4067, “Five Messages to the Japanese People,” Box 78, Thomas Papers.
15 Thomas, Four Fears.
16 Thomas, Four Fears, 7, 42-43, 45, 69, 87, 94, 102, 111, 130.
20 Thomas, Four Fears, 158-59.
21 Ibid., 158-60, 162.
22 Ibid., 160-64.
23 Ibid., 166-67.
25 Ibid., 159-60, 164.
26 Ibid., 147.
27 See the transcript of the 14 July 1945 broadcast by the National Broadcasting Company, 5-8, 12, 20, “1945 Aug. 18 Japan after Surrender,” Box 78, Thomas Papers.
31 Elbert D. Thomas, “Atomic Bombs in International Society,” The American Journal of Interna-
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tional Law 39, no. 4 (October 1945): 736.
32 Ibid., 737.
33 Ibid., 738.
34 Ibid., 738.
37 Ibid., 739.
39 Ibid., 162.
40 Ibid., 163.
41 Ibid., 164.
42 Thomas to Colegrove, 1 August 1946, Colegrove Papers, Hoover Presidential Library.
43 Thomas, “Leadership in Asia,” 164.
44 Ibid., 165.
45 Thomas, “Atomic Bombs,” 743-44.
46 See Fellers’s 28 March 1945 memorandum to General MacArthur in Annex 6, 60-61, PWB report, RG 4, USAFPAC, Box 56, MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, VA. In addition, see Fellers to Colonel Carter W. Clarke, 19 March 1944, Box 19, Folder 20, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University. In this letter, Fellers wrote the following:
“i am bitterly opposed to Imperialism, yet we must face facts. Americans face a certain destiny in the world. This destiny is to impart our way of life to other people. Never before has a nation possessed the energy, capacity, talent and genius [sic] which our country possess. There has never been another Middle West, a Chicago, a Detroit, a Henry Ford and a Walter Chrysler. Never before has there been a standard of living comparable to ours.
I do not mean that we must give every dirty nose Oriental a bottle of milk and a ham sandwich, but we can lend a hand. We can send scientists, teach other people how to develop their own resources. In this way backward people can have the pride of accomplishment in working out their own destiny.”
48 See the page between the Acknowledgements and table of contents section in Four Fears. Thomas stated in his 1948 article that he made this statement in 1943; see Elbert D. Thomas, “Leadership in Asia,” 165.
49 Colegrove to G.B. Heal, 20 October 1950, Thomas to Colegrove, 8 November 1950; Thomas to Colegrove, 29 November 1950; Colegrove to Truman, 4 December 1950; Hassett to Colegrove, 16 December 1950; Colegrove to Thomas, 22 December 1950, “Elbert Thomas,” Colegrove Papers, Hoover Presidential Library.


52 The exact dates of Thomas’s Japan visit is not known at this point but in a letter addressed to his daughter in January 1953 he mentioned his recent stay in Japan, see Thomas to Chiyo Thomas Telford, 17 January 1953, Chiyo Thomas Telford Papers, University of California, San Diego Special Collections. Thomas’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine is mentioned on page 82 of the history of the Mormon Church in Japan published in 2002 by the Church of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) in Japan: *Seiki of Koete: Beyond the Century Suejitsu Seito Iesu Kirisuto Kyokai Dendo Hyakunen no Ayumii*. 