

Fish Caught in a Casting Net: The Japanese Defense of Okinawa, 1945

絶望と希望の狭間で —沖繩防衛戦をめぐる日本の戦争指導—

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沖繩防衛戦は、第32軍終焉の地、摩文仁高地での最後の抵抗に至るまで、一連の誤報、誤判断、一次凌ぎとしか言えないような戦略・戦術の安易な変更、恐怖心と焦り、そして、絶望感の繰り返しであった。しかも、陸海軍間の激しい競争意識と相互の疑惑や不信感によって、戦況は一層悪化した。しかしながら、日本の戦争指導者たちは、非現実的な楽観主義と近視眼的な希望的観測だけを頼りに、態勢の挽回を図るため、はなかい希望に必死に取りすがっていたのである。その意味で、最近発掘された第6航空軍司令官菅原道大中将の日記は、その間の事情を明らかにする貴重な第一級史料である。

ここでまず問題となるのは大本営陸軍部の対沖繩戦略構想であり、特に空軍力に期待するところ大であり、新設の32軍喫緊の任務が新飛行場の建設にあったという事実である。しかも、沖繩は「本土防衛の礎」という意味合いで当初から考えられていたものではなく、マリアナ諸島の「絶対国防圏」を守るための手段として位置付けられていた。

しかし、32軍先任作戦参謀の八原博通大佐は、マリアナ防衛に疑念を抱き、制海権と制空権の確保と維持が島嶼防衛の前提条件と常々考えていた。かくして中部太平洋地域における戦況の推移は、凶らずも八原参謀が最も恐れていたことを実証してしまったのである。

マリアナの陥落は、米軍による本土空襲の危険性を急速に増大させ、今度はフィリピンが新たな「決戦の地」とされた。しかし、海軍航空部隊による「台湾沖航空戦」は全くの誤報であり、強気の海軍は決戦を「レイテ島沖海戦」と航空戦に求めた。他方、海軍の戦果報告を真に受けた陸軍は、作戦計画をルソンからレイテに急遽変更した。しかし、ここでも再び

制海権と制空権が決定的要因となり、「捷1号作戦」は完全な敗北と帰してしまっただ。

そこで、大本営陸軍部は、沖縄戦の最大の狙いを、「最後の決戦」を戦うべき本土防衛のため可能な限り時間を稼ぎ、その間敵に最大限の出血と戦争資源の消費を強いることと考えるようになった。しかし、陸海空軍力による「水際撃滅戦」を信奉する余り、32軍に大きな期待を抱いてはいなかった。ところが、32軍は、首里の複郭陣地を中心とした「縦深戦術」による持久戦を選択したのである。大本営と第10方面軍は、何とか当初の計画通りに戦闘させ、米軍に対して大規模な反抗をさせようとしたが、32軍はその意のままには動かなかった。

他方、必死の回生を賭ける海軍は、特攻攻撃により最後の最後まで悲壮なまでに楽観主義を貫き、陸軍に「逆上陸作戦」を強要し、余りにも消極的としか映らない32軍の戦闘をしばしば督励するほどであった。海軍は沖縄の戦闘開始直前に「九州沖航空戦」を戦い、第5航空艦隊が潰滅的打撃を受けていたのにかかわらずである。

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On L-Day, April 1, 1945, Operation Iceberg, even more impressive than the much documented Normandy operation with the largest armada ever assembled in the Pacific, was finally put into practice. Sixth Air Army Commander Lieutenant General Sugawara Michio wrote in his diary:

This morning, went to office with halfhearted expectation for the news of a smashing victory. Waited impatiently until afternoon. With no such news, I could not help but feel grouchy.¹

Gen. Sugawara then continued: “I was about to dash off a poem, when my chief of staff reported that the 1st Assault Group could not make advance. The reason being poor repair and maintenance, I had to

conclude that our side had lost the time to strike. However, it was understandable in view of the fact that the Assault Groups were a haphazard motley of *kamikaze* units.”²

A slight false step at the very outset of the defense of Okinawa turned out to be a bad omen. For, when seen from the vantage of strategy and tactics, what followed from the beginning of the campaign until the last stand of the shambling 32nd Army on the Hill of Mabuni, site of Lt. Gen. Ushijima Mitsuru’s headquarters cave, was a series of misinformation, miscalculations, misconceptions, haphazard changes of strategy and tactics, fears and frustrations, and total despair, all of which were to a large extent aggravated by fierce, cutthroat interservice Army-Navy rivalry as well as by morbid suspicions and mutual distrust shared equally by the two services. But, in spite of all of this, Japan’s wartime military leaders continued to cling to what little hope was left, encouraged by bizarre optimism and myopic wishful thinking. Indeed, they desperately hoped against hope for a change to restore the ever worsening battle situation.

On the first day of landing, the enemy forces quickly occupied both North (Yomitan) and Central (Kadena) airfields. Sugawara writes three days later in a most gloomy and yet intensely cynical mood:

Now that things have come to this pass, who cares about the consequences? We may have to throw in all the available forces in desperation. I seriously wonder to what effect the superbattleship *Yamato*’s action will have on the course of the battle? I have heard that due to the fuel shortage other ships are incapable of making any move.... When this is disclosed to the Japanese people, their distrust of the Navy will certainly bear out distrust of our air power. Is Army capable of succeeding by itself? One rambling thought after another comes in to my mind.³

About the *Yamato*, suffice to mention here that the world's largest ship had to be given only enough fuel for a one-way trip with no air cover whatsoever, and that she made her fateful sortie on April 6 to be sunk on the following morning attacked by swarms of American carrier aircraft from Task Force 58.

Gen. Sugawara's pessimistic view of the defensive campaign in Okinawa reaches the highest point when he continues: "...also, given the abilities of our *kamikaze* units, it is almost certain that the present operation will follow in the wake of the previous ones. Thus it fell out that ever since last year due to insufficient military preparations we have always been put at a great disadvantage against the enemy, repeating the same mistakes over and over."⁴

Because of acute distress and frustrations on the eve of the *Tengo* or "Heavenly" Operation, it soon became a habit for the general to take sleeping pills before he went to bed. Sometimes even they did not work, though. On that night two doses did not help, and he remained widely awake until four-thirty A.M. By then he was completely depressed and suspected a nervous breakdown.⁵

This may be the most rightful place to stop to make a comment on Gen. Sugawara's observations of the early battle situation in Okinawa. After reading his diary one cannot help but conclude that the general never expected such an early fall of the two airfields in enemy hands. On the same day, he writes: "The ground battle situation in Okinawa indicates that our side could neither keep nor recapture the two airfields and that today Americans have already made swift advance to the Eastern Beach."⁶

This is a *very* weird situation. Didn't the general know in advance that a quick surrender of those airfields without resistance had been a foregone conclusion of the 32nd Army prior to the opening of hostilities in Okinawa?

It was 32nd Army's most urgent "special" responsibility to complete the rapid construction of numerous airfields throughout the entire

Ryukyu Islands and to defend those airfields with a kind of “blood and guts” offensive spirit. The Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) had assigned such a mission to this new army before its activation in March 1944. It was expected without a shadow of doubt that the air power based there should be able to provide adequate defense of the so-called, “Tojo Line” in the Marianas in the Central Pacific.

Accordingly the defense of Okinawa was faithfully based on the principle of top priority for air power. However, senior staff officer of the 32nd Army, Colonel Yahara Hiromichi, the man largely responsible for making and actually executing its operations plans, could not wipe off a doubt about the impregnability of the defenses in the Marianas as persistently asserted by IGHQ’s Operations Section Chief Colonel Hattori Takushiro. But, airfield construction had to be rushed by means of “human wave” tactics, using picks and shovels.⁷

As Col. Yahara correctly stated the axiom in his memoirs, “There is no naval supremacy without air supremacy, and without naval supremacy there is no way to defend the Pacific islands.”⁸ So the events in 1944 and 1945 confirmed Yahara’s forebodings about the loss of the Marianas and the rapid disintegration of Japanese air power, “far beyond the worst-case scenarios of the Japanese staff planners.”⁹

In June 1944, the decisive battle of the Philippine Sea or “The Battle of the Marianas” in Japanese military parlance, was fought. However, in spite of Navy’s overly optimistic expectations to restore the war situation, the battle was a total disaster. With the annihilation of the Navy’s prized 1st Air Fleet, Naval air strength had almost been wiped out, while the Combined Fleet lost the main body of its carriers. It was extremely ironic that the Navy had to rely on land-based planes to fight this decisive battle, largely because of the lowered quality of carrier flyers. Moreover, while the Navy quickly diverted some 480 land-based planes to Halmahera upon American assault on Biak in late May, these malaria-stricken pilots became useless soldiers.¹⁰

Then in less than a month, Saipan which the Army had always

boasted as the “impregnable rampart on the Pacific” fell, and Guam and Tinian quickly followed suit. For American command of the sea and of the air transformed Japanese garrisons on the Mariana Islands into “fish caught in a casting-net”. Thus a do-or-die effort by the Japanese defenders quickly came to naught. The fall of Saipan sounded the death knell of the Tojo Cabinet, while the fiasco of the Imphal Operation in Burma from March through July due largely to gross underestimation of enemy strength and ignorance of logistics, was a heavy blow to IGHQ’s war planners and much discredited the Army.

The loss of the Mariana Islands as a result of “the Marianas Turkey Shoot” meant the creation of a wide gap in Tojo’s “absolute zone of national defense” in the Central Pacific region. This breach quickly facilitated American advance toward Japanese homeland and threatened its very security. Much to the distress to the Japanese war planners at IGHQ, the giant B-29s or Superforts began to bomb the main islands from Saipan and Guam in late September. The situation of the war plunged into a critical phase.

On the other hand, the next decisive battle was set in the Philippines. On the nights of October 13 and 14, air battles raged off Taiwan. The Navy, however, strangely overestimated its successes with the announcement that the Japanese side sank as many as eleven enemy aircraft carriers, inflicting many other heavy losses upon the American task force fleet.¹¹

Upon receiving this news which might as well have relegated Admiral Togo into the minuscule position, Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki shouted at the top of his voice that “The victory is now just *above our head sic*, or it is just around the corner.”¹² So, without realizing the bizarre nature of its totally unrealistic overestimation, the Navy was further encouraged to stage its “final” decisive battle-- the greatest naval battle ever fought- against the “remaining” enemy.

When American intention of landing on Leyte became increasingly apparent, “Operation *Sho-I*” or “Operation Victory Plan No. 1” was

finally implemented. IGHQ then assigned the job of fighting this decisive battle only to the Navy and the Air Force. According to IGHQ's operations plans, it was only when the Americans attacked Luzon that the Army would join in this decisive combat. This was largely due to the weakness of Army strength in the Philippines.¹³

However, IGHQ suddenly changed its existing operations plans and decided to conduct the Army's decisive battle not on Luzon but on Leyte. This was because of its gross misconception that American aircraft carrier strength had greatly dwindled. On the other hand, P.M. Koiso solemnly announced to the Japanese people on the radio broadcast that Leyte in this present great war meant *Tennozan*, or "a decisive struggle on which, for a time, they would stake everything".¹⁴

On October 18, when "Operation *Sho-I*" was formally implemented, the Operations Office of the 14th Area Army was packed with staff officers, and they were still pondering if a sudden emergence of enemy warships in the Gulf of Leyte was an indication of an imminent landing. In no time shocking news was brought in from the *kempetai* military police sources to the effect that the twelve enemy aircraft carriers were still intact and their planes were responsible for the present air raids on Luzon.

Major Hori Eizo was Commanding General Yamashita Tomoyuki's brilliant and yet cool senior intelligence officer, and he later won his reputation as "MacArthur's staff officer" because of his outstanding abilities in predicting the exact locations and proper timing of the anticipated enemy landings. According to his postwar recollections, each and every staff officer present at the meeting became utterly speechless at the news.¹⁵

None the less, "Operation Victory Plan No. 1" was once again a complete disaster. From the very beginning Gen. Yamashita had been strongly opposed to the decisive battle on Leyte. When he reached Manila only twelve days earlier, he found his troop strength miserably insufficient and no preparations were made to send military equipment

to Leyte. Yamashita also correctly judged that the Japanese side had already lost the command of the sea and of the air.¹⁶

Thereupon, IGHQ dispatched a special envoy comprising of vice chief of staff, Operations Section Chief Col. Hattori and others, to Manila in order to persuade him to give up his original ideas and to immediately send reinforcements to Leyte. Under such pressures, somewhat bureaucratic but certainly good-natured Field Marshal Terauchi Hisaichi, Commander in Chief of the Southern Army, Yamashita's boss, severely reprimanded him by saying, "Your Field Marshal is giving you an order, do you understand?"¹⁷ Poor Yamashita then had to give in, sacrificing the treasured two divisions (1st & 26th) on Luzon.

The Naval Battle of Leyte Gulf on October 24 almost completely wiped out the remaining naval strength, with 24 warships including Superbattleship *Musashi* and four carriers going down to the bottom of the Philippine Sea. On the following day, Navy's first *kamikaze* suicide unit in a desperate but futile attempt to retrieve the battle situation, made its first attack on American warships.

By now I suspect that I have expended too many words to explain the rapid disintegration of Japanese air power prior to the Battle of Okinawa from the loss of the Marianas to the fall of the Philippines. Now to change somewhat the direction of my story, let me discuss the strategic aspect of the Battle of Okinawa, as I think disruption and disparities in grand strategy on the significance of the defense of Okinawa predestined the tragedy of the 32nd Army. This was where fierce interservice rivalry occurred.

From the outset of operational planning the Army had thought that the defense of Okinawa was *simply* a means to gain time for preparations of homeland defense. That is, by fighting a bloodiest yard-by-yard *jikyusen* or "war of attrition" and by so coercing the enemy to shed blood as well as waste its war materiel for the maximum time period in Okinawa, the Army pinned its desperate hopes to fight the

“final” decisive battle in the homeland. Thus Okinawa was considered to be an important stepping stone to facilitate a *real* decisive struggle in the homeland.

The Army then was on its way to deploying some sixty divisions on Mainland Japan, with major concentrations in southern Kyushu and the Kanto region. Under the circumstances where the command of the sea and of the air was unmistakably in enemy hands, it was impossible to send reinforcements to an isolated island bastion, nor to expect a decisive battle to be fought there.

However, impudent and fearless Major General Cho Isamu, Ushijima’s chief of staff, originally demanded five divisions on the main island of Okinawa. He did so by intimidating the General Staff Office, saying, “If Okinawa should fall because you did not take my recommendations, the section heads of the General Staff Office will have to commit *seppuku*.”¹⁸ However, IGHQ’s halfhearted gift for the 32nd Army ended up with only two (24th and 62nd) divisions and one brigade (44th Independent Mixed Brigade) after a sudden transfer of the mighty 9th Division to Taiwan, thusly gravely weakening the defense capabilities in Okinawa. It was later decided, however that the 84th Division should be dispatched to fill the gap. But Operations Bureau Chief Lt. Gen. Miyazaki Shuichi intervened and suspended the decision. Miyazaki thought it more urgent and practical to build up military preparations in the homeland rather than risking the division at the mercy of U.S. submarines.¹⁹

The Army had been much less confident of victory in the *Tengo* Operation than the Navy, but IGHQ did not dare to change its operational plans for Okinawa. It will not be necessary to repeat the background history of such misgivings. However, the plans adopted for the battle in Okinawa were based on the policy of IGHQ to use the navy and air force to crush advancing enemy forces at sea. Under these plans the ground units were needed only to mop up enemy remnants after their landing.

The 32nd Army was by far more suspicious of the fighting strength of the Navy and Air Force than IGHQ. So Col. Yahara, the mastermind and executioner of 32nd Army's operations plans, seriously questioned the viability or a "fighting chance" of his troops against swarms of invading Americans should they land without sustaining much damage. Although it was a great shock, he was very quick to realize that IGHQ did *NOT* have any specific guidelines for coordination of air, land and sea forces for the coming campaign in Okinawa.²⁰

The end result of such thinking was a complete change in the existing operational plans: 32nd Army's decision against a "beachhead attack" or "destruction of the enemy invaders at the water's edge"; abandoning of Yomitan and Kadena airfields; *jushin* tactics or "defense in depth" so that the main force was to be concentrated behind several heavily fortified lines north of army headquarters at Shuri Castle; and the tactics of delay that would impose on the enemy staggering losses not only in time but in still more valuable life and equipment. This was a clear departure from Army's orthodox island defenses. In sharp contrast, by fighting a "war of attrition" 32nd Army wanted to fight for time for the sake of homeland defense, but not victory.²¹

On the other hand, the Navy saw *Tengo* Operation as the last opportunity to score a "great, redeeming victory" in spite of its intensely aggravating naval and air strength. The Navy staff officers were confident of their final victory over Americans in Okinawa, and they suspected that the Army was not willing to cooperate with them in launching an all-out air strike against invading Americans. They often blamed the Army for not doing enough or not committing as many suicide planes as it should to the critical defense of Okinawa. For they thought that the Army was still largely restrained by the thinking that homeland defense and its military preparations for the final battle there were much more important than the battle of Okinawa. Needless to say, their suspicions were well grounded.²²

The Navy's such line of thinking was largely derived from three

reasons. First, with its surface fleets including its most precious aircraft carriers and battleships completely wiped out in the past unfortunate “decisive” encounters with Americans, its only remaining strength was air power without qualification. Second, the Navy’s operations staff officers thought that if air power was really useless in stopping the enemy at Okinawa, its role in homeland defense would be seriously curtailed and become meaningless. Third, the Navy was still encouraged by the grossly overestimated performance in the recent battles. Here again, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Okinawa, the Navy repeated the same grave mistakes.

On March 17, the Combined Fleet picked up the information to the effect that the American task force fleet was on its way to launch an attack on Kyushu. It was the time when the days left for the remaining Japanese garrisons on Iwo Jima were numbered. The views severely conflicted between the Combined Fleet and the 5th Air Fleet as to how to deal with a sudden appearance of a new opportunity to deliver a heavy blow to the Americans.

According to the basic principles of *Tengo* Operation plans, it was agreed that an attack would be withheld should the enemy task force fleet not be accompanied by landing units on transport ships. Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Toyoda Soemu radioed to the 5th Air Fleet headquarters his order to stick to this principle and withhold an attack. However, 5th Air Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Ugaki Matome was adamant in disobeying the order, and he finally carried the day.

On the following day, 5th Air Fleet launched its air attacks and continued its engagement for the next two days. It unwittingly claimed that it had achieved great results in the battle by sinking five enemy aircraft carriers, two battleships, one large cruiser, two medium-sized cruisers, etc. On the entry of March 20, Gen. Sugawara wrote: “At night heard the results of Navy’s twilight attacks. They claimed sinking of two enemy aircraft carriers. It seems like Americans sustained heavy

damages. Should things remain as they are, the enemy advance to Okinawa will be impossible.”²³

This was again a gross overestimation!! In fact, only one carrier, *Franklin* was severely damaged. In sharp contrast to this, 5th Air Fleet lost 80 percent of its planes out of 193, while sustaining 50 heavily damaged on the ground. This was indeed a great aerial disaster. On March 28 and 29, the enemy task force fleet assaulted Kyushu for the second time, but weakened 5th Air Fleet did not possess sufficient fighting strength to counter the enemy. This, indeed was a replay of the air battle off Taiwan.

In the coming decisive air battle of Okinawa, Navy’s 5th Air Fleet was expected to play a major role. But, as we have just seen, the air battle off Kyushu dissipated its remaining strength, and it was not ready for another major battle, nor was it able to recoup its losses. Moreover, the 3rd and 10th Air Fleets, the reinforcements for *Tengo* Operation, to be deployed in Kyushu under the command of the 5th Air Fleet, were still suffering from poor training of pilots and miserable repair and maintenance.

In spite of all of this, the Navy remained confident of its victory in Okinawa. On the other hand, as early as April 7, upon hearing the shocking news of *Yamato*’s most tragic fate, Gen. Sugawara wrote in his diary: “Alas! All hope is gone. The chance for the success of *Tengo* is thus greatly diminished. This, largely due to the impossibility to restrain the activities of enemy task force fleets. The Navy’s plans are gradually on the way to collapse.”²⁴

Ad. Toyoda was adamant and still clinging to what little hope was left for a smashing victory. On April 17, he sent a message to Gen. Sugawara that the Army should carry out an all-out running fight against the enemy landing forces and that it should dauntlessly attempt “counter landings” on Okinawa. Sugawara immediately took up this desperate proposal from the Navy, and ordered his chief of staff to inform Vice Chief of Army General Staff General Kawabe Torashiro

by calling. But this proposal was flatly rejected on account of its unrealistic nature.²⁵

Four days later, on April 21, the Combined Fleet issued the following directive.

In order to retrieve the battle situation by finally upholding the air operations as well as by executing counter landings on Okinawa when a good opportunity arises, the Combined Fleet will:

- (1) strengthen the fighting power of the 5th Air Fleet by extracting the air power of the 3rd and 10th Air Fleets as much as possible so that it can enforce Operation *Tengo* with its all-out aerial might;
- (2) demand the Army to recoup 6th Air Army's fighting power and enforce the 6th Air Army to dedicate itself to the execution of *Tengo*;
- (3) try to promote close operational cooperation between Taiwan's 1st Air Fleet and the 8th Air Division.²⁶

On the other hand, the 32nd Army wanted to execute its original operational plans for the war of attrition as designed by Col. Yahara. The army was technically under the command of the 10 Area Army stationed in Taiwan, but it remained unruly, sometimes openly challenging the authority of its upper organization.

At the outset of the battle, the 32nd Army was under heavy pressures for counteroffensive. On April 4, it decided to launch an offensive from the 7th, but on the 5th, it suddenly called it off. 10th Area Army Commander Lt. Gen. Ando Rikichi then ordered Gen. Ushijima to recapture the two airfields with the opening date set for April 8. But the 32nd Army suddenly cancelled the new offensive for the second time. Because it feared that a sudden appearance of 110 enemy transport ships off Machinato on the previous day might

indicate imminent enemy landing on its flanks. On the 12th, Gen. Ushijima finally started off the counteroffensive, but with heavy losses incurred he sent an order immediately to stop it.

To the eyes of IGHQ and the Navy, the passive if not overly cautious fighting attitude of the 32nd Army was simply unforgivable. The Navy became increasingly frustrated and furious. So were its Air Force units. On May 4, duty-conscious Gen. Ushijima launched an all-out counteroffensive, for the first and “last” time, with his entire forces available. However, on the next day, under enemy’s extremely heavy fires and bombardment, Ushijima had to suspend the entire operations. So he decided to return to the original positions and “finally” resort to the war of attrition that he desperately needed to recoup his dwindled forces. The damages of this haphazard counteroffensive were tremendous. For example, the 24th Division lost half of its fighting strength. In spite of all this, the Navy was still dreaming about recapturing the lost territories. On May 26, IGHQ issued a directive to the Commanding General of Air General Army to prepare for imminent aerial operations in the homeland with a focus on Kyushu and the Korean Channel Area.²⁷ With this new order, the Army formally stopped the *Tengo* Operation and shifted to the final battle in the mainland, whereas the Navy was still hoping against hope.

In June an aerial general offensive was carried out twice in a row, but without any significant battle results. In these two offensives a total of 502 planes were used, out of which 104 were *kamikaze*. 113 planes were lost in the battles. On June 22, the 32nd Army ceased its resistance, thusly ending the eighty-three days of a “blood and guts” desperate struggle. The Navy finally gave up its aerial operations in early July.

On June 8, upon seriously reflecting on the general war situation including the most tragic battle on Okinawa, Marquis Kido Koichi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal wrote in his diary his unflinching will to ask the emperor to shore up his courage in endorsing a most difficult

policy for peace.²⁸ On June 22, Emperor Hirohito revealed his innermost feelings to Kido, encouraging him to study immediately the proper means to terminate the war and attain peace in complete disregard of the hitherto orthodox ideas and conflicting opinions.²⁹ But the government's policy thusly selected was again a most desperate attempt to approach Stalin's Russia as an honest broker for peace. Japan was doomed to crumble on its knees.

注

- 1 Sugawara Michio, "*Sugawara shogun no nikki*" [General Sugawara's Diary], *Kaiko*, No. 539 (November 1995), p. 17.
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 4 *Ibid.*, pp. 18-9.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 7 Yahara Hiromichi, *The Battle for Okinawa* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), p. 8.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 10 Mineo Kyudai, *Sanbo honbu no abaremono: Rikugun sanbo Asaeda Shigeharu* [The Rowdy at the Army General Staff Office: Asaeda Shigeharu](Bungei Shunju, 1992), pp. 253-4. Also see Paul S. Dull, *A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978), pp. 303-10.
- 11 Mineo, p. 259.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 258.
- 14 George Feifer, *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992), xi; Hori Eizo, *Daihon'ei sanbo no joho senki* [Recollections of IGHQ's Intelligence Officer]

- (Bungei Shunju, 1989), p. 157.
- 15 Hori, p. 155.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 158.
- 17 Mineo, p. 268; Hori, p. 161.
- 18 Yahara, p. 15.
- 19 Boeicho Boeikenshusho Senshishitsu [Defense Agency, National Defense College, War History Office], *Senshi sosho* [Military History Series], Vol. 17: *Okinawa homen rikugun sakusen* [Army Operations in the Okinawa Area] (Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1968), pp. 167-8.
- 20 Yahara, p. 13.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- 22 Robert Leckie, *Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II* (New York: Viking, 1995), pp. 19-20.
- 23 Sugawara, *Kaiko*, No. 538 (October 1995), p. 17.
- 24 *Ibid.*, No. 539 (November 1995), p. 22.
- 25 *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.
- 26 Hattori Takushiro, *Daitoa senso zenshi* [The Complete History of the Great East Asia War] (Hara Shobo, 1965), p. 805.
- 27 Boeicho Boeikenshusho Senshishitsu, p. 547.
- 28 Kido Koichi, *Kido Koichi nikki* [Kido Koichi's Diary], Vol. 2 (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), pp. 1208-9.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp. 1212-3.