Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations under Authoritarianism:

Focusing on the Choices and Practices of Semi-Presidentialism

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Abstract: Comparative executive-legislative relations have been central to analysis on democratic performance and survival. Then what about dictatorship? Specifically, why have executive-legislative relations been rarely addressed in authoritarian literatures? How diverse are executive-legislative relations under dictatorship? Do these varieties matter in authoritarian regimes? This study attempts to answer these questions by reviewing both of the literatures on authoritarian institutions and democratic executive-legislative relations, presenting a universe of regime subtypes, namely, presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and parliamentarism under dictatorship, and reorganizing several choices and practices of semi-presidentialism within the context of authoritarianism. This paper points out inter-indifference between the two main sets
of literatures as a reason for the limited attention paid to authoritarian executive-legislative relations. Then, the tentative list of the three regime subtypes highlights the relatively recent and growing feature of semi-presidentialism, which still awaits examination even in the newly emerging authoritarian literatures. Subsequently, by reconstructing the choices and practices of semi-presidentialism under dictatorship, the author demonstrates how executive-legislative relations are worthy of consideration, as distinctive institutional arrangements different from their democratic counterparts.

**Keywords:** authoritarianism, institutions, executive-legislative relations, regime subtypes, semi-presidentialism

1. Introduction

Comparative executive-legislative relations have been central to analysis on democratic performance and survival. Then what about dictatorship\(^1\)?

Executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism have received little attention, despite the burgeoning literature on authoritarian institutions since the 2000s.

\(^1\) Throughout this paper, the terms “authoritarianism,” “dictatorship,” and “non-democracy” are used interchangeably.
These studies have closely examined how seemingly democratic institutions contribute to the endurance of dictatorships. The challenges facing authoritarian leaders, namely coordination within the ruling coalition and with the opposition\(^2\), can be alleviated by legislatures (e.g. Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Svolik 2012; Wright 2008), executive and/or legislative elections (e.g. Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Simpser 2013) and political parties (e.g. Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006; 2008; Svolik 2012). Executive institutions have not been neglected in these literatures: features of ruling coalition or power bases (i.e. how chief executives are selected and ousted) have been central to varieties of authoritarianism. Based on these standpoints, Geddes (1999) sub-classifies dictatorships into military, personalist, single-party, and hybrid types, and Cheibub et al. (2010) identifies monarchy, military and civilian ones. In spite of the growing contributions, executive-legislative relations remain under examined.

On the other hand, research on comparative executive-legislative relations is generally and implicitly limited to democratic regimes. With some exceptions, these analyses have mainly taken the two forms, namely regime subtypes and institutional

\(^2\) Here, coordination refers to arrangement of spoils, which takes various forms including sharing of economic privileges or official posts, or influence on political appointments or policies. Coordination within the ruling coalition is also referred to as “power-sharing (e.g. Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012),” and coordination with the opposition as “cooptation (e.g. Gandhi 2008)” in the literatures on authoritarianism.
dimensions, as discussed below. Even in the case of several works that list every country with a particular constitutional form of executive-legislative relation both under democracy and dictatorship (e.g. Elgie 2011a), authoritarian regimes have not been the subject of empirical analysis as such.

Then, why have executive-legislative relations been rarely addressed in authoritarian literatures? How diverse are executive-legislative relations under dictatorship? Moreover, do these varieties matter in authoritarian regimes? The present paper seeks to address these questions by examining the current insight on executive-legislative relations, presenting a universe of presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and parliamentarism in authoritarianisms and reorganizing choices and practices of semi-presidentialism within the context of authoritarianism. The second section overviews the literature on executive-legislative relations under democratic regimes and the recent developments in their authoritarian counterparts. Even in the newly emerging literature, the dual-executive system (i.e. semi-presidentialism) has yet to be examined. The third section provides a partial list of presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary forms of authoritarianism. Finally, in the fourth section, theoretical discussions on choices and practices of semi-presidentialism are reconstructed within the context of coordination within the
ruling coalition and with the opposition under authoritarianism.

2. Classifying and Operationalizing Executive-Legislative Relations

Based on a review of the previous works on democratic executive-legislative relations, this section classifies and operationalizes presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems. The existing works on executive-legislative relations can mainly be divided into two approaches\(^3\). Table 1 shows the main contributions, datasets, and advantages and disadvantages of the two perspectives that have been selected for the purpose of this paper.

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\(^3\) The veto player approach (Tsebelis 2002) may be included, but it is beyond the framework of this paper due to its level of abstraction; however, the idea is utilized in other works discussed below (e.g. O’Malley 2007).
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<td><strong>Trichomy: Presidentialism, Semi-presidentialism, and Parliamentarism</strong></td>
<td>Duverger 1980 [substantial]</td>
<td>Presidentialism, Semi-presidentialism, Parliamentarism</td>
<td>election of the president by universal suffrage; president’s considerable powers; and presence of a prime minister and ministers which have executive power and are responsible to the parliament</td>
<td>Shugart &amp; Carey 1992 [constitutional]</td>
<td>Presidential Powers</td>
<td>1. legislative: package veto/override; partial veto/override; decree; exclusive introduction of legislation; budgetary powers; and proposal of referenda; 2. nonlegislative: cabinet formation; cabinet dismissal; censure; and dissolution of assembly</td>
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<td>Elgie 1999 [constitutional]</td>
<td>Presidentialism, Semi-presidentialism, Parliamentarism</td>
<td>direct election of the president for fixed term; and prime minister and cabinet being responsible to legislature</td>
<td>Metcalf 2000 [constitutional]</td>
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<td>judicial review added to the legislative powers identified by Shugart and Carey (1992)</td>
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<td>Przeworski et al. 2000 [constitutional]</td>
<td>Presidentialism, Mixed, Parliamentarism</td>
<td>government’s responsibility to the elected president; and to the legislative assembly</td>
<td>Siaroff 2003 [substantial]</td>
<td>Prime Ministerial or Parliamentary Powers</td>
<td>popularly elected president; concurrent election of president and legislature; discretionary appointment powers; chairing of cabinet meetings; right of veto; long-term emergency and/or decree powers; central role in foreign policy; central role in government formation; and ability to dissolve the legislature</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shugart 2005 [constitutional]</td>
<td>Presidentialism, Semi-presidentialism (President-parliamentary, Premier-presidential), Parliamentarism</td>
<td>the prime minister and cabinet being dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority or exclusively accountable to the assembly majority (especially regarding subtypes of Semi-presidentialism)</td>
<td>O’Malley 2007 [substantial]</td>
<td></td>
<td>(prime ministerial) freedom to select ministers in own party; to select ministers in other party; to dismiss ministers in own party; to dismiss ministers in other party; to convoke elections; to determine the cabinet agenda; and to determine the parliamentary agenda</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cheibub et al. 2010 [constitutional]</td>
<td>Presidential, Semi-presidential, Parliamentary</td>
<td>the government being responsible to the assembly; and popular election of the head of state for a fixed term</td>
<td>Fish &amp; Kroenig 2009 [substantial]</td>
<td></td>
<td>(parliamentary) influence over the executive: to replace executive, to serve as ministers, to summon and hear executive, to independently investigate the chief executive, to oversight the agencies of coercion, to appoint the prime minister, and to confirm/appoint ministers (as other parliamentary dimensions, institutional autonomy, specific powers, and institutional capacity omitted here)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Subtypes</strong></td>
<td>Shugart &amp; Carey 1992</td>
<td>Presidentialism, President-parliamentarism,</td>
<td>popular election of the president for a fixed term; cabinet’s responsibility to the parliament; president’s powers to</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suitable to grasp the whole picture of the cases in question</td>
<td>Unable to inform each value of each variable when aggregated, and possible to be based on an inaccurate weighting of values</td>
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<tr>
<td>Able to uniquely inform each value of most representative variables when defined in clear, mutually-exclusive, and collectively-exhaustive terms</td>
<td>Unsuitable to grasp the whole picture of the cases in question</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Powers of Multiple Political Actors:
- Cheibub et al. 2014 [constitutional] executive veto, executive decree, emergency, legislative initiation, legislative oversight, cabinet appointment
- Teorell & Lindberg 2015 [substantial] selection of chief executive; hereditary (hereditary succession or appointment by a royal council); military (threat/application of force or appointment by the military); single-party (appointment by the ruling party in a one-party system), presidential (direct election of chief executive); parliamentary (likely power of the legislature to remove the head of state/government from office); and dual executive (head of state ≠ head of government)

Premier-presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Assembly-independent
- appoint and dissolve cabinet ministers; and to dissolve parliament and/or legislative powers

Beck et al. 2001 [constitutional]
- Presidentialism, Assembly-elected
- Presidentialism, Parliamentarism
- election of the president; presidential veto power; presidential power to appoint and dismiss prime minister and/or other ministers; presidential power to dissolve parliament and call for election; election of the chief executive by the legislature; and easiness for assembly to recall the chief executive

Major Datasets of Institutional Dimensions

[constitutional] refers to understanding of executive-legislative relations based on political institutions.
[substantial] refers to understanding of executive-legislative relations based on actual practice.
2.1. Approach 1: Regime Subtypes

First, executive-legislative relations are treated as regime subtypes mainly within a democratic regime. Traditionally, executive-legislative relations were understood as a dichotomy, i.e. presidentialism and parliamentarism. Recently, however, it often appears as trichotomy, which has its roots in the formulation of the concept of semi-presidentialism by Duverger (1980) and in its modification by Sartori (1997). Initially, definitions of semi-presidentialism were essentially substantial, as typically seen in the conditions such as the “quite considerable powers” of the president (Duverger 1980, 166). Robert Elgie later reformulated the definition in a purely constitutional manner: “the situation where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament (1999, 13).” As mentioned below, however, compared with presidentialism and parliamentarism, it has not been widely accepted as a form of executive-legislative relations or as one of the regime subtypes within a democracy. For instance, semi-presidentialism does not appear as a value of the SYSTEM variable in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001). Or, Shugart and Carey (1992, 18-27) classified democracies in which presidents were popularly elected into the five subtypes without referring to semi-presidentialism, while Shugart (2005) has
later redefined their premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism as the two subtypes of semi-presidentialism. That said, the tripartite classification (presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and parliamentarism) has become one of the most widespread understandings of varieties of executive-legislative relations or democratic governing forms. For example, building on Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000), which classified democracies into presidential, parliamentary, or mixed systems in mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive terms, Cheibub and Chernykh (2009, 209) dealt with the mixed regime as semi-presidentialism, following Elgie’s (1999) definition, which is subsequently reflected in Cheibub et al. (2010). In their scheme, Cheibub et al. (2010) identify democratic regimes in which cabinets are not responsible to the legislature as presidentialism; out of the rest, regimes where the head of state is elected for a fixed term fall into the category of semi-presidentialism or mixed regime; and the others qualify for the type of parliamentarism. Dividing democracies explicitly in two dimensions and in a mutually exclusive way, their taxonomy enjoys analytical advantages as a typological approach: it makes it easier to capture the complete picture of the cases in question, and uniquely specify values of most representative variables. This classification also clearly emphasizes the “mixed,” not intermediate, nature of semi-presidentialism: it combines
both direct election of the head of state as a presidential principle on the one hand, and
government’s responsibility to the legislature as a parliamentary one on the other hand.
Thus, despite these attempts to sophisticate the trichotomy of executive-legislative
relations, their effects on democratic survival and performance have not been
empirically supported. Following Linz (1990), which type of government can be
beneficial or harmful for newly introduced democracies has been the main subject of
varieties of democracy. In particular, Siaroff (2003) and Cheibub and Chernykh (2009)
are among those who raise questions about the validity of the classification approach,
especially of the category of semi-presidentialism.

In turn, why have the scholars of executive-legislative relations paid attention
solely to democracy rather than directing their interest to authoritarianism as well? The
first possible reason may be the fact that they have little interest in the roles of
institutions under authoritarianism to begin with. Although their purely constitutional
conceptualization of semi-presidentialism has enabled some scholars to list all regimes
with semi-presidential constitutions regardless of whether they are democratic or
authoritarian (e.g. Elgie 2007; 2011a; 2011b; Wu 2011), their focus has been generally
and implicitly limited to democracy or democratization, as well as to the survival of
“new democracies.” Their limited attention to dictatorship stems at least partially from
the assumption that “…constitutional stipulations would have limited, if any, effect in” non-democracies (Wu 2011, 39, also Moestrup 2011, 136). This idea seems reasonable, but to play limited roles is one thing, and to play no role is another, as demonstrated by a series of authoritarian literatures (e.g. Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2012). Secondly, the scarcity of studies on authoritarian executive-legislative relations may derive from perceived and/or real dissimilarities between the forms of executives of democracy and dictatorship. It can be best described by citing Cheibub et al. (2010), which classifies democracy into the above subtypes and dictatorship into monarchy, military, and civilian types: “the way in which governments are removed from power” is important to distinguish both among democracy and among dictatorship, but “…in dictatorships, we know that there is no one institution, such as elections or lottery, which determines the removal and succession of authoritarian leaders”; thus, they stress “inner sanctums,” which most frequently pose a threat to individual dictators, as a means to classify among dictatorships (Cheibub et al. 2010, 84). It should be noted here, however, that the absence of a single, unified institution that defines rules for selecting and ousting leaders is not necessarily equivalent to the insignificance of institutions other than the characteristics of a ruling coalition. In fact, such authoritarian literatures have not ruled
out the possibility that executive-legislative relations are worthy of consideration.

Only recently have executive-legislative relations under dictatorship been explored with a particular attention. For example, Higashijima and Kasuya (2014) and Roberts (2015) adopt typological approaches. While they differ from one another in their ways to identify authoritarian regimes and other indicators of varieties of authoritarianism, they share the way of classifying authoritarian regimes with multi-party elections into two categories of executive-legislative relations based on the DPI (Beck et al. 2001): the first category combines parliamentary and assembly-elected systems and the second is presidential. In particular, the former argues that the first category is negatively correlated with the democratic transition from authoritarian regimes with electoral competition; the latter concludes that the first category of systems can prolong the tenure of ruling coalitions, but not that of dictators themselves. This paper shares their close attention to the causal importance of executive-legislative relations under dictatorship, but at the same time it should be noted that semi-presidentialism holds no distinct position in their studies because of the classification scheme of the DPI.
2.2. Approach 2: Institutional Dimensions

Institutional dimensions of powers possessed by presidents or other political actors constitute another approach to executive-legislative relations. Some scholars prefer to take a different approach because they believe that the existing regime subtypes alone cannot treat the variation in executive-legislative relations appropriately. There are at least three perspectives among such studies. Firstly, presidential powers have been the major issue within this approach. In addition to regime subtypes of democracies, Shugart and Carey (1992) suggested institutional dimensions of presidential powers (for detail, see Table 1), which were later modified by Metcalf (2000). On the other hand, Siaroff (2003) criticized their constitutional understanding and thus took into consideration actual practice, i.e. substantial aspects of presidential powers. The second set of works is about prime ministerial or parliamentary powers. O’Malley (2007) and Fish and Kroenig (2009) are characterized by their utilization of the expert survey. While the former provides the dataset on prime ministerial powers of parliamentary democracies, the latter introduces the dataset on parliamentary powers regardless of whether a country is democratic or authoritarian, including non-popularly elected assemblies such as the consultative council of Saudi Arabia. Third, several works treat powers of multiple political actors. Cheibub et al. (2014) includes a
legislature’s power along with presidential powers and covers authoritarian constitutions as well as democratic ones by drawing on the dataset of Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) (Elkins et al. 2014). A general advantage of such dimensional approaches lies in more detailed and nuanced understandings of executive-legislative relations as compared to typological approaches. On the other hand, aggregated scores of powers may make it difficult to inform each value of each variable or raise questions regarding weighting of values. Moreover, they have often adopted substantial characterization of powers of particular actors, rather than restricting themselves to constitutional terms of powers.

As in the case with typological approaches, it is only relatively recently that dimensional approaches have paid explicit attention to executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism. For instance, by utilizing the data of the CCP (Elkins et al. 2014), Gandhi (2014) examines the causal effects of specific presidential powers, namely the president’s unilateral powers to appoint cabinet members, to dismiss them, or to impose a state-of-emergency declaration, on coalition formation in presidential elections under authoritarianism. It demonstrates that unilateral powers of the president to dismiss cabinet ministers and to declare emergency and impede the opposition’s effort to coordinate. In addition, relying on the Varieties of Democracy Project
(V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2015), Teorell and Lindberg (2015) set five dimensions of executive appointment and dismissal, namely hereditary, military, single-party, presidential, and parliamentary principles plus an indicator of dual executive (e.g. semi-presidentialism), claiming that all these dimensions need to be addressed both for democracy and dictatorship. They show that the executive’s reliance on parliamentary confidence leads to a lower level of repression.

Thus, typological and dimensional approaches to executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism, albeit small in number, have started to examine whether executive-legislative relations can affect the survival of rulers, ruling coalitions, or regimes as well as the lives of the ruled under authoritarianism, and to show the significant findings to these questions.

2.3. Operationalization

Here the operationalization of executive-legislative relations in this paper is provided. This article adopts a typological approach based on the traditional three types of executive-legislative relations for the following two reasons.

First, a regime subtype approach is chosen because even the complete picture of executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism, which may be the basis for
empirical analyses, has not yet been systematically grasped in contrast to its
democratic counterparts. Certainly, while Gandhi (2014) and Teorell and Lindberg
(2015) have already taken into consideration institutional dimensions, this paper
cannot simply follow their approaches. The former focuses on dictatorships that have
popularly elected presidents, and does not aim to present a complete image including
regimes that lack presidents. While seemingly suitable for specifying countries with
each combination of executive-legislative relations, the latter measures the
parliamentary principle in particular based on subjective interpretations by country
experts on the likely consequences of a hypothetical situation.\textsuperscript{4} It would be highly
appropriate for other research themes, but for the purpose of this paper, that
executive-legislative relations are to be understood according to objective measures,
namely constitutional terms.

Second, this paper builds on the triparty classification of executive-legislative
relations, i.e. presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and parliamentarism. As to the
earlier works on executive-legislative relations relying on regime subtypes under
dictatorship (Higashijima and Kasuya 2014, Roberts 2015), both build their subtypes

\textsuperscript{4} The question states as follows: “If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took
actions to remove the head of state / government from office, would it be likely to succeed even
without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other
agency?” (Teorell and Lindberg 2015: 13).
on the SYSTEM variable of DPI (Beck et al. 2001), which explicitly classifies semi-presidentialism into either of the two systems, namely presidential or parliamentary ones. According to their coding rules (Keefer 2012, 3-4), systems which can be understood as semi-presidential in Elgie’s (1999) definition are deemed presidentialism under either condition: (1) “president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a supermajority to override the veto,” or (2) “president can appoint and dismiss prime minister and / or other ministers” and “president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections.” Otherwise, the systems fall into the category of parliamentarism. It is true that presidential veto powers and powers to appoint and dismiss premier and ministers as well as his or her power to dissolve parliament are parts of institutional dimensions of presidential powers stipulated by most works on this topic, and that they may be meaningful parts of definitions of executive-legislative systems. In addition, both studies mentioned above (Higashijima and Kasuya 2014; Roberts 2015) have shown significant effects of parliamentary and assembly-elected systems in the measures of DPI on survival of dictatorship or of a ruling coalition. Therefore, the suggestion here does not intend to cast doubt on the validity of their concepts regarding varieties of executive-legislative relations.

Rather, what this paper seeks is to cast light on another aspect of
executive-legislative relations, namely the number of executive(s).

Semi-presidentialism is characterized by its dual-executive in which the president as a head of state exists alongside the prime minister as a head of government and each post is authorized by popular confidence respectively. On the contrary, while presidentialism and parliamentarism differ in their forms of government in that the origin and survival of the executive and legislative branches are separate in the former and fused in the latter, both of them share a single-executive nature (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 2005). It is true that the common three types of executive-legislative relations, particularly semi-presidentialism, have not been necessarily widely accepted as regime subtypes of democracy as mentioned above, but this does not mean that it is also the case for dictatorship. In addition, the fact that semi-presidentialism has become increasingly a choice of newly introduced constitutions or constitutional amendments both for democracies (Wu 2011) and dictatorships (see below) and that dictators have taken the trouble to change their constitutional forms from another type to semi-presidentialism implies at least that the adoption, if not effect, of semi-presidentialism has some meaning to their political lives. Thus, following Cheibub et al. (2014), this paper operationalizes regimes as:
presidential if “the head of state is popularly elected (directly or indirectly) and the
government does not need assembly confidence in order to exist;” as
semi-presidential if “the head of state is popularly elected (directly or indirectly)
and the government needs to obtain the confidence of the legislative assembly in
order to exist;” or as parliamentary if “the head of state is a monarch or a president
elected by the existing legislature, and the government must obtain the confidence
of the legislature in order to remain in power,” in their constitutions (Cheibub et al.
2014, codebook, 2)

This operationalization makes it possible to capture the three types of
executive-legislative relations that shed light on the nature of the executive, i.e. single
or dual; to understand executive-legislative relations in purely constitutional and
mutually exclusive terms, by following Cheibub et al. (2010) discussed above; and to
classify both constitutions of democracies and dictatorships that are included in the
CCP (Elkins et al. 2014).

3. A Universe of Authoritarian Executive-Legislative Relations

This section presents a tentative universe of the three types of executive-legislative
relations under authoritarianism, which are to be understood as types rather than degree, and in minimalist and procedural terms. After identifying authoritarian country-years by Svolik’s (2012) “authoritarian spells” and “no authority spells,” the three types of executive-legislative relations are specified by Cheibub et al. (2014) as discussed in the previous section. In this scheme, not all of the regimes fall into any of these categories due to the features of single-executive forms unique to authoritarianism.

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5 Svolik’s “no authority spells” are included in order to cover continuous terms of constitutional structures.

6 In the single-executive cases of authoritarianism (particularly military rule and monarchy), some heads of states are not popularly elected and/or some heads of governments are not responsible to the legislatures. The cases in which neither heads of states nor heads of governments are responsible to the citizens/legislatures cannot be classified under any of the three types of executive-legislative relations here (e.g. Myanmar from 1988 to 2011, Libya from 1968 to 2011, and Saudi Arabia). In this sense, the scheme is not collectively exhaustive in the case of dictatorships.
Figure 1 illustrates a trend of numbers of authoritarianisms with each institutional subtype. Table 2 lists a partial universe of country-years with each executive-legislative relation. An important limitation of these should be noted: while Svolik’s (2012) dataset is complete, the CCP dataset is in progress and Cheibub et al.’s dataset (2014) reflects this fact. Therefore, some country-years included in Svolik’s (2012) “authoritarian spells” and “no authority spells” are absent in Table 2, but they are counted as “Authoritarianism without Data” in Figure 1.
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**Sub-Saharan Africa**  
Benin 1964, 90-91  
Angola 1975-  
Central African Republic 1976-78  

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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*The title and structure draw on table 18.1 of Shugart (2006: 351-352). **Authoritarianisms are identified by Svolik’s authoritarian spells and no authority spells (2012), and the executive-legislative relations are specified by Cheibub et al. (2014). Out of Svolik’s spells (2012), country-years that are unavailable in Cheibub et al. (2014) are absent here.
In spite of the limited nature of the universe, several points can be implied from the figure and table. Firstly, as seen in Table 2, all of the three types of authoritarianisms including the semi-presidential one have existed and been distributed across the regions. Second, the general trend in Figure 1 shows that presidentialism had been the modal type of executive-legislative relations when the number of dictatorships was largest in the 1970s, and semi-presidentialism is a relatively new option for dictators. While the missing data of the CCP make it difficult to list all of the country-years and to specify the proportion of each form of executive-legislative relations,\(^7\) there is still a general trend that semi-presidentialism is on the increase. It mirrors the increase of this type in newly democratized countries (Wu 2011) and coincides the period of democratization or proliferation of multi-party elections under authoritarianism in the early 1990s. Third, geographical spreads of the three types indicate that many countries have been influenced by the institutional arrangements of their past colonial powers. Certainly, presidentialism had been the major form of executive-legislative relations within authoritarianisms across regions as seen in Latin America (e.g. Mexico and Paraguay) and Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Cameroon and

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\(^7\) For example, as typical cases of authoritarianism, the Islamic Republic of Iran should fall into the category of presidentialism; Azerbaijan since 1995 should be classified as semi-presidential; and Iran under the Pahlavi Dynasty, Kuwait since 1980, Ethiopia since 1994, and Malaysia should be classified under parliamentarism.
Namibia). On the other hand, the other two types, namely semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism show certain trends in that semi-presidential authoritarianisms have been mainly found in the post-French (e.g. Algeria and Tunisia) or Portuguese colonies (e.g. Cape Verde and Mozambique) in the African continent and parliamentarism has been mainly distributed in the Asian countries affected by their British legacy (e.g. Bangladesh). However, there are also the authoritarianisms that have introduced or changed their type of executive-legislative relations that do not necessarily follow these geographical patterns.

In particular, semi-presidentialism has not been given attention in recent authoritarian executive-legislative literatures, despite the fact that it has grown in number and that some dictators have replaced another type of executive-legislative relations with semi-presidentialism. Therefore, the next part concentrates on the main choices and practices of semi-presidentialism.

4. Choices and Practices of Semi-presidentialism: Their Implications for Authoritarian Contexts

This section briefly summarizes the main choices and practices of semi-presidentialism often discussed in the literatures on executive-legislative relations, which have
implicitly focused on democracy, and explicitly extends them within the context of authoritarianism. Semi-presidentialism is known for its “easy to choose, difficult to operate” nature (Wu 2007) in the studies on newly democratized countries. The major two issues in the literature are reflected in this phrase: the first is the adoption of semi-presidentialism and the second is the varieties of practices, which can be traced back to Duverger (1980). Given this, how can the choices and practices of semi-presidentialism be organized within authoritarian contexts?

4.1. Choices

Choices of semi-presidential constitutions take one of two forms, namely (1) introduction: the situation where semi-presidentialism is adopted as the first form of executive-legislative relations after the establishment of new regimes and/or independent states; (2) amendment: the circumstance in which rulers change their relations from any other type to semi-presidentialism. As for the previous works, Elgie points out four different reasons for choosing semi-presidentialism (Elgie 2011b, 12-15): (1) to reach a middle ground between the supporters of presidentialism and parliamentarism (e.g. democratic transitions in Lithuania and Slovenia); (2) to appeal a democratic credential (e.g. the addition of presidency as the result of independence and
transition from a parliamentary monarchy in Iceland and Ireland); (3) to strengthen the executive power in unstable conditions (the introduction of direct elections of presidents in France and Turkey); and (4) to balance the presidential powers (adding premier posts and/or making the cabinets responsible to the legislatures in Georgia and Senegal). In addition, Wu offers the geographic and temporal tendencies in institutional choices of semi-presidentialism: (1) in established democracies in Western Europe, they have been often adopted to deal with political crises after long experiences of parliamentary democracy; (2) in the post-Leninist states, the dual power structures in the old systems (general secretaries as presidents and prime ministers who are responsible to the legislatures) have been transformed into semi-presidentialism (cf. Blondel 1992), and (3) in post-colonial (most of them Francophone or Lusophone) states, the demonstration effect of the colonial powers was behind the institutional choice (Wu 2011, 24-29).

Then, the introduction of semi-presidentialism under authoritarianism can derive from two main factors: the structural diffusion of the former colonial powers and the institutional tradition of the given states. First, as structural/historical background, the dictatorships that had been under colonial powers such as France and Portugal have tended to introduce both presidential and premier posts on the occasion
of the establishment of new regimes and/or independent states, as implicitly argued by Wu (2011). Second, dual-executive systems as institutional legacies of the former regimes can also affect the introduction of semi-presidentialism. For example, previous monarchies with prime ministers can transform themselves into semi-presidentialism by adding presidential posts upon the establishment of new regimes (e.g. Egypt since 1956\textsuperscript{8} and Tunisia); and post-Soviet states have also tended to change their former dual-executive systems into semi-presidentialism as noted by Wu (2011). What is unique to authoritarianism is the possibility that semi-presidentialism may precede the introduction of multiparty elections, given that under democracy it usually appears as a way of sharing power or handling political crises under competitive contexts, i.e. multipartism. Certainly, there are a number of states in which the adoption of semi-presidentialism almost coincides with democratization,\textsuperscript{9} whereas some countries have taken a long time to introduce multiparty elections after adopting semi-presidentialism (e.g. over 20 years in the case of Algeria).

Amendments to adopt semi-presidentialism can be the venues for dealing with the two needs for coordination, namely with the opposition or within the ruling

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\textsuperscript{8} The entry-year should be 1956 based on the constitutional history of Egypt, but it is written as 1971 in the table 2 due to the lack of data mentioned above.

\textsuperscript{9} This includes Bulgaria, Rumania, Mongolia, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Niger, Peru, Poland, and Portugal.
coalition, which arise from the contrasting balances of power between them. In particular, these mainly take the form of adding the posts of prime ministers to presidential systems. First, semi-presidentialism may be a likely option for coordination with the opposition when dictators face a relatively strong threat from outside the ruling coalition. The addition of premier posts to presidentialism through “national conferences” in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s is a typical example. Certainly, it was “a convenient compromise” between rulers and civil society activists (Elgie 2011b, 13). However, the compromise can be either substantial or nominal, depending on whether the ruling coalition had held the predominant position toward the opposition when the conference started. For an instance of the former, the Malian military, which was weakened as the result of popular protests and a coup had already established an interim government with the opposition before the national conference in July 1991 where the new constitution with a premier post was drawn (that was approved by the national referendum of January 1992), and this paved the way for democratization (Moestrup 1999, 177). On the contrary, in Togo, the president Gnassingbe Eyadema preempted similar protests by holding the conference of August 1991 on the condition that he would keep his position as president throughout the whole process; while the position of interim prime minister went to the hands of
opposition leader Joseph Koffigoh, the president managed to keep his previous executive powers and to avoid ceding his powers to the premier post despite the formal introduction of semi-presidentialism by the new constitution of 1992 (Nwajiaku 1994, 439; Seely 2005, 368). Similar cases can be found in Kenya and Zimbabwe after the post-election crises in 2007 and 2008, as premier posts were added to presidentialism to include the opposition leaders from the largest rival parties into the governments (Cheeseman 2011). Although the legislature has been given almost exclusive attention as the major arena of coordination with the opposition in the literature (e.g. Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2005), these cases suggest that the introduction of semi-presidentialism, which allows the opposition to enter the executive branch, may also be a similar means under the predominance of authoritarian presidents.

Second, even when the opposition does not pose a threat to the rulers, amendments to semi-presidentialism may compose a way of coordination by addressing the demands or threats from within the ruling elites. In order to prevent them from defying him, the ruler needs to credibly commit to reasonably share the political and economic spoils with the other elites by offering a means to balance the ruler’s powers. A very appropriate example is the stipulation of prime ministerial posts to presidential constitutions in the case of the fourth amendment to the 1977 Tanzanian
constitution in August 1984 and the amended basic law 2003 of the Palestinian Authority. In these cases, using economic or external pressures on the governments for their own good, the parliamentarians urged the president to balance presidential powers vis-à-vis legislative ones. It compelled the presidents to strike a bargain with them by formally providing the premier posts, thereby regenerating the legislatures’ support for the presidents to some extent. In Tanzania, when the government led by the president Julius Nyerere sought to reintroduce the poll tax in the face of financial hardships since the early 1980s, the MPs from the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi took advantage of the public objection to the tax to demand “parliamentary control over the party’s finances” and parliamentary power over the executive (Van Donge and Liviga 1989). In the Palestinian Authority, against the background of international and domestic pressure to democratize, MPs from the ruling Fatah sought the end of the rule by presidential decrees of Yasser Arafat and the expansion of parliamentary powers (Shimizu 2015). While the literatures have mainly dealt with the legislature as a coordinating venue between the ruling coalition and opposition on the one hand and the ruling party as one within the ruling coalition on the other (Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012), in consideration of the semi-presidential system in which premier posts link the executive with the legislature, it is implied that the legislature may be a venue for coordinating within the
ruling coalition as well.

4.2. Practices

The last section argued that semi-presidentialism can be chosen as a means of coordination within the ruling coalition but, when it comes to practice, it holds true only under united government. A variety of practices under semi-presidentialism need to be considered for two different situations: under united government and a divided one (cf. Duverger 1980, 182-85). The former refers to the circumstances in which the president and parliament majority are from the same party (or parties within ruling coalitions); the latter occurs when the president and majority party in the legislature come from opposing parties. 10 First, on the situation under united government, some authors have claimed that in addition to their own executive powers, presidents may acquire prime ministerial powers through the parliamentary majority, thus making the system more susceptible to personalization (e.g. Lijphart 2004, 102); on the contrary,
others have argued that the dual-executive is more likely to destabilize politics and reduce efficiency than single-executives are (Linz 1994, 55). Second, divided governments take two forms, namely divided majority government (cohabitation11) and divided minority government,12 and both of them tend to pose a threat to newly introduced democracies in different ways. In the former, intra-executive rivalry can easily transform into disputes over the legitimacy of the two branches, i.e. the presidency and the legislature, thereby potentially bringing the democratic regimes to the brink of breakdown (Linz and Stepan 1996; Shugart and Carey 1992). The latter tends to cause a power vacuum on which the president or military can capitalize, and it then may solicit the president to bypass the legislature and to rule by decrees, therefore posing a threat to democracies again (Linz 1997; Skach 2005).

Semi-presidentialism under dictatorship usually operates under united government. In this situation, it may typically strengthen the presidency and may stabilize the whole system by providing the premier post to which the president shifts his own responsibility. First, the system is more likely to be personalized under authoritarianism than under democracy as argued by Lijphart (2004). Typically, the

11 Cohabitation is “the situation where the president and prime minister are from opposing parties and where the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet” (Elgie 2011a: 12).
12 Divided minority government refers to the situation in which “neither the president nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature” (Skach 2005: 17).
Middle Eastern republics, which have been often understood as presidentialism (Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia before 2011), constitute examples of semi-presidentialism under united government. Second, semi-presidentialism may stabilize the whole system by enabling the presidents to make the prime minister take responsibility for their own mismanagement because instability at the government level does not necessarily amount to that at the regime level (cf. Tsebelis 2002; Duverger 1980, 172). The repeated rotations of prime ministers in Peru after the autogolpe (auto-coup), amounting to ten prime ministers in eight years under the presidency of Alberto Fujimori, represent this situation.

On the other hand, in the case of dictatorship, divided government should be less likely than in the case of democracy, as dictators can preempt it by manipulation prior to elections or on the day of voting if they are predominant enough to do so. In fact, in order to extensively manipulate, incumbents need to be strong vis-à-vis the opposition (Simpser 2013), and if so, it can successfully prevent the situation of divided government. However, when electoral results in favor of opposition happen to become apparent to citizens, dictators may declare a state of emergency, nullify the results and/or ban the opposition party as post hoc measures to retain their powers, as happened in the 1991 elections in Algeria. In turn, if cabinets are formed under divided
government in dictatorships, the likely form that results is power-sharing government\textsuperscript{13} rather than cohabitation as seen in democracies. When the rulers are compelled to make a compromise with the opposition after a “post-election crisis,” power-sharing among the ruling party and opposition can be a possible form of government as found in the “National Unity Government” between Hamas and Fatah formed in March 2007. In addition, power-sharing governments can emerge under divided minority government as well where there is no force constituting legislative majority. Semi-presidentialism, which necessitates the appointment of a prime minister even under such contexts, can exacerbate the potential rivalry in dictatorship by including antagonistic parties in the same boat. The 1993 Yemeni government is one example, while it was not fully semi-presidential because the president was not directly elected yet. As the result of the first election after the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the only existing legal political organization in the former, the General People’s Congress (GPC), won about 41% of the seats; a new party breaking away from the GPC, the Islah, won about 21%; and the previous ruling party in the latter, Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), won about 19% of the

\textsuperscript{13} Here power-sharing government refers to the cabinet that is composed of the members from the president’s party and from the opposing largest party in the legislature, regardless to whether it is exceptional (e.g. overmajority government during wartime) or regular (i.e. coalition government), unlike cohabitation which lacks the ministers from the president’s party.
seats. The president Ali Abdullah Saleh formed a power-sharing government of the three parties, with the prime minister from the YSP and the chairperson of parliament from the Islah. Having seats in the same cabinet, the potential rivalry between the YSP and Islah surfaced and developed into a confrontation between the president and YSP, leading to the outbreak of civil war in May 1994 (Matsumoto 2006, 129-131).

* * *

As discussed in this section, while many forms of semi-presidentialism in democracy and dictatorship share their structural and/or institutional legacies, semi-presidentialism under dictatorship is not merely an incomplete version of its democratic counterpart in its choices and practices but shows characteristics distinctively different from that under democracy. In addition, with regard to the three subtypes of executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism, one notable feature of semi-presidentialism lies in its possible sudden shift in its role from a venue for coordination within the ruling coalition and with the opposition to a ground on which the opposition may enter the executive, a situation which dictators may be impelled to prevent through constitutional or extra-constitutional means. During a period of united government, dictators can remain indifferent to their semi-presidential constitutional forms, but once under divided government, the constitutional structure comes to the
surface. This element is unique to a dual-executive system, i.e. semi-presidentialism. Such a shift in the executive branch cannot emerge from the election results under presidentialism and parliamentarism: divided government refers to the divided context between the executive and the legislature in the former, and alternation in power in the latter. Thus, semi-presidentialism may be worth considering as a distinctive form of executive-legislative relations, not only in democratic contexts but under authoritarianism.

5. Conclusion

This paper first explored why executive-legislative relations under dictatorship have gained little attention. It pointed out that the inter-indifference between literatures on authoritarian institutions and on democratic executive-legislative relations comes from a combination of two reasons: a real and/or perceived difference between democracies and dictatorships on the one hand, and the lack of interest in the role of authoritarian institutions within the latter literatures on the other hand. This contributes to both sets of literatures by showing a research gap and its background.

Based on the operationalizing criteria derived from Svolik (2012) and Cheibub et al. (2014), the following section showed a partial universe of the three
subtypes of executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism. This contributes to studies on authoritarian institutions by demonstrating that dictatorships vary in their executive-legislative relations and they have shown certain trends. Semi-presidentialism has generally increased in number, and some dictators have spent their time and effort in changing their constitutional form to semi-presidentialism; nevertheless, it still remains underexplored as a distinctive form of executive-legislative relations even in recent works.

Given this, the last section attempted to extend the arguments on choices and practices of semi-presidentialism, which have been generally and implicitly limited to democracies, to authoritarian contexts. It demonstrates that semi-presidential dictatorships share some arguments with their democratic counterparts, but others are distinctively different from the ones under democracy; therefore, it is worthy of consideration within dictatorial environments. This contributes to the literatures on authoritarian institutions especially by showing firstly that the executive can be a venue for coordination with the opposition while the legislature may be a means to coordination within the ruling coalition, and secondly that semi-presidentialism can operate under both contexts of united and divided governments distinctively from the two other forms of executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism, thereby
indicating possible ways by which variations in executive-legislative relations matter under dictatorship.

On the basis of arguments in this article, there are at least four future research paths. First, varieties of practices of semi-presidentialism in dictatorships can be further treated from other institutional varieties under semi-presidentialism such as whether the president has the power to dismiss the prime minister and the cabinet or not (i.e. president-parliamentalism vs. premier-parliamentarism). Second, they can be also analyzed in combination with the variation in other institutions including the types of ruling coalition such as monarchy, military, or civilian, which have been mainly discussed in the literature on authoritarian institutions. Third, the concept of dual-executive systems represented by semi-presidential republics can be applied to the authoritarian regimes in which the head of state who is “not” popularly elected exists alongside the head of government who is chosen by the legislature that is popularly elected. Fourth, whether and how the practices affect the outcomes including regime survival, occurrence of civil war, or economic performance can be empirically analyzed. Comparative executive-legislative relations under authoritarianism have only just begun.
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